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ABSTRACT 
In Iran, the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah deeply influenced the country's economic, 
political, and social life. Everything either began or ended with the state. The state was 
the most important institution in the country and enjoyed a significant monopoly in 
political and economic decision-making, trade, etc. It enjoyed autonomy from social 
pressures and pursued its own policies, whilst controlling political groups. Therefore, to 
analyse the function and behaviour of the state and the economic development of the 
country, I have used a political economy approach. To this end, a model has been 
constructed to describe the political structure of the Iranian state and to map the 
country's political and economic development. It has been argued that: 
1. The political structure of the regime was authoritarian-bureaucratic, based on the three 
pillars of the state bureaucracy, the security machinery and the armed forces, and the 
network of court patronage. A parallel to this structure can be seen in the Safavid 
dynasty whose pillars of power were the same. 
2 The decision-making process and exercise of power was manipulated by, and depended 
upon, the Shah and the ruling elite. This manipulation depended substantially on the 
degree of state autonomy from social and economic groups. 
3. The state acted as the engine of economic growth and the main source of capital 
accumulation. Thus, the political system became the main economic decision-making 
body who dictated economic policies far more than the market. In spite of this direction, 
the state never questioned the essence of private capital accumulation. 
4. Oil revenues, both by increasing the magnitude of resources at the disposal of the state 
and by easing structural constraints, substantially increased the capacity of the state to 
intervene in economy and society to pursue its own policies, and 
5. Oil revenues provided a new kind of economy, built on rent and heavily reliant on the 
export of a single raw material, the production of which required little contact with the 
rest of the economy. It brought spectacular growth, yet at the same time engendered 
dependency on volatile markets. In the long run oil also created new international 
interdependencies as the state relied on foreign markets for capital, labour, and goods. 
Furthermore, Iran had no independent technological capacity and had to import semi-
finished goods to meet its industrial needs. Therefore, a process of 'dependent 
development' was shaped during the 1960s and 1970s. 
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EimtaDdhndiflQim 
The role of the modern state in Iran (from the 16th century) has influenced, and to a 
major extent, determined the creation of a modern economic system and its possible 
transformation over time, and the class structure of society. In the Post-World War II 
period, during which Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (hereafter, the Shah) ruled Iran, the 
position of the state in economy and society was of crucial significance for the dynamic 
of the system. In a society where the state dominated all spheres of life, the political 
system shaped the organisational structure of its authoritarian and bureaucratic organs 
and determined their goals and functions in society. Therefore, the political, 
administrative, and economic elements of the system, under the Shah's rule, were so 
intertwined that it is impossible to analyse the latter two without understanding the 
former. 
As a result, in this research, I have adopted an approach based on political economy in 
an attempt to provide a concrete understanding of the character and position of the state 
in Iran. While previously the main economic role of the modern state, in the pre-World 
War n era, was the mobilisation of resources for investment within a predominantly 
agrarian economy, in the new era of the Shah's rale, the state faced the task of 
distribution and allocation of the already centralised economic surplus in the form of oil 
revenues. This radically influenced the state structure and its behaviour, transformed the 
nature of state-economy and state-society relationship and inaugurated a period of rapid 
institutional change. Oil revenues helped to reinforce the autonomy of the state and 
strengthened the Pahlavi state, whilst increasing the ability of the state to bargain with 
advanced capitalist countries. 
The thesis is divided in six chapters. Chapter one provides the theoretical foundation 
for the main topic of the study, and thus, is essential for a full understanding of the rest 
of the thesis. Rather than a general theory of the capitalist state, and of world-wide 
development, a model has been constructed which pursues the historically specific 
processes of state formation in a given social formation. In this model, the state is 
situated at the crossroads of transnational and domestic processes and changes. Thus, the 
state structure, its capacities and policies are influenced by the domestic and international 
circumstances in which it exists. 
Introduction 2 
A central contribution of this model is to integrate the world-system and dependency 
perspectives on the one hand, and the Weberian-Hintzian approach on the other, to yield 
insights into the understanding of the structure and functions of the semiperipheral, 
dependent capitalist state in Iran. Furthermore, to extend our analytical framework into 
the state behaviour vis-a-vis internal and international capital, two key concepts, namely 
'autonomy' and 'interdependence', are developed. 
Therefore, one of the tasks of the analysis in this research is to use this model to 
describe the structural characteristics of the regime, and to map Iran's political process 
and economic development in terms of its class relations and qualitative and quantitative 
integration into the capitalist world. 
Chapter two provides a historical-comparative study of the modem state in Iran, 
starting from the Safavid dynasty in the 16th century, in order to conceptualise the 
elements of continuity and change in the historical process of modern state formation in 
Iran. In a close examination of the rise of the modern state, elements of continuity and 
change are noted. For instance, a certain parallel between the rise and fall of the Safavid 
dynasty (the 16-17th century) and the twentieth century Pahlavi dynasty are noted; both 
dynasties based their power on three pillars, namely, the state bureaucracy, the armed 
forces, and the network of court patronage. Both dynasties represented peaks of national 
economic power, dominated to a great extent by the Shahs at the pinnacle. A second 
parallel is noticed within the Pahlavi dynasty itself, when the state during the rule of Reza 
Shah (1925-41) and Mohammad Reza Shah (1942-79) is compared. 
In the Post-World War I period, the Iranian state and economy entered a new phase 
of development, with oil revenues assuming a growing significance in financing 
accumulation. Quantitative and qualitative examination of this development is the focus 
of chapters 3 to 6. 
In chapter 3, the aim is to describe the political structure of the Shah's regime. This 
chapter analyses the authoritarian-bureaucratic establishment of the state, showing that 
the ultimate aim of the political structure was to protect the Shah and his dynasty, 
primarily from internal threats. Hence, the country's political system was based on the 
supreme loyalty to the Shah and the monarchy; overlapping responsibilities; and the 
virtual absence of any lateral communication within the administrative and military 
hierarchy. In addition, the authoritarian-bureaucratic establishment of the regime was 
Introduction 3 
extensively used both as an instrument of power and control and as a tool for achieving 
developmental goals; an instrument for system maintenance and regime enhancement. 
The decision-making process and exercise of power was manipulated by and 
depended exclusively upon the Shah and his relationship with the limited circle that was 
the ruling elite. Analysis of the state autonomy in Iran describes such manipulation. The 
main elements that enhanced the autonomy of the state - apart from the state's 
organisational character - were the massive oil revenues and the unequivocal US support. 
It is argued that in the 1960s and 1970s and in the absence of effective societal 
constraints, the political decision-making process was determined by a variety of factors. 
Most important among them was the set of beliefs and psychological attributes that 
shaped the Shah's policy priorities. It is further argued that if the Shah's self-esteem was 
reinforced by his psychological relationship with the US, his manipulation of political 
decision making was consolidated by the massive wealth which oil exports generated. 
This chapter also examines how the personal wealth of the ruling royal elite (mainly 
through the Pahlavi Foundation) was increased and, furthermore, how it was used as 
means of control and royal patronage. 
Chapter 5 outlines the process of capital accumulation and policies of economic 
development which were pursued to renovate the economy's industrial base during the 
Shah's rule. In examining the Development Plans, it is argued that during most of this 
period, oil production and export acted as the leading sectors of the economy and the 
determinant of the increase in exports. Furthermore the availability of oil income over 
this period allowed rapid accumulation to take place without the need to mobilise 
domestic savings through taxation or other policies aimed at curbing the consumption of 
high income groups. However, the way in which oil revenues were allocated by the state 
compounded the existing obstacles and constraints to achieving an export-oriented non-
oil economy. As a result, the unbalanced development of the Iranian economy was 
reinforced and led to a series of serious economic problems with deep social 
consequences. Thus, in an oil-based economy such as Iran, oil revenues provided a new 
kind of economy, built on rent and heavily reliant on the export of a single raw material, 
the production of which required little contact with the rest of the economy. It brought 
spectacular growth, yet at the same time engendered dependency on external volatile 
markets. 
Introduction 4 
Chapter 6 mainly studies the relations with and influence of international capital over 
the political and economic development process during the Shah's regime. It is argued 
that international capital played a significant role in the process of accumulation of 
capital and the growth of the productive forces in Iran. In the changing international 
division of labour, Iran was a stable source of relatively cheap oil and also was active in 
the production and export of industrial goods during its drive for industrialisation. 
The state which was tied to the international capitalist system, benefited from direct 
political and military support of the major capitalist nations. Being the sole recipient of 
oil income, the state played a central role in the 'alliance' with the local bourgeoisie and 
the TNCs. Nevertheless, in spite of these advances, Iran still was subordinated to the 
West, to an extent that the unevenness of capitalist development on a world scale and the 
ongoing dependent development process in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, made Iran 
a weak constituent of the system. In this respect, firstly, its economic prosperity still 
rested on the export of a single primary product whose market it did not control. It was 
therefore vulnerable to shifts in demand and to manipulations of distribution by the oil 
company cartel and the world market. Secondly, whilst, the industrial policy of the 
regime, known as I SI, further increased the influence of the TNCs in the industrialisation 
process of the country, Iran had no independent technological capacity and had to import 
semi-finished goods to meet its industrial needs. 
In addition, oil created new international interdependencies as the state relied on 
foreign markets for capital, labour, and goods. The number of choices, the range of 
options that oil revenues created, the things that oil money could buy, initially masked 
the growing dependency on foreign powers and markets. Having said this, it is 
nevertheless argued that Iran was, to a greater extent than in the past, an independent 
actor in the international capitalist system, although the stronger actors in this system -
the advanced capitalist states - would seem to have encouraged her development only in 
so far as this would accord with their own interests. 
In conclusion three points are raised: 
a) an overview of the structure and behaviour of the Shah's state with reference to the 
high degree of state autonomy from pressure groups, and its decreasing dependent 
relations within the capitalist world; 
b) the major theoretical contribution of this study which has been to effect a synthesis of 
perspectives derived from the above mentioned theories in understanding the state; 
Introduction 5 
c) the benefit of the comparative method is to shed new light on why similar states 
behave differently (internally and externally) and why countries with similar situations 
end up at different degree of their development, class relations, etc. A second type of 
comparison which has been used is of an internal type (i.e. between the Safavid and the 
Pahlavi dynasty, between the rule of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah), where the 
historical-comparative methodology turns on a single case which yields much theoretical 
interest. It is by using this type of comparative method that we can notice the elements of 
continuity and changes within the process of modern state formation in Iran. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Chapter One; Theoretical Foundation 
Some scholars have regarded the state as an instrument of class rule, others as an 
objective guarantor of production relations or economic accumulation, and still others 
as an arena for political class struggles. International relations as a modernisation 
approach regards states as separate phenomenon, autonomous from each other and 
only conditioned by agreed rules of same states.1 In contrast, the radical approach 
took the state as a derivation of the world-system. For them, underdevelopment is a 
condition or symptom of capitalist domination. 
As will be argued, to understand the rise of modern states in developing countries, 
we need to understand both internal and external aspects of state formation, in which 
states are shaped by the interaction of these two forces. These forces are, the 
structure of social classes, their relative power vis-a-vis the state, the external 
ordering of states, their position relative to each other, and their overall position in 
the world. Therefore, the state as the main body regulating internal affairs and 
external relations, is located at the intersection of the two and is shaped by both. 
Thus, it is not enough to simply trace processes over time and within the national 
boundaries. Analysts should take into account the embeddedness of nations in 
changing international relations - such as wars, interstate alliance, balance of power, 
market flows, international division of labour - all within a system of global 
interdependence. As states are situated at the intersections of transnational and 
domestic processes and changes, their structure, capacities, and policies are 
influenced by the domestic and world circumstances in which they exist. 
Internal and external forces mostly go hand in hand - not necessarily with equal 
weight - and sometimes are not distinguishable. Two points are worth mentioning in 
this regard. Firstly, state formation occurs in a historical context and is a lengthy 
process. Obviously the weight and the interrelationship between internal and external 
forces will vary during the process of state formation.2 
Theoretical Foundation 
Secondly and more importantly, it is argued that lack or deficiency of either of 
these forces - external and internal - will be filled partly by the state's intervention; the 
state will help to redefine and reshape itself. The timing and the nature of 
incorporation of the state into world system are important and it will influence the 
subsequent form of the state. While the internal and external processes influencing the 
state need to be examined, the analysis of the state structure and its organisations (i.e. 
the military and bureaucratic establishment), the important role state autonomy plays, 
the state position in the world system (i.e. periphery or senaiperiphery), and the state 
status in relation to the core (i.e. dependent or interdependent), and its economic 
policies (i.e. dependent development) are of utmost importance. By focusing on 
theories explaining the internal and external relations of the state, an analytical base to 
construct a model of understanding the state will be established. 
L I . Tto® TfocoirsttiKCfflll Basils f o r M © < M ConnsHmncttioiiii AHMDUQH: 1th® M©dlemni State: 
Imiftsinmffll Aspects 
1.1.1. UbepasMsm mmd Mimdsm: jmMespomMam af Ske tifawFy of the siMe 
Liberalism as Held argues is "the idea to define a private sphere independent of the 
state and thus to redefine the state itself, i.e. the freeing of civil society - personal, 
family and business life - from political interference and the simultaneous delimitation 
of the state's authority" (1984: 31).3 After extensive conflicts, during the 18th and 
19th centuries, the Western world was more influenced by liberal democratic thinking 
- by allowing the people to express their judgement on the performance of those who 
governed them. 
John S. Mill (1806-73) was an advocate of liberal democracy. For him, liberal 
democracy could develop further individuality in which public participation is a 
proper means of increased citizenship. Representative democracy is the best kind of 
government while the free exchange of goods on the market is the best way of 
maximising economic liberty. Thus, Mill argued that the neutral liberal state should 
ensure both the security of the individual and of property, and equal justice between 
individuals. Therefore, " i f these things can be left to any responsibility below the 
Theoretical Foundation 
highest, there is nothing, except war and treaties, which requires a general 
government at all" (Mil 1972: 355). 
The relationship between individuals and the state is the central problem facing 
liberal and liberal democratic theory. By this theory, as Mill (1972) argues, although 
the state must have a monopoly of coercive force, this force could deprive citizens of 
their freedom. 
According to Marx and Engels, Mill's idea of security of person and property is 
contradicted by the reality of a class-divided society where the class structure 
determines the individual's life. An industrial capitalist state by defending the 
ownership of the means of production by capitalists can never be neutral. The state 
plays a central role in the integration and control of a class-divided society (for an 
overview of Marx's and Engels's account of class see Giddens et al 1982: 12-39). It 
is not the state, Marx argued, which underlies the social order, but it is the social 
order that underlies the state. True democracy can be established by the destruction of 
social classes and ultimately the abolition of the state itself. The state must wither 
away, leaving a system of collectively free, equal and self-governed society, Marx 
argued. By calling an end to the state, and reducing politics to economic and class 
power, Marxism tends to marginalize or exclude certain types of political issues. The 
ambiguity of Marx's view toward the state has led to different understandings and 
interpretations of the role of the state in society. 
Contemporary Marxism can be categorised at least into three major camps, namely 
libertarians, the pluralists, and the fundamentalists (Held 1984b: 226). Libertarian 
Marxists (such as Herbert Marcuse) argue that Marx's position is a consistent 
opposition to the division of labour, state bureaucracy, and authoritarian leadership. 
For them, there can be no association with the state; for it is always the power 
apparatus of dominant economic interests. The road to socialism involves non-
coercive means and requires a mass movement, independent from corrupted 
bourgeois state apparatus. The pluralist Marxists (such as Nicos Poulantzas) conceive 
the state institutions as significantly independent from the bourgeois class. These 
institutions - the party system, election, etc. - can be deployed against the interests of 
the dominant class. Transition to socialism is achieved by conquering the state and, 
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later, restructuring society. For the fundamentalist Marxist, the democracy of the 
liberal democratic state is no more than an illusion. The working class is exploited by 
capital, and frequent elections cannot alter it. The coercive structure of the state must 
be cracked by revolution. According to Marxist-Leninists a revolutionary party of the 
working class and a professional vanguard are necessary for the creation of socialism. 
It can be argued that both liberal democratic thinking and Marxism are concerned 
with the protection of individual freedom and democracy. Equality and liberty can 
only be guaranteed if one considers the scepticism of liberalism about political power 
and the scepticism of Marxism about economic power. I f the main failure of liberalism 
is to see markets as powerful mechanisms of co-ordination and, thus, to neglect the 
distorted nature of economic power in relation to democracy, Marxism's central 
failure is the reduction of political power to economic power and, thus, neglect the 
dangers of centralised political power. Accordingly, liberalism's account of the nature 
of markets and economic power must be doubted while Marxism's account of the 
nature of democracy must be questioned. 
1.1.2. Weberian-Hintzian perspective: distancing from reductionist approach 
The recent emphasis on the state is reiving upon the works of the German scholars 
Max Weber and Otto Hintze on the state. Weber argued that states are compulsory 
associations claiming control over territories and the people within them. 
Administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organisations are the core of any state. 
These organisations are variably structured in different countries. From the Weberian 
perspective: 
"the state must be considered as more than the 'government'.4 It is the 
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that 
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public 
authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within 
civil society as well" (Stepan 1978: x i i ) 3 
However, the state may be an abstract and general force, its power has to be 
materialised. This endows the power of the modern state with some further distinctive 
characteristics. State apparatuses acquire distinct political characteristics of their own. 
They can become the power bases for quite distinctive interests. Directly or indirectly, 
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the structures and activities of state profoundly condition the capacities classes have 
for achieving consciousness, organisation, and representation. The history of the 
state, Weber argues, cannot be reduced to class relations. 
The state contains a differential set of institutions and personnel, embodying 
centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover 
a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises a monopoly of authoritative, 
binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence. 
Foremost among the state's institutions are the administrative apparatuses - a vast 
network of organisations run by appointed officials. 
Weber extended the meaning of the concept of bureaucracy as was characterised 
by all forms of large-scale organisation. As economic life becomes more complex and 
differentiated, bureaucratic administration becomes more essential. But this Weberian 
view of the state does require us to see it as "much more than a mere arena in which 
social groups make demands and engage in political struggle or compromises" 
(Skocpol 1990: 8). 
Hintze considers states as organisations which control territories. For him, firstly, 
the structure of social classes and, secondly, the external ordering of the states 
determine state organisations (1975: 183). This leads us away from basic features 
common to all polities, and toward consideration of the various ways in which state 
structures and actions are conditioned by historically changing internal and 
transnational contexts. International aspects impinge upon individual states through 
geopolitical relations of interest domination and competition, through world economic 
patterns of trade, investment flows and international finance. Using Hintze view, 
Skocpol argues that states necessarily stand: 
"at the intersections between domestic socio-political orders and the 
transnational relations within which they must manoeuvre for survival and 
advantage in relation to other states" (1990: 8). 
Thus, the modem state as Weber and Hintze conceptualised it, has been part of a 
system of competing and mutually involved states. Nonetheless, the position of the 
state in world politics and economy and its competition with other states should be 
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analysed within different theories, as will be argued, among them the world-system 
theory and the dependency paradigm. 
Skocpol (1979) draws upon Weber and Marx and emphasises the two-dimensional 
view of Hintze, which determine the state organisation - namely, the structure of 
social classes, and the external ordering of the state. She expands the latter dimension 
in terms of military relations. Thus, the two basic sets of tasks are undertaken by a set 
of administrative and military organisations headed, and more or less well co-
ordinated by, an executive authority for whom resources are extracted from society. 
These resource-supported administrative and coercive organisations are the basis of 
state power. This power can then be used with a degree of autonomy against either of 
the dominant class, or against foreign states (see also Tilly 1981 and Giddens 1981). 
Mann (1986) assembles essentially the same dual theory of the state which 
identifies the two dimensions as: the domestic, economic/ideological aspect of the 
state and the military, international aspect of the state. The domestic aspect, he 
argues, would be likely to centre upon state-class relations due to the dominance of 
Marxified Weberian social theory. And as states would now be responding to two 
types of pressure and interest groups, a certain space would be created in which state 
bureaucracy could manoeuvre, play off classes against other factions, and states, and 
so take out an area and degree of power autonomy for itself. To put the two together 
would give us an initial account of state autonomy, to which we return later. Using 
his concepts of state power - 'despotic' and 'infrastructure' - conceptualisation of an 
institutionalised form of despotic state is possible, in which all significant social power 
must go through the authoritarian command structure of the state. Therefore, such a 
state's power is high in both dimensions: having high despotic power over civil 
society groups and being able to enforce it through infrastructure powers of the state. 
Later in the chapter, the features of the state as viewed from a Weberian-Hintzean 
perspective can help to explain autonomous state action: features such as the extra-
national orientation of the state and the challenges it may face in maintaining domestic 
order. 
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From what has been said above, the emphasis of the Weberian-Hintzian approach 
is focused more on the bureaucratic-military structure of the state which is mainly 
shaped by domestic forces. 
1.2. The Theoretical Basis for Model Construction about the Modern State: 
External Aspects 
Major approaches which focus on the external aspects of state formation, structure 
and behaviour that are found in the literature - although it is a literature that rarely 
impinges upon the theory of the state as an explicit issue - are that of international 
relations, world system, and dependency. In the former tradition, each state is seen as 
having its own integrity and relating to other integral states, so that an important issue 
is the nature of each state's policy regarding war and defence, the balance of 
payments, and political and economic alliances. In this tradition, it seems, the role of 
the external dimension in state formation is very much neglected and is far from the 
contemporary reality of the state formation and functions. 
The second tradition and, to a major extent, the dependency paradigm, both derive 
the individual state from the existence of a world system. Our interest in these 
perspectives are not in their historical deterministic approach which neglects the 
importance of the internal forces and to a major extent the centrality of the nation-
state in the world polity, but rather on the way in which they emphasise the external 
forces shaping the state and its behaviour. 
Because both theories partially focus on the concept of imperialism, a brief survey 
of classical and new theories of imperialism and later the notion of postimperialism is 
helpful. 
1.3. The State and Theory of Imperialism 
Within the Marxist tradition the term 'imperialism' was initially applied to the 
relations between 'advanced' and 'backward' countries within the capitalist system, 
and later to the totality of a particular phase (the monopoly phase) in the development 
of the system, characterised by a particular form of relationships among the 
'advanced' countries, and between them and the 'backward' countries. 
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1.3.1. Classical theory of imperialism 
The disparity between the development of productivity and the division of the 
world amongst the large capitalist firms, and the 'great powers', was for Lenin the 
key characteristic of the form imperialism took at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. It was an imperialism in which the most important aspect was the tension and 
rivalry between the leading capitalist states, given that there were no longer any 'open 
spaces' for capitalists to expand into. This rivalry, Lenin believed, was the product of 
a distinctly new form of internationalisation of capital. 
Lenin (1969: 151-2) describes the main features of imperialism, the 'highest stage 
of capitalist development', as: 1) monopoly in the economic market; 2) creation of a 
financial oligarchy based on financial capital; 3) export of capital; 4) formation of 
international monopolist capital; and, 5) territorial division of the world. The reason 
for capital export was lack of profitable investment opportunities in capitalist 
countries, Lenin argues. In his words imperialism is: 
"capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of 
monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of 
capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the 
world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all 
territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been 
completed..." (1969: 78). 
The result of this would be a tendency towards a greater integration of the world 
economy, a considerable degree of capital movement, and an international division of 
labour which would restrict the growth of backward economies to the production of 
mineral and agricultural primary products. Nevertheless, the historical progressiveness 
of capitalism in the backward regions of the world - in the colonial and post-colonial 
periods - is analysed as being limited by the previously mentioned alliance between 
imperialism and traditional elite, the so-called 'feudal-imperialist alliance' (see the 
Sixth Congress of the Communist International, the Comintern, in 1928, in Degras 
1960: 526-48). As the process of industrialisation in the backward countries was seen 
in contradiction not only with imperialism, but also with some internally dominant 
groups, the ability of the incipient national bourgeoisie to develop it in the post-
colonial phase would depend upon their political capacity to assert themselves over 
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that alliance, and to impede the adoption of such policies as, for example, those of 
free trade which it sought to impose. This double contradiction in capitalist 
development in Latin America became the paramount base for the rise of dependency 
paradigm, to which we return below. 
Lenin attempts to show that the economic partition of the world necessitated the 
political partition of the world. It seems, as Elson (1984) argues, Lenin confuses 
correlation with causation. In fact Lenin supplies no analysis of how the connection 
between the economic and political division of the world is actually made. Based on 
Lenin's argument, it is assumed that the actions of the leading 'great powers' 
necessarily reflect the interests of finance capital. The state is implicitly seen as a 
direct instrument of finance capital. Yet in spite of its reductionism, Lenin's theory of 
imperialism does not downgrade the importance of the state, nor does he dissolve the 
specificity of the nation state. Finance capital is assumed to exist in national blocs, and 
to require its own national state to further its interests abroad. 
Rosa Luxemberg (1963) provides a systematic analysis of the effect which 
imperialism would have on the backward countries. However, her analyses is limited 
by the fact that, following the Marxist tradition of the period, she underestimates both 
the increase in real wages which takes place as capitalism develops in the advanced 
countries, and the internal inducement to invest provided by technological progress. 
Consequently she overplays the role of the periphery in the process of capital 
accumulation in the developed countries. The periphery has, indeed, played a role 
both qualitatively different and quantitatively less important than that which her 
analysis depicts (see Sweezy 1942: 124-9). Bukharin (1915, 1926) continually 
emphasises throughout the course of his work that imperialism is a phenomenon 
which connects the advanced and the backward economies, and criticises 
Luxemberg's views on the subject (see O'Brien 1975: 21).4 
Much criticism of Lenin's theory of imperialism has centred on the emphasis 
placed on the export of capital (see O'Connor 1970; Warren 1980).5 Among the 
critics are Trotsky's contributions, and in particular that of 1930, in which he insists 
that the specific historical circumstances of individual countries would preclude their 
repeating the path to capitalist development traced out by the advanced nations. 
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1.3.2. New theories of imperialism 
New theories of imperialism try to cope with the events that have occurred since 
the end of the World War H Although the world today remains divided, the nature of 
the division has changed. There are hardly any colonies of significance left, the major 
competition for 'spheres of influence' has been for four decades between the West 
and the Soviet Union, and now between the economic poles within the capitalist 
world. The internationalisation of capital has become even more significant. It's 
dominant form today is the transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Mandel modifies Lenin's theory of imperialism and illustrates it by modern 
developments, in which advanced capitalist societies are related to each other in a 
hierarchical relationship and Third World societies are subordinated to them. The 
underlying perspective is one of an essentially international economic system: 
capitalism extending and developing its international structure over time and 
determining to a significant extent the position and role of nation-states. He assumes 
that the activities of leading capitalists states will reflect the needs of the TNCs. He 
identifies the interests of the TNCs as being: "a successful struggle against crises and 
recessions", to be achieved through an international form of anti-cyclical economic 
policy (Mandel 1975: 328). This is a crucial step in his implicit reduction of state 
policy to an economic foundation. It is crucial because it represents the interests of 
the TNCs as simple and straightforward, and capable of satisfaction by appropriate 
state action. Gaining (1971: 301) defines new imperialism as: 
"a system that splits up collectives and relates some parts to each other in 
relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of 
interest, or conflict of interest". 
He moves further to distinguish different types of imperialism: economic, political, 
military, and so on. Hence, the peripheral state is influenced by imperialism to provide 
raw material and markets for the centre (economically), obedience and imitation 
(politically), discipline and production of traditional hardware (militarily) he argues 
(1971:310). 
The new theories of imperialism that have been shaped and advocated by the 
dependency school emphasise economic imperialism. 
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"The theory of neo-colonialism is the theory of economic imperialism: the 
economic domination of one region or country over another... It has been in 
form of control by the advanced capitalist countries over the liquid and real 
economic resources of economically backward areas" (O'Connor 1970:283). 
It seems that theories of imperialism, although they had an influence on 
dependency and world-system theories, can not adequately conceptualise the existing 
relation between the industrial capitalist countries and developing countries. The 
existing world economy permits the industrialisation and economic development of 
peripheries. Although the dominant actor in this relation between the two, is the 
capitalist core, the latter should accommodate in its relations, the increasing role of 
the developing countries in world politics and economy. Therefore, the approach of 
postimperialism, as will be argued, to an extent, can provide a better framework to be 
used in our model. 
1.4 Dependency Paradigm 
Dependency analysis can be distinguished in three major approaches. The first is 
that begun by Frank (1967) and continued by other scholars such as Dos Santos 
(1979) and Marini (1972). Its essential characteristic is that it attempts to construct a 
'theory of underdevelopment', based on the Latin American experience, in which the 
dependent character of these economies is the hub on which the whole analysis of 
underdevelopment turns. It suggests that underdevelopment is in fact the direct result 
of relationship of these economies with the developed capitalist countries (for 
critiques of this approach see Laclau 1971; Brenner 1977; Lall 1975, for empirical 
critics see Warren 1980; Chase-Dunn 1975). The second approach, found principally 
in Sunkel (1975) and Furtado (1966) is characterised by the attempt to reformulate 
the ECLA analyses of Latin American development (see also Prebisch 1963) from the 
perspective of a critique of the obstacles to national development. Finally, the 
approach which is the point of emphasis here is the one which deliberately attempts 
not to develop a mechanico-formal theory of dependency and concentrates its analysis 
on what has been called 'concrete situations of dependency', conceptualised by 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979). 
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One characteristic of the latter approach to dependency has been to incorporate 
more successfully into its analysis of Latin American development the transformations 
which are occurring and have occurred in the world capitalist system, and in particular 
the changes which became significant towards the end of the 1950s in the rhythm and 
the form of capital movement, and in the international division of labour. The 
emergence of the TNCs progressively transformed centre-periphery relationships, and 
relationships between the countries of the centre. As foreign capital has increasingly 
been directed towards manufacturing industry in the periphery, the struggle for 
industrialisation, which was previously seen as an anti-imperialist struggle, has 
become increasingly the goal of foreign capital. Thus dependency and industrialisation 
cease to be contradictory, and a path of 'dependent development' becomes possible.7 
It is not a case of seeing one part of the world capitalist system as 'developing' and 
another as 'underdeveloping' or of seeing imperialism and dependency as two sides of 
the same coin - as claimed by the development of underdevelopment approach. But 
rather, in the words of Cardoso and Faletto: 
"We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as 
forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere 
external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of 
interests between local dominant classes and international ones..." (1979: 
10-11). 
The most significant feature of this approach is that it insists on how the general 
and specific determinants interact in particular and concrete situations. It is only by 
understanding the specificity of movement in these societies and a synthesis of these 
internal and external factors, that one can explain the particularity of social, political 
and economic processes in the dependent societies. 
The preliminary definition of dependency offered by Cardoso and Faletto stresses 
the limits to development: 
"From the economic point of view a system is dependent when the 
accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic 
component inside the system" (ibid.: xx). 
This formulation points to an international economic system within which the 
various nations occupy positions of qualitatively different levels of power and 
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influence. At the centre the advanced industrial nations control the key sectors of 
technology and finance, an advantage that shapes the special forms taken by 
industrialisation in the periphery.5 
The principal contribution of dependency theory has been to provide an analysis of 
how imperialism affects the internal social structures of peripheral countries. In doing 
so, dependency theory has directed attention to variation among countries in the 
periphery and to the analysis of dependent development. Dependence is then defined 
most simply as a situation in which the rate and direction of accumulation are 
externally conditioned. 
Nevertheless, dependence includes a wide range of disparate situations. The case 
of OPEC and the oil crises of the 1970s provided a powerful reminder that exporting 
primary products does not universally entail having a permanent weak or rigid 
position in international trade. Even more important, saying that a country is 
'dependent' does not indicate that its relation to the international economic system is 
immutably fixed. 
In all that was said above, this approach of the dependency paradigm leads away 
from the construction of models of stagnation and toward an analysis of dependent 
development, characterised by the association or alliance of the state, international 
and local capital. Hence, dependent development becomes the dominant aspect of 
dependence. 
The reference to dependence, here in our model, is a broad and general one, in 
which the state rather than local bourgeoisie plays the main mediator in the process of 
dependent development. While using the analytical grounds of the theory as a 
'concrete case of dependency' and its new approach of 'dependent development' as a 
special instance of dependence, the model is not bound to the assumptions of the 
dependency theory. 
1.4.1. Postimperialism 
Warren (1980), on empirical grounds, criticised both schools on the role of the 
TNCs. He gave credit to the classical Marxism with respect to the development of 
capitalism. However, it is the new approach of Becker and Sklar (1987), labelled 
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'postimperialism', that abandons the premise of the continuous imperialist nature of 
capitalist expansion and tries to accommodate the TNCs in the Marxist approach to 
development of capitalism in the Third World. 
In this view, the TNCs offer the Third World access to capital resources, 
dependable markets, and technology. It suggests that beneath the usual differences 
regarding distribution of rewards there lies a mutuality of interest between politically 
autonomous states at different stages of economic development. Localisation or 
indiginization of labour and management of the TNCs is the condition of a viable 
relationship between the TNCs and the Third World state. The second condition of 
viability is the local participation in equity ownership, such as joint ventures. A class 
of managerial bourgeoisie consisting of local and foreign nationals emerges. Its 
members share a common situation of socio-economic privileges and common 
interests in political power and social control that are intrinsic to the capitalist mode 
of production. The upper stratum of the local bourgeoisie has evolved a cadre of class 
leaders dependent on the corporate form of organisation and class. This stratum is 
called by postimperialist theorists, corporate national bourgeoisie. 
Economic stability that follows political stability becomes the common interest of 
both the TNCs and the state. On economic policy, the corporate national bourgeoisie 
favours an active local state and a more mercantilist policy of individual protection 
and substitution than TNCs prefer. Thus TNCs' economic relation is subject to the 
clashes between local nationalism and cosmopolitan internationalism of the managerial 
bourgeoisie. Postimperialism argues that the conflict will be mitigated by the 
disposition of the latter by the idea of doctrine of domicile, in which the TNC and its 
subsidiaries adopt and operate in accordance with the state policies. Parallel to the 
'good citizenship' of TNC, capitalism itself has evolved an adaptive process to 
prevent the Third World defection from capitalism due to the harmful decisions 
against the Third World, by more accommodation to the most urgent demands of the 
developing world. 
Postimperialism implies the beginning of a new post-nationalist age. The 
bourgeoisie has taken the lead, and the TNCs, the financial system, and other 
institutions should be analysed from the standpoint of transnational class development 
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(Sklar 1987). The instrument of corporate international bourgeoisie transcends the 
restrictive nation-state system. This analytical approach to the role of the TNCs 
provides us with an important explanatory tool to integrating the idea of 'dependent 
development' in the model. Because, dependency has been unable, to a major extent, 
to analyse the development taking place in the Third World partly because its static 
approach with regard to the role of the TNCs, has not been changed and redefined. 
1.4.2. The concept of dependent development 
Dependent development refers to cases: 
"where capital accumulation and diversified industrialisation of a more than 
superficial sort are not only occurring in a peripheral country, but are 
dominating the transformation of its economy and social structure" (Evans 
1979: 32). 
Dependent development is not, it should be stressed, the total negation of 
dependency. It is rather dependence combined with development (ibid.). Therefore it 
is not a phase that all peripheral countries will be able to reach. Wallerstein (1974) 
claims that the more advanced exemplars of dependent development are 
semiperipheries which occupy their own distinct position within the world system. 
The significance of the notion of dependent development is that it presents a model of 
capitalist development, of which the central premise is the existence of a 'triple 
alliance' between international capital, the state, and local capital. Such an alliance is 
the balance between conflict and co-operation which is yet to be explored in the 
Iranian case of the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign capital is no longer an external force 
whose interests are represented internally by comprador bourgeoisie and agrarian 
exports. Instead, foreign capital shows an interest in the further development of local 
industry. As a result, there is no irreconcilable difference between local and 
international capital or between the latter and the state. 
Viewing the internal structure of the dominant ruling class as a triple alliance also 
means rejecting the notion that dependent development represents the capitulation of 
local capital to imperialism. The dominance of the TNCs within the partnership is not 
taken for granted but seen as varying from industry to industry and over time. Nor is 
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the subordinate position of local capital taken for granted; rather it is assumed that the 
state and local industrial bourgeoisie have certain economic and political advantages 
that give their leverage in its bargain with the TNCs. 
More importantly, the state - as has been the case in Iran and as in Brazil and 
South Korea - enforced a priority on local accumulation and pushed local 
industrialisation effectively. Therefore, the centrality of the state in the alliance and in 
development is special. States should enjoy autonomy domestically and have control 
over a sufficient segment of the surplus so that they can offer incentives as well as 
support their own activities. The state apparatus must be willing to oppose the TNCs 
where questions of local accumulation are at stake. This requires organisations, 
abilities, and resources more than just simple bargaining. Control over natural 
resources, the expansion of the state apparatus, (i.e. by creation of state enterprises) 
and technical expertise play a role in this respect. 
This image of dependent capitalist state goes further than its role as an agent of 
accumulation. It is also an agent of social control. Although, Cardoso and Faletto 
(1979) and Evans (1979) emphasise the repressive nature of dependent capitalist state 
as a necessity to control the workforce - especially in those countries that are trying 
to push the process of dependent industrialisation further. In Iran as will be shown 
later, the use of force by the Shah's regime was more of a political nature. 
However, i f classical dependence was associated with weak states, dependent 
development is associated with the strengthening of strong states in the 
semiperiphery. Evans, therefore, argues that "The consolidation of state power may 
even be considered a prerequisite of dependent development" (1979: 11). Thus 
dependent development can be defined as growth within limits and advances for a 
minority of the population. By general reference to recent literature on dependency 
and post-imperialism, a conceptual model of dependent development which can 
describe the economic development of Iran in the 1960s and 1970s can now be 
presented. Its explanatory power is considerably enhanced, however, by considering 
another body of literature - world-system theory and its conceptualisation of the 
semiperiphery. 
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L§. Th® State amid tin© Wortd-Systcm Perspective 
Just as modernisation theory saw the world economy as an aggregation of 
fragmented but similar units, albeit to some extent interdependent, so too the 
contemporary international relations theory saw the world as essentially divided into a 
set of units controlling particular territories. In contrast, the world-system perspective 
(like the theories of imperialism), seeks to get behind and beyond the surface 
appearance of international relations. 
The way the world-system perspective differs from imperialism is that it takes a 
'monist' rather than a 'dualist' view of the world system. There is a single world 
system into which all nations are integrated. It refers to a system because the 
relationships between its parts (the nation-states) are not taken to be random, 
arbitrary or haphazard. Rather, there is an interdependence of a regular and systematic 
kind between the parts. This interdependence is such that changes in one part of the 
system necessarily have implications for other parts of the system; the relationships 
between the parts keep the whole system functioning. Furthermore, it is a world 
perspective, because it views the world as a single whole, rather than as an aggregate 
of overlapping, but separate, sets of relations between states. The system is capitalist 
world-system because it is capitalism which provides the logic of the system, the basis 
for its essential interdependence. 
World-system theory, associated above all with the work of historical sociologist 
Immanuel Wallerstein discussing the emergence of a capitalist world economy in the 
sixteenth-century Europe, and moving the analytical focus to the level of a global 
framework, within which a dependent or underdeveloped capitalism is the lot of most 
Third World nations. For Wallerstein: 
"capitalism and a world economy (that is a single division of labour but 
multiple polities and cultures) are obverse sides of the same coin. One does 
not cause the other. We are merely identifying the same indivisible 
phenomenon by different characteristics" (1979: 6). 
This capitalist world-system is more than the sum of its parts, and constitutes the 
level at which any effective analysis of any individual component states must begin, 
Wallerstein argues. He differentiates two kinds of world systems: world empires and 
Theoretical Foundation 
world economies; the former has a common political system, the latter do not. The 
world empire is an economic network across multiple cultures over which an 
encompassing state apparatus has formed. Empire states compete with each other for 
greater control. In such socio-economic system, as Chase-Bunn (1991) argues, the 
political organisation of force is the main determinant of social dynamics. Religion is 
used to legitimate the role of the palace. Codified law is created to centrally define 
correct behaviour and deviance across local communities which have formerly relied 
on unwritten moral tradition (The Safavid Iran is analysed here in this category). 
At the global level, central to Wallerstein's approach is the idea of three positions 
in the capitalist world economy; a periphery, a core or strong state taking the greatest 
part of the international economic surplus, and a semiperiphery consisting of a 
stratum of states exploited by the core yet able to profit vis-a-vis the periphery. They 
form the basic and necessary structure of the world capitalist system, with all 
individual nation-states located in one or another of them. Mobility between the three 
positions is possible. This three layered structure is a normal and necessary condition 
of a world system. 
One of the tasks of the analysis, here, will be to map Iran's development process in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative integration into the world-system. First, Iran had 
been a regional empire in the 17th and 18th centuries, without any subordinate 
relation with the European countries. Then it became a peripheral supplier of raw 
materials in the late 19th until the mid-1960s. Finally it became a semiperipheral state 
up until the 1979 revolution.8 Hence, such an analysis describes the state in Iran with 
regard to the country's international position and its integration into the capitalist 
world. 
The world-system model has provoked a number of important criticisms since its 
original formulation in 1974.6 The world system theory looks over-deterministic, 
picturing a world determined only by capitalism and by those who control the 
capitalist core. The most telling of these criticism have to do with the methodological 
assumption of the world-system theory that defines capitalism as an economic system 
only in terms of its exchange side, that is, markets and trade between countries. There 
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is no equivalent importance attached to production relations and national internal 
class structure (see Laclau 1977). For Laclau: 
"the fundamental economic relationship of capitalism is constituted by the 
free labourer's sale of his labour-power, whose necessary precondition is the 
loss by the direct producer of ownership of the means of production" (1977: 
23). 
That is to say, it is in its production relations that we find the defining 
characteristic of capitalism. Hence, while wage labour was found in Europe from the 
16th century on, other forms of labour were dominant in other areas of the world, 
making it impossible, according to Laclau, to call them capitalist. 
A second related criticism is the characterisation of the entire world-economy 
today as capitalist, with no theoretical space for pre-capitalist or socialist mode of 
production within individual societies (see Worsley 1983). In addition, for Bernstein, 
the notion of 'national economy' and 'world economy' which are used extensively in 
the world-system theory, remain problematic because they cannot be taken as given 
entities (1982: 230-32). The globalist perspective paints an illusive picture of 
domination based on "a 'passive receptacle' notion of the Third World in which the 
internal class forces are non-actors, or even blank surfaces ready to be shaped and 
exploited by the core" (Petras and Brill 1985: 405), while the state is controlled by 
core power or dependent on core-based TNCs. 
1.5.1. The concept of the semiperipkensl sksSe 
As we have already hinted above, the structure of the world-system divided the 
world into positions of the core, semiperiphery, and periphery. The existence of a 
semiperipheral state enhances the stability of the world-system, Wallerstein argues. 
The world-system might work without semiperiphery economically but "it would be 
far less politically stable, for it would mean a polarised world-system" (Wallerstein 
1979: 377). Wallerstein argues that the existence of semiperipheral states acts to 
depolarise the core-periphery hierarchy by providing intermediate actors whose very 
presence reduces the salience of potential conflict along the core-periphery dimension 
of inequality (ibid.: chapter 5). 
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The strategy of a state, Wallerstein claims, depend on its role in the world 
economy. Thus, Wallerstein differentiates the core-periphery distinction as: 
"those zones in which are concentrated high-profit, high technology, high-
wage, diversified production (the core countries) from those in which are 
concentrated low-profit, low technology, low-wage, less diversified 
production (the peripheral countries). But there has always been a series of 
countries which fall in between in a very concrete way, and play a different 
role. The productive activities of these semiperipheral countries are more 
evenly divided. In part they act as a peripheral zone for core countries and in 
part they act as a core country for some peripheral areas" (ibid.: 96-7). 
Therefore, the semiperipheral state is the arena, where, because of a mix economic 
activities, state activity may do most to affect the future patterning of economic 
activity (ibid.: 274). Wallerstein employs two elements in his definition of the 
semiperiphery - the dichotomy between core and peripheral activities, and the notion 
that a state boundary encompasses an approximately equal balance of both core and 
peripheral activities. By this definition, there are no semiperipheral activities as such 
(Chase-Dunn 1991: 210). Rather there are semiperipheral states which contain a 
balance of both core and peripheral activities. 
We may reconceptualise core-peripheral activities, using Chase-Dunn's (1991) 
analysis, on a continuum of relatively capital intensive/labour intensive forms of 
production, for a semiperipheral area to contain an intermediate level of production 
with respect to the core/periphery continuum. The semiperiphery idea, therefore, is an 
important one because it enables us to examine the ways in which intermediate actors 
have different strategies, and intermediate states, such as Iran, have different 
developmental possibilities - different in the sense of systematically differentiated from 
either typical core or typical peripheral regions. 
For instance, when the core producers face a situation of 'over-supply', 
semiperipheral countries can, up to a point, pick and choose among core producers 
not only in terms of sale of their commodities (i.e. OPEC oil) but also in terms both of 
welcoming their investment in manufactures and of purchasing their producers 
goods. These shifts in advantages are reflected in: 
"the policies of states, in the degree of their nationalism and militancy, and in 
the pattern of their international diplomatic alliances" (Wallerstein 1979: 99). 
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Thus, the definition of core-periphery described above focuses on relative levels of 
the capital intensity of commodity production on the one hand, and the power 
relationships among core-peripheral states on the other. One of the main structural 
features which reproduces this hierarchical relationship is the exercise of political-
military power by the core states: to use political and military power to control the 
behaviour of other countries (see i.e. Petras 1981). 
Peripheries in which the state is substantially controlled by core powers or 
dependent on core-based transnational corporations experience heightened levels of 
competition among contending groups of peripheral capitalists, and exacerbated class 
conflicts, though these may be largely invisible most of the time because of externally 
supported repression. These conditions explain the high levels of political instability 
and likelihood of authoritarian regimes, as well as the internal weakness of the 
peripheral states. 
In all that was said above, semiperipheral countries are those in which there is a 
mix of core and peripheral activities, and there is a predominance of activities which 
are at intermediate levels with regard to the distribution of capital intensive/labour 
intensive production; where the state successfully pursues industrialisation and 
economic development to a major extent. The TNCs would have an interest in the 
process of industrialisation and the expansion of the domestic market. So they would 
act economically and politically to foster the growth of the national economy, albeit in 
a away which might exacerbate inequalities among classes. 
As a result, the contradictions between the global rationality of the TNCs and the 
interests of the state and local capital are seen as potentially resolvable, provided that 
the overall conditions under which the alliance operates are not too unfavourable to 
continued capital accumulation in the semiperiphery. 
As was mentioned earlier, the local bourgeoisie in the triple alliance observes the 
semiperipheral state as its negotiating instrument with the rest of the capitalist world-
economy. In addition, autonomy and centrality of the semiperipheral state, and the 
rivalries between the two major camps of capitalism and Communism - up until the 
mid-1980s - would provide more room to the semiperiphery to manoeuvre, and force 
the TNCs to be on their best behaviour vis-a-vis the semiperipheral state. 
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There is also a competition between semiperipheral states, or a fear that they may 
lose out in a game of 'each on his own' against the core powers-they may come to 
favour a strategy of collective transnational syndicalism which inevitably pushes them 
'leftward', more in terms of international policy. A good example might be the role of 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in oil-price hike in the framework of OPEC in 1973/4, while 
the two were competing for the share of international oil market in 1970-72. 
1.6. The State's Internal and External Behaviour 
Our reference to dependency and the world-system perspectives is, of course, not 
at all to imply that it is no longer appropriate to treat nation-states as central actors in 
the system. On the contrary, nation-state as was remarked earlier in the Weberian-
Hintzian approach, continue to be viable and adaptive mechanisms for collective 
action. Some states, in fact, enjoy near total power to frame and execute policies, and 
many also reap the benefits of intense nationalism - of strong loyalties to the nation-
state and those charged with its welfare. This, indeed, highlights the state autonomy, 
the importance of such autonomy for the state to pursue its own politico-economic 
objectives. 
Therefore, emphasis on rapid change and mounting interdependence should not 
obscure the central role of national governments and states in world affairs. By the 
same token emphasis on nation-state should not downgrade the importance of the 
global position of the state and the growing interdependence of relations. 
The concept of state autonomy will help us to analyse the state's behaviour 
towards social and economic groups and within the national borders. Furthermore, 
the concept of interdependent relations will describe the relation of a semiperipheral 
state (such as Iran) vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
1.6.1. The concept of state autonomy 
State autonomy for Skocpol, means that: 
"the state formulates and pursues goals which are not simply reflective of the 
demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (1985: 9). 
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State autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of any government system. It rises 
and falls and goes because crisis may precipitate the formulation of strategies and 
policies by elite or administrators who otherwise might not mobilise their own 
potential for autonomous action. Furthermore, the very structural potential for state 
autonomy changes over time in relation to societal groups. 
The question whether the state is autonomous or reducible to society is one of the 
most important ways of differentiating theories of the state. Simple pluralist theory 
supposes the state to be largely autonomous. The state acts as an umpire between 
competing interest groups, and its neutrality with respect to different interest groups 
in society is guaranteed by its separateness and autonomy. Marxist theorists see the 
state as an instrument of the dominant class whose autonomy is an illusion to fool the 
working class to think that the state is neutral. Other theories of the state range 
between these two poles. For example, Poulantzas, a pluralist Marxist, argues that the 
capitalist state often acts with a 'relative autonomy' to preserve the capitalist system 
itself rather than simply serve the dominant class. The state arises out of society and is 
powerfully shaped and constrained by the social relations which surround it. States, 
then are not autonomous of society. They are only 'relatively autonomous'. However, 
for Poulantzas (1974) this relative autonomy is necessary if the state is to carry out 
important policies needed to evolve successfully to the next capitalist stage and thus 
to avoid revolution. 
In contrast to Marxists, scholars in the Weberian tradition tend to take for granted 
that states are potentially autonomous and that the controllers of the means of 
coercion and administration may pursue goals at variance with dominant classes or 
any other social group. What more directly interests scholars in this tradition are 
variations in state capacities, 'stronger' or 'weaker' according to how closely states 
approximated the ideal type of centralised and fully rationalised Weberian 
bureaucracy, supposedly able to work its will efficiently and without effective social 
opposition.7 Because the officials attempt to implement policies that seem feasible 
with the means in hand, the state capacity is closely connected to the autonomous 
state's goal formation. Sovereign integrity and the stable a<iministrative-military 
control of a given territory are prerequisites for any autonomous state to implement 
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policies. Beyond this, the availability of financial resources, and loyal, skilful civil 
servants are basic to state effectiveness in achieving the objectives (Skocpol 1985: 
15). A state's means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than 
could any other single factor about its existing capacities to create or strengthen state 
organisations, to employ personnel, to gain political support, to subsidise economic 
enterprise, and to fund social programmes. 
All in all, it is arguable that for Marxists like Poulantzas and for scholars who are 
influenced by Marx, such as Skocpol, Trirnberger, and Hamilton, the state must have 
a moderate degree of autonomy from the dominant social class to carry out the 
economic policies needed to avert economic crises or, in the case of Hamilton, to 
reduce foreign dominance. For non-Marxists working within this general paradigm, 
the state must have at least a moderate degree of autonomy from all interest groups in 
order to carry out effective policies in that issue-area. However, they view state 
autonomy in fundamentally limited terms. All of them portray state autonomy as a 
short-lived phenomenon, emerging in periods of crisis and receding fairly quickly after 
the crisis has ended. But what happens when the autonomy is neither an ephemeral 
phenomenon, nor a limited one, but rather, when a state achieves a high degree of 
autonomy from society? 
Gasiorowski (1993: 445) defines a highly autonomous state as: 
"a state that can act with almost complete independence from social pressure 
in formulating and implementing its policies" 
In the absence of societal constraint, the policies of a highly autonomous state are 
shaped by various other factors. The belief and psychological attributes of top state 
officials are likely to have much more impact on state policy making under a highly 
autonomous state than under a less-autonomous state. Organisational and 
bureaucratic processes operating within the state apparatus may play a much greater 
role. Abundance of resources such as state revenues, may enhance the state's policy 
making options in fundamental ways. Aspects of the international environment may 
also have a considerable impact, including the nature of the country's tie to the world 
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economy, its diplomatic and security relationships with other neighbouring and 
powerful countries, 
Factors such as these do not, of course, necessarily force state policy to diverge 
from society's interests. However, state officials in a highly autonomous state feel 
much less compulsion to serve society's interests than officials in a less-autonomous 
state. As a result, when they are forced to choose between policy alternatives they are 
less likely to pursue policies that serve society's interests, especially its immediate 
interests. 
Moreover, even i f a state leader does carry out policies with the intention of 
serving society's interests, his conception of society's interests may differ substantially 
from that held by most members of society. In the absence of societal pressure, no 
mechanism exists that can force state policy to respond to the needs felt by society. 
Therefore, to the extent that state policy-making is shaped by factors such as the view 
of top state officials, organisational and bureaucratic processes, resource constraints, 
cultural matters, and aspects of the international environment rather than by societal 
pressure, it is likely to diverge from society's interests. I f the divergence between 
state's policies and society's interests is considerable and persists over time, 
economic, political, or social crises may emerge. I f so - as was the case in Iran of the 
1970s - the government may face a legitimacy crisis which threatens its own 
existence. Nevertheless, too little autonomy from society may leave a state so mired 
down by social pressure that it cannot carry out the policies needed to avert crises and 
domestic unrest, while too much autonomy may enable it to ignore the interests of 
society altogether, creating similar crises and unrest (Gasiorowski 1991. chapters 4-
5). 
In a state with little autonomy, powerful interest groups exert excessive pressure 
over such a state, forcing it to carry out policies that serve their interests, and 
preventing the state from serving the interests of society as a whole. One possible 
result is that such a state, due to its inability to implement policies that are needed to 
resolve economic, political and social crisis, faces in the long run, unrest and revolt. 
The full potential of the concept of state autonomy can be realised in historical 
studies that are sensitive to structural changes within given polities. We can 
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differentiate different industrialised capitalist states through their degree of autonomy. 
In Germany, in contrast to Britain, it was the autonomous state that led the industrial 
revolution. Skocpol (1979), in her analyses of the French, Chinese and Russian 
revolutions, argues that weak states with little autonomy were constrained by the 
feudal classes to bring about the policies needed to avert economic crisis, and were 
consequently overthrown. 
The extranational orientation of the state, the challenges it may face in maintaining 
domestic order, and the organisational resources that collectivities of state officials 
may be able to draw on and deploy, all of these features of the state - as viewed from 
a Weberian-Hintzian perspective - can help to explain autonomous state action. In an 
especially clear-cut way, combinations of these factors figure in Stepan and 
Trimberger's explanations autonomous state action. A key in Stepan's explanation of 
Brazilian and Peruvian corporatist regimes (1968 and 1964 respectively) is the focus 
on state autonomy: the formation of a strategically located cadre of officials enjoying 
great organisational strength through existing state organisations and also enjoying a 
unified sense of ideological purpose about the possibility and desirability of using state 
intervention to ensure political order and promote national economic development. 
Trimberger (1978) by focusing on Japan's Meiji restoration, Turkey's Ataturk 
revolution, Egypt's Nasser revolution, and Peru's 1968 coup explains how 
autonomous bureaucrats, including military officials, seized and reorganised state 
power. Then they used the state to destroy an existing dominant class, a landed upper 
class or aristocracy, and to reorient national economic development. Thus, the state in 
these countries was sufficiently autonomous that it could reinforce reformist or 
revolutionary changes and undertake a 'revolution from above'. As she puts it: 
"A bureaucratic state apparatus, or a segment of it, can be said to be 
relatively autonomous when those who hold high civil and/or military posts 
satisfy two conditions: 1) they are not recruited from the dominant landed, 
commercial, or industrial classes; and, 2) they do not form close personal and 
economic ties with those classes after elevation to high office" (1978: 4). 
Thus, when the state is free of ties or alliances with dominant classes, 'revolution 
from above' may occur. Such a state desires to ensure political order and promotion 
of national economic development and to contain any possible upheavals from below. 
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Nevertheless, for Helco (1974) autonomous state actions are not all acts of 
coercion or domination; they are instead, the intellectual activities of civil 
administrators engaged in diagnosing societal problems and framing policy 
alternatives to deal with them. Therefore, the bureaucracy might be perceived as 
another source of state autonomy. 
For Mann (1986: 135), autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of 
enhanced territorial-centralisation to societal life in general. Because, this has varied 
considerably through the societies and so consequently has the power of states 
(oscillation between despotic and infrastructural powers). 
However, in a peripheral country, state autonomy is crucial in its economic 
development policies. The integration of the peripheral state into the world economy 
leads to a highly uneven development of domestic forces of production. Structural 
heterogeneity ensues, with differentiation and polarisation of domestic classes, and of 
their alliances in relation to the state. Given the historical weakness of the domestic 
bourgeoisie in promoting industrialisation, the peripheral state must fulfil this function 
and intervene in the economy in order to secure the accumulation process. This 
function forces the peripheral state to accumulate political power and become 
relatively autonomous from the existing social classes and, therefore, to mediate 
between social classes (e.g., national and international bourgeoisie). The state 
develops its repressive, administrative, planning and ideological capacities in order to 
integrate and dominate civil society. To this end it applies strong ideological 
measures. In performing its functions, the state may face constraints and therefore 
take undesired actions. For instance, unable to reproduce capital, the state is 
inevitably forced to derive more revenues from the domestic economy (e.g., via 
austerity programs), from foreign borrowing, or from both. Political pressure and 
increased repression may parallel the economic pressure. The contradiction between 
labour and capital, Moghadam argues: 
"is transformed into that between state and civil society, and the crisis of 
accumulation may become a crisis of legitimation" (1988: 230). 
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1.6.1.1. Oil revenues and state autonomy 
The amounts and forms of revenues and credit available to a state grow out of 
structurally conditioned, yet historically shifting political balance and bargains among 
states and between a state and social classes. Thus, domestic institutional 
arrangements and international situations set limits difficult to change within which 
state elites must manoeuvre to extract taxes and obtain credit (ibid.. P. 17). However, 
in an oil exporting developing economy, state revenue is not limited by these factors. 
As will be discussed, in an oil-based economy, the form, functions and limits of the 
state can be understood by relating the state to the following processes: 1) the general 
conditions of the internationalisation of capital, 2) the particular form of domestic 
accumulation, and 3) the unique conditions of civil society vis-a-vis the state, in a 
social formation. The increasing autonomy, provided by oil revenues, lead the oil-
based state to an over-developed, repressive, and interventionist state which controls 
major economic functions, and has a potential for bargain with outsiders 
(Moghaddam 1988). 
For example, windfall revenues from international oil sales can make states not 
only more autonomous from social groups, but also more vulnerable to crises because 
of the weaknesses of social roots and political pacts. In case of Iran, Katouzian (1981: 
324) points out that: 
"... oil revenues accrue to the state directly as large and independent sources 
of finance: the state does not even have to depend on the domestic means of 
production for their revenue....Once these revenues rise to a high level, 
making up at least 10 per cent of the national output, they begin to afford the 
state an unusual degree of economic and political autonomy from the 
production forces and the social classes of the country". 
Such constant oil revenues can enhance the state autonomy to a great extent. 
1.6.2. The concept of interdependence 
Interdependence is: 
"a situation between disintegration and integration of political and economic 
processes...It is the prototypical phenomenon of an international system that 
derives its dynamics from the pursuit of the national interest as well as of 
interests that are narrower and larger than the national interest" (Hanrieder 
1978: 155). 
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Interdependence relationship between developed and developing countries has 
increased but also that the relationship has become less subordinate. The increasing 
levels of interdependence limits certain options but opens others. This 
interdependence is, of course, asymmetric: for example, only six developed countries, 
which have only a tenth of world population, control two-thirds of world trade 
(Iglesias 1987). However, that increased economic interaction is a pre-condition for 
what Warren calls "a genuine equality among interdependent economies" (1980: 
184). 
Since the late 1960s, the major oil-producing countries and the NICs have 
challenged the static picture of a fixed industrial core and a fixed non-industrial 
periphery. It shows that the terms of interdependence have not remained absolutely 
disadvantageous to the Third World. One can argue that the oil producers, East 
Asian, and some Latin American countries, gained substantially from the changes in 
the global context of interdependence and also from the changes in the international 
capitalist system. Brewer (1980: 178) in his critique of the concept of dependency for 
implying that the process of development in the advanced countries is economically 
independent and self-sustaining, speaks of "relations of interdependence and 
dominance rather than of dependence". Leys (1977: 95) also speaks of a complex set 
of interdependency, and Ray (1973. 4-20) argues that, as it is impossible to achieve a 
state of non-dependence, it is preferable to speak of degrees of dependence in an 
interdependent world. 
Increasing economic activities between developed and developing countries; 
geopolitical location of the country; and, other global issues such as environment, 
have increased the level of negotiation, co-operation and interaction between them. 
Thus, as a result of increasing interdependence, the bargaining power of developing 
countries has increased extensively. 
During the early 1970s the increased power of oil-producing governments over the 
TNCs and the consumer countries dramatically altered the existing relations in favour 
of the former. Oil-based accumulation facilitated the integration of oil-producing 
states into the world economy, while OPEC's apparent ability to control prices and 
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output resulted in discussions about the rise of a major Third World cartel. The oil 
price hikes of the 1970s increased the interdependence relationship between the 
OPEC member countries and the developed world to a major extent. 
During the 1970s, oil revenues led to a redistribution of the surplus between 
international oil capital and the oil-producing countries. It also led to a differentiation 
between petroleum-exporting countries and the rest of the Third World countries. 
Moreover, oil-based money capital, the so-called petrodollar, became a significant 
portion of the overall money capital available at the global level throughout the 
1970s. 
However, in majority of these cases, the developed countries dominated the 
relationship in their own favour (see Wachtel 1987; Knox 1991). In the Third World, 
the exception of the state's economic role, in combination with the extreme rarity 
with which the TNCs are actually expelled has left Third World states increasingly 
enmeshed in the transnational system of production organised in the first instance by 
the TNCs themselves. At the same time, the interaationalisation of production has 
increased the need of the TNCs themselves for strong, predictable Third World 
partners. Evans (1990: 218) argues that both state officials and transnational 
managers know that their survival depends on their ability to achieve mutually 
acceptable accommodations. 
Neither of these approaches denies that the developed countries dominated the 
existing interdependent relationship. For oil-exporting developing countries, the net 
revenue of export of oil was less than the net benefit it brought to developed 
countries through taxing the imported oil (Amirahmadi 1993), even leaving out the 
spill over effects and the gains from oil-related industry, in which the developed 
countries are most likely the major beneficiaries. 
While in the 1970s the OPEC states appeared to be powerful and independent 
actors on the international scene, the 1980s reveal the limits of their autonomy. The 
1980s have revealed the vulnerabilities and limits of both oil-producing states and oil-
based accumulation. However, the interdependence relationship has been in favour of 
the developed countries. As Moghaddam argues, such an oil state is: 
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"a crisis-ridden state, and its ability to survive depends on both the 
availability of oil rents and its domestic political and ideological legitimation" 
(1988: 233). 
It should be acknowledged that in this mutual relation of interdependence, the 
cases in which the recipient state - such as Iran of the 1970s - is able to turn the 
asymmetrical relations in its own favour are increasing. While increasing 
interdependence opens new opportunities and increases bargaining for developing 
countries, it limits other opportunities and limits the state's room for manoeuvre on 
other issues (i.e. the use of military force to solve economic problems, or the limits 
imposed on developing countries' production by the issue of global environment). 
1.7. A Model for the SefflBipsriphera! Capitalist State 
An understanding of the state, its capacities and autonomy, its formation and 
reorganisation, its interactions and relations requires an efficient theoretical and 
methodological approach. All three theoretical approaches discussed above yield 
some interesting insights into the understanding of the structures and functions of the 
modem semiperipheral state. Rather than a general theory of world-wide 
development, we have a framework that requires the researcher to study the state in a 
given social context under the pressure of particular conjunctures of the world 
economy. 
The state, as we saw earlier, is shaped by pressures and influences from domestic 
and external structures. The extent of these impositions and influences depends itself 
on the degree of the size, capacity (financially and intellectually), and effectiveness of 
the state structure. The outcome of such interactions of forces and influences on the 
state determines the behaviour of the state within the domestic polity, and vis-a-vis 
other countries. These two sets of behaviours can be traced fruitfully by analysing the 
notions of autonomy and interdependence respectively. 
A central contribution of the present research is to indicate a solution to the 
problem of integrating the world-system and dependency perspectives on the one 
hand, and the Weberian-Hintzian approach on the other, into the theory of the 
formation, structure and function of the modern dependent capitalist state of Iran. 
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Thus, the recent theoretical perspectives such as postimperialism and dependent 
development have helped us to analyse the economic process involved in the 
country's transition to dependent capitalism. As important as the state has been in the 
development experience of the advanced industrial economies, it has proven even 
more central to the process of dependent development in the developing country. In 
20th century Iran, the state's position as recipient and disburser of vast oil revenues 
and the shah's role as originator of economic policies and as virtually the sole political 
arbiter, plus the characteristic weakness of the industrial capitalist class, combined to 
give the state a pre-eminent role in all economic, social, and political development. 
We shall see that this has been the case historically too, as the Iranian state from the 
Safavid dynasty's height in the 17th century onward has aspired to be a centralising 
monarchy with a great concentration of political, military, and economic power. 
Therefore, an analysis of state structures and organisations will help us to realise the 
state's capacity. The recent perspectives built on the Weberian-Hintzian theoretical 
approach (such as Skocpol and Evans) is useful in this respect. 
Furthermore, the state in Iran, should be treated as an autonomous structure, a 
structure with a logic and interests of its own. Thus, such a state is a set of 
administrative, policing, and military organisations with a high degree of autonomy, 
headed and co-ordinated by the Shah and a limited circle of elites. Therefore, its 
organisational and financial capacity - which partly determines its degree of autonomy 
from social pressures - determines its degree of manoeuvre to freely act, initiate, and 
implement policies for society. Nevertheless, the structure and capacity of state 
autonomy is influenced, to a major extent, by the state's international position. The 
world-system theory provides us with a concept, namely semiperiphery, to define a 
level of relations between a developing economy and world capitalist economy. As a 
semiperipheral state with a high degree of autonomy, the Iranian state was, in the 
1960s and 1970s, able to move its dependent client-patron relationship with the 
capitalist developed countries to an interdependent relation, in which it could bargain 
with the core countries, and furthermore, have a strong position vis-a-vis the TNCs in 
the 'triple alliance'. 
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It seems that none of these perspectives taken alone can adequately account for the 
causes of continuity and changes in the process of modern state formation in Iran in 
general, and during the Shah's reign (1942-79) in particular. My essential point in all 
of this is to show that the three approaches complement one another. 
As Chart 1.1 shows, in this model, as is the case for many developing countries, 
the state is situated at the intersection of transnational and domestic processes. By 
using concepts of autonomy, in which the state enjoys a degree of freedom from 
domestic economic and societal groups, and interdependence, in which it describes 
the relationship between the state and the rest of the capitalist world, this model is 
empowered to interpret the state interactions and behaviour with both external and 
internal structures. 
Chart 1.1 shows how these perspectives complement one another in explaining the 
complex structure of the state, and as a result, the complex nature of the state's 
behaviour vis-a-vis both society at large and the rest of the capitalist world. In 
particular, such behaviour with local and international capital, known as the triple 
alliance, needs to be examined. It is the degree of autonomy of the state that outlines 
the behaviour of the state in relation to social and economic groups in society. 
Furthermore, realisation of the semiperipheral status for the state - through a difficult 
competitive process of political bargaining and economic development - enables the 
state to establish a new interdependent relationship in which its prior client-patron 
relationship with the core is circumscribed. 
It will be noted that this is a complex, conjectural causal model (see Ragin 1987: 
23-25). It consists of several factors - semiperiphery of the world system theory; 
dependent development of the dependency paradigm; and the structure of the 
bureaucracy and repressive apparatuses derived from the Weberian- I^ Ql^ ian 
perspective. The theoretical work is informed and advanced by a solid case stutjh/ of 
Iran thaf is not iinprisoned inside one or another of the several perspectives, hut racier 
which draws carefully on all of them, providing, in the process, a basis, for the 
evaluation of their merits and deficiencies. It is through such case studies that a tatter 
integration of the theories can be effected and our knowledge of Third World states 
improved. 
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One of the tasks of the use of the model will be to map Iran's polity and 
development process in terms of quantitative and qualitative integration into the 
capitalist world. Firstly, during the Safavid dynasty (the 16th and 17th centuries), Iran 
was a regional empire, influencing politico-economics of the region while competing 
with other regional empires. Furthermore, while the Safavid Shahs enjoyed a 
hegemonic position in the state and economy, their contacts with the West could in no 
sense be considered dependent. Secondly, during the 19th century Qajar rule, the 
Iranian economy re-oriented toward England and Russia. The failure of the attempt 
by the Qajar Shahs to restructure the state institutions - while suffering military 
defeats at the hands of Russia and England - led to a cumulative process of 
disintegration of the traditional state, concomitant with the greater commercialisation 
of the economy. This situation can be characterised for the first time as one of 
dependence on the West. During the rule of Reza Shah (1925-41), the formation of a 
centralising authoritarian state with the modem bureaucratic institutions substantially 
enhanced the power and autonomy of the state to intervene in the polity and the 
economy of the country. Furthermore, its drive towards industrialisation was 
prompted by external factors: the end of British-Russian rivalries which formerly 
intensified the paralysis of the Qajar state; the changing international conditions; and, 
the pressure of circumstances arising from the world depression and the adjustment 
problems it created for the Iranian economy. During the late 19th century to mid 20th 
century period, Iran was integrated in the world capitalist economy and was a 
peripheral supplier of raw materials. 
Finally, post-World War II period witnessed important changes in the international 
economy and the domestic political scene as well as the structure and autonomy of 
the state. This happened when the structure of the state witnessed a major expansion 
and modernisation. Oil revenues and the full US support enhanced the autonomy of 
the state. Its position in the world economy shifted from one of periphery to the 
semiperipheral state. Its dependent relation with the US was changing to more of 
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state's powerful machinery, its enhanced autonomy, the geopolitical location of the 
country, its increasing bargaining power, etc. 
As a result, we need to investigate the process of modern state formation in Iran in 
order to highlight the elements of continuity and change in this process (chapter 2). 
We clearly need to probe the internal complexities of state structures, without going 
to the extreme of treating the state simply as a disconnected collection of competing 
agencies (chapter 3). Along with formal bureaucratic mechanism of both civil and 
military apparatus of the state, budgetary, legal, and ideological processes can be 
examined to discover the various ways and degrees to which the state achieves overall 
co-ordination of its activities (chapter 5). Furthermore, examinations of the 
reorganisation of state that accompany the end of major crisis - i.e. the 1953 coup and 
the 1963 uprising in Iran - might shed more light on fundamental issues in 
understanding state structure and behaviour. We need to investigate the elements that 
enhanced the state autonomy and therefore changed the process of decision-making in 
the country (chapter 4). How does the geopolitically strategic location of a country 
impact on the behaviour of the state internally and externally? And how do 
international balances of power and the accompanying new alliances and flows of 
coercive and economic resources affect the domestic doings of the state, i.e. the state 
position in relation to the triple alliance, both vis-a-vis private local capital and vis-a-
vis the TNCs (chapter 6). 
According to Chart 1.2, by integrating into the model, the independent variable of 
oil revenues, its influence on structures of the state, and its behaviour can be traced 
through the model as follows. As a result of the control of an internally independent, 
but externally dependent variable of oil revenues, the state is able to pursue the 
process of rapid industrialisation and economic development. The state becomes 
involved extensively in economic activities, either to compensate for the weakness of 
the national bourgeoisie, or to mediate between the local and international capital in 
the process of rapid industrialisation - which is one focal objective of the state. The 
state's economic involvement also includes a greater economic interaction with the 
rest of the capitalist world. Furthermore, as the sole recipient of oil revenues, it is able 
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to influence class alliances in society in its own favour. Its objectives are less 
constrained by financial resources. 
Hence, the state becomes what Moghaddam (1988) calls interventionist, over-
developed, highly autonomous, repressive, possessing power to bargain in the triple 
alliance. Nevertheless, this is a short-lived shift with long term impacts. As has been 
noted, autonomy is not a fixed issue and it fluctuation partly depends on the nature of 
the source of autonomy. Due to the dependent nature of oil exports, both its price and 
marketing policies - and consequently its revenues - are exposed to and controlled by 
the capitalist West. 
Therefore, there exists a contradiction: oil revenues enhance state autonomy 
internally and increase bargaining power of the state externally. But it deepens the 
country's dependence on the capitalist world. This contradiction can be solved only 
when the state is able to internalise the factors which has led to enhancement of its 
autonomy and its capacity and the means which gives the state the power to bargain 
in the world system. This can be done - in the case of Iran of the 1970s, for example -
by diversification of government financial resources, through a successful process of 
export-led industrialisation and efficient extractory institutions. Nevertheless, political 
liberalism by legitimisation of the rule of the regime - through expansion of its 
'infrastructure' power, - using Mann's concept - and democratisation of its decision-
making process will provide the state with the needed socio-political support in the 
process of economic diversification. 
1.7.1. Method and techniques 
The states in Brazil, South Korea, and Iran (during the 1960s and 1970s period) 
shared important characteristics. Their rulers had come to power through a coup. 
They established a strong authoritarian-bureaucratic establishment, and enjoyed a 
degree of autonomy from social groups. They were developmentalist states. 
A systematic comparative study might well shed new light on why similar states 
take different behaviours (internally and externally). Such comparative studies show 
why countries with similar situations end up with different degrees of development, 
class relations, etc. The state structure, its autonomy, its place in the triple alliance, its 
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position in the world economy and its degree of interdependent relations with the core 
are the chief determinant factors in this comparison. 
Comparison among societies serves to illuminate the various resolutions of the 
existing dilemmas - often in contrasting ways - in various national and temporal 
contexts. 
The 'historical-comparative' method is applied to analyse the state as the main 
body of regulating the internal affairs and the external relations which is located at the 
intersection of the two, and is shaped by both. In this method of conduct, no 
limitation to any grand theory is appropriate. Thus, the 'historic-comparative' 
approach investigates the state in a broader, and interdisciplinary manner. 
Furthermore, the historical comparative functions as bright threads that, when woven 
into the fabric of historical narrative, allow the researcher to identify general patterns 
while at the same time preserving a sense of historical particularity. As Moore points 
out: 
"...a comparative perspective can lead to asking very useful and sometimes 
new questions....Comparisons can serve as a rough negative check on 
accepted historical explanations...[It] may lead to new historical 
generalisations" (1966: xiii-xiv in Skocpol 1980, emphasis in original). 
The role of the state in promoting basic economic transformation, and especially 
industrialisation, was especially salient in such nations as Brazil, South Korea and 
Iran. Moreover, such countries shared the difficulty of attempting to industrialise in a 
world dominated by international capital based outside their borders. Yet despite 
these basic similarities in the state's task and the world historical context, each of 
these countries presented a very different specific state structure and different 
relationships of state organisations to domestic and transnational elites. Heretofore, 
there has been a surprising lack of systematic comparisons of such cases across geo-
cultural regions. 
In the present research the logic of comparative-historical method will be used in 
two ways, both of which will help evaluate the manner in which key theoretical 
variables affected state formation and processes of change in each of several historical 
periods. First, the relevant comparisons of the Pahlavi Iran of the 1960s and 1970s 
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with other countries of similar characteristics namely South Korea and Brazil will be 
briefly considered. Second, the logic of the comparative-historical method will be 
turned upon a single historically and culturally significant country, Iran, which 
experienced the state in several historical epochs. A comparisons of the major two 
dynasties of modern Iran - the Safavid and the Pahlavi - will provide the basis for 
understanding the trend of continuity and change in the process of state formation of 
the country. 
The plausible approach in our method in the study of the Iranian state ties the 
analytical approach to historical comparative method (see Somers and Skocpol 
1980).8 This approach shows that despite differences in characteristics between states, 
some countries and states followed almost the same structural changes. On the other 
hand, by emphasising the similarities of the compared cases, it shows how, in spite of 
similarities, each case has had a different result in its structure. While this method has 
been used mostly in a cross-national comparison, here, in addition to the prevailing 
norm, a second type of comparison will be used. The historical comparative method 
focused on a single case, showing similarities and contrasting patterns. The latter 
comparison is particularly useful, when the model traces the elements of continuity 
and change in the process of state formation in a singular country. 
Furthermore, a careful comparison of two main periods within the twentieth 
century - the states under Reza Shah and the Shah - will highlight the continuity in the 
structure of the state in spite of major changes in the world polity and economy. It 
further sheds light on the changes, particularly on the state's position in the world 
capitalist system; a move from peripheral to a semiperipheral state. The result is a 
qualitative time-series analysis comparing instances of state formation in a single 
country at different points in time. It is quite informative to investigate Pahlavi Iran 
(the period of 1942-79) in the context of a political economy approach. To this end, 
we use a conjunctural model, both on internal and external elements axes, and on 
economic and political axes. 
In the course of this research, the attempt has focused on primary materials and 
official data - reports, diaries, official interviews and prints - especially in analysing 
the nature of politico-economic development of the country and the dominance of the 
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state decision-making process by the Shah and a limited circle of the ruling royal elite. 
However, a critical/analytical approach has also been applied in the course of such 
reading. 
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CHAPTER TWO; T H E MOBEMN STATE IFOIRMATION IN IRAN, 
1500=1941 
A: The SafmM Bymwsty (1500-1722) 
2.1. The SafavM Moiera Centralised State 
The Safavid dynasty signals the commencement of the modern state in Iran. Abbas I 
(known as Abbas, the Great) turned the kingdom, previously held together primarily by 
the ardent faith of a number of militant tribes, into a cohesive and stable monarchy. He 
consolidated the state by securing the borders, establishing a central administration, 
fortifying the economy and creating a standing army responsible not to the tribal heads 
but to the king as the head of the state. As one analyst states: 
"Abbas I must be considered the chief architect of the modern Iranian state" 
(Yarshater, 1978: xvii). 
The characteristics of a modern state, which became established during the Safavid 
period, and are the main features which distinguish it from the pre-Safavid states 
include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legitimacy. 
During the Safavid dynasty a concept of national border gradually emerged and 
Persia regained almost all its territory. Shah Abbas had a particularly well developed 
sense of what constituted hereditary territory. In his diplomatic correspondence with 
neighbouring monarchs, he was constantly emphasising the point that the particular 
piece of territory he was engaged in controlling at that particular time constituted part 
of his hereditary domains. As Savory points out: 
"He was merely recovering territory which was rightfully his, the other side 
had no cause to feel any sense of grievance" (1974: 180). 
It was with the same logic that he re-conquered Ghandahar from the Mongols in 
1622 and Baghdad from the Ottomans in 1624. The only problem on the border issue 
were in the north-east and north-west. In both cases the border disputes arose not 
because of ambiguity, but rather resulted from the Safavid's failure to maintain the 
necessary military power in those regions. 
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On the issue of sovereignty, in the Safavid era as in the Western Europe of the 
absolutist state, absolute authority was in the hands of the king. However, the theory of 
the divine right of the king was reinforced in the case of the Safavid shahs by other 
powerful factors, namely their claims to be the representatives of the twelfth Imam of 
the Shi'ite and the supreme spiritual leader of the Sufi order (Murshed-e Kamel) 
respectively. This was, in essence, demanding unquestioning obedience from their 
subjects. Also, Kingly glory (farr) in form of the shadow of God in the Safavid period 
had its root in pre-Islamic history. The combination of the above three factors which 
mainly was established through a carefully planned policy as well as through 
propaganda, strengthened the sovereign's position beyond question. 
How did this overwhelming power of the sovereign affect the people? Paradoxically, 
it was the common people who were least affected by it. Such authority was used 
against those who could pose a threat to the throne and absolute authority of the king, 
and moreover, those "who themselves held positions of power and influence who were 
at the mercy of the Shah's arbitrary power" (Savory 1974: 185). Thus, it was mainly 
the officials who stood between the shah and the mass of his people, who were 
considered to be the slaves of the shah; their lives, their property, and the lives of their 
children were at the disposal of the shah. Therefore, the existence of a class of state 
officials between the shah and people was by itself a guarantee of individual freedom 
and security within the lower echelon of society. This state of affairs, of course, 
depended on the shah's exercising his absolute power over those to whom he delegated 
his authority. Another important factor in mitigating the effect of the shah's absolute 
power on the mass of his subjects was the geographic, ethnic, political and social 
diversity of Safavid Iran. The communication problems posed by the mountainous and, 
in the north, densely forested, terrain meant that no matter how much power was 
apparently concentrated at the centre, a considerable degree of decentralisation 
occurred in fact. 
The question of legitimacy preoccupied the Safavids more than any other ruling 
institution in Iran. The Safavid drew their legitimacy primarily from a centuries-old 
tradition of secular kingship and patrimonialism, but they also created a new, complex 
synthesis evoking several (primarily religious) bases of authority, particularly in the 
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reign of the Ismail I. Therefore, the Safavid Shahs retained two other basic sources of 
legitimacy: firstly, as spiritual leader (murshed) of the Safavid order of Sufis; secondly, 
as the representative of Imam Mahdi, through a dubious genealogy which purported to 
establish their descent from the Imams of the Shi'ites (Savory 1986). Although, 
theoretically such a fabrication had no bearing on the legitimacy of their rule, they were 
able to convince a major part of the populous through a successful campaign of 
propaganda. 
As a result, the Safavid shahs were obliged to 'shut the mouth' of those ulama who 
were inclined to assert that the shah had usurped their prerogative to being the 
legitimate representative of twelfth Imam. By making the office of soar (the highest 
official religious authority) an organ of the political branch of the administration, the 
Safavid shahs were able to suppress any threat to their sovereignty on the religious 
plane. 
2 .LL The SafavM adnaifflii§trata©n and amiiMftairy establishment 
The Safavid state can be analysed in terms of three key institutions - the central 
bureaucracy, the provincial government, and the army. At the apex of Safavid 
administrative and social structure was the Shah.1 He and his court constituted the apex 
of a substantial bureaucracy centred in the capital. Considering Chart 2.1, the highest 
officials of the court included vazir-e a'zam (chief minister), amir al-omara 
(commander in chief of the army), sadr, and vice-regent - although this post later was 
abolished. Then were senior military officers, religious judge, the state treasurer, and 
court dignitaries, e.g. the shah's personal physician. Below this highest stratum were 
numerous other posts and offices - court physicians, astrologers, palace eunuchs, artists 
and artisans. 
Respect for the government order and regulations was mainly achieved during the 
Abbas I period, which was responsible for increasing security of public life. 
2 X L L Tine administration 
The administrative organisation of the Safavid state was divided both horizontally 
along ethnic lines and vertically along the lines of state functions.2 In horizontal 
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division, up to the time of Abbas I, the qizilbash (the tribal army who brought the 
Safavid dynasty to power) had dominated the military commands, provincial and some 
major central government posts.3 Persians were in control of the posts of viziers, the 
numerous classes of officials in the royal secretariat, the accountants, the clerks, the 
tax-collectors, and other officials of the financial administrations. In addition, the 
majority of ulama were Persian origin or lived among Persians. Vertically, the 
administration was divided into bureaucracy (dolat-khaneh), financial and judicial 
affairs, while at the same time these portfolios, were functionally divided into court 
(dargah) and chancery (divan)* The daily functioning of the state was transacted by 
the state council (divan-e a 'la) which incorporated the high ranking amirs.5 
TABLE 2.1: The Safavid Shahs and Their Chief Ministers During the J 7th century 
The Shah Period of Rule Chief Minister 
Abbas I 1587-1629 Khalifeh Sultan (1624-29) 
San- 1629-42 Khalifeh Sultan (1629-32) 
Miiza Taleb Nasiri (1632-34) 
Mirza Mohammad Taqi (1634-42) 
Abbas II 1642-66 Mirza Mohammad Taqi (1642-45) 
Khalifeh Sultan (1645-54) 
Mohammad Beg (1654-61) 
Mirza Mohammad Mahdi (1661-66) 
Sulaiman 1666-94 Mirza Mohammad Mahdi (1666-69) 
Sheikh Ali Khan Zangane (1669-S9) 
Mirza Mohammad Taher (1691-94) 
Hossain 1694-1722 Mirza Mohammad Taher (1694-99) 
In part, the Safavid state was the inheritor of a bureaucratic system which resembled 
the traditional bureaucracy of the Persian state under the Teimurid and the Turkemans. 
The existence of the tightly-knit Sufi organisation of the Safavid, however, constituted 
an essential point of difference between the Safavid and their predecessors. 
At top of the bureaucracy was chief minister (vazir-e a 'zam). Looking at Table 2.1, 
it can be seen that the chief ministers generally had a lengthy stay in office and on 
frequent occasions continued to serve in the office after the shah who had appointed 
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them had died. This shows the continuity and consistency of the administrative policies 
which Abbas I had laid the foundations of. Other ministers, secretaries and high 
rankings of the royal secretariat were under the supervision of the chief minister. No 
letters of appointment to a post in the bureaucracy were valid without his seal. Except 
for the shah, he was the final authority of financial affairs. However, the technical 
business like preparing and auditing the budget, assessing taxes, and collecting the 
revenues, was in the hands of a large staff of accountants, clerks, tax-collectors and 
financial experts, under the direction of Minister of Finance (mostowfi al-mamalek) 
(Tazkirat al-moluk, trans., PP. 44-46, hereafter Minorsky, TM). 
To investigate the evolution of the Safavid administration and the new army, we 
should look at three different periods: from Ismail I up to Abbas I (1501-88); the era of 
Abbas I (1588-1629); and, from the emergence of Safi to the fall of the dynasty (1629-
1722). The first period (1501-88) was one of change and adjustment, during which the 
functions of the principal officers of the state were not clearly defined. As a result, the 
powers of one official frequently clashed with those of another. During this period, the 
tribal qizilbash dominated the army. They were ruling most of the provinces and were 
obliged to offer military services to the shah in time of need. 
During this period, the shahs tried to balance the vertical division of the Safavid 
administration; the Turkeman 'men of sword' and the Persian 'men of pen'.6 Ismail I 
established the position of the shah's vice-regent (yakil-e nqfs-e nafis-e homayun). For 
Savory (1986: 358-60) creation of this office represented an attempt on the part of 
Ismail to bridge the gap between a theocratic form of government (the Turk Sufi order) 
and a bureaucratic one (the Persian). The subsequent decline of the position of vice-
regent (parallel to the decline of the office of sadr) was a shift from Ismail's earlier 
position: 
"a decisive movement away from the concept of a theocratic state and towards 
the separation of religious and temporal powers" (ibid.). 
It seems that this, was politically motivated, as an attempt to balance the power of 
Persians and the Turkemans within the state, because the Safavid shahs had no 
intention of creating a theocratic state. Ismail established the office of sadr to forge a 
link between the political institution and the religious institution on one hand, and to 
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impose a doctrinal uniformity throughout the Safavid state on the other. Hence, it was 
the political institution almost throughout the Safavid period which controlled the 
religious one. 
The military command with the new post of commander-in-chief {amir al-omara) 
was under full control of the qizilbash. This new administration undermined the position 
of a Persian elite within the government vis-a-vis the Turkomans. 
The authority of the chief minister was later increased and reinforced by a decrease 
in the power of sadr. In all, the authority of the shah increased and a corresponding 
curtailment of the influence of the qizilbash in political affairs was achieved by the end 
of Tahmasb. 
During the second period (1588-1629), the administration of the Safavid state was 
reorganised on entirely new bases by Abbas I. In this period, Abbas the Great, 
established a new standing army. With the Georgian and the Caucasian prisoners of 
war, labelled as gholams (a counter balance to qizilbash revolt; see Morgan 1988), the 
army was balanced along three ethnic groups of qizilbash, Georgians, and the 
southerners. This balance ensured against any military coup attempt against the shah. In 
terms of the formation of the administration, phase two, or the reign of Abbas I (1588-
1629), was the most important of the Safavid period. It was marked by the gradual 
transfer of tribal governmental power to the absolutist monarch. As the military 
strength of the qizilbash became a double-edged sword for the Safavid rulers, with the 
waning of unconditional qizilbash devotion to the shah, the question of how to check 
the power of the qizilbash became a problem of the first order for Abbas I. 
The expenses of the new army, as opposed to the qizilbash which had been paid by 
the Turkeman chiefs who formed the military aristocracy of the early Safavid state and 
held all the important provincial governerships, was paid by the crown revenue. This 
revenue was drawn substantially from converting state land (mamalek) which mostly 
was tyuls of the qizilbash, to crown land (khasseh)7 Abbas I reinforced the policy of 
restricting the qizilbash by compulsory migration, supplanting them with Caucasians. 
This policy resulted in a change both in the forms of land ownership and in the socio-
politics of the state. Thus Abbas I destroyed the aristocracy, as Chardin (1811) notes. 
A number of instances are recorded of people rising from obscure or lower class origins 
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to positions of influence, as well as many instances of sudden declines in fortune for 
those who incurred the shah's wrath. This was probably the main form of social 
mobility in the Safavid period. Chardin observes that the shah made appointments 
without regard to birth, asserting that there was no hereditary nobility in Iran and going 
so far as to claim that consideration was given only to one's office, merit and wealth.8 
Such restrictive social mobility was due partly to the shah's fear of any possible power 
building by the nobles. One way of balancing such a threat was building a new elite 
class from the lower echelons of society who would always be grateful and loyal to the 
Shah. As will be argued, a close parallel to this kind of mobility is found in the Pahlavi 
dynasty (1925-79) who attempted to replace the traditional elite (landlords and nobles) 
with a new class of educated technocrats who had almost no connection to the nobility. 
With the king's support, the political and administrative influence of the gholams 
increased substantially to the extent that, by the end of the 17th century, they had 
occupied one-fifth of all government posts. Thus, the old dichotomy between Turk and 
Persian had been further complicated by the emergence of the Caucasian (and 
Georgian) elements as a powerful 'third force' (Savory 1986: 364-5). 
The greater centralisation of the administration under Abbas I is reflected in the 
improved status of the vizier, the head of the bureaucracy and leader of the Persian 
elements in the administration. Abbas I supported the chief minister by honouring him 
with the title of e 'temad ol-doleh (trusted support of the state). The shah reinforced 
respect for law amongst the elite and in all levels of administration by empowering the 
law throughout the country, close inspection of its implementation by regional officials 
and by harsh punishment (Monshi, 1970: 525, trans.). Abbas I succeeded in the 
reorganisation and centralisation of the state in such a way that it continued to function 
for more than a century after his death. 
Therefore, during the first phase of Safavid administrative development, the whole 
administrative system had a pronounced military character, and bureaucrats who had no 
military function had little influence. In phase two, Shah Abbas broke the power of 
qizilbash, and as a consequence of this and of the increased centralisation of the 
government, the power of the bureaucracy grew. 
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The third period (1629-1722) was one of gradual sclerosis and consequent decline 
both in the efficiency of the administration and the effectiveness of the army. In this 
period, despite the security and development achieved in the second period, no major 
effort was carried out to maintain the relative strength of the army. The military was 
weakened to the point where it was no longer able to check the intrusions of marauding 
tribesmen from Baluchestan and Afghanistan. At the same time, the bureaucracy while 
expanded in size, became more rigid and less effective in its organisation and operation. 
A significant change throughout this entire period was the increasing rise to 
prominence of the crown domain. Rather than extending to the entire khasseh 
administration, this development concerned a narrow inner circle. Within the crown 
domain it was the immediate entourage of the ruler, composed in large part of gholams, 
which usurped power and began to exercise a hold over the entire royal household and 
by extension, over the management of state affairs. During Sulaiman's rule, the council 
of the state was established in such a way that the chief minister, Sheikh Ah" Khan, was 
excluded. Thus shah Sulaiman's reign witnessed the emergence of a functional duality 
of power between an inner council engaged in decision-making, and a chancery that 
continued to oversee the implementation of fiscal policy (Matthee 1994: 94). 
2.1.1.2. Provincial administration 
The provincial government was, to a large extent, a replica of the central 
government. Excluding the posts of guard command (ghurchi-bashi), army chief 
commander {amir al-omara) and the Shah's vice-regent, the central administrative 
posts all existed, albeit on a smaller scale, in the provinces. Based on Tazkirat, the head 
of provincial government was called vali (viceroy).9 Chardin writes that each governor 
was assisted and observed by administrators who reported to, and depended on, the 
shah. Falling from grace often entailed not just dismissal from one's post, but the 
confiscation of much of one's wealth. Under a strong monarch such as Abbas I, then, 
the central authority held the upper hand vis-a-vis its erstwhile provincial 
representatives. At other times, however both before and some time after his reign, the 
governors were able to rule more autonomously. 
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Although, to some extent, these governors were financially independent from the 
central government, they were obliged to pay parts of locally-generated revenues to the 
centre. The governors 
"sent to the capital only limited sums of cash, but considerable stocks 
{barkhane) of local products for the King's table and raw materials for the 
royal workshops" (Minorsky, TM: 25). 
They were obliged to obey the legal code of the central government for taxation. In 
judicial affairs, criminal law was solely the responsibility of the governor. The 
provincial government also came to be shared out among the several components of the 
elite. 
2.1.1.3. Military function of the Safavid state 
In the Safavid regime, military success and internal restructuring invariably went 
together. As was noted, the qizilbash dominated the army in the first period (1501-88) 
while in the second period (1588-1629) the army was balanced along three ethnic 
groups to ensure against any military coup. In the third period (1629-1722), no major 
effort was carried out to maintain the new army. For instance, during Sulaiman I's 
reign, while the number of paid soldiers was 80,000, but only 10,000 could be 
mobilised at any one time (Chardin 1811, V8: 216 trans.). 
Ghurchi-bashi10 was the commander-in-chief of the army and had extensive 
influence over the shah on military issues. He was responsible for the well being of the 
army, employment of personnel, support and ammunitions, and superintendent of royal 
military workshops (buyutat). Thus the total number of the army personnel, consisting 
of the traditional and the new regiments, was 120,000 during the reign of Abbas I 
(Chardin 1811: V5: 314), and only 90,000 during that of Sulaiman (Kaempfer 1940: 
73, 91). The traditional army during Sulaiman included the qizilbash (ghurchiyan) with 
70,000 members and the royal guard numbering 12,000 - excluding the regional 
regiments (molazeman), which were under the command of the regional governors and 
consisted of about 58,289 soldiers (Minorsky, TM: 52-56; Dela Valle 1843).11 
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The new standing army was consisted of the royal corps of slaves (gholaman),12 
artillery (tupchiyan),13 musketeers (tqfangchiyan), infantry bodyguard (jaza 'eriyan),14 
and the falconet and the cannon regiments (zanburakchiyan).15 
Abbas I established the new army, and attempted to utilise modem weaponry for it. 
This was one of the cornerstones of Abbas's successful centralisation policies aimed at 
containing tribal power. In his efforts he enjoyed foreign assistance, mainly from 
Europeans, such as that of the Sherly brothers. In the artillery and weaponry factory of 
Abbas I , as Sir Ross (1938: 29, 163, 222 quoted in Minorsky, TM: 51) points out, 
more than 200 labourers were working. 








1501-88 1588-1629 1629-1722 
A: traditional army B: the new army C: the total number of regional and central armies 
According to Chart 2.2, the numbers of the traditional army were decreasing relative 
to those of the new standing army. However, because of overall negligence towards the 
army, the total number of the new standing army was declining in the third period 
(1629-1722) relative to the previous period (1588-1629). Like the civilian bureaucracy, 
both officers and rank and file soldiers were paid with drafts from the land revenues.16 
One crucial element which influenced the shahs to pursue reforms was the Ottoman 
factor. The Safavids tried to remain out of the circle of control of the Ottomans, who 
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claimed the control of the whole Muslim nation both politically and culturally. The 
Safavid shahs declared Shi'ism as the official religion of Iran - a different doctrine than 
that which existed in the Ottoman empire. They also recaptured Iranian territories from 
the Ottomans. At the time, the Europeans and the Ottomans were involved in 
occasional wars, and the eastern border of Europe had been attacked and partly 
occupied by the Ottomans. Aware of the differences between Iran and the Ottomans, 
the Europeans - among them were the King of Sweden, the King of Poland, and James 
VI of Scotland - tried to encourage Iran to take more military actions against the 
Ottomans.17 Thus, the Europeans both helped Iran to reorganise her army and 
administration, and were also, in general, successful in provoking the existing hostility 
between Iran and the Ottomans. 
Thus, the Safavid shahs based their power on three pillars: the administration, the 
army, and the network of the court patronage. While the administration was an 
instrument for regime enhancement and control, the army played the crucial role of 
system maintenance and was the guarantor of the Safavid rule. Nonetheless, the policy-
making and exercise of power was manipulated by, and depended exclusively upon the 
Shah and his relationship with limited key individuals in the court. The Safavid court 
maintained hegemony over other ruling classes, namely tribal chiefs, controllers of land 
revenues (and tyul holders), merchants, and official ulama. 
2.1.2. The economy and trade under the Safavids 
Studying the economy of the Safavids requires investigation of the rural and urban 
economies of Iran during that period. While the former was a combination of 
agricultural production, by settled peasants, and cattle breeding, above all in the hand of 
nomads, the latter was largely restricted to trade and light industries. The village was 
the basis of rural production, and authority over it was exercised by landowners, fief-
holders or tenants. Villages and tribes were mostly isolated both from cities and from 
one another. The times of tax collection and of the division of sharecrops were the only 
times peasants would be in direct contact with a representative of the government or 
landlord. The tribal hierarchy, which was generally identical with the military hierarchy, 
would produce the market's meat. Although as time passed, their chiefs settled to a 
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great extent in cities, they were still able to control their tribes. Furthermore, from the 
14th to 16th century, tribal chiefs generally "were the possessors of large fiefs or 
benefices" and thereby combined two social functions (see Fragner 1986: 493). 
However, in the same context, although landlords were generally the mediators 
between peasants and the administration, from the 15th century we repeatedly 
encounter: 
"a tendency toward the development of a landowners class possessing far-
reaching powers and authority" (ibid.). 
The economic structure of the Safavid period was agriculture, in which land tenure 
was the key determinant. Land ownership was in forms of melk (private estate), 
khasseh (crown land), mamalek (state land), and vaqf (charitable or religious 
endowment land). 
The Safavid shahs transformed large-size pre-Safavid soyurghal1* to smaller sizes 
{tiyul) - but these were large in number of holders. Nevertheless, by increase in crown 
estates, tiyul holders decreased in number. The central power was considerably 
strengthened by the prevention of the growth of large tiyuls, and its organs consciously 
directed their policy toward this end. Safavid tiyuls were subject to a time-limit and 
were not hereditary. Land was always connected with some services to be rendered to 
the state. The fundamental constituent of the tiyul was the grant of the tax yield from a 
particular area or of a part of that yield. Thus, it is beyond doubt that the principal 
reason for a form of tiyul which was different than the suyurghal was the intention to 
restrict, at least formally, the authority of the high amirs in the provinces. 
During the Safavid period, tax was the main source of fiscal revenues for the state.19 
Minorsky (1989: 209-228) estimated the total revenue of the state as 785,623 
tumans20 The government expenditure for the same period was calculated as 491,796 
tumans. Therefore, there was a major surplus in government balance of payments, 
which mainly, was saved in the state treasury.21 
During the Safavid dynasty, the port custom and internal trade taxes22 became the 
main source of state revenues. Abbas I tried to nationally systematise the tax collection 
and to codify its practice.23Almost all taxes were in direct forms and were collected 
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throughout the country in accordance with the legal code prepared by the central 
government. 
During the Safavid dynasty, an unprecedented economic prosperity - with its peak 
during the 17th century - was attained. The most important urban production included 
textiles, carpets, porcelain objects, high quality arms and armour, leather, and dyes. A 
second major sector of the urban economy centred on the productive activities 
organised by the shah in the royal household - chief among them were 30 royal 
workshops, each employing 150 workers (Chardin VII: 329-34). 
2.1.2.1. Internal and foreign trade 
Commerce was largely restricted to the urban sector of the economy and, at best, 
extended only to villages which were in the vicinity of towns. Although the city, above 
all, was the place of trade and exchange, the commercial development actually 
depended to a degree upon the quality and safety of the road. Trade was taking place 
mostly in cash money. In addition to the importance of the availability of cash capital, it 
was of vital necessity for the city to be attached to a supra-regional communication 
network (Fragner 1986: 524). Bearing this in mind, the existence of a well-organised, 
centralised state with the widest possible area of dominion was, therefore, highly 
advantageous to the intensification of Iranian internal trade. 
Abbas I developed the communications network, secured roads, and invested in the 
infrastructure.24 To safeguard and support internal trade, he ordered: 
"if any merchant or traveller or resident were robbed, it was the duty of the 
governor to recover his money for him or replace it out of his own funds" 
(Monshi, V.I: 527-8, trans.). 
By founding friendly relations with foreign countries, mainly in Europe, he boosted 
Iran's foreign trade. In spite of all these efforts, however, Iranian foreign trade was 
relatively minor, hindered by an undermonetarised economy and compounded by the 
difficulty of transportation.25 Even the trade importance of Isfahan in the 17th century 
should be looked upon primarily as internal.26 Abbas I tried to place Iran on a firm 
commercial footing, when Persia, as Humphrey (1991: 199) argues, was in danger of 
becoming a back water. Europeans became more interested in Iranian raw materials. 
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Increase in crown lands and a booming market for gems, minerals and other light 
manufactured products, raised government revenues through taxation and commission. 
However the state, except in silk and tobacco, essentially manifested no major interest 
for intervention in trade. The silk trade was a monopoly of the court and the tobacco 
trade was under its control.27 
While foreign trade was dominated by the Europeans and Armenians, the native 
merchants could only partially adapt to the mercantile requirements of the time and 
concentrated more on home markets.28 In spite of this, the local merchants, every year 
"made a profit of 30% to 40% on their business capital" which itself was a substantial 
profit margin (Fragner 1986: 527). In spite of all efforts, in contrast to the situation in 
Europe, Iran lacked the dynamic element of capital investment necessary for greater 
production. This is partly because owners of capital were frightened of any investment, 
as the monopoly of investment was in the hands of the government, and furthermore, 
there always existed a risk of confiscation during the later Safavid period. The existing 
capacity was geared to production of luxury items used by the court, while foreign 
investment was for an immediate cash return. By the early 18th century with the 
increasing importance of European commercial shipping in inter-continental trade, Iran 
found itself pushed onto the fringe of the world economic scene. 
In conclusion, throughout the Safavid period, Iran, in terms of the world system, 
may be characterised as a regional empire engaged in roughly egalitarian patterns of 
trade with the European core countries that centred on luxury items such as silk rather 
than on large-scale bulk commodities. The important set of countries in primary contact 
with Iran in the 17th century included its immediate neighbours, mostly regional-
empires like Iran itself. In the 17th century, there was no major re-orientation of the 
economy for exports and no significant dependence on any imports, except for pepper 
and sugar, which were consumed by some urban classes but not yet the mass of 
population. In terms of the mix of raw materials and manufactures, balance of trade, 
and appointment of profits, Iran could certainly not be viewed as dependent on Europe. 
Both sides were fairly self-sufficient and structurally independent of each other. Thus 
when they interacted, they did so as relative equals. In the 17th century, moreover, the 
Safavid and the Ottoman empires were far too strong to be colonised and dominated by 
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the Western Europe. However it was too weak to compete with Europe in the new 
peripheries of Asia and Africa. 
2 . O . Tfin® fall ©IF tk<s SaffavM aflynnssty amdl ttfin© p<£rn©dl off ttrgnmsfittiom 
The Safavid's reign of 222-years was the longest for a millennium in Iran (and until 
now) and this durability constitutes further testimony to the political stability they 
enjoyed. The fall of the Safavids cannot really be conceived of as a single event, for the 
actual capture of Isfahan (the capital) by an invading army of Afghan tribesmen in 1722 
was preceded by a process of decline and crisis extending over half of a century. The 
fall of the dynasty can be conceptualised in terms of simultaneous and interrelated 
economic, political, military, and ideological crises. 
Economically, it involved fiscal crises and consequent problems of balance of 
payments in the late 17th century, inflation compounded with corruption, and growing 
tax exploitation of the population. A military decline came about with the alienation of 
the tribal armies through the replacement of qizilbash provincial governors by state-
appointed intendants, which led to the dismantling of the traditional tribal cavalries. 
This coincided with the poor state of the new standing army which was largely 
neglected by the state. Faced with fiscal crisis, and at peace with the Ottomans, the 
later Safavid shahs allowed themselves to be convinced by the private harem council to 
save money by not spending it on the standing central army. At the political level, the 
rise of faction-ridden new groups to power at the court - the eunuchs, shah's harem, 
and the increasing involvement of the official religious dignitaries - precluded the 
making of coherent state policy. The bringing up of the royal princes in the highly 
artificial and sheltered atmosphere of the harem exacerbated the problem. On partly 
ideological grounds (i.e. the zealousness advocated by some official religious (Shi'ite) 
dignitaries), the Georgian military commanders and bureaucrats, Armenian merchants, 
Zoroastrian and Hindu communities, and Sunni tribal groups on the periphery of the 
empire in the Caucasus, Baluchestan, Khuzestan, and Afghan province were all 
alienated.29 
Lambton (1953: 107-9), Minorsky (1943: 23), and Savory (1986: 364) among some 
other historians and economists see the land conversion policy of the state as one major 
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element in the Safavid collapse. Lackhart has tended to focus on the woeful personal 
inadequacies of the last several shahs, sometimes supplemented by a political factor or 
two. For Foran (1992: 298) the economic breakdown led to political collapse, as he 
argues that: "the economic crisis involved a tale of inflation, declining trade balances, 
state budget problems, tax farming of the customs and sale of offices, corruption, and 
growing tax exploitation of the population" which influenced the political institution by 
devastation. 
In the same line Anderson (1974) argues, the weakening and withering of the 
established institutions of Abbas I, to a great extent, led to dismantling of the dynasty. 
However, the personality of the shah was, to a great extent, responsible for such a 
decay: a trend that had already undermined the state for half a century from within. 
Ceremonial extravaganzas, alcoholism, gluttony , and a whole range of indulgences 
monopolised the shahs' time and attentions. This was partly the result of Abbas I's 
policy of limiting the princes to the harem, which was implemented continuously 
throughout the Safavid period. 
As a result, the Safavid dynasty lurched into an intertwined economic, political, and 
ideological crisis by the turn of the 18th century. It took the greater part of the 18th 
century to affect the transition from Safavids to Qajars - via Afghan invasion, Nadir's 
re-conquest and Asian campaigns, renewed civil wars to control the state power, Karim 
Khan's smaller Iran, another round of civil war, and finally, the rise of the new Qajar 
dynasty. 
Afghans, Afshars, and Zands lacked the extensive royal domain of the Safavid, did 
far less building and commercial infrastructure, controlled the economy less 
determinedly and, for most part, commanded fewer resources. Furthermore, they had 
no centralised state identifiable with the totality of Iran and lacked military strength 
coinciding with centralised administration - the Afshar dynasty was militarily strong but 
administratively weak, while the Zand dynasty had an effective administration but 
lacked a powerful military establishment. The result was the reversal of the internal 
dynamic of economic development in the country, an enormous setback in the urban 
economy's development. Therefore, the Iranian state was weakened - or lost its 
meaning in the sense of its identification with the totality of Iran - as the central single 
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economic actor in the social formation, and as the political means of territorial 
integration of the country. 
In multiple respects the 18th century provided a disastrous link between the 
promising political economy of the 17th, and the social formation of the 19th. 
E: The Qmjw-Itymmfy (1796-1925) 
2.2. TEne Qajar Weak State 
After a century of insecurity and internal war among different tribes, the Qajar 
dynasty was established in 1796 by a military force of tribal warriors led by Agha 
Mohammad Khan.31 
The Qajar shahs tried to routinize their power by constructing a state-wide 
bureaucracy; stabilise their position by creating an effective standing army; and 
legitimise their dynasty by imitating the court manners of previous emperors 
(Abrahamian 1982: 38). However, failing to maintain a military build up, involved in 
major wars, with no administrative stability and little ideological legitimacy, the Qajar's 
power was primarily based on the old tribal military and on the use of a policy of 
'divide and rule' whenever the regime was confronted by dangerous opposition. 
Furthermore, the Qajar dynasty ruled 19th century Iran with neither the instrument of 
coercion, nor the science of administration, but with the practice of prudent retreats and 
the art of manipulating all possible variations in the complex web of communal 
rivalries. 
The bureaucracy was nothing but a collection of hereditary mostowfi and mirza 
(secretary) in the central and provincial capitals and the standing army by the end of the 
19th century, was nothing but a handful of Cossacks. Furthermore, contrary to 
appointments in central government, regional appointments were mostly either 
hereditary or by request of provinces, tribes and nobles. Therefore, the method of 
appointment was a concession between the shah and regional magnates (Malcolm 1829, 
V. H: 412). 
The Qajar family was large in size and its members were supported by being given 
offices at the court, or within the mini courts which existed in each province, and within 
them they were conducting their own policies rather than the central government 
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policies. Indeed foreign policy partially was consigned to the care of such provincial 
courts.32 
There was no group commitment to reform, which had made the reform dependant 
largely on the individual - whose dismissal would have returned everything to its initial 
step. The reformers lacked consistent purposes33 and were not strong enough to win 
over the forces opposed to them, the royal court in particular. Although the Qajar shahs 
were receptive to new ideas and were willing to sponsor schemes of modernisation, due 
to this weakness, such schemes never materialised substantially. 
There was no generally accepted system for succession, and thus contenders for the 
throne often looked for outside support. For instance, Britain and Russia intervened to 
support the succession of Mohammad Shah in 1834 and Naser al-Din Shah in 1848. 
This fact undoubtedly contributed to further weaknesses of the government. The 
increasing foreign influence and the Russia-Britain rivalries contributed to the failure of 
reform and development in the country. In general, the interests of Britain (and its 
colony India) and Russia were suited to preserve Iran as a weak buffer between them. 
By their constant interference and competitions they handicapped Iranian development, 
aligning themselves with conservative groups and contributing to the downfall of 
reformers.34 Attempts by Iran to get the help of a third power in an effort to break out 
of this control failed. 
2.2.1. The Qajar administration and military establishment 
The Iranian political system during the Qajar period was characterised by a minimal 
government. All virtually economic and social functions were left to non-central 
government agencies. The army was in the hands of provincial rulers, the economy left 
to itself, and border problems and protection were left to the provincial governors. In 
such a situation, the Iranian government could not coerce, but was obliged to bargain 
with its subjects and its own local governors. 
2.2. L L The administration 
At the top of the bureaucracy, offices tended to become the private property of their 
holders and to be concentrated in the hands of a few families which were constantly 
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engaged in rivalries. Early governors were drawn from among the leading families and 
tribes, and included a large number of Qajar princes. Chief minister (Sadr-e a'zam) was 
head of the bureaucracy. However it is impossible to give an exact description of the 
duties which he had to perform. He was sometime placed at the head of every 
department, other times this power was divided among a few ministers.35 As soon as 
the shah would become suspicious of the chief minister he would deprive him of office 
and in some cases of his life. 
To analyse the Qajar bureaucracy, three stages are distinguishable; from the 
emergence of the dynasty to the reign of Mohammad Shah; the Naser al-Din Shah era; 
and from Mozaffar al-Din Shah to the Constitutional Revolution. 
In the first period (1796-1848), Agha Mohammad Khan obtained and consolidated 
power through tribal networks, tribal conquests and tribal alliances. The Shah himself 
was minister of finance and treasurer36 
Fathali Shah, a powerful king, discarded the tribal style in favour of the ancient 
traditions of imperial monarchy. Both as a result of an early relaxed political situation 
and in response to different administrative needs, the number of office holders began to 
proliferate (Hambly, 1991). Thus the administration and the royal household were 
developed mainly by imitation of the Safavid exemplar.37 
Nevertheless, the bureaucracy remained minimal as the state was involved in wars, 
and military strength failed to provide solutions to financial problems or, to create on 
extensive and viable administration. This failure meant that local communities preserved 
administrative autonomy. Furthermore, they expanded the positions within the 
bureaucracy, even without offices or functions, to recruit relatives. Nevertheless, the 
Qajars were successful in compartionalizing the central palace into special sections for 
royal treasury, mint, etc. 
Throughout this period no middle course appeared possible between concentration 
of authority in the hands of the chief minister, and its near fragmentation between 
competing factions of the bureaucracy who, in the absence of effective control, 
proceeded to carve out their own independent spheres of influence (Meredith 1971: 
65). 
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While the bureaucracy of circa 1800 was quite rudimentary and small, during the 
second period (1848-96), the administration grew in size. The number of ministers rose 
from 6 to 9 and later to 13.38 Such increase did not at all constitute the differentiation of 
the state apparatus and creation of specialised ministries, but occurred, at least partly, 
to stanch the various fiscal crises of the shah, through the auctioning of officerships, 
governorships, position in the mint, and in customs. As Curzon (1892 V. I : 450) 
argues. 
"the bureau was set up at whatever spot the minister happens to be, whether in 
his house, an anteroom, or a court of the royal palace". 
There were some modernised areas of the state such as the postal service, the official 
newspaper, and telegraphs, which were mainly controlled by foreigners. In this period 
there was a growing tendency for change and reform, among a group of administrators, 
ulama and the intellectuals. Amirkabir the first Chief Minister of Naser al-Din Shah, 
sparked such a mood in urban society and paved the way for future reform both in 
chancery and the court.39 
However, due to pressure from the court, pressure groups, and foreign powers, no 
major structural change was achieved during the second period. Once more, the harem 
and the private quarters of the shah became very influential. The ruling elite, including 
the prince-governors, had to walk within these limits (Nazem ol-Islam-e Kermani 
quoted in Shamim 1372: 332). 
In spite of all the efforts in this period, except in the time of Amirkabir, the 
administration remained inefficient, the army was in disarray, the financial affairs of the 
governments were so bad that every year about 150-200,000 unpaid barats and tax 
cheques were in people's hands and the country was vulnerable to foreign penetration. 
The third period (1896-1905) was the gradual decay in the existing weak 
administration. Foreign influence within the administration increased dramatically.40 
The administration during Mozaffar al-Din Shah was shifting between two Chief 
Ministers, Amin al-Sultan and Amin al-Doleh, whose appointment was the product of 
the influence and pressure of Russia and Britain respectively, and their internal 
collaborators. Thus the pressure for reform which was gaining popularity among the 
merchants and intellectuals, prompted gradually increasing pressure for a radical change 
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of the system of rule. During this period, the royal writ and government orders had no 
more credit and value. 
As Keddie, Ashraf, and Sheikholeslami argue, in traditional patrimonial bureaucracy 
of the Qajar, yearly auction of tax farms, arbitrary dismissals and punishment of high 
officials, and the relative lack of specialisation in government offices were common 
features of all the three periods. 
2.2. L2. FirovnimcBal adminnfistir&ttioifli 
The failure to create a centralised bureaucracy meant that local communities 
preserved their administrative autonomy. In each provincial capital there was a copy 
(on a smaller scale) of the court at Tehran with all the burden which such a structure 
imposed on the local population. The provincial administration was headed by an 
appointed prince called beiglar-beig. Governors enjoyed considerable local autonomy 
and kept much of their jurisdiction's surplus. To control his activities, both the 
provincial royal minister and the finance minister (mostowfi) were appointed from the 
centre. During the Qajar era, local structure of power and wealth were often supported 
by the central government. This was an inescapable outcome of the balance policy of 
the Qajars. It was through this "pyramidal structure of power that government could 
reach its subject" (Sheikholeslami 1978: 289). The central-provincial relationship was 
an interdependent one. On one side, it was more effectively pronounced in the 
collection of taxes. On the other side, the local notables also enjoyed the legitimacy that 
recognition by the government brought them. This ensured their rights against other 
possible local rivals. 
The performance of official functions by notables came about mainly because of their 
local roots rather than by assignment from the central government. This duality of 
authority structure created an axis of conflict between the centre and the region. The 
central government demanded more money as the cost of the government soared, and 
the region tried to retain as much of the taxes as possible.41 By the second half of the 
19th century, governorships were systematically sold to the highest bidder - the one 
who promised to remit the most in taxes. This meant extra taxes to cover the extra cost 
of buying the post of governorship. 
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On the other hand, the provincial governor had his own representative in the capital, 
known as vakil. He was supposed to present the list of the expenditures and income for 
the previous year to the central government for ratification. The agents of important 
provincial governors in the court would, furthermore, try to resist any effort to 
strengthen the central government at the expense of the provinces - i.e. the case of 
agent of Zell al-Sultan in Tehran, Mirza Yussef. 
Overall, most governors remained powerless outside the immediate vicinity of their 
provincial capitals, and some had no authority as they were too young or too 
incompetent - i.e. Kyumars Mirza, governor of Kerman. 
2.2.1.3. The Qajar army 
The Qajar army was not an autonomous institution fulfilling technically specific 
functions, and differentiated from other traditional institutional processes of the 
country. On the contrary, the army was closely tied, in its recruitment, financing, and 
administration, with the country's diffused social and economic structure. 
The army, of course was not large enough to maintain a strong presence in the 
whole country, but it was enough to suppress several revolts. When it became 
necessary to extend bis sovereign authority, the shah often had enough military power 
at his disposal to do so forcefully (Safari 1971: 35 based on a letter from Naser al-Din 
Shah to Mirza Hossain Sepahsalar in 1875-1876). The traditional army was composed 
of three different categories; irregular tribal warriors, the royal gholams, and militia. 
Royal gholams, mostly the Georgians, were, contrary to the situation during the 
Safavid period, under the command of the Qajar nobles. Theoretically, the traditional 
army was estimated to be around 80,000 (Mories 1882: 214) and the militia - which 
was raised and equipped by the provincial and city governors - was numbered around 
150,000 (Abrahamian 1982). 
The Qajar army went through many changes in the course of the 19th century, none 
of which solved its problems sufficiently to make it a particularly useful instrument of 
the state externally or internally. Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince of Fathali Shah, after 
1800 made efforts to modernise training and armaments, but the latter were of poor 
quality and the Russians (after some early setbacks) prevailed decisively in the wars of 
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1810-13 and 1826-28.42 Although this new army was supposed to eliminate tribalism, 
its recruitment and organisation policies were such that the problems of tribal rivalry 
continued to prevail.43 For a brief time under Amirkabir around 1850, the army was 
systematically recruited, better trained, and regularly paid. Foundation of Dor al-
Fonun, a technical-military college and initiating a new system to finance the army,44 
were among of his endeavours. Amirkabir's force quelled revolts in 1850 but 
degenerated again soon after his downfall and had to back down under English pressure 
over Afghanistan in 1853-56. In 1879, a Russian officer formed a Cossack brigade for 
the Shah's army, which became an effective tool of oppression and an aid for the 
execution of Russian policies. (Kazemzadeh 1968: 166-168) 
Although lack of finance and modern weaponry were important in the failure of the 
rationalisation of the army, the incompatibility between the traditional social structure 
and the modern superstructure - that the reformists or the Shah hoped to impose upon 
the army - should probably be considered primarily accountable for its failure. 
Hambly (1991) believes that the belief of Naser al-Din Shah that the territorial 
integrity of Iran would be preserved by Britain, and the increasing influence and vested 
interest by tribal chiefs in court, had further blocked any reform of the army. During the 
Naser al-Din Shah's rule, the actual size of the new army was 20,000 (while in theory it 
was 100,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry, Foran 1993: 139). By the end of the second 
period and during the third period (1896-1905) 1,500 Cossacks were the only 
disciplined army of Iran (Yapp 1991: 197). 
2.2.2. The economy and state revenues 
The traditional tax system of the country inherited by Fathali Shah proved 
increasingly inadequate to provide for the growing needs of government. Thus 
arbitrarily imposed taxes became the chief means of revenue collection. It was at the 
level of provincial government, as noted previously, that fiscal arbitrariness and 
downright extortion received their fullest expression. The revenue sent to the capital 
was only a fraction of the collected revenue,45 so, the central government was not the 
chief beneficiary. The royal treasury absorbed most of the revenue.46 The sources of 
state income in the second period (1848-1896) were primarily the land tax, 78% of 
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total revenues in 1868, and the customs at about 11% (according to Thomson in Issawi 
1971: 29-30). By 1911, the customs, due to increased trade, were up to over 40% of 
the total.47 The land tax increased from one-tenth of land revenue to one-third by the 
end of the 19th century. This left little room for positive incentives towards greater 
regional productivity.48 The custom tariff for foreigners was uniform and about 5%. 
The Russians and the British later decreased it to 1.5% (Sharnim 1372: 353-54). The 
custom tariff for local businessmen was 3% in nominal term. However, adding the road 
and transit taxes, their tariff was actually much higher than foreigners, as foreigners did 
not have to pay extra taxes. The expansion of foreign trade made the customs even 
more profitable during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah. In ten years, by increasing 
foreign trade of the country, the shah's income from customs had tripled. 
Katouzian (1981: 43) based on Gardone and Malcolm, estimates the annual revenue 
of the land tax (as the substantial share of the whole tax revenue) as 20 million tumans 
in the first decade of the 19th century, increased to 50 million tuman by the end of the 
century. According to his estimates for 1867, 1868 and 1885, less than 60% was spent 
on the army and the bureaucracy (the army taking 40%) and the rest of revenue was 
allocated mainly to the privy purse, pensions for the nobles and divines. 
TABLE 2.2 Revenues of the Iranian State, 1800-1907 
Year Estimator Revenues in Tumans Revenues in Pound Sterling 
1807 Gardane 2,000,000 2,000,000 
1810 Malcolm 3,000,000 
1820 Fraser 2,500,000 2,200,000 
1839 Rabino 3,402,615 1,835,994 
1853 Rabino 3,368,558 1,153,163 
1868 Thomson 5,012,500 1,965,000 
1876 Rabino 5,070,000 1,950,000 
1888 Curzon 5,531,000 1,653,000 
1907 Jamalzadeh 8,000,000 1,538,000 
Source: Issawi 1971: 352; Foran 1993: 139 
Fiscal crises occurred with some regularity in Qajar Iran, especially in two waves, 
from the 1820s to 1850, and from the 1880s onward. Table 2.2 gives an overview of 
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some estimates on the size of Iran's revenue from 1800 to 1907. Significantly, due to 
the depression of the Iranian currency, state revenues, expressed in pounds sterling 
reached their peak of 3 million in 1810, declined to 2.2 million in 1820, and never 
surpassed 2 million for the rest of the century, reaching in fact their second lowest level 
of just over 1.5 million pound sterling in 1907. As the Iranian state and economy 
became enmeshed in the world system over this period, the weight of this decline was 
presumably felt fiscally despite the gains in terms of tumans. 
As a result, total public debt reached £7,650,000 in 1913. This consisted of 
£6,750,000 debt to Russia and Britain, plus floating debts of nearly £900,000 to other 
foreign creditors. It required annual servicing of £400-500,000, which ate up one-
fourth of all government revenues (Brown; 1926: 240; Issawi 1971: 128, 339).49 In 
1922, the total debt to Britain was £5,590,000. In a search for revenues, numerous 
concessions were granted to foreigners i.e. tobacco, oil, custom. Neither the loans, nor 
the concessions helped the economy and the development of economic infrastructure. 
Rather they caused political turmoil, in which the economy and society both suffered 
very much. 
2.2.2.1. Foreign investment 
The total foreign investment in the 19th century was about £16,000,000 by the 
Russians while the total British investment for the same period was around 
£9,700,000.50 In total, foreign investment in Iran did not exceed £30 million ($150 
million) (Issawi 1971: 595-600). Considering table 2.3, during the same period, the 
foreign investment in Egypt and Turkey were $1 billion each, and in India was $2 
billion. Iran lagged behind in investment and infrastructural progress. Two factors were 
crucial in the success or failure of these countries. The first factor involves the state's 
pattern of rule, in which its attitude toward the change and reform would be essential. 
In Iran, the Qajar shahs were very reluctant to implement any change in the army and 
the administration. Their patrimonial system of administration would not allow for any 
internal factor concerns reform, and they were hesitant to make use foreign experience 
and advise. 
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TABLE 2.3 Comparison of Foreign Investment and Trade; Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and India 
Iran Turkey Egypt India 
Per Capita Foreign Trade (1913) $10 $15 $24 $4 
Foreign Investment: 19th century $150 $1 $2 
million billion billion 
Growth of Foreign Trade: 12 folds 12 50 50 folds 
from 1800 to 1913 folds folds 
Railways (by 1900) 8 km. 3,500 4,300 56,000 
km. km. km. 
Source: Issawi 1971: 590-600, calculated by the author 
The second factor concerns the attitude of foreign powers toward the country. Iran, at 
the centre of rivalries between Britain and Russia, was therefore paralysed with respect 
to receiving any foreign help. Furthermore, later Russian-British consent to keep Iran a 
weak and underdeveloped country, prevented Iran from utilising even its own limited 
resources. 
2.2.2.2. Foreign trade 
According to Issawi, the total trade of Iran increased 12-fold for the period of 1800-
1913. It doubled between 1800 and 1860, but later quadrupled for the period of 1860-
1913. The depreciation of local currency was partly responsible for this increase in 
trade. Malek (1991) estimates the depreciation of Iranian currency, relative to sterling 
to be about 410% in the 19th century. Furthermore, this growth was primarily 
indicative of the increased demand in the European market for Iran's raw and primary 
materials. This shift altered not only the volume but also the composition of Iran's 
exports and imports, with generally undesirable consequences for the national 
economy. The export of woollen products declined from 23 to a mere 1%, while at the 
same time, the share of raw cotton in the same total had increased from 1 to 7% (Issawi 
1971. 130-31, 40). Displacement of Iranian trade in the 19th century was partly due to 
the changing international economic situation, and increasing penetration of European 
economy into Iran. In the past century, European manufactured goods superseded local 
Iranian commodities. The export of raw materials replaced the export of finished 
Modern State Formation 74 
goods. International market limits, curtailed the ability of Iran to export agricultural 
products.51 
Among the reasons for the decline of industrial export were the penetration of 
foreign capital which favoured the European bourgeoisie, the decline of indigenous 
industry, the failure of the state and Persian money dealers to establish an autonomous 
local and national banking system, and, finally, the preference of Iranian merchants to 
invest in land rather than in industrial production. Consequently, this situation limited 
the emergence and growth of an independent bourgeoisie in Iran. In contrast, the partial 
custom policy favouring the European bourgeoisie led to the creation of a comprador 
bourgeoisie by the early 20th century in Iran - i.e. Some local merchants would prefer 
to travel using a foreign nationality to gain privileges (Ashraf 1970: 326-27).52 
While Russia had begun a rise to commercial and political hegemony in Iran, it had 
equalled if not surpassed Britain as Iran's leading trading partner by 1895; the gap 
continued to widen in favour of Russia through the next decade. In 1913, 55.5% of 
Iran's total imports were from Russia and 27.8% from Great Britain (and its colony 
India). For the same year, 71.5% of the country's total export was to Russia while 
13.5% was exported to Great Britain (Foran 1993: tables 4.1, 4.2). This shows the 
extent Iran's trade depended on these two major powers. While in the beginning of the 
19th century foreign trade was dominated by Iranian merchants, by the mid-19th 
century, a considerable part had passed into European control, which by World War I 
accounted for the bulk of Iran's foreign trade. 
By the end of the 19th century, the reality of Qajar power fell far short of its 
projected ideal. In the view of Bharier: 
"In 1900, Iran was a fairly primitive, almost isolated state, barely 
distinguishable as an economic entity....There were signs that the economy 
was developing but at the turn of the [20th] century it still remained one of the 
most backward countries in the world" (1971: 19-20). 
We therefore notice Iran's transition from a regional empire to an increasingly 
integrated peripheral role in the capitalist world economy, both as a supplier of raw 
materials - silk, opium, cotton, fruits, and so on - and one traditional manufacture -
carpet - and as a consumer of manufactured imports - textiles, hardware, and processed 
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agricultural products such as sugar and tea. The growing weakness of the Qajar state 
vis-a-vis Western states and their more powerful armies and economies was linked to 
processes of fiscal crisis and deligitimation internally. While contact with the world 
economy did create pressure for reforms and the elaboration of some new institutions, 
it did not result in any successful centralisation of the Qajar polity. The Qajar shahs 
were neither too strong (like the Safavids), nor too remote (like the 18th century 
dynasties) to be directly dominated. Furthermore, they faced two strong rivals, Great 
Britain and Russia, who completely disaggregated their dreams of strong central 
control internally. Dependence was imposed, as Foran argues: 
"by military power, channelled into economic domination, and ended in 
substantial political and strategic control" (1993: 143-4). 
This is not to say that all or even most of the internal economy was determined by 
the external relations, but rather that a critical threshold was crossed in this period such 
that increasingly large numbers of people were affected to a greater extent than ever 
before in their daily fives by external forces. This process extended to the Qajar state as 
well: its institutions were recast and weakened by their new relations to the West and 
civil society. As Abrahamian notes, the Qajars were: 
"despots without the instruments of despotism, Shadows of God on Earth 
whose writ did not extend far beyond the capital; King of Kings who trembled 
before unarmed demonstrators; and absolutists ruling with the kind permission 
of the provincial magnates; the religious dignitaries, and the local officials" 
(1974: 13). 
Notwithstanding, as Katouzian (1981) argues, the political economy of Iran was still 
controlled from the centre. 
The state ultimately emerged in the period from 1800 to 1925 as a key actor in 
Iranian social formation. This is seen in the comparison between the weakness of the 
Qajar, caused by the external pressures and internal challenges, and eventual stability of 
Reza Khan's new state, which found its source of strength after 1921 in a new 
component in the Iranian state, an effiriently-administered army. In between these weak 
and strong states there existed from 1906 to 1921 a transitional state with its own new 
institutions - the Majles, and in civil society, the political parties, trade unions, and free 
press - which would eventually come into conflict with Reza Khan's vision of the state 
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2.2.3. The Constitutional Revolution and the rise of Reza Khan 
The Constitutional Revolution (1906) (CR) originated in the call of the people for 
freedom, political participation and a move toward progress and prosperity in Iran. As 
a result of an urban multi-class populist revolution of artisans, merchants, ulama, 
workers, and lower classes, Iran became a constitutional monarchy. The institutions 
they created - Majles, constitution, trade unions - were new in the history of Iran (see 
Edward Browne, 1995, section II). In 1908, due to both external pressure and internal 
disunity, it was the tribal leader who succeeded to reap the rewards of the CR. 
Although the CR succeeded in destroying the traditional centre of despotic power, it 
made no major attempt to transform the economic relations and political system, or to 
broaden its limited power base. In the words of Halliday: 
"In the final analysis, no revolution occurred, and the state was not 
fundamentally altered by these events" (1979: 22). 
The revolution failed due to the internal instability of its shifting alliances and due to 
the force brought to bear on it from outside. The articulation of the complexities of the 
Iranian social formation and the dependence imposed on Iran within the world system 
network. The coalition that carried the revolution was a shifting and a fragile one that 
could not hold itself together either politically or ideologically. It was rooted in the 
complex class structure which had experienced the Western impact in divergent ways. 
Ever increasing foreign intervention in the Iranian state and polity and later the impact 
of World War I , in which Iran was forcibly involved, caused a deterioration in the 
already fragile stability of the country. 
While regional movements, with the idea of either secession or of implementing the 
constitution, were emerging, in the capital, the already inefficient central government 
was unable to respond to these challenges. Both the constitutional alliance and the 
monarchy it opposed had exhausted themselves. By 1920, so many forces had pulled 
Iran in different directions for so long that something had to give. All in all, by the late 
1910s, the situation led to call among both the urban masses and the revolutionaries for 
establishment of a centralised and powerful government. 
Furthermore, foreign factors paved the way for emergence of a centralised state in 
Iran. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 put an end to the old British-Russian rivalries in 
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Iran and to their joint policy of dividing Iran (the Anglo-Russian Entence of 1907 ) 
and changed the historical situation of both the Qajar and the colonial competition. 
Britain later attempted to establish her own predominance in Iran through the Anglo-
Iranian agreement of 1919 which would have given Britain virtual control over Iran's 
military and financial resources and would have made Iran her dependent ally.54 After 
the Persia-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1921,55 however, Britain's dream "to bring 
Persia wholly within the orbit of the British Empire" withered (Lord Curzon cited in 
Elwell-Sutton 1955: 27). As a result, the temporary withdrawal of the Soviets and the 
uncertainty of the British - due to what Foran (1993) calls 'the new conjuncture in the 
world system' - , the weakness of the Qajar state, and the fragmentation of the social 
movement gave Reza Khan - a 42 years old officer who came from an obscure Turkish-
speaking military family in Mazandaran, but who had risen through the ranks to head 
the Cossak Brigade in Qazvin - a chance to seize power through a British-sponsored 
coup of 1921 5 6 The new order would be different from the old one, as will be seen, and 
the new stronger state would clamp down its hold on civil society and face a changing 
world system in which Britain was slowly declining. 
C: Reza Shah and the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-41) 
2.3. The State Under the Rule of Reza Shah 
The formation of the modern state with a unified and centralised administrative and 
military apparatus in the 1920s heralded a new phase in the political economy of Iran, 
and thus a new phase of state-economy relations. By this time, the political and 
economic preconditions for the formation of the nation-state were already in place: 
internal crises led to mass support for the formation of a strong centralised state; the 
interimperialist rivalry between the British and Russians ended; and, the government's 
new source of revenues through indirect taxation and oil, increased state income. 
2.3.1. From the 1921 coup to the Pahlavi dynasty 
The years 1921 to 1926 witnessed the transformation of Reza Khan to Reza Shah: 
his rise to power from Minister of War, to Commander in Chief, to the post of Prime 
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Minister, led finally in 1925, to his displacing Ahmad Shah Qajar, and establishing the 
Pahlavi dynasty. 
During these years, reform was, indeed, urgently needed in the administration and 
the army. The traditional bureaucracy was unable to carry the new tasks of 
development and progress that the Majles had in mind. The traditional, weak and 
disorganised army was not even capable of restoring order in the capital, let alone 
defending the independence of Iran. After the February coup, there were a series of 
measures taken by the state to rationalise and expand its central administration.57 At the 
core of these reforms was the creation of a centralised and unified national army which 
could end the widespread brigandage and political autonomy of the various regional 
governors and tribal chiefs, and defeat the popular movements in the north region. 
During his rise to power, Reza Khan had developed some political skills. He was too 
inarticulate to hold discussions and too poor a reader to master paperwork, but he was 
accustomed to command and quick to resort to violence to get his own way. By 1923, 
Reza Khan had become de facto ruler of the country, but still very cautious, he worked 
within the cabinet and parliamentary system established by the law. In this period he 
avoided a direct conflict with the leaders of ulama until he strengthened his position. In 
spite of his limited parliamentary skills, the division in the Majles prevented any unified 
opposition to his increasing autocracy. 
During 1921-5, the crucial element in the establishment of a centralised state was the 
victory of central authority over provincial autonomy. In this respect, Reza Khan 
eradicated regional magnates and movements crushed Khiyabani's uprising in 
Azarbayjan, Jangali's movement in the north, Pasiyan's uprising in Khorasan, Simtqu's, 
rebellion in Kordestan, and Khaz'al revolt in Khuzestan. He used these military 
successes and increasing increments of state power to engineer his own rise to the 
monarchy after 1923, in a series of adroit political manoeuvres and manipulation of 
social forces. 
With the creation of a professional and specialised officers corps, the hereditary 
officers and princes of the Qajar family were shorn of their ranks, and the old provincial 
levies and tribal contingents were replaced by an organised and effective military 
establishment (Banani 1961; Kazemi 1980). By 1925, the army was the most powerful 
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and centralised institution in the whole country, and Reza Khan, as the commander in 
chief of the newly created national army could exert his authority over almost all the 
regions of the country. 
Reza Khan particularly stressed the three vital principles of constitutional 
intellectuals for attaining the establishment of the Iranian nation-state; 
constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism. Nevertheless, Reza Khan supplanted 
constitutionalism by authoritarianism and coerced secularism and nationalism. By 1925, 
the Pahlavi dynasty was founded as the first of non-tribal origin and coming to power 
without reliance on tribal support. 
2»3.2. The autocratic regime of Reza Shah 
Reza Shah consolidated his power and strengthened his support on three pillars: the 
modern army, the administration, and court patronage. As we noted above, parallel to 
the centralisation of the military-administrative apparatus of the state, the parliament 
diminished its political significance and the polity shifted totally in favour of Reza Shah, 
who formally exerted absolute control over the state apparatus. From the 6th to the 
13th Majles, it was the shah who "determined the outcome of each election, thus the 
complexion of each Majles through his administration involvement and his military-
police forces and influence" (Abrahamian 1982: 138). The Majles became a "decorative 
garb covering the nakedness of military rule" (Matin-Daftari, Khandaniha, 5th April 
1956). The administration remained in power, while having the confidence of the shah 
and not of the Majles. The political parties were destroyed,58 independent new parties 
were closed, and any voice of dissent was silenced. The shah developed an absolute 
autocratic style of rule. 
Once the control of Reza Shah over the state machinery was established, and the 
organs of the modem state had acquired the necessary strength, the state machinery 
was turned towards the levelling out the multi-ethnic structure of the society and the 
destruction of what had remained of the constitutional political organisations. 
The central impact of the Constitutional Revolution on the new system was in its 
profound distance from the traditional despotism. It was no longer a stagnant, minimal, 
traditional patrimonial state, but rather a central developmentalist authoritarian state 
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with a growing modern administration and the modern army which was "before and 
above everything" (Reza Shah quoted in Wilber 1975: 49). Throughout the period of 
1925-41, Reza Shah's regime relied heavily on its coercive apparatus and the support 
of its bureaucratic-military clientele to maintain its power. Equipped with the military, 
bureaucracy, and court patronage, Reza Shah was able to wield absolute control over 
the political system. 
2.3.2.1. T is mmj 
Establishment of an absolute authoritarian rule became the main objective of the 
state for any reform or appointments.59 The military was the backbone of this process. 
Anyone who questioned the state, authority or who was a possible threat to the shahs' s 
rule was punished severely. This included not only the leaders of opposition but also the 
erstwhile close allies who were the architects of his reforms. 
This system brought about a new socio-political structure that was different from 
both the Constitutional Revolution and the traditional Qajar despotism. In this system, 
both the new army and the modern administration became the means of national 
progress and the personal authority of Reza Shah. 
The army was the vehicle through which he had advanced to the throne, and it 
continued to be the chief pillar of his reign. He dominated most ministries through his 
control of the army. Later, through his influence in the army, he controlled the Majles 
members, the press and the provincial magnates. Therefore the army was the guarantor 
of his rule and the preserver of his dynasty. He expanded the army of 40,000 in 1925 to 
130,000 in 1941 together with some 20,000 in the reconstituted gendarmerie (Yapp 
1991: 169).60 The junior officers were mostly drawn from the lower middle classes and 
"perceived the army as a means of social advancement" (Ghods 1991: 223). By offering 
privileges to them, Reza Shah linked the military elite to his regime. The army relied 
partially on foreign advisors - i.e. the Swedish Colonel Nordquist who was air advisor 
to the government. Reza Shah safeguarded the continuous financial well-being of the 
army by direct transfer of revenues from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of 
War. One-third of the national budget was devoted directly to the army, while some 
other infrastructural projects were financed by other ministries but were mainly for the 
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benefit of the army. Further construction of roads and railways enabled rapid 
deployment of troops. There was, in addition, a special budget based on revenues from 
oil, tea and sugar. 30-35% of this revenues appears to have been devoted to military 
expenditure (Bharier 1971: 63-4). With regular pay, improved equipment, and rising 
morale, the army gave the shah its unqualified loyalty. 
2.3.2.2. The administration 
Rationalisation of the state administration was accompanied by functional and 
structural differentiation of the state apparatus and the creation of specialised 
ministerial branches which could play a more direct and active role in the economy. 
Reza shah transformed the Qajar minimalist government into one of some 90,000 full-
time personnel employed in 10 ministries.61 The majority of civil servants were from the 
middle-income social groups and some from the lower classes. 
The provincial division of eyalat and velayat were rearranged based on 11 ostans 
(provinces), 49 shahrestan (counties), and many bakhsh (municipalities) and dehestan 
(districts), each with its own administration.62 Thus, the hand of the state reached out 
from the capital directly into the provincial towns and counties. 
During the latter half of the 1920s, with the help of foreign advisors the finances of 
the state were reorganised and effective measures were taken to regulate the civil 
service by establishing educational standards, introducing life tenure, and providing a 
table of ranks and a regular scale of promotion with fixed salaries. The same 
bureaucratic criteria were applied to the judicial and educational systems. Furthermore 
the formation of the modern bureaucratic state institutions substantially enhanced the 
power of the state to intervene in the economy. 
The shah gathered around himself younger men of the civil service and the 
professions, many of them with Western education, to make up the emerging modern 
administrative elite of the country. It was the new men with high calibre who could 
initiate, plan and implement reform policies. Teymurtash, one of them, had all the skills 
that Reza Shah lacked, and as the Minister of Court, controlled Iran's foreign affairs 
and exercised an important influence over domestic affairs. Davar, successively the 
Minister of Interior, Justice and Finance, was the architect of judicial reforms. 
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However, both, along with some other high ranking administrators, became the 
victims of Reza Shah's suspicion and, while the former was imprisoned and killed, the 
latter to avoid such a fate committed suicide. In spite of many changes in 
administration, corruption continued to be widespread. The shah, in order to satisfy the 
high ranking administrators (civil and military), would allow them to gain economic 
benefits from their position in office. The extent of corruption, therefore, within the 
administrative hierarchy, was believed to be considerable and it was generally assumed 
that this extended to the highest levels. 
The formation of this new centralised and unified bureaucratic machinery in a 
predominantly pre-capitalist economy and amidst a diversity of socio-political 
structures and vertical dismemberment of the society, had important consequences for 
the distribution of power within the state itself. Bureaucratisation of the state apparatus 
was tantamount to the institutional separation of the state from the agrarian land-based 
economy and was the first pre-condition for autonomy of the state from the 
economically dominant classes. The degree of autonomy of the state, however, 
depended on the prevailing socio-economic and political relations within Iranian 
society. The absence of strong class structures and well-articulated class interests on a 
national scale, which was due to the backwardness of the Iranian economy, coincided 
with an emerging modern repressive administrative establishment. The combination 
resulted in a high degree of autonomy for the state. 
2.3.2.3. Court patronage 
The third pillar of the state was the court. Reza Shah who had no land or wealth 
upon rising to power, eventually accumulated enough wealth to become the biggest 
landlord and the richest man in Iran. By 1941 he had £3 million plus nearly 1.5 million 
hectares (2000 villages and related lands), mostly in the fertile lands of the northern 
provinces. As Millspaugh puts it. "The Shah was receiving gifts of villages" (1946: 25). 
These estates were collected through forced sale, confiscation of private and state land, 
vaqf and khalesseh lands, and dubious claim to royal domain (see British Minister to 
the Foreign Office, FO 371/Persia 1932/4-16077; also ibid. 1934/35-18992).64 Reza 
Shah by abolishing the land tax in 1934 further improved the landlord's position. For 
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instance, while the Majles became increasingly dominated by big landlords, he allowed 
them to retain their lands and local influence in return for not opposing his policies. His 
circumstances meant that the impact of the changes he introduced could have little 
effect in the countryside. As he had the administration and the army behind him, no one 
dared to show any resistance to his land usurpation, while the new law was actually 
justifying his previously illegal claims. This wealth and property, 
"financed the establishment of royal hotels, casinos, palaces, companies, 
charities, foundations, and led to a proliferation of court positions, salaries, 
pensions, and sinecures" (Abrahamian 1982: 137). 
The court, thus grew into a wealthy landed military complex offering lucrative posts 
and favours to those willing to serve the Pahlavi dynasty. 
2.3.3. Bureaucratic reforms 
The inter-war conditions and the Soviet revolution, enabled Reza Shah to neutralise 
foreign influence and move toward administrative reform and economic development. 
However in both foreign policy and socio-economic reforms, his personal 
egocentricism and his narrow, personal vision of public interest set the direction. Trans-
Iran Railway, which was economically an unprofitable waste project (Katouzian 1981), 
was a good example of this. Nonetheless, he built personal prestige and national pride 
through this project, while at the same time, another aspect of national pride was 
excoriated and attacked by Reza Shah to the extent that the Western code of dress was 
imposed to replace the local costumes. 
I f modernisation was his major goal, and centralisation his method, then nationalism 
and secularism were the ideology that aimed to legitimise both of the former. 
Nationalism looked upon by Reza Shah as a source of inspiration , a replacement for 
religion as the dominant ideology, to stand in as the culture of modernisation in the 
absence of culture of the national bourgeoisie. 
Although Reza Shah never formulated a systematic blue print for modernisation, his 
long-term goal in reform was "to rebuild Iran in the image of the West - or, at any rate, 
in his own image of the West" (Abrahamian 1982: 37). Having undisputed political 
power, Reza Shah initiated a number of social reforms. He intended that, Iran should be 
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free of clerical and religious influence, nomadic uprising and ethnic differences. Hence, 
he pushed for the annihilation of regional powers, and the supplanting of domestic and 
religious traditions and values by Western values. Thus, Westernization of Persian 
manners became "a prominent part of the Pahlavi government's reform program" 
(Ferrin to State Department, 1929 cited in Faghfoory 1993: 300). 
European-type dress and hat became a gesture of modernisation, and "the way into 
the civilised world" (Reza Shah cited in Safa'i 1355: 101-4). As Premier Hedayat 
writes, the new dress was to make us "like them [Europeans] that they won't make a 
fool of us" (n.d., 405-8). 
Secularisation and modernisation were further imposed on other fronts; judicial and 
educational reforms, modern economic structures, and communication networks. 
Reza Shah took on, and implemented, a concept of Iran as a distinct cultural and 
political entity moulded by history and language. The emphasis shifted to pre-Islamic 
Iran; the official Islamic calendar was changed, and teaching of the ancient history of 
Iran dominated the history course in the curriculum. Reform finally took place in the 
army, the administration, the education of judiciary system. In the judicial platform, 
between 1927 and 1939, various laws were promulgated as supplements to the new 
civil code of 192865 It was mostly the secularisation of the shari'a by the abolition of 
the shari'a court and the adoption of a European model civil code in 1939 and a penal 
code in 1940, which was provisionally promulgated in 1926, using the French pattern 
for the civil code, and the penal code of Fascist Italy (see Banani 1961. 74). 
Although these reforms provided the context for later capitalist development, the 
new law was, in practice, unable to define the ruler-ruled relations in the economic, 
social and political domains, due to the arbitrary rule of Reza Shah. Indeed, he used the 
new judicial system totally in his favour. For instance, he used the new justice rninistry 
to legalise his acquisition of property, and to jail political opponents and the people 
who were reluctant to sell their property to him.66 As Katouzian (1981) argues, Justice 
Minister Davar did not realise that even the law and court are not helpful in a lawless 
military-bureaucratic social system like that of Reza Shah. 
Another important domain for reform was education. For Reza Shah, the function of 
education was to integrate the individual into society. Therefore, its main goal, other 
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than training bureaucratic and technical personnel, was to act as an instrument of 
socialisation for Reza Shah's nationalism.67 A triple loyalty to God, the Shah, and 
mihan, (motherland) was stressed to bring about obedience, discipline and morality 
(Menashri 1992: 91-2). Loyalty to the state and ruler was promoted through the 
curriculum, mainly in teaching of pre-history of Iran, geography, and social sciences 
It seems that the education expansion was consistent with the need of a industrialist, 
modernising state. That is why, while more than 85% of society were illiterate, the 
majority of educational spending was on capital intensive, urban oriented projects. 
Indeed, the average annual spending in education decreased from 6.8% of the budget 
during 1928-1933 to 4.9% for the period of 1934-1941 (Jamalzadeh, 1951: 32, see also 
Mahnomen Rasmi-ye Vezarat-e Farhang, V. 11-12, 1939: 88-104).68In Yapp's words: 
"in many ways the education provided in Pahlavi Iran was superficial and it 
remained largely an urban phenomenon" (1981: 177). 
The process of modernisation and reform in Iran, mobilised primarily with security 
and military pressure, was accompanied, to a considerable degree, by changes in social 
stratification: "a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people" (as Karl 
Polani writes about the Industrial Revolution in Europe, quoted in Chehabi 1993: 228). 
It altered the class structure of Iran. New social classes and occupational groups 
emerged, and the powers of the old and traditional elites declined. A parallel can be 
found, as was argued earlier, during the reforms of Shah Abbas, when he tried to 
replace the qizilbash with new class of gholams and Persians in the army and provincial 
administration. The composition of the landholding upper class changed substantially. A 
new landlord class was firmly established - as an amalgamation of those old landlords 
with court favourites, army officers, and high bureaucrats who through their connection 
with Reza Shah and his court had acquired land. 
The bazaar guilds were also, as Connally (1935: 462) states, oppressed and as a 
result of government policy and trade monopoly - and world trade conditions, - were 
practically ruined. However, a limited new middle class of bourgeoisie, who mostly 
were involved in economic activities through court patronage, did emerge. While the 
bazaar had remained ideologically close to the ulama, this modern bourgeoisie had 
identified itself with the internal nationalism of the centralised state. 
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2.3.4. Economic policies 
The state economic policy during the 1921-41 period was not based on a coherent 
and systematic economic ideology. The general tendency, like the state's social policy, 
was towards the creation of a 'national economy' by providing the basic politico-legal 
and infrastructural requirements of a modern economy. Within this context, however, 
there were radical shifts in the form of state economic intervention. 
The impact of the new state on economic development was far from the simple 
intent of creating a new economic order with its efforts directed in a unilineal manner 
towards the 'modernisation' of a 'traditional' economy. The rise of the authoritarian 
regime of Reza Shah removed from the political agenda any talk of fundamental 
economic reform, especially land reform. It enhanced the political power of the 
absentee landlords and strengthened the agrarian relations of production in the 
agricultural sector which became a major obstacle to rapid economic expansion over 
the next half century. For economic reform and agricultural tax imposition, Ghods 
(1991) argues Reza Shah was more concerned with the creation of a reliable flow of 
funds with which to finance development of the army and his own power base than with 
changing the basics of the Iranian economy. 
In the absence of any modem long-term credit organisation and the lack of existence 
of large accumulations of money capital in the hands of the Iranian merchants, the 
concentration of funds through the state budget and private monopoly trade companies 
played an important part in financing fixed investment during the 1930s. The pace of 
capital formation particularly accelerated in the latter half of the decade. The major part 
of investment during this period was concentrated within the state sector. More than 
40% of total government expenditure during the decade was invested: mainly in 
transportation and industry. 
The state extended its control over the economic spheres, particularly over trade and 
industry by creation of system of monopolies. The state became the only active 
economic agent, and like the rest of the social system, economic modernisation centred 
around the Shah's own person. 'Etatism' naturally appealed to a man of Reza Shah's 
temperament. 
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Furthermore, the relatively high rate of capital accumulation during the 1930s was 
financed by domestic resources mainly through indirect taxation, such as tariffs and 
road taxes, profits of monopoly companies - foreign contribution was confined 
exclusively to technical assistance. 
"It was to be a cardinal principle of government throughout the entire Pahlavi 
period that much of the impetus for development, together with control of key 
organisations and industries, should be in the hands of the state" (Hambly 
1991:229). 
The state economic development ignored the agricultural sector, and the principal 
features became the development of modern industry based on an import substitution 
strategy and the construction of a nation-wide system of communications. The shah 
established monopolies, which were either controlled by the state, or awarded to 
favoured entrepreneurs. Most of these enterprises were poorly and corruptly 
administered. On many occasions, the shah used the government's development funds 
to enrich himself (Connally 1935: 460; Millspaugh 1946: 30). 
As will be shown, the state's autonomy was enhanced by its control of the economy; 
i.e. monopoly of foreign trade, increasing oil revenues, and state-sponsored 
industrialisation. According to Table A l , the role of oil revenues, received from AIOC, 
changed substantially from the 1930s. In the mid-1920s the direct royalties represented 
about 10% of the government general budget, increased to about 30% between 1929 
and 1932 and inclusive of petrol taxes, settled to about 25% during 1934-48 - extra 
revenues following the 1933 agreement which Reza Shah agreed to extend British 
control for an extra 28 years. It was also a significant source of foreign exchange, 
financing up to 30% of visible imports before 1943 ( Issawi and Yeganeh 1962: 144-
47). 
Although the share of the Iranian government in the profits of the AIOC was very 
low (about one-tenth for the period 1919-30),69 the issue of the distribution of the 
profits of the AIOC formed an important aspect of the relation of state power to capital 
accumulation during this period. Furthermore, the total profits of the company, 
compared to the entire investment outlays in the Iranian economy as a whole, 
constituted a formidable sum.70 The emergence of oil as a key commodity in the world-
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economy and of Iran as the fifth-largest producer in the 1920s and 1930s confirmed 
Iran's peripheral role in the world-system. Iran's exports consisted almost entirely of 
oil, agricultural product, and carpet while importing finished manufacturers and capital 
goods from its major trading partners - Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and 
the US. During the world depression this pattern of trade worked against Iran as the 
value in rials of its raw material exports fell by 2 or 3 times while the cost of its import 
rose. 
In the 1930s, foreign trade was under state scrutiny and monopoly, to a greater 
extent than the other sectors of economy. Export of most commodities came under 
state monopoly, while, for other goods, exporters were obliged to sell their foreign 
exchange earning to the government. Right to export, and monopoly rights were used 
extensively by the state to reward its royal favourite - i.e. monopolies like sugar and tea 
in 1925, opium in 1928 and tobacco in 1929. Russia and Britain lost their monopoly of 
Iran's foreign trade by the 1930s. The US trade with Iran grew fairly steadily from the 
1920s. On the other hand, the sudden jump in Germany's share during the mid-1930s 
reflects the Iranian government's changing foreign policy at that time. Furthermore, the 
1930s were transitional in the sense that Iran's economy moved closer to dependence 
on a single commodity to finance state projects and balance of trade (Table Al ) . 
23.4.1. State industrialisation policy 
Reza Shah's economic policy was characterised by an appetite for industrialisation 
far beyond the economic rationale. The drive for industrialisation was not the result of a 
pre-conceived plan by the government, but was prompted rather by the pressure of 
circumstances arising from the world depression, and the adjustment problems it 
created for the Iranian economy. However, the existence of the new state structure 
with its relative autonomy did play an important part in making the drive towards 
industrialisation possible. 
The industrialisation policy however, was an mcuscriminate imitation of the surface 
gloss of Western societies: 
"the power-that-be in Tehran seems to regard machinery as a passport to 
equality with the greater nations of the world and as the only means of ridding 
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themselves and their country of an inferiority complex produced by a long 
history of internal corruption, and backwardness" (Connally 1935: 461). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the manufacturing industry of Iran was 
confined to small scale workshops, mainly for domestic markets. Although the foreign 
and domestic entrepreneurial attempts to establish manufacturing activity (such as 
sugar, matches, textile) failed in this period, in the late 1920s and 1930s, the same types 
of manufacturing industry were successfully established. The slow development of 
large-scale industry took place against the background of a lack of integration in the 
economy, and a generally low level of custom duties on imported manufactures (4 to 
5%), not to mention a series of political changes. Particularly after the World War I , 
these industries were compensated to some extent by the proliferation of small-scale 
industry within the larger cities. These industries were mainly protected in the early 
1920s by the high freight rate for the foreign goods.71 This was a tentative start of 
industrialisation, which in later decades was driven rapidly by state investment. Indeed, 
the founding of new factories accelerated as did the move towards larger factories from 
1934 on.72 
There is little information available about the development of small-scale industries 
during the period 1925-41, but it is known that there were over 15,000 workshops and 
factories in operation in 1941 throughout the country (Bharier 1971: 171). It is possible 
that due to a drastic reduction in the inland freight rate, which reduced the protection of 
these workshops against imported goods, the number of workshops declined.73 
Many of the new factories introduced in the 1930s belonged to the state, or were 
somehow within the scope of its monopoly. By the end of the decade, the state was 
allocating about 20% of its budget to industry. Sugar, tobacco and cement were 
entirely state-controlled, while the first two were specifically state monopolies. Bharier 
(1971: 180) argues that, with the exception of 5 factories, it appears that all state-
owned plants made relatively high losses. Industrial production rose from an 
insignificant proportion of GNP to about 5% between 1926 and 1947, with total 
employment in all industry reaching about 100,000 by the latter date.74 
However, if the state had failed to support these industries, almost all of them would 
have collapsed, while the policy of pushing away the traditional merchants made an 
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alternative route an almost impossible task. The state's limited source of revenue, had 
curtailed its endeavours in this respect. Furthermore, the lack of any attempt to alter 
agrarian relation in the country limited the scope of industrialisation. As Halliday 
argues: "this state provided the context for the late capitalist development of Iran but it 
was incapable itself of initiating the major changes required in this direction" (1979: 23-
4). 
Because of the state monopoly, the aim of the new class of entrepreneurs was to 
reap quick, high and safe profits, without much regard for augmenting sales by price-
cutting or competition. They preferred non-competitive monopolies which they could 
exploit to the maximum level. 
The period from 1925 to 1941 can be seen as a combination of economic expansion 
and political repression. Reza Shah clamped down on all forms of dissent in society 
through legalisation, and institutional and military measures. Those who were his main 
sources of support - army officers, bureaucrats, monopoly traders, industrialists, and a 
segment of the intelligentsia - were always under the threat of suspicion, confiscation, 
and death. Those who were opposed to him - the ulama progressive intellectual, tribes, 
part of working class - were ruthlessly repressed. 
Others were closely watched (the guilds) co-opted or in-different (landlords). 
Therefore, Reza Shah's state lacked deep legitimation in civil society but was able to 
rule by this combination of extending material advantages to new groups, repressing 
long standing opponents and the losers in the developmental process, and keeping 
much of the population either apathetic, apolitical, or frightened. 
Reliance on the army successfully underpinned this approach to power for most of 
his reign, and though social movement did occur, it was limited. Reza Shah's regime, 
despite its impressive institutions, by the 1930s had: 
"no viable class base, no sound social props, and was thus without firm civilian 
foundations". 
As Abrahamian (1982: 153-4) points out Reza Shah had become not a nation-
builder but "a self-seeking founder of a new dynasty", not a genuine reformer but "an 
autocrat strengthening the conservative landed class", who had already created hatred 
among major section of society by his policies of either anti-religious or anti-democratic 
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sentiments. The Pahlavi state, therefore, was strong in as much as it had at its disposal 
powerful means of coercion. But it was weak in that it failed to cement its institutions 
of coercion into the social base to possess measures of legitimacy. In their absence, 
however, the tension in the world-system which had given him an opportunity to rise to 
power in 1921-25, proved his undoing in 1941. 
With the application of foreign forces, the army did not resist, and the autocratic 
regime was undermined. Eventually Reza Shah, who had seemed so strong internally, 
was forced to abdicate. Thus as a result of external pressure, with his abdication, the 
social forces that he had so assiduously repressed were released. A semi-democratic 
polity emerged until the coup of 1953. 
It might be said that Reza Shah in many ways resembled Ataturk of Turkey. Both 
aimed at transforming their traditional societies into modern nation-states. Both 
associated modernisation with Westernization: the past with administrative inefficiency, 
tribal anarchy, and social heterogeneity; the future with political conformity and ethnic 
homogeneity. Both attempted secularisation by attempting to wither the influence of 
religion in society and pushing the religious authorities to the periphery of society. Both 
alienated a section of society by attacking its cultural foundations. Both rose to power 
mainly with the assistance of the military, and held the conviction that social, cultural, 
and economic reforms could not be achieved without political absolutism. However, 
whereas Ataturk channelled the backing of the intelligentsia into the Republican party, 
Reza Shah, gradually lost his initial urban support, let alone the intelligentsia. 
Furthermore, while in Turkey, the religious authority did not challenge the status quo, 
in Iran, the ulama showed great concern and resentment against the secularism 
provoked by the state. 
The removal of Reza Shah in 1941 led to the disintegration of his authoritarian 
regime and ushered in a period of limited political participation. There developed in 
Iran during the years after 1941 a tripartite struggle for influence between the Shah, the 
Majles and the occupying powers. However, major changes and reforms that achieved 
in the army, bureaucracy, polity and economy of the country during the Reza Shah's 
rule, set the ground on which Mohammed Reza Shah built his own rule. 
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The socio-political background and the character of the autocratic regime of the 
Shah during the period of 1953-77 was to some extent reminiscent of Reza Shah 
during the inter-war period. As Abrahamian (1982: chapter 9) has pointed out both 
leaders relied on their over-extended bureaucratic and military establishments - which, 
largely being their own creations and lacking strong ties with the prevailing social 
forces, functioned as subordinate tools in the hands of the two monarchs - and the 
system of court patronage which was at the centre of the clientalistic relations which 
characterised the channels of access of public institutions and policy for private 
interests. 
In theory the Shah observed the 1906 Constitution - supplemented and amended 
later in 1907, 1925, 1949, 1957, and 1967 - which envisaged a constitutional 
monarchy with an independent legislature and independent judiciary. These 
amendments were made mainly to grant greater powers to the Shah not only to reign 
but to rule.1 In practice the distinction between the executive authority of the Shah and 
the independence of the legislature and the judiciary became blurred and all were 
merely part of the monarch's executive arm. All important decisions were by imperial 
decree. The monarchy was the country's only institution, around which all power 
revolved without any formal checks and balances. Nevertheless informal checks and 
balances existed: namely the self-interest of the Shah in staying on the throne and the 
self-interest of those who depended upon the Shah as the source of all favours. 
In the post-1953 coup period, the structure and policies of the Shah's regime began 
to change. The regime began a systematic attempt to exclude all the dominated classes 
from major political positions and to prevent them from participating in important 
economic decision making. It further adopted an economic strategy that promoted 
dependent capitalist development. These political and economic orientations, followed 
under the aegis of advanced capitalist countries, had a great impact on the country's 
class structure and class politics. The form and content of class conflict, that transpired 
in the 1960s and 1970s, emanated from the bureaucratic and repressive policies of the 
Shah's regime as well as from its alliance with international capital. Hence, these 
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policies reinforced the expansion of the bureaucracy and its repressive apparatus. Over 
time, an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime grew extensively in Iran (Moaddel 1993: 
52). 
Crucial differences existed between the general conditions that preceded the coup in 
Iran and those that preceded the inauguration of an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime 
in countries such as Brazil and South Korea. Cardoso (1978) observes that the 
Brazilian coup (1964) was the consequence of a change in the pattern of class alliance 
produced by foreign capital infiltration, whereby international capital became 
economically but not politically dominant. In contrast, pre-coup Iran, experienced little 
infiltration of international capital, save for the oil sector. In South Korea, Koo and 
Kim (1992: 123-4) argue that the continuing economic difficulties combined with 
political instability invited a military coup in 1961. It was rooted in internal politico-
economic elements - the failure of the Chang's government to bring about a coherent 
programme to attack economic and social problems, while facing in ordinate 
expectation for an immediate delivery of economic welfare and political democracy. 
Nevertheless, there were similarities between the 1953 coup in Iran and the 1973 coup 
in Chile. In broad outline they shared the combination of government problems , 
internal opposition and external intervention.2 
In Iran power was distributed to a series of individuals or agencies with overlapping 
functions which were kept fragmented and weak. Loyalty was at a premium in a 
handful of trusted positions. The centres of this fragmented power were deceptive 
because the system had two sides - the bureaucratic side and the repressive side 
(Graham 1980: 131-2). The former consisted of what would be in a Western society 
the institutions of democracy: the Majles, the judiciary, the cabinet, the political 
parties, the provincial governors and the press. However, the function of these 
bureaucratic organisations were either controlled, monitored or duplicated by the 
authoritarian establishment of the regime which consisted of the military and police 
forces, SAVAK, Imperial Inspectorate, Special Bureau, military tribunals, and 
furthermore by powerful individuals without fixed positions, the economic power of 
the Pahlavi family, and the allocative and distributive power of the Shah and his regime 
- resulted from the oil boom. In some instances these two worlds converging in the 
royal court and in the person of the Shah. In other instances, personalities had 
connections with both worlds. Yet the one constant factor was the Shah's own direct 
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relationships with a series of individuals either in their function as heads of agencies 
and ministries or as private citizens. 
In many cases, individuals were ending up playing a more important role than the 
organisations they served or their appointed heads. Baldwin (1967: 29) has noted: 
"Law [was] weaker than personalities. Much weaker, one [could] not expect 
that the ship of state, once set on course, [would] hold it" (in Farazmand 
1989: 45). 
It seems that the Shah conceived and used key individuals as an alternative channel 
to other established official ones. Writing in 1961, the Shah claimed that " I am a great 
believer in a plurality of administrative channels and in having alternative channels 
always available" (Mission 1961: 321). Soon after though, the emphasis on the 
authoritarian side of the regime increased considerably. 
The court consisted of the royal family and a limited circle of key individuals. It was 
an additional instrument of autocratic rule in Iran and had its own organisation and 
immense wealth. Different branches of the court apparatus organised the Shah's daily 
schedule, and thus controlled access to his person, and promoted the extensive 
economic interests of the Shah and his family. There was an extremely powerful 
executive arm of the court, the Special Bureau, whose task was to ensure that the 
Shah's policies and orders were carried out. The most distinctive court institution was 
the Pahlavi Foundation. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the Foundation as a charity 
organisation was financed by the Shah's wealth, was the largest industrial and 
commercial group in the country with extensive interests in all major economic fields 
and played a regulatory role in government business relations in the sense of giving 
incentives or withholding favours. 
As Chart 3.1 shows, in order to operate the system, the Shah had effectively made 
himself the sole decision-making authority in every significant sphere of the country's 
affairs. Three vital areas of defence, oil policies and foreign affairs were exclusive 
spheres for him. A few people such as Reza Fallah (deputy of NIOC), Jamshid 
Amuzegar (OPEC representative), the Court Minister Asadollah Alam and General 
Hasan Turanian (the deputy Minister of War) were involved. In the area of intelligence 
and internal security, the dominant and leading players were: (a) at the organisational 
level, SIB and HCIC (both directed by Fardust and were answerable only to the Shah); 
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(b) at intelligence gathering level, SAVAK and the military intelligence unit; and, (c) at 
operational level, police and gendarmerie led by SAVAK. 
The economic planning, however, was under the control of a broader community of 
elite within the bureaucracy. With the oil boom of 1973, the Shah increased his control 
of this sector as well and imposed severely his own will over the technocrats and 
manipulated the country's economic decision-making process. Thus, after the 
considerable increase in oil revenues from October 1973, the linkages between the 
economic and political policies of the regime were eroded, and had ceased to exist by 
1977. 
The civil service was watched over by the Imperial Inspectorate and Imperial 
Commission for mismanagement and corruption, and by SAVAK for political 
misbehaviour. Military intelligence offices were controlling the armed forces and para-
military forces. SIB was to check and balance the overlapping intelligence and security 
organisations. 
The inauguration of authoritarian-bureaucratic regime, resulted in a structural 
separation of the state from civil society, with no significant intermediary organisation 
that can connect the two. 
3.1. The Bureaucratic Establishment of the Pahlavi Regime 
The classical distinction between politics and administration could not be maintained 
in a system without stable law and independent institutions. Administration could not 
simply be the enactment of previously determined policies, for the administrative 
apparatus reflected the higher level of conflict and also provided none of its own 
mechanisms for resolving them (Macdaniel 1991: 97). 
In a society like Pahlavi Iran, where the state dominated all spheres of life, the 
political system shaped the organisational structure and behaviour of its bureaucratic 
system and determined its goals and functions in society. The governmental and political 
processes affected the internal and external performance of the bureaucracy and its 
administrative behaviour. In Iran, the administrative and political systems under the Shah 
were so intertwined that it is impossible to analyse the former without understanding the 
latter. 
The Shah's regime deeply influenced the country's economic, political and social life. 
Everything either began or ended with the government, and these connections always 
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had a decisive influence in matters. The government was the biggest business in the 
country and enjoyed significant monopoly rights in domestic and foreign trade (see 
chapter 5). Over one half of the country's economic activities was directly in the hands 
of the government, while it had indirect but firm control over the other half (IA 1968: 
564). During the 1960s and in particular the 1970s, the government had expanded its 
activities to include an immense variety of undertakings that would tax the wisdom and 
ingenuity of even the most experienced administrators. Indicative of the increasing 
complexity of the government's economic operations, as will be shown, was the size of 
state's investment in economic development and its ever-expanding size of the national 
budget. Obviously, with so much influence in every aspect of economic and social life, no 
major changes could be introduced without proper government administration. Thus, the 
bureaucracy was expanded partly in response to the government's increasing economic 
activities and partly autonomously, at rates somewhat higher than the total non-oil GDP.3 
Both state's investment in economic development plans, from the First Plan (1949-55) to 
the Fifth Plan (1973-77), and its national budget, between 1941 and 1978, had increased 
about 1000 times. 
Variations and contradictions of policies were reflected in and even exacerbated by 
the administrative process, which had no fixed integrity to insulate it from political 
struggle (for contradiction in policies in the land reform see Hooglund 1982). With the 
plethora of overlapping agencies salient political conflicts penetrated throughout the 
administrative apparatus. The pronounced personalism of the Iranian bureaucracy surely 
served to heighten bureaucratic incoherence. 
3.1.1. The political orientation of the bureaucracy and its structure 
The bureaucracy in the 1960s and 1970s was the main instrument of not only policy 
formulation, development and administration, but also policy legitimisation and 
communication. It was the main instrument for carrying out the major structural socio-
economic transformations in urban as well as rural Iran. It was, therefore, both as an 
instrument of power and control and as a tool for achieving developmental goals. This 
political and administrative role of the civilian bureaucracy was used as an instrument of 
power and control for system maintenance and regime enhancement and as a tool of 
developmental policy implementation (Farazmand 1989: 7-9).4 
Authoritarian-Bureaucratic Regime 98 
Therefore, because of the intensely political nature of the bureaucracy, no 
distinction could be made between the goals and function of the political system and 
those of bureaucracy. The latter was the organisational power behind the regime, and 
its goals were almost the same as the regime's for "the organisational framework of 
Iranian politics hinged upon the bureaucracy" (Afkhami 1985: 57). The Iranian 
bureaucracy due to extreme centralisation and politicisation had special characteristics. 
It was, as Afkhami correctly argues: 
"structurally centralised, elitist in character, behaviourally formalistic, and 
functionally political". 
Just as bureaucracies are conditioned by their political and socio-economic 
environments, their growth and expansion perpetuate the goals they are created to 
achieve. The overriding goals of the Iranian bureaucracy, therefore, were: (a) to 
enhance the Pahlavi regime and the personal interest of the Shah; (b) to enhance the 
process of capital accumulation in the interests of both local and international capital; 
(c) to legitimise the social system of capitalism with its social relations in Iran; (d) the 
formulation, development, and presentation to the Shah of policies and programmes 
that would enhance the above mentioned objectives; and, (e) to enhance its own 
power. From among these goals, the Iranian network of bureaucracy helped 
extensively the Shah to extend his control over all domains of society. 
To operate the bureaucratic system under his control, the Shah carved himself into the 
cornerstone of the decision-making process. He regularly presided over the meetings of 
councils, commissions, and gave specific orders on various issues from important 
economic policies to unimportant issues such as preference of planting plane trees over 
pines.5 Since the ultimate head and manipulator of the state was the Shah himself, the 
bureaucratic state was dependent and accountable to no one but the Shah. This gave the 
bureaucracy an autonomy that was evident in Iranian society. However, at the same time, 
senior officials lived in fear of incurring the Shah's displeasure. For example, the 
measures to dampen the over-heated economy in late 1975 had been held up almost nine 
months because ministers were afraid of losing face and admitting to chaos. Furthermore, 
the fear from SAVAK was pervasive among civil servants. Many of SAVAK agents were 
among the rank and file of the various bureaucracies (Zonis 1975). 
Hence, the sense of insecurity and the role of key individuals' in the political system 
made the search for informal power a significant character of the Iranian bureaucratic 
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system. While people obeyed the formal authorities, they actually complied with the 
orders of the men in control. Networks of informal ties based on clientalism generally 
predominated over and against the formal structure. Co-operation, trust, and initiative 
were discouraged by the all-encompassing fear of the arbitrary power of the ruler. It is in 
this context that the Shah ambassador to London (1976-9) points out that: 
"Fear rather than rationality, fear rather than common sense, fear rather than 
patriotism, seems the growing force in the life of an Iranian public servant" 
(Radji 1983: 51). 
The bureaucratic institution stupor and mediocrity that such a system encouraged 
were evident in the creation of the Rastakhiz in 1975. The party's effectiveness was 
doomed from the start because success would have made it an alternative power base to 
the Shah. 
He trusted power in the hands of the military, but he always restrained himself from 
making a military general responsible for the top positions in the bureaucracy. For 
example when General Zahedi became the Prime Minister after the 1953 coup, a strong 
determined man who could have helped the Shah extensively to consolidate his rule, was 
politely ousted out of the country within two years. Furthermore, lip-service 
notwithstanding, the Shah was unwilling to risk decentralisation for fear that concessions 
might establish a chain reaction that would threaten the throne. Indeed the Shah, 
invariably created overlapping responsibilities and parallel agencies to reinforce the 
throne. 
Government-business relations were based on a distribution-regulation pattern, and 
this created an environment of clientalism, discretionary policies and pressure to 
influence public policy. This was mainly due to the government policy of encouraging 
private initiative in development affairs (Bashiriyeh 1984: 46-7). On the surface the 
regime structured a corporate framework in order to channel diverse interests through 
state organisations. In practice the real business of politics went on behind the back of 
formal organisations. In other words, the representation of interests was based on 
clientalism. Clientalism consisted of relationships between the regime, which was capable 
of dispensing resources, and private interests with channels of access to public 
institutions attempting to influence public policy and extract resources. It was thus a 
more informal process based on individual relations between private interests and state 
institutions. Clientalist relationships were concentrated within the decentralised agencies 
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of the government of which the NIOC was the central financial institution, PBO was the 
important institution around which business interests circulated, and the Pahlavi 
Foundation was a conduit for pensions. However, for all practical purpose economic 
policymaking originated in the court which was also the centre of clientalistic relations. 
Moreover, many bureaucratic agencies and organisations fulfilled no functions to 
attain prescribed political goals. They were simply created for special prominent 
individuals in order to satisfy their personal status needs, to co-opt them, or just keep 
them busy. As Tullock states: 
"new organisations are sometimes proposed, not in terms of the function that 
they will perform, but in term of the persons that will be hired, as if their basic 
function was that of hiring employees" (Tullock 1965: 126). 
The bureaucracy also served as the main vehicle for co-opting a large number of 
college graduates, some of them political opponents of the regime in the 1940s and 
1950s (for example, more than 600 ex-members of the Tudeh party were co-opted to the 
political system reaching to high administrative and political positions) (see Abrahamian 
1982; Bill 1975). Many of these individuals were easily co-opted into the system through 
the bureaucracy, the executive power in particular. The huge oil revenues of the 1970s 
made this technique an even more practical device for the system. 
3.1.2. The executive power 
At the top of this branch, was the Shah. From 1963 to 1978, the government grew 
from 12 miniseries with 150,000 civil servants to 19 ministries and 7 ministers of state 
with over 850,000 civil servants (IA 1978: 463). 
The government was fashioned around the principle of sustaining the Shah's power, 
the hallmark of all authoritarian regimes. The Prime Minister and the cabinet were 
responsible for the implementation of state's policies and plans. Since, the experience 
of Mosaddegh, the Shah turned the premiership into the chief public administrator with 
rare opportunity to initiate policy of any significance. The post came to resemble more 
and more that of the old Grand Vizier of the Safavid and of the Qajar periods (Fardust 
1991; Graham 1980). The comparative analysis, according to diagram a and b in Chart 
3.2 shows the Prime Minister's power over the executive was undermined by the Shah. 
The two main bodies of politico-economic policy making, namely the cabinet and the 
High Economic Council were indeed headed by, and responsible to, the Shah. Premier 
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Amir Abbas Hoveyda (1965-77) who accepted this subservient role was an astute 
interpretator of what the Shah wanted from the post of the prime minister. The cabinet 
would take no independent important decisions in main issues concerning the country. 
These decisions were reached in advance by the Shah or in private audience either with 
the prime minister or with individual ministers or heads of agencies. On these issues, at 
best the cabinet acted as a forum for working out the application of decisions. An 
Iranian of ministerial rank explained his experience in cabinet meetings as follows: 
"at my first cabinet meeting I was very nervous; but then I almost laughed 
when I saw how frivolous the whole thing was. No one talked very much. I 
remember one day a minister got up and asked why do we bother to come 
here if no one discusses anything" (quoted in Graham 1980: 134). 
Such attitudes stemmed from the Shah's control over their appointment and 
dismissal. Although the Constitution would have it otherwise, Parliament had actually 
no say in such executive appointments. 
Ministers tended to use influence defensively, to protect their own position from the 
rivalries of other ministers or heads of government agencies. This created a 
considerable antagonism between ministers, often deliberately fostered by the Shah. An 
important by-product of this antagonism was that ministers continually sought to 
ensure their ministries were seen in a favourable light by the Shah, distorting facts and 
figures being one method amongst others (for ample examples in this respect see Alam 
1991). The Shah was a master practitioner of the art of "government by distrust" 
(Fatemi 1982: 51) and the policy of "divide and rule" (Graham 1980: 131). Thus, his 
mode of governance became one of creating overlapping and competing bureaucracies, 
dependent on him. The Shah, knowing that facts were withheld or doctored (ibid: 135) 
reinforced his parallel government, which duplicated with little efficiency the institution 
it was monitoring. For instance, in 1975 the Shah created an Energy Ministry to be 
responsible for the country's energy policy. Nevertheless, this ministry had no control 
over the management and policy of NIOC, NIGC, and AEO, those of which reported 
direct to the Shah - never to the cabinet. Even the NIOC itself, was not consulted on 
oil price policy. Thus, the ministry theoretically responsible for energy matters had its 
ministry broken up into separate parts which could only be co-ordinated through the 
Shah. 
Considering Chart 3 .1, three vital areas of defence and intelligence, oil policy and 
foreign affairs were exclusive spheres for the monarch. In foreign policy, there were a 
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limited circle of individuals rather than organisations who carried out policy 
initiatives.6 At the top were Alam and the Iranian Ambassador to Washington, 
Ardeshir Zahedi. The Shah had daily meetings with the Foreign Minister who 
presented him with confidential reports arrived from the Iranian embassies. Moreover, 
he was furnished with intelligence reports on other countries by bis intelligence 
organisations - SIB and SAVAK in particular - and by the CIA and British intelligence 
agents in Tehran (see Alam 1991). 
For the Shah, burgeoning oil revenues was not only the source of realisation of his 
dreams and ambitions for Iran, but also a main instrument in keeping the elite in 
control and society at large in satisfaction, and hence preserving the monarchy. This 
was done by personally negotiating the oil contracts and price policy with foreign 
governments and companies (i.e. the major 1972 oil contract and the 1973 price 
policy), by giving specific directives to the NIOC and the Iran's representative in 
OPEC7 and by monitoring important affairs both in the policy-making and the 
operational level of the oil industry. 
In many developing countries the one ministry that provides a separate power base 
is defence. In Iran, the Ministry of War had been kept in the hands of the military since 
defence was considered to be outside the sphere of civilian ministers. In the area of 
defence, as will be argued, the Shah effectively discouraged any horizontal links among 
the top generals, and involved himself in making decisions on all kind of military 
activity. By providing benefits and privileges, he isolated the officer corps from 
domestic politics and made them completely loyal and subservient to him. Purchase of 
military equipment was handled by General Tufanian, based on the Shah's prior 
decisions. 
3.1.3. The legislature 
The Constitution had given the legislature, consisted of the Majles (assembly) and 
the Senate, the authority to control the policies and acts of the cabinet on matters vital 
to the interest of the nation. It should approve any disposal of state property or funds, 
internally or foreign managed concessions and monopolies, and government 
borrowing. The Shah through the 1949 amendments of the Constitution gained the 
power to dissolve the Majles during a session. He also acquired authority to withhold 
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his signature from any bill passed by the parliament and also return them for 
reconsideration. 





During the Shah 
until 1963 
1963-67 1967-71 
Civil servant 32 27 32.5 60.5 69.4 
Landlord 29 40 40.5 13 0.5 
Ulama 17 8 3 1 0.5 
Bazaar merchant 11 11 9 6 1 
Technical 9 12 13.5 15 22.5 
profeshion 
Private sector 2 1.5 1.5 6 1 
employee 
Lower classes — 0.5 — — 5.1 
Source: for 1963-71, Karname-ye Majles-e Shora-ye Melli (The Majles Report), Various issues; 
Shaji'i, 1963: 181, 265 
Table 3.1 shows that the number of landowners in the Majles had increased from 
the Constitutional Revolution until 1963. The Majles, during thr CR period, consisted 
of large landlords, government officials and ulama, consecutively. The first Majles (in 
the first CR) was led by merchants and ulama, and supported by the Qajar 
administration. The second Majles (1909-11), following the second CR, was 
dominated by landlords at the expense of merchants and the ulama. During the Pahlavi 
dynasty - until the land reform of 1963 - by the policy of forceful co-optation of 
landlords to the modernisation policy of Reza Shah, the landlords remained in power 
and were present in the Majles but more as urban-centred officials. However, their 
source of power, this time, was not their land or tribal connections but their connection 
to the court. 
The 1963-78 period witnessed the enormous expansion of the economy and the 
bureaucracy. As a result, the Majles in this period - the 21st to 24th sessions - was 
represented more by government officials, professionals and businessmen. Through the 
effect of the land reform of 1963; 
"the traditional landowners who occupied the key positions in the 
bureaucracy and legislature in the pre-land reform era lost their power basis 
qua landowners" (Ashraf and Banuazizi 1980: 54; see also Ashraf 1995). 
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They were in the Parliament with their new status as businessmen and industrialists. 
The Shah's policy of new elite recruitment from new social bases led to an increase in 
number of bureaucrats in the Majles, mostly from the middle class who had no 
connection to land ownership. In spite of the rapid industrialisation process, the 
representation of industrialist technocrats in the Majles remained rriinimal relative to 
the bureaucrats. In the 21st Majles (1963-67), for example government employees 
represented 60.5% of deputies, while the representation of landlords were limited to 
13%. The trend was to continue with the rapid capitalist development of the country. 
In the next Majles (1967-71), educated professionals dominated the Parliament. 67.4% 
of the deputies had university education, while more than 69% of the deputies were 
bureaucrats, (see also the CIA report, 1976 in Asnad 1980: 73). 
Although the Senate was provided for in the Constitution, its first session met in 
1950. It numbered 60 members of which 30 were appointed by the Shah, 15 elected 
from Tehran and 15 from the rest of the country. Its role was to act as a conservative 
check upon the Majles, and consisted of former prime ministers, cabinet ministers, 
retired generals, business and professional men, all in all, a place for members of the 
loyal elite of the elder generation. In seven sessions, during the 1950-78 period, 80 % 
of Senators were landlords or of landlord origin. 
From 1962 onwards, all Majles elections were controlled by the state by 
widespread use of the security forces and fraud. Only those, who were approved 
secretly by the regime were to be elected (Fardust 1991: 257). The Shah admits that "it 
was taken for granted that every one [candidates] cheated" (cited in Laing 1977: 221). 
However, by the establishment of the Rastakhiz party in 1975, secret introduction of 
such list of designated candidates became official, permitting no one other than the 
approved list to run for election.8 
Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, both Houses of Parliament played a role in 
enhancement and institutionalisation of the Pahlavi regime. However, in areas of 
concern to the Shah, they were nothing but a rubber stamp to his desires and a 
working committee at the government's disposal (Katouzian 1981: 123). They were 
functioning more as administrative rather than political organisations (Graham 1980: 
137, 144). 
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3.1.4. Political pasties 
In the post-World War I I period the most active and influential parties were the 
Erade-ye Melli (national will), the Communist Tudeh (masses)9, Iran Party which 
continued to be active with its liberal programme throughout the post-war years, Hezb-e 
Zahmatkeshan (the Toilers' Party) which was designed to speak for the industrialist 
workers, the Pan-Iran Party included ardent nationalists, and Jebhe-ye Melli (the 
National Front). 
In 1950 the National Front attached itself to the prestige and personality of Dr. 
Mosaddegh. In time it came to include the Iran and the Toilers parties, religious 
leaders and independent deputies in the Majles. After the fall of Dr. Mosaddegh (1953) 
as the Prime Minister, his most vehement nationalist followers gathered in the Nehzat-e 
Moghavemat-e Melli (the National Resistance Movement, 1954). In the aftermath of 
the coup the political parties of the Mosaddegh era found themselves banned and a 
tight censorship imposed. Later in the 1950s two parties loyal to the Shah were set up 
- the ruling Melliyun (the nationalists) led by Premier Manuchehr Eghbal and the 
'opposition' Mardom party (the peoples') headed by the then Interior Minister Alam. 
In 1960, some of the political parties including the National Front were reactivated 
once again. 
However, the short period of quasi-party system was abandoned when by the end of 
1963, the Shah began consolidating his power and let only those parties to flourish that 
had proved loyal to the Shah and his regime. By the 1960s only Iran Novin and 
Mardom parties, popularly known as the 'yes' and 'yes sir' parties, were allowed 
which dominated the houses of Parliament.10 No one really believed that this system 
represented something like a two-party system (Binder 1962: 221-2). These 
organisations were without substance and both wholly under the Shah's domination. 
On a couple of occasions when the leaders of the Mardom Party voiced criticism, they 
were dismissed: Ali-Naqi Kani in 1972, and his successor Naser Ameri were sacked 
(Halliday 1979: 46-7). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, none of the parties were seriously involved as a means 
for political participation of the masses. Most party functions were done by the 
institutional interest groups, among which SAVAK was one of the most important 
(Razi 1970: 83). 
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By 1975, however, the Shah had decided to create a one-party system, to undertake 
a more active policy designed to mobilise support for the regime and to strengthen the 
state's political role, not merely in a passive but in an active way within Iranian society. 
In a new initiative he announced the establishment of a new single party, called 
Rastakhiz-e Me Hi (National Resurgence Party). 
The party was used in three main ways: to channel and depoliticise public debate, to 
act as a parallel watchdog organisation of the aciministration, and a sort of popular 
police force.11 To act as a unifying organ, the party had to 'educate' the nation the 
kingship ideology (see Hinnells 1975) - the mythology which for the Shah was the 
"spirit and ideology of Iranian [White] Revolution" (the Shah 1976: 183-4; Mission 
1961: 336). Therefore, the party founded five newspapers (the daily Rastakhiz, the 
Workers, Farmers, Youth, and the Theoretical Rastakhiz) as one of the means to 
achieve this goal. 
It had an additional and important purpose, namely to generate support for the 
regime and to provide a means of forcing people to compromise themselves by 
declaration of loyalty. Promotion, security, contacts - much could depend on whether 
someone was a party member or not.12 The creation of Rastakhiz party dismissed the 
verbal claim of the Shah for a democratic political system in Iran.13 The Shah's word 
on the matter was blunt enough: 
"We must straighten out Iranian's rank. To do so, we divide them into two 
categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Sixth 
Bahman Revolution [the White Revolution]; and those who don't...A person 
who does not enter the new political party [Rastakhiz] and does not believe in 
the three cardinal principals which I referred to will have two choices. He is 
either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the 
outlawed Tudeh party, or in other words is a traitor. Such an individual 
belongs in an Iranian prison or i f he desires he can leave the country 
tomorrow...because he is not an Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities 
are illegal and punishable according to the law" {Keyhan International, 8 
March 1975). 
Helped by SAVAK, the party took over the ministries that controlled thousands of 
livelihoods and tightened state supervision over organisations dealing with 
communications and mass media. Thus, it intensified state control over the salaried 
middle class, the urban working class, and the rural masses. The party became 
responsible for directing debate in society, including in the Majles and media - on non-
contentious issues like rent and traffic. Key issues such as defence, oil policy, and 
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freedom of expression were never touched on in party debates or the Majles 
discussions. 
The party, by the design of the Shah, was split into two wings - the Progressive 
Liberals led by Interior Minister Amuzegar, and the Constructive Liberals led by 
Hushang Ansari, the Finance Minister.14 The distinction between the party executive 
and the government was deliberately obscured, because one way or another, the 
majority of the Cabinet was represented in the party's Political Bureau. 
In practice the party proved, as all single party systems under an authoritarian 
regime seem to do, to be just another extension of the executive. Instead of 
establishing stability, the party weakened the whole regime, cut the monarchy further 
from the country, and intensified resentment among diverse groups. 
3o2. The adtaimistirative role of the bureaucracy and its failures 
In line with increasing oil revenues, the role of the state expanded dramatically in 
the Fourth Plan period, and as of 1974 it was predicted to expand again. This meant 
that the burden of satisfying the rising level of expectations among the population 
would increasingly lie on the shoulders of the bureaucracy. In fact, the revised Fifth 
Plan turned out to be well beyond the absorptive capacity of the administrative 
apparatus of the state. Yet the state was to be caught in the unenviable position of 
being forced on the one hand to expand its role in the economy and on the other, of 
being made to fulfil the promises it had made, albeit at the urging of the Shah. The 
government did not refuse to carry out a programme it knew it could not implement. 
As will be shown, the surge in oil revenues radically expanded the role of the state in 
the economy. In every sector, oil money was to be spent on bigger projects and more 
wide-ranging social programmes. The demands of the Fifth Plan on the Iranian 
bureaucracy required an almost overnight expansion as well as a concurrent 
simplification of procedures. 
According to Table 3 .2, the administrative expenditure, accounted for a major share 
of the government national budget. The Table shows that the modernisation of the 
bureaucracy was a priority for the government in the 1960s. The development of the 
bureaucracy under the Shah was filled with ironies. Challenging new demands were 
placed upon it, and the administration grew rapidly in size and in technical expertise. In 
the years from 1965 through 1978, the number of Ministries expanded from 12 to 19. 
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TABLE 3.2% Composition of Central Government Consumption Expenditure 
(in percent) 
1963 1970 1976 
General Expenditure 62.7 68.9 68.1 
General administration 36.0 30.9 19.6 
Military expenditure 26.7 38.0 48.5 
Specific Expenditure 37.3 31.1 31.8 
Education 21.1 14.6 12.2 
Health 4.2 4.2 4.5 
Social welfare 0.6 1.1 1.7 
Agriculture 1.3 2.5 6.6 
Transport and communication 5.3 3.3 1.1 
Miscellaneous 4.6 5.3 9.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total (billion rials) (47.2) (135.2) (1170.0) 
Source: PBO, The Budget of 1977-78; Karshenas table 7.15 P. 195 
1 excludes extra budgetary accounts and local governments budget 
The number of established civil servants15 increased from 97,000 in 1965 to 280,000 
in 1973 and later to 850,000 in 1978, a 9 times increase over 13 years (Iran Almanac; 
Statistical Yearbook, various years). In 1975, the government announced that it will have 
opening for 102,000 new civil servant employees in the year 1975/6 (IA 1975: 430-1) 
which was more than the aggregate newly employed civil servants in the 1960s. 
However, the nature of their responsibility changed just as rapidly, for they were now 
charged with the rapid modernisation of virtually all aspects of the nation's life. 
Public employment was perceived by the state as an appropriate channel to distribute 
oil income. The number of public employees increased from 660,000 in 1966 to 850,000 
in 1972, an average of 25,000 new recruitment per year. But from 1973, the rate of 
public employment growth increased substantially, notifying the extensive impact of oil 
revenues in the expansion of the bureaucracy. Public employment had risen to 1.7 million 
in 1976 and around 2 million by 1978.16 Public employment constituted 7.6% of the 
country's work-force in 1956, rising to 19% in 1976 and over 20% in 1977 (Iran's 
Statistical Yearbook 1995: 70; 1978; IA, various years). To the number of public 
employees in 1977, should be added the extremely costly 100,000 foreign workers,17 
many of whom were from the US and Europe and working in defence and defence 
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related fields. The direct share of public sector in work-force shows the vital importance 
of the public service in labour market. 
Another major characteristic of the bureaucracy was the emerging dominance of the 
new, technocratically oriented younger generation of a major segment of the civil 
servants over the older, experienced traditional ones. In the 1960s and 1970s a formal 
degree was one of the principal criteria for filling jobs in the bureaucracy. Education and 
political power went together, and the higher the education, the more prestigious the 
government positions gained. The substantial increase in the number of universities and 
colleges and the number of students sent abroad for higher education resulted in large 
numbers of college graduates, and so the bureaucracy expanded very rapidly during this 
period, and graduates were easily absorbed by the bureaucracy, partly to respond to the 
more active role of the state and bureaucracy in the economy and social life. The Pahlavi 
regime by the 1970s created a large class of educated bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie 
composed of officers, civil servants, and professionals in Iran. For the first time, a 
partially Westernised class of bureaucratic technocrats emerged as a significant social 
and political force in Iran. In the period of 1971-77, the number of civil servants with 
higher education (BA and higher) almost tripled, rising from 22,000 in 1971 to about 
60,000 in 1977 (IA, 1971, 1978). In 1975, 30% of them were educated abroad. This 
accounted for 2.9% of the total educated civil servants (IA 1976: 360). 
Although, very often the formal economic and social goals of the bureaucracy were 
announced publicly, the actual manifestation of those goals were frequently delayed, 
forgotten or completely abandoned. Furthermore, there was always confusion about the 
organisational goals and objectives of the bureaucracy due to the continuous creation of 
new agencies, amalgamation or separation of the existing offices, and constant changes 
and revisions in their duties and functions. This confusion often caused delay, indecision, 
inaction, and conflict (for a case study on these points see Farazmand 1989). 
Self-enhancement objective of the bureaucracy, however, were consistently pursued 
by the individual bureaucratic organisations. This was done through the annual budget 
preparation (by PBO), the review of agency performance, the formulation of proposals 
for organisational and administrative reform and improvement (to Administrative and 
Employment Organisation). Such proposals often contained requests for increase in 
agency personnel and greater organisational and administrative discretion in policy 
implementation as well as internal operational decision-making processes. 
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The country's administrative system was premised on overlapping responsibilities and 
therefore conflicting interests and intense rivalries among the actors; the virtual absence 
of any lateral communications within the administrative (and the military) hierarchy 
(Farazmand 1990: chapter 2; Mottale 1987;.on the military see P. 122). 
Secondly, the administration was highly centralised in management and decision-
making, both geographically and bureaucratically. In 1972, against every six government 
employees working in the provinces, four were working in Tehran alone. However, the 
governors of towns in district places are virtually sent from Tehran, or a major provincial 
capital, by direct appointment. The manager of a small bank branch in a rural township, 
for example was virtually appointed by the bank chairman in Tehran; this goes for all 
other institutions, including education, finance, and so forth. For instance, the directors 
and managers of state firms and enterprises were mostly appointed by the Cabinet or 
other powers to be, generally without consultation with the permanent staff of those 
concerns. The independence of the state apparatus from the local elite would also 
encourage the arbitrariness and high-handedness of the central bureaucratic authority. 
Furthermore, Katouzian (1995: 19) argues that due to multi-ethnicity of Iranian society, 
the strict administrative centralism and the prevailing attitudes and policies of the Shah's 
regime towards the provinces had resulted in a considerable degree of conflict on ethnic 
and linguistic minorities. The hierarchy of power and decision-making was from top-to-
bottom, resembling more of a military-form chain of command, a characteristic of an 
over-centralised state. 
Thirdly, although almost all modern bureaucratic organisations show a degree of 
formalisms, 1 8 the Iranian bureaucracy was marked by extreme formal structure and a 
high degree of formalism. The degree of formalism and bureaucratism was so pervasive 
that no political, economic, or social affair of the country could be run without the 
exercise of bureaucratic power. Self-perpetuating and self-serving bureaucratic 
organisations spent a great deal of time every year preparing achievement reports to 
demonstrate favourable achievements to the Shah (reported directly or in the annual 
Ramsar Conference every August). In fact these documents often distorted or even 
falsified facts in order to make the agency's work appear prestigious and significant (Bill 
and Leiden 1974). 
Extreme degree of bureaucratisation had caused delay, indecision, and inaction. One 
high official recalled: 
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"When I reached the top, I realised that I had to follow through every decision 
myself if I wanted to be secure that it had been carried out" (Economist, August 
28, 1976: 13). 
Bureaucratisation was prevalent in every facade of the administration. This high 
degree of formalism was significantly functional to the political system, which considered 
rational administrative behaviour a challenge to the regime (Bill 1972; Binder 1962). 
Finally, a most debilitating feature of the bureaucracy, as was pervasive in the 
monarchical system of the Shah, was its corruption, both actual and, perhaps even more 
so, perceived. The Shah's use of public money to enrich himself, as will be shown in the 
following chapter, was not new; it dated back at least to the latter part of the 1950s. The 
personalistic approach to government made it impossible for the Shah to distance himself 
from ubiquitous corruption. The institutionalisation of corruption meant that formal 
written laws and regulations had little to do with the actual activities and had little impact 
on how Iranians felt about legal and illegal behaviour. It was not uncommon to observe 
the making and implementing of important organisational decisions based on informal 
considerations and corruption and then stamping them with legal formalities. I f one did 
not want to get a job done, one was able to bide behind bureaucratic rules and 
regulations. 
3.2.1. Failure of the administration 
The Iranian bureaucracy was not public service oriented; rather, it was a powerful 
political instrument in service of the monarchy and the Pahlavi regime under the Shah. 
Hence, the political role of bureaucracy seemed to outbalance its administrative role. As 
the political system maintenance and regime enhancement roles of bureaucracy 
outweighed its administrative public service role, it became a repressive tool of 
domination, maintaining control, and imposing constraints over population and 
permeates society. 
The government decision-making process under the monarchy was cumbersome and 
highly centralised. The need to eliminate bureaucratic red tape and excessive 
centralisation, to streamline the decision-making process, to restructure the incentive 
system of public sector employees, and to fight ubiquitous corruption and lethargy was 
widely recognised especially after the advent of the oil boom. The then prevailing system 
in which even the most minor requests went to Tehran and large contracts were awarded 
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from Tehran had become anachronistic and presented a major roadblock to higher fixed 
capital formation. A start, seems, had been made in the direction of decentralisation, but 
the policy appeared to have remained more in law than practice (Economist, August 
1976: 13). 
A perceptive observer characterised the deficiencies of the system as follows: 
"The de facto decisional apparatus continues to resemble the bureaucracy's 
traditional, patrimonial system. It is a system marked by informal relations in 
which tensions and competition are everywhere evident. Officials are cautious 
not to offend superiors or to be identified with decisions and programs that 
might fail to realise expectations. In the absence of agreed achievement criteria, 
ambiguity prevails over whether one will be judged by performance standards, 
by paper credentials, or by family and friendship ties. The many elaborate, often 
redundant, procedures instituted to thwart administrative wrong-doing are 
ineffective in preventing serious conflicts of interest. Opportunities for personal 
gain are expected to offset low government salaries" (Weinbaum 1977: 442). 
Despite the appearance of an extensive and the recently renovated bureaucratic 
machinery of the 1960s and 1970s, and having access to massive financial resources 
from the oil sector, the bureaucracy was severely handicapped in its goal oriented 
activities due to subordination to the court and the clientalistic nature of the form of 
representation of the state (Karshenas 1990: 195). The government resembling the 
characteristics of a rentier state was not under the same kind of pressure to develop an 
orderly and efficient bureaucracy (Mahdavi 1970: 466-7). 
Another principal weakness of the bureaucracy was its structural instability to 
implement the excessive responsibility of both regime enhancement and development 
policies. Divided authority and insufficient co-ordination - particularly between the 
regional and central organisations or between municipalities and the ministries -
severely impaired administrative efficiency. The administrative tasks were made doubly 
difficult because the existing governmental structures combined most of the 
disadvantages of overlapping and overcrowded ministries and organisations with 
excessive departmental independence, combined with many of the evils of excessive 
centralisation. That is to say, where greater local autonomy and fewer bureaucratic 
formalities seemed to be in order, the administration was handicapped by excessive 
bureaucratisation and centralised direction. And where inter-agency co-operation and 
policy co-ordination were absolutely essential, the needed central planning and 
supervision with no conflict of functions seemed to be lacking (Mcdaniel 1991: 98; 
Farazamnd 1990: 44-51). 
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In addition to these inefficiencies, overlapping jurisdictions existed and increased by 
the Shah personally among government offices. Some important constitutional 
relationships between the various branches of government were not satisfactorily 
clarified. The government's development activities, for example, were not always in 
harmony with its monetary, fiscal, trade, and defence policies. Altogether there was 
not enough collaboration among ministries and agencies (Foran 1993: 314; Graham 
1980: 133-4). 
Judged by contemporary standards of efficiency and streamlined organisations, the 
Iranian administration had many additional shortcomings of which over-classification, 
salary discrepancies, irregular promotion of civil servants combined with corruption and 
wastage are some examples. In a sense these problems were organically tied together. 
For example, the deficiencies in the administrative machinery, the high degree of 
centralisation, and corruption exacerbated the question of absorptive capacity. 
3.3. The Authoritarian Regime 
There are two types of political stability - one brought by increased participation, 
the other by repression (Pesaran 1982: 305). Of these, the state forged by the Shah 
between 1953 and 1978 clearly adhered to the method of repression as Reza Shah had 
done between 1925-41.19 In many respects the conditions of the rise of the Shah to 
power and the social and political character of his regime were similar to those of Reza 
Shah in the inter-war period. The Pahlavi state developed over a decade into an 
authoritarian regime relying on a repressive army and oil revenues as the twin sources 
of its hegemony in Iranian society. 
The most important function which the repressive apparatus performed was that of 
guarantor of the regime's survival. However, it is essential to see how the apparatus 
was used, and in what manner its different branches were deployed. The Shah, as his 
father, used the army to crush resistance in towns and the countryside. Tangibly, direct 
intervention by the army is how both Shahs came to have effective power. After the 
major urban operation in crushing the mass uprising of June 1963 in Tehran and a 
number of other cities until the commencement of the revolutionary movement in 
1977, the army remained garrisoned near towns, occupied universities and was sent 
into tribal areas on a number of small-scale campaigns. But having said this, it was not 
the army that played the most active repressive role in the country in the period of 
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1964-77: this was shared out among the other sections of the repressive apparatus, 
behind whom the army stood in reserve. Hence, the army played a major role in 
regional hegemony of the regime. 
Evans (1978: 48-9) argues that in the case of dependent development, the need for 
repression is great and the coercive apparatus excludes the already activated urban 
popular sector. In Iran as in countries like Brazil and South Korea exploitation and 
repression were integral component of the state in its development process. In the 
latter two countries, repressive apparatus was extensively used to incorporate labour 
into the industrial structure, and keeping wages growing at a rate substantially lower 
than productivity and profit. This was because, in Brazil and South Korea, control of 
labour was one of the critical components of capital accumulation. Therefore, Evans 
notes: 
"To complement the state bourgeoisie in the economic sphere a professional 
bureaucratic group is required to staff the coercive apparatus, and the military 
are the obvious candidate" (ibid.). 
However, the prime objective repressive apparatus in Iran was to destroy all the 
political groups to preserve the monarchy on the one hand, and to provide stable 
condition for the inflow of international capital and technology on the other. In Iran 
the working class was bought in by the abundant oil revenues. Therefore, in Iran 
repression was aimed more at political objectives. Any opposition to the rule of the 
Shah and his alliance with the US was repressed. The political process gradually lost 
its relevance in affecting the course of decision making and "politics became 
depoliticised" (Moaddel 1993: 55). National integration was therefore maintained by 
brutal force. The army intervened when SAVAK failed to control anti-government 
movements. Before the establishment of SAVAK, the Shah used para-military groups 
to suppress any internal opposition to his oppressive rule. Among these were SUMKA 
(National Socialism of Iranian Workers) and the military wing of the Arya Party - led 
by military generals.20 
3.3.1 The military forces 
For the Shah, a strong army was the foundation of the state. In reality, the existence 
of his regime and his father's was due to military intervention (in 1921 and 1953). 
Thus, his regime rested on the armed and security forces. However, while Reza Shah, 
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originally a military officer, put a distance between himself and the armed forces by 
becoming an autocratic monarch, the Shah increased this distance and made it much 
more difficult for any commander of the armed forces to challenge his position without 
challenging the very structure of the state. 
The Pahlavi military machine, compared with pre-Pahlavi armies, was not only 
different in its size, institution, and organisation, but also with regard to its source of 
recruitment. The latter almost always was recruited from the tribes. Thus, the tribal 
structure was the determinant factor in the emergence of dynasties. During the Pahlavi 
era, however, the new modern army was established from the urban and rural 
inhabitants and young educated technocrats having no major connection with 
economic and political base of power. 
The new army was a twentieth century creation with no strong pre-determined 
social character or historical role and with no more connection with the armies of 
Xerxes and Shah Abbas (Halliday 1979: 66). However, the regime tried to foster a 
sense of continuous military strength through the ages. Apart from this kind of 
propaganda, it was also an ideological construct, one designed to obscure the 
predominant discontinuity in Iran's military history. The members of the armed forces 
were constantly reminded in their training of the need to be loyal to the Shah and of 
the need to re-create the past greatness of Iran, a greatness inextricably linked in 
current mythology with the institution of monarchy. The Shah might have been reliant 
on the army as he was, but he also controlled it and was increasingly able to 
depoliticise it. 
The army was "the eyes and ears, where necessary, his [the Shah's] iron fist, 
neutralising all those disloyal to the regime" (Graham 1980: 145). Furthermore, "the 
army" for the Shah was "the very cornerstone of this country's future" (Alam 1991: 
523). Thus, modernisation of the army, as in the time of Reza Shah received priority 
and the major share of government revenues. The Shah emphasised to the American 
ambassador in 1970 that: 
"...for us the acquisition of arms is a matter of life or death", therefore, "we 
shall find the means to finance our defence budget, even i f it means our going 
hungry" (ibid.: 137). 
The military forces consisted of The Imperial Armed, Air and Navy Forces and the 
Shah's personal guards being Guard Javidan (immortal), Guard Vazifeh (conscript) 
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and Capital's Division One. Furthermore, Law Enforcement Forces of the Police, the 
paramilitary Gendarmerie,21 and auxiliary organisations such as the Civil Defence 
Organisation, the National Resistance Forces,22 were parts of the enlarged military 
forces of the country. 
It was the Shah himself who decided what arms to buy and how much. The defence 
decision making process was relatively simple: 
"The Shah decides on all major purchases; his vice-Minister of War, Hasan 
Tufanian implements these decisions" (US Senate 1976: 7; see also General 
Ghara-Baghi BBC Document, programme. 18, tape no. 6). 
The size of the armed forces increased from 200,000 men in 1963 to 413,000 
regular personnel, 300,000 reserves, and 74,000 para-military forces in 1978. The 
ground, air force, and navy consisted of 285,000, 100,000 and 28,000 personnel 
respectively (the Military Balance 1978-79). 
TABLE 33 : Defence Expenditures, million dollars. 
Year 1963 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
. . „ _ . . . . . „ „ „ . _ ___ . _ . 
Source: Table A28 
Calculated based on $1= 67 rials in 1974 
According to Table 3.3, the annual defence budget increased from $200 million in 
1963 to $1.3 billion in 1973, and later to $10 billion in 1978, excluding $1 billion 
allocation for paramilitary forces of gendarmerie and police (PBO 1978, part 3). Out 
of the 1976-7 budget of $45 billion the Shah was spending $9.3 billion on defence 
(Financial Times, 21 June &11 August 1976). 
The average annual increase of defence share in GDP was 5.3, 7.8 and 12.2 percent 
during the Third, Fourth and Fifth Plan periods respectively. One of the peculiarities of 
Iranian military expenditure was its very high import content. While arms imports were 
rising by 36.7% on average annual growth rate, it constituted about 30% of the 
country's total imports during the Fifth Plan - rising from 12.2% in the Fourth Plan 
period (Mofid 1987: table 5.3). 
From 1955 to 1978, foreign military sales agreements between Iran and the US 
totalled $20.7 billion, of which 92.5% accounted for the 1973-78 period. The Shah in 
1976 placed an order for another $12 billion worth of armament to be delivered by the 
Authoritarian-Bureaucratic Regime 118 
US by 1980, and an order for $4 billion worth of Rapier intercept missiles in return for 
crude oil to be delivered by the UK (Table 6.4). 
During the Fifth Plan (1973-78), defence expenditure accounted for 31% of public 
expenditures and more than 10% of the country's GNP. Ehiring the reign of the Shah, 
the military budget was growing faster than the rate of growth of the national budget. 
For instance, from 1954 to 1972, the military budget increased 34 times while the 
national budget increased 24 times (Table A26). In 1974/5, Iranian arms expenditures 
accounted for 46% of US arms sale abroad - more than four billion dollars - and kept 
more than a third of a million American employed in defence work (The Scotsman, 21 
March 1975). 
In addition to the registered defence budget, the secret budget was another source 
of military expenditures, part of the civilian accounts included sizeable military 
allocations such as the establishment of military posts and outposts, construction of 
military roads, housing, and training of military personnel. For example 70% of the 
public housing outlays during 1973-78 went for military construction (Moaddel 1993: 
57-8; Abrahamian 1982: 435-6). Clawson (1993) correctly argues that in case of Iran, 
such priority given to military expenditure constituted a distortion of the country's 
overall socio-economic development. 
Bribery and embezzlement were common in both foreign and domestic military 
contracts and had very much involved the royal family and the military elite. 
Furthermore, embezzlement included billions of rials of domestic military contracts - in 
construction of houses, military bases and airports, internal purchases, etc. - controlled 
by high ranking military personnel in addition to the royal family. It included 5% - and 
in cases 10 to 20 percent - of the price of the actual contract.23 The Shah, being aware 
of the extent of involvement by the military ruling elite in financial malpractice, used 
this knowledge as a tool to dismiss and imprison some of the high ranking officials. For 
example, in 1976 rear-admiral Atta'i and his deputy rear-admiral Rafi'ee along with 12 
other officers were sentenced in connection with $120 million embezzlement 
concerning the development of the port of Bandar Abbas. 
In the 1970s, oil revenues enabled the regime to purchase enormous quantities of 
weapons, while at the same time, it was encouraged by the US to become a regional 
power. Thus, the function of the army was partly to underwrite Iran's claim to regional 
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supremacy in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Asia in the 1970s. As the Shah pointed 
out: 
"We are not thinking of defending Jask and Chah-Bahar. We are thinking of 
Iran's security perimeter and I am not speaking in terms of a few kilometres. 
Anyone versed in geographical, strategic matters and especially in possibilities 
of naval and air forces o f today would guess how distant the frontier could be 
from Chah-Bahar" {Keyhan International 11 November 1972). 
Thus, the Shah's personal regional ambition made him the best nominee for the 
Americans, to police the Persian Gulf. By 1977, Iran had the largest navy in the 
Persian Gulf, the most up-to-date air force in the Middle East, and the fifth largest 
military force in the world (Abrahamian 1982: 435-6). 
On the other hand, the army played a major domestic role. Combined with the 
security forces, it was a guarantor of the Pahlavi dynasty and would confront any 
potential internal fragmentation of the Shah's regime. As US Senator Humphry put it 
in 1960: 
"Do you know what the head of the Iranian army told one of our people? He 
said the army was in good shape, thanks to US aid - it was now capable of 
coping with the civilian population" (quoted in Halliday 1979: 75). 
His concern for the army took two basic forms. Firstly, it was to transform the 
Iranian military into one of the greatest powers which, to this end, he solicited and for 
the most part obtained vast quantities of technical advice and advanced equipment. 
Secondly, he took great pains to ensure the army's loyalty to his person and prevent 
any possibility of independent action on its part. His mechanism of control were 
multiple and effective. Highly trusted individuals, often family members, were put in 
the top posts (see Alam 1991: 60). The army as a whole was treated as an extremely 
privileged caste, cut off as far as possible from the rest of society and enjoying the 
special favour of the Shah. The Shah co-opted his officers by purchasing the best 
military equipment available and by giving them special prerogatives, among them, 
high pay, special privileges, access to new housing, and special discount stores. 
The Shah's capacity to control the army was not only a matter of keeping them 
materially happy and its top leadership insecure; above all, it was a function of the 
general economic and political 'stability' of the country. It seemed that: 
"as long as the state has the money to meet the army's demands and to ensure 
prosperity for the Iranian bourgeoisie, the Shah's capacity to control the 
repressive apparatus will be considerable" (Halliday 1979: 71). 
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In short, military officers became a new privileged class, wholly dependent on the 
Shah for their livelihood. By providing these benefits, the Shah successfully isolated 
the officers corps from domestic politics and made them completely loyal and 
subservient to himself. The long-term result was that the upper class of the officer 
corps lost touch with the Iranian people. 
The Shah created a multiplicity of offices and purposefully played them against each 
other. The result of this policy was that the military administration became unwidely, 
with unclear lines of authority and a poorly defined structure. A problem emanated 
from the very structure of the armed forces: In theory, each service was headed by a 
general officer who was a member of the supreme commander's staff, similar to the 
American military system. However, in contrast to the latter, the commanding 
generals had little real authority over their commands. As the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces, the Shah was reported to on a regular basis on all matters concerning 
the funding, organisation, and military preparedment of the services. What made this 
seemingly normal reporting requirement unusual was that the Shah made decisions on 
all kinds of military activities.24 This made him the de facto commander of the 
individual services as well (Sullivan 1981: 74), and left little room for the development 
of initiative. In fact, initiative was the one factor likely to get a senior officer into 
serious trouble with the Shah. 
Ever conscious of the possibility of a military coup against the monarchy, the Shah 
constantly manipulated his senior officers, just as he did other politically influential 
members of Iranian society. I f a senior officer attained a position from which he might 
derive too much power or influence, he was subject to rapid retirement, demotion, or 
transfer.25 
The Shah's unique form of administration of the armed forces effectively 
discouraged any horizontal links among the top generals, thus, discouraging a sense of 
solidarity and mutual trust within the hierarchy, since a cohesive officer corps posed 
potential political danger. As a consequence, a possible co-operative structure within 
the army was undermined. Furthermore, the army began to resemble patrimonial 
armies that were, in Weber's words "incapable of any action without the ruler and 
completely dependent upon him" (Weber 1968 in Moaddel 1993: 61; Homayun, BBC 
Document, programme. 18, tape no. 6). Whatever draw backs this inefficient structure 
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may have had for administrative rationality of the armed forces, were offset for the 
Shah by its political advantages. 
Quite separate from the loyal cadre of officers, were two distinct classes: the 
warrant and non-commissioned officers, and the conscripts. The former were drawn 
largely from the urban middle classes with a different attitude towards the Shah. The 
non-commissioned officers who had risen from the ranks were, in the main, ardent 
supporters of the Shah. The warrant officers were highly trained specialists who filled a 
variety of technical positions, but while they had received their education from the 
government, they had not been granted privileges commensurate with those enjoyed by 
the officer corps. 
Even more loosely tied to the Shah's regime were the conscripts. Because they had 
not volunteered for duty, the conscripts were never fully trusted by the military cadre. 
During two years of military service, there was little to make them loyal to the 
Commander in Chief, the Shah. They were often kept in a position of near-servitude 
while other regular personnel were noticeably enjoying a wide range of privileges. 
The Iranian armed forces in 1978-9 were in turmoil. Organised for the wrong war, 
divided by class and loyalty, lacking decisive leadership, and disunited among 
themselves, it was unable to control the situation (see General Jam ibid.; General 
Rezvani, ibid.; Zahedi in an interview, London Keyhan, 11 August 1994). 
Furthermore, the conscripts, who were present in the streets to confront 
demonstrators, disobeyed their commanders on frequent occasions. When the 
conscripts were ordered into the streets to face down the revolutionaries, they were 
met by people from the same strata o f society who held the same values and beliefs as 
they did. Hence, these situations combined with the indecisive attitude pervasive 
among the top generals, resulted in a moral dilemma, in which the conscript was not 
enthusiastic to shoot the people in support of the Shah (see Ghara-Baghi BBC 
Document, program. 18, tape no. 6). 
When the Shah fled the country on 16 January 1979, the military he left behind was 
a far cry from the one in which he had invested so heavily during his reign. The Shah 
may have hoped that the military would somehow be able to restore his throne, but the 
Iranian military forces were unable to preserve themselves, let alone the monarchy. 
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3.4. Yh& Secmiiriitly Faress amid JPfflDntncall M©pir©3§ii<D>im 
Over twenty years the security services became the central pillar of the Shah's 
system of government. In matters of national security the judgement of such 
authorities had to be accepted without further debate. The armed forces may have been 
the ultimate guarantors of power; but the security forces ensured that the armed forces 
used the least to confront the opposition. Even in the security field the Shah wanted to 
have overlapping authority and alternative channels of control. Security services 
during the Shah's rule can be divided into two broad groups; the intelligence unit and 
the operational unit. The former consisted of SAVAK, the Special Intelligence Bureau 
(Dqftar-e Vizhe-ye Ettela'at), the military intelligence or G-2 (Rokn-e Do), and 
Imperial Inspectorate (Bazrasi-ye Shahanshahi). The operational unit included the 
Gendarmerie, Police, and Imperial Guard (though each had its own limited intelligence 
unit). While each of these organisations acted independently of one another, there 
existed frequent overlapping and sometimes conflicting duties and functions. 
As Chart 3.3 shows, while the military intelligence monitored the activities of 
officers within the armed forces, the Special Intelligence Bureau closely watched over 
SAVAK, and also guarding against any military coup or conspiracy. To increase 
efficiency in intelligence gathering, the 'High Council of Intelligence Co-ordination' 
(HOC) was established in 1960 and headed by General Fardust. Its main objective was 
to co-ordinate planning and organising functions of the security forces. Members of 
the council were heads of SAVAK, gendarmerie, and police force, the chief of staff, 
and chief of G-2 (Fardust 1991). However, over time, the council was marginalised by 
SAVAK and later lost its importance by the establishment of the National Security 
Council headed by the Shah himself in the 1970s. 
While the SIB and the HCIC were British model agencies,26 the Military 
Intelligence and SAVAK (main part of the organisation) were modelled on the 
American system. 
The Imperial Inspectorate was created in 1958 partly in response to US' accusation 
of corruption in the Iranian bureaucracy. It was primarily an investigative agency -
probing into political, economic and social matters. Its prime concern was monitoring 
how ministers and individuals were carrying out the Shah's policies and investigating 
sensitive cases of misconduct or suspected disloyalty among high officials. I t also 
appeared from time to time to monitor the activities of other members of the royal 
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family - especially their business involvement. Every organisation in Iran was under 
orders to co-operate with it and it was empowered to carry out regular, but 
unannounced, inspections in every sphere of central and provincial government 
(Mission 1961: 177). The heads of the Inspectorate were first General Pakravan, and 
later from 1971 General Fardust. 
The SBI was the least-known of them, created in 1959, after the attempted coup by 
General Gharani. It was answerable neither to the Majles, the Rastakhiz Party, the 
cabinet, the police and SAVAK nor the armed forces - only to the Shah himself. Most 
important of all, as Chart 3.3 shows, it was responsible for secret monitoring and 
investigating the activities of the armed and security forces including SAVAK -
through secret networks established by the Bureau, which only the Shah had been 
informed of. 2 7 Moreover, the Bureau was the most important channel of the news and 
analyses to the Shah. It prepared a daily report (only in one copy) to the Shah, 
containing the most important political intelligence, military, and administrative issues. 
3.4.1 SAVAK 
Sazman-e Ettela 'at Va Amniyyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK) was established in 1957 with 
the help and influence of the CIA, the FBI, MI6 and Mossad - the Shah had already 
turned to the Israelis for the provision of his personal security (Laing 1977: 208; 
Halliday 1979: 75-90). It seems that the Shah preferred to have both overlapping 
authorities and different organisational systems within the security field. Responsibility 
of the Third office of SAVAK was similar to the FBI and MI5. The Second, Seventh 
and Eighth offices were responsible for espionage and anti-espionage activities, similar 
but smaller scale MI6 and CIA type organisations. The appointment of Fardust as the 
vice-Chief of SAVAK for 10 years, was the turning point in peaceful coexistence and 
merging of the two different American and British systems of intelligence in SAVAK. 
It operated under the protective cover of the military, organisationally affiliated to the 
Prime Minister's office, and answerable only and directly to the Shah. By the mid 
1970s, the Anti-Sabotage Joint Committee, known as the komiteh, consisting of the 
police and the gendarmerie was established and led by SAVAK. In fact, it became the 
first stage of interrogation and torture, any political prisoner would have experienced. 
During the 1970s, both the intelligence gathering and operation against political 
opponents were entirely led by SAVAK. 
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SAVAK became a key instrument in the Shah's acquisition of absolute power. 
Since its establishment, it thrived on the Shah's deep-felt need to insulate himself and 
his regime from all potential enemies. It penetrated all aspects of Iranian life, 
infiltrating organisations through its network of agents and a large number of paid 
informers.28 Iranians, particularly in urban areas, lived with the permanent fear that 
they were under surveillance (Macdaniel 1991: 66). SAVAK's functions were 
manifold: it gathered information on individuals and groups; infiltrated or directly 
controlled many organisations such as government-run trade unions (of which there 
were over one thousand in 1978); exercised influence over many aspects of 
government social and economic policy, which could easily be constructed as relevant 
to security; and pursued and punished enemies of the regime without limitations on its 
power. 
SAVAK's all-embracing brief meant that it could overrule ministries and other 
government agencies. For instance, it interfered extensively with the ministry of 
information and culture on matters of censorship and artistic control. 
Although the true number of political prisoners had never been verified, Amnesty 
International estimated 25,000-100,000 political prisoners in Iran in 1976. The 
repression was of course pervasive in political life. By the late 1970s, no area in the life 
of an Iranian was immune. The economy, culture, education, and all forms of 
communication were subjected to vigorous SAVAK scrutiny and control. 
SAVAK's basic weapon was intimidation by a ruthless suppression of suspected 
opponents. The effect aimed at by SAVAK was to spread a deep sense of fear, 
suspicion, disbelief, and apathy throughout the country, and in so doing it formed an 
integral part of the state's overall relationship to Iranian society, including among the 
officials (for a case among many see Radji 1983: 37). Its activities either real or 
imagined, created a widespread fear and had Iranians being afraid of the mere threat of 
SAVAK's intervention. The extent which this policy effected the life of ordinary 
people is clear in this known proverb of the 1960s and 1970s that 'arvar mush dareh, 
mush gush dareh' (wall has its mouse and mouse has ears and is listening to what you 
say even in your private moments). 
Some forms of intimidation were denial of exit visas and job promotion, refusal or 
withdrawal of grants, pressure on family or friends, threat of legal prosecution, exile, 
arrest and imprisonment. The ultimate form of intimidation was the threat of death. 
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Yet, even with its all power, SAVAK was subject to the same set of controls and 
instruments of surveillance of which it was a part. It was set off against the military 
security organisation and monitored by a still more secret, independent organisation, 
the SIB. No doubt this flowering of the coercive apparatus intimidated many of the 
Shah's potential opponents and destroyed a significant part of opposition, but it did so 
at enormous cost to the regime and the Shah's domestic and international reputation. 
Macdaniel (1991: 66-7) points out that his mastery of the instruments of autocratic 
rule proved their limitations in the actual governing of a modern society, which 
depends on more than the public fear of the ruler. 
3.5. The Monarchy-Centred Nationalist Mythology 
The idea of democracy was suppressed by the advent and consolidation of the Pahlavi 
monarchy, while secular ideology remained the dominant discourse both within the 
society and the state. The implementation of Reza Shah's modernisation programme 
resulted in an increasing dissociation of state ideology from religion. Although the ulama 
were instrumental in bringing Reza Shah to power, the official ideology of the new state 
began to glorify the pre-Islamic period (see Faghfoory 1993). During the rule of Reza 
Shah, nationalism began to be identified with the nation, and the concept of citizenship 
was substituted for religious allegiance (Moaddel 1993: 62). 
The ideology of the state under Reza Shah and the dominant cultural trend within 
society by and large belonged to the same ideological universe, and the Shah's campaign 
against the ulama was reinforced by the anticlerical attitudes and secular orientations of a 
segment of the Iranian intellectuals. However, after World War I , the nationalistic 
feelings and secularism of this intellectual elite were organised more in the National 
Front under the leadership of Mosaddegh. 
The pre-emption of the idea of nationalism from the monarchy and association of the 
regime with foreign interests during the oil nationalisation period were causing serious 
ideological problems for the Shah. What further cast doubt on the nationalism of the 
Shah was that his rule was established through the direct assistance of the US and Great 
Britain. Following the coup, the state was directed toward responding to the ideologies 
of the opposition, liberalism of the National Front and Communism of the Tudeh. It 
attempted to appreciate the idea of nationalism from the first and revolution from the 
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second. Then it took on an increasingly anti-Islamic character and at the same time 
drifted in an authoritarian direction. 
The Shah began to portray his nationalism as a 'positive'2 9 force- in response to 
Mosaddegh's ideology of negative nationalism - and to portray himself as the champion 
for revolutionary change. As the Shah proclaimed: 
"Iran needs a deep and fundamental revolution that could, at the same time, put 
an end to all the social inequality and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction 
which impeded progress and kept our society backward" (the Shah 1967: 15). 
From this period, the Shah associated his rule with the idea of modernisation, 
civilisation, and equality. These reforms provided a basis for the Shah's ideological 
campaign against his opposition. The Shah frequently referred to the ulama as 'black 
reactionists', the pro-Mosaddegh nationalists as 'destructivists', and the Communists as 
'the red force of destruction' who combined to paralyse his action (The Shah 1967: 12). 
The Shah's ideologues were claiming that the ship of state was steering a proper course, 
navigated by an experienced captain capable of guiding it through the stormy waters of 
social change to the threshold of a 'Great Civilisation'. To provide his 'revolution' with a 
sense of continuity, the Shah was periodically adding other principles - to the initial 
principle of the land reforms of 1963 - to what he called 'the Shah-People's Revolution'. 
In the 1970s, while the Shah was enjoying full control over the populous at large -
through efficient monitoring and manipulation of the authoritarian-bureaucratic 
establishment - his desire for greater institutional sation of the monarchy increased.30 
For him "the attainment of goals is not possible except by relying on the racial virtues 
and ancient qualities" (the Shah 1954 cited in Laing 1977: 141). Thus, among the most 
controversial of his actions were the widespread propagation of the ideology of 
kingship. The Shah in his interview with Fallaci stated: 
"When there's no monarchy, there's anarchy, or an oligarchy or a 
dictatorship. Besides, a monarchy is the only possible means to govern Iran" 
(cited in Halliday 1979: 58). 
To propagate the monarchy-centred national/kingship mythology further, emphasis 
was laid on the pre-Islamic history of Achaemenid. The twenty five hundredth 
anniversary of the Achaemenid dynasty at Persepolis was celebrated in 1971 to 
establish a historical continuity between the political past and the present. In 1976 the 
Islamic calendar was changed into a monarchical one, whose beginning was dated back 
to the accession of Cyrus the Great, from whom the direct descent of the Persian 
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crown was somewhat unhistorically claimed. Prime Minister Hoveyda, praised this 
decision of the Shah in the Parliament as: 
"a reflection of the historic fact that during this long period, there has been 
only one Iran and one monarchic system and that these two are so closely 
interwoven that they represent one concept" (Keyhan International, 15 
March 1975: 1). 
Furthermore, these efforts were to create an illusion that the Pahlavi monarchy had 
clear and deep roots in the ancient kingship of the country.31 
The state discourse became authoritarianism proper when in 1975 the Shah abruptly 
dissolved all the 'official' political parties and declared that the country had a one-party 
system, the Rastakhiz party. "One country, one Shah, and now one party" became the 
regime's new slogan (Zabih 1979: 7). In principle, there was little difference in the 
state's ideology under the two Shahs, even though the second Shah stretched the 
monarchy-centred nationalist discourse to its logical extreme (Moaddel 1993: 64). 
Based on what has been said, the Shah based his power on three pillars: the state 
autonomy, the armed forces, and the network of court patronage. The authoritarian-
bureaucratic establishment was used both as an instrument of power and control, and 
as a tool for achieving development goals; an instrument for system maintenance and 
regime enhancement. The repressive apparatus performed as the guarantor of the 
regime's survival. The decision-making process and exercise of power, depended 
exclusively upon the Shah and his relationship with the ruling elite. Such exercise and 
manipulation of power depended on the autonomy of the state. 
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Chapter Four; State Autonomy and Shah-Elite Relations 
The Pahlavi state had two social bases. At its narrowest, it could be reduced to the 
Shah, i.e. his vast decision making power, his extensive wealth and central position among 
the economic elite, and the general tendency to credit him for everything that the state 
made happen. As a set of authoritarian-bureaucratic institutions, the practical basis of the 
Pahlavi state could be broadened to include the court, heads of the army, security forces, 
the bureaucracy, and key individuals. While the court on the one hand, and the 
bureaucracy and the authoritarian apparatus on the other, were the main pillars of the 
Shah's regime, any influence in these institutions meant an influence in the political 
process of the country. 
In the 1960s and 1970s and in the absence of effective societal constraint, the political 
decision making process was determined by a variety of factors. The most important of 
such factors - apart from the state's organisational character which was shown in chapter 
3 - was the set of beliefs and psychological attributes that shaped the Shah's priorities. 
Certain critically important resource limitations and international constraints suddenly 
ceased to offset state policy-making in Iran, due to. the tremendous increase in Iran's oil 
revenues in the early 1970s; its growing military power; and, the British decision to 
withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Shah was able to enhance his quality of leadership, to tighten his control through money, 
and to expand the room provided to him by autonomy of the state. This situation enabled 
him to impose his personal ambitions as state priority policies and objectives. Thus, an 
analysis of the Iranian state in the post-World War I I period cannot avoid focusing on the 
personality, vision and modus operandi of the Shah.1 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is firstly, to examine the forces which shaped the 
Shah's set of beliefs and psychological attributes, namely his 'dual' personality and the 
US moral and politico-material support for his regime, secondly, the ways in which, the 
Shah could efficiently control the ruling elite, and thus the policy-making process. 
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4.1. Dual Personality of the Shah; Grandiose Versus Passive Personality 
In political systems where there is a dominant figure, modes of psychoanalytic thinking 
can be productively used to analyse the political behaviour of a political leader and the 
relation of a leader to his followers, and thus to serve as part of the process of monitoring 
the 'pulse' of a political system (Zonis 1991). The point of emphasis here is that 
psychoanalytic theories can point to the behavioural components of the Shah's character 
which are significant and will help us to shed light on why he took or failed to take certain 
actions (see Kaplan 1990; Gronn 1993). 
To understand the Shah's life, we should note, as Kets de Vries argues, the socio-
cultural context of his life and examine it over time. The Shah's character highlights: 
"the impact of the interplay of genetic predisposition, parental influences, and 
the effects of society [political circumstances] at each stage of [his] life" (Kets 
de Vries 1990: 426). 
Indeed the pursuits of the Shah were heavily influenced by bis personality and the 
experience of his early youth. The Shah had two contrasting characteristics. When he was 
in control and was not challenged, he would display his grandiose character, being a 
forceful, determined and active man. However, when he faced a challenge to his rule, he 
would turn into a passive, and indecisive man, lacking self-esteem and self-confidence 
(Sullivan 1981: 12-3; Zonis 1991: 17). These contradictions resulted from his personal 
struggles to compensate for his inadequate psychic supplies; his severe 'narcissistic 
imbalance' - which were the result of his childhood experiences in the form of indulgence, 
threats and rejections (for his childhood experience see Mission 1961; Ashraf 1980; 
Sorayya 1963;Fardust 1993). 
Parental influence had a major role in shaping the dual personality of the Shah (see 
Mission 1961). Furthermore, such 'duality of personality' was evident in his years at Le 
Rosey school2 (see Jacoby, diaries from bis days in Le Rosey, Newsweek, No. 20, Feb. 
1949; Fardust 1991: 42-44; Zonis 1991: chapter 2). The result of his childhood both in 
Tehran and in Le Rosey was that he had grown into a young adult with what 
psychoanalysts would characterise as severe narcissistic imbalance (Zonis 1991: 53-4). He 
was a young man lacking self-confidence. He himself believed that he may have grown up 
with some sort of a 'complex' (Alam3 1991: 372). Fearlessness and a weak-willed 
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personality were what Reza Shah had always feared for in his son (Zonis 1991: 106). At 
the early stage of his rule, the Shah's identification with his father enhanced his sense of 
comfort and strength. He praised Reza Shah frequently for his strong personality (see in 
his Mission 1961: 12, 27, 36-7,40-50). This praise served at least two purposes. It served 
to convey legitimacy for himself and his dynasty. Furthermore, by elevating the stature of 
his father, it served to provide a personal purpose - an idealised representation of his 
father which the Shah had created for himself during his formative years and into his 
adulthood. 
Although the regime relied extensively on repressive armed and security forces, and oil 
revenues as the twin sources of its hegemony in Iranian society, the Shah relied on 
sources of moral support to maintain his capacity as the Shah and to substantiate his 
grandiose character - to be Shahanshah or the king of the kings. The principal means 
through which he received psychic strength was by: establishing close personal links with 
a few determined but absolutely loyal personal associates who particularly could help the 
Shah in his difficult moments.4 They included Alam, Peron, his twin sister Ashraf, 
Fardust, Shapur G., Hoveyda, Ayadi and Farah.5 For example, it seems in the 1963 
uprising, it was Premier Alam who gave the necessary moral strength to the Shah to make 
the decision of military intervention and the dispersal of the protest (Alam 1991). The 
second major source of confidence which could generate the Shah's self-affirmation, was 
external support. In his childhood and early adulthood, the source of such support was 
God or 'divine protection' which had saved him from "dangers and perils" (the Shah 
1961: 54-6, 222). " I receive messages... I have been chosen by God to perform a task. 
My visions were miracles that saved the country" (The Shah interviewed by Fallaci, in 
Fallaci 1973: 1). This conviction must have given him the first independent feeling of 
strength.6 It is not clear whether these claims were more than a political device from 
which he sought greater authority and legitimacy, were only public relations gimmicks, or 
a deeply held belief to help him overcome the passive quality more apparent in his youth. 
However, going through the 1950s, the source of external moral support came to be 
the US. It is worth noting that US support for the Shah's regime was far from a politico-
psychological support. Indeed, one of the major forces involved in the establishment and 
expansion of the Iranian authoritarian-bureaucratic state was the US. Throughout his 
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reign, the Shah utilised these two mechanisms to distance himself from his passive 
character, to enhance his own positive self, and to believe that the latter was his most 
dominant quality. 
In his weakness, his propensity for withdrawal from threatening or challenging 
situations would increase (for his cases of withdrawal in 1953 see Ashraf 1980; for 1963 
see Alam; for 1978-9 see Sullivan 1981).7 Such instances of withdrawal were frequent 
and consistent enough so that their occurrence constituted a pattern - a pattern that 
would provide him with comfort and calm. The Shah was quoted as saying: 
"physically I am not afraid, but mentally you're [I'm] always constantly afraid of 
something, either by yourself or something that might go wrong with yourself or 
with your friends or with your allies that you're counting on" (The Shah 
interviewed by David Frost, 1979, quoted by Zonis 1991: 98). 
In the context of the Shah's prevailing passivity and weakness in the 1978-79 crisis, 
therefore, Arjomand (1988: 117) argues "with no doubt that the collapse of the man [the 
Shah] preceded the collapse of the monarchical regime". 
Confidence, for the Shah, in the international arena was slow in coming. To a great 
extent, ever since the 1953 coup, the Shah had been dependent on the US for military, 
economic, moral and political support. In order for the Shah to achieve confidence, it was 
necessary for him to shift away from his client patronage with the US to a growing 
independence. The importance of the confidence factor in the international arena for this 
analysis is that the Shah began to approach Iran's internal problems with a self-confidence 
and presumed infallibility that was to lead the country toward what Vakil and Razavi 
(1984: 64-6) call: "wrong policy choice". What had been painfully required in 
international politics, after many a humiliating experience, was now to be applied to the 
solution of domestic problems. The added confidence resulting from the 1973 surge in oil 
income sealed that infallibility in the Shah's own mind, and made materialisation of his 
ambitions possible. This was, in spite of the fact that the increased complexity of the 
economy required ever greater delegation of authority at all levels (ibid.). 
His relation with the ruling elite would alter to a major extent, from his time of control 
to the time of weakness. After surviving challenging situations, he further consolidated his 
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monopoly over the political process, and ensured that those beneath him in the system, 
co-operate fully with him. 
In his positive and strong personality, he sought to 'modernise' Iran through 'rapid 
industrialisation', rush the country towards 'the Great Civilisation', to refashion the 
country in an image of power and international significance which would mirror his own 
grandiosity (for many instances which emphasise this aspect of the Shah see Karanjia 
1977). 
4„LL Grandiose years and the Shah's policy priorities 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah had finally thrown off the 'play boy' image which 
dogged his youth and emerged as a formidable statesman and politician. In the course of 
trying to realise his ambitions, he developed a personal arrogance which later become 
institutionalised (The Times 12 September 1971, 29 November 1978). 
As Iran's resources increased with oil sales, realisation of his gratifying ambitions 
increased. "We shall not accept anything less than a first class position for Iran" (The 
Shah in an interview with daily Keyhan, cited in Keyhan International 17 September 
1977: 6). Iran would regain the splendour of the Persian empire, the Iranian economy 
would attain Western European standards, and the Iranian army would become the 
strongest conventional, non-nuclear military power in the world, all in less than two 
decades (see the Shah in Alam 1991: 389; Fallaci 1974: 19; Karanjia 1977: 261, 243; 
Heikal 1981; The Guardian 23 July 1975). He made great efforts to develop Iran's 
economy in the 1960s and 1970s, using the state's growing revenues to promote rapid 
industrialisation. Cottam (1979: 362) notes that the Shah's ambition and grandiosity 
dominated his domestic and foreign policies (on the Shah's psychology see also Bayne 
1968; Zonis 1991). In so doing, however, the Shah overemphasised Iran's financial 
resources, underestimated the country's absorptive capacity and ignored the social cost of 
such spending. As will be illustrated in chapter 5, his development programmes were 
grossly ill-suited to the country's social and economic conditions. He did not succeed in 
diversifying the single-commodity export economy. He did little to alleviate poverty and 
the disparity in income distribution that afflicted many classes and individuals in the 
country. He placed a high priority on building up Iran's armed forces and expanding its 
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role in regional and world affairs. However, he ruled in a highly authoritarian manner, 
repressing all forms of opposition and emasculating Iran's political institutions. 
Two dramatic experiences had concerned the Shah. Firstly, was the humiliation of his 
father by the Allies, who forced him into abdication and exile in the wake of their 
occupation of Iran in 1941. Secondly was the humiliation that the internal opposition had 
heaped on him in the 1940s and especially in the 1950s. As a result o f these experiences, 
two equally and related concerns became the obsessions of the Shah. These were firstly 
the pursuit o f external security of his state and his dynasty through the expansion and 
equipping of the Iranian armed forces at the highest qualitative and quantitative level, and 
secondly, the construction and expansion of an administrative hierarchy, highly 
centralised, totally disintegrated and answerable only to him. 
For the Shah, it was only himself who carried the merits: the magnificence, the genius 
gene in all subjects, and uniqueness in leadership. He remained convinced of the 
faultlessness of his conduct of government, thus wishing it to continue entirely unchanged 
under his successor (the Shah in Karanjia 1977: 263). It was the Shah's will which 
counted. He always claimed that he sought what was best for the country and the people. 
For him to achieve his objectives for Iran, required a strong leader "who is not dependent 
on people's vote [and] is free to act directly in their national interest" because the nation 
does not realise its interest due to its "ignorance" and lack of "maturity" (Alam 1991: 
383; Radji 1983: 97). Such a high degree of self-esteem resulted in his claim that "the 
whole nation is mine without me having to stake some petty private claim. Everything is 
at the disposal of a ruler of strength" (the Shah to Alam - when he was presented with the 
title deed of the new palace on Kish island in his own name - in Alam 1991: 228; see also 
Radji 1983:180). For example, in 1975, the regime, having confidence in the continuing 
increase in oil revenues, signed a trade package calling for $15 billion in purchases by Iran 
from the US, including 8 nuclear plants (Keyhan International, 4 September 1975). In the 
same year the Shah boasted that within two decades Iran would build 21 nuclear plants, in 
which, estimates for the capital costs of plant construction, infrastructure, nuclear fuel, 
and training programme could approach $100 billion (ibid., 1 September 1977). Such 
nuclear ambitions were a reflection of the grandiose fantasy that the Shah was pursuing. 
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In his heydays, magnification of himself was equal with humiliation of others. His 
continuous humiliating behaviour offended everyone. The Shah liked to give the 
impression that "anything we say is far too insignificant to merit his attention", Alam 
argued and further pointed out that in serving him "ingratitude is all part of the job" 
(Alam 1991: 60, 218). For the Shah, the Pahlavi family was "a selfish bunch" of "good 
for nothing" who would be "totally lost" without him (Alam 1991: 473, 485). The 
ministers, thus, could not be more than a bunch of "donkeys" or people who had "as 
much intelligence as a herd of sheep" (Alam 1991: 393, 413). 
4.2. The Shah by the Grace of the US 
The Shah witnessed dissolution of the Iranian modern army - which was built by his 
father over two decades - in just a few days during World War I I . For him, while the new 
army saved the Pahlavi dynasty vis-a-vis the internal unrest and regional movements, it 
was unable to protect the monarchy and to preserve territorial integrity of the country 
against major foreign assaults. Thus, reliance on an external power became a must in 
order for him to preserve his royal seat. He saw the US as the most powerful of 
protectors: 
"As long as the Americans support me, we can do and say whatever we want" 
(quoted by P. Salinger 1981:59 in Zonis 1991: 168). 
Indeed, the US was the power ultimately responsible for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Azarbaijan and Kordestan in 1946; for the 1953 coup which restored the 
Shah to his throne, for the massive military and economic assistance that allowed the 
Shah to stay in power after his restoration to the throne and for selecting the Shah's 
regime to serve as a regional power as part of President Nixon's foreign policy in the 
1970s.9 
Furthermore, underlying the political and economic ties between the Shah and the US 
was a special personal and psychological relationship that the Shah had developed with 
the US and its presidents. It was to a significant extent, a source of psychological well-
being for the Shah's political leadership (Zonis 1991: chapter 8; Sullivan 1981. 163). The 
Americans full confidence in the Shah and astounding new oil revenues, which made 
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purchasing military equipment from the US possible contributed to an extensive 
enhancement of the Shah's power within the state. 
Nonetheless, the consolidation of American influence over the Shah and the Shah's 
utter dependence on the US did not occur until the overthrow of Mosaddegh. In the early 
1950s, the central position, which the Shah had so assiduously cultivated after assuming 
the throne in 1941, rapidly collapsed, along with his morale. After his abrupt 
reinstatement of Mosaddegh, following the street demonstrations in 1952, the Shah's 
morale diminished in fear of a replication of the coup partem in Egypt which led to the 
exile of King Farouq by the Free Officers. Therefore, the American-led coup of 1953, 
accomplished by the CIA, with participation of ARMISH, GENMISH and the 
instrumental role of MAAG, restored the Shah's power and rebuilt his personality as a 
"new man [who] for the first time, believes in himself' (Eisenhower 1963: 165; Rick 
1982).10 
Consequently, the regime committed itself to a formal alliance with the West, and tied 
not only Iran's foreign policy but also the country's socio-economic development to the 
interests of the capitalist world. This alliance constituted: 
"the basis for the development of Iran's 'dependence relationship' with the 
United States at the cost of the country's traditional policy of nonalignment" 
(Saikal, 1980: 46). 
The dependent relationship with the US was fostered as well by the oil consortium 
agreement of November 1954. American oil companies managed to win a 40% share in 
Iranian oil production from which they had previously been completely excluded on 
account of the British monopoly.11 
The commitment to Iran's stability as a bastion in support of US economic and 
political interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East meant commitment to 
the monarchy through economic and military loans, credits, and grants during the 1950s 
and 1960s (see chap 6). The Shah later agonised over the possibility of abandonment by 
the US under the Kennedy administration, as he thought that the US was going to 
support a major change in Iran's political system. Although, the Shah was forced by the 
new Kennedy administration to announce the land reforms, US support for his regime 
continued.12 
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4.2.1. US-Iram relations restructured 
The Nixon-Kissinger visit to Tehran in 1972 and its consequent result, i.e. a blank 
cheque to the Shah which guaranteed him access to some of the most sophisticated non-
nuclear weaponry in the US military arsenal, restructured the US-Iran relationship for the 
1970s.13 Americans granted the regime the status of the major regional power in the 
Persian Gulf.14 Now he felt that he was recognised as a world class strategist, and that the 
country was privileged to have entered a regional, strategic security-alliance with the US. 
As a result, by the early 1970s a strong military relationship with the US was moulded 
and later reasserted by the oil boom of 1973, and became the main conduit for realisation 
of the Shah's ambitions. However, there was a personality change by mid-1970s. Now 
and then, the Shah manifested a grandiosity and arrogance toward the West - as he was 
doing toward Iranians. He was fond of lecturing the West on its decadence and its failure 
to keep its own house in order (i.e. see the Shah quoted in Heikal 1981:96-7: Fallaci 
1974). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah was successful in persuading the establishment 
of a 'Shah-centric' foreign policy in US administration towards Iran. This policy 
reaffirmed the Shah's behaviour in which, effectively, all contacts with the US had to pass 
through his person or the institutions which were part of the system. The US policy was 
Shah-centric because over the years he had been such a faithful ally. 
During the later 1970s, while the Shah's psychological dependence on the US 
crystallised, the election of Carter exacerbated bis fear. He became uncertain about the 
new American interest in this part of the world, its commitment to previous agreements, 
and its attitude towards him as a ruler (Sullivan to the State Department, 
January/11/1978, in publications of SFI, hereafter Asnad, Vol. 12: 16). This was due to 
the receipt of contradictory and ambiguous signals from the Carter electoral campaign 
and later from Carter's administration.15 The resolve of the Shah was thus weakened by 
fostering doubt in the commitment of the US to his rule, which simultaneously 
encouraged the opposition to the Shah to believe that the US might support some 
alteration in the balance of power in domestic Iranian politics. To solve the contradictory 
signals and to strengthen his resolve, the Shah undertook a state visit to Washington in 
November 1977; President Carter had a stopover in Tehran in 1978. As a result of these 
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trips the Shah recovered his mood of confidence and satisfaction. Carter's support was 
beyond the Shah's expectation (Homayun, BBC Documentary, programme 20, tape no. 
7). In Tehran, he declared: 
"Iran because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one 
of the most troubled areas of the world...We have no other nation on 
earth...closer to us in planning our mutual military security... And there is no 
leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal 
friendship" (Keyhan International, 3 January 1978: 1). 
However, in December 1978, General Azhari told Ambassador Sullivan: 
"you must know this and you must tell it to your government. The country is 
lost because the king cannot make up his mind" (Sullivan 1981: 212). 
The Shah had obviously been used to receiving advice from the US on internal politics. 
Brzezinski writes that "the Shah wanted the US to take responsibilities for the painful 
decisions needed to keep Iran intact" (Brzezinski, 1983: 371). It was not that he sought 
to evade the responsibility for making the difficult decisions. His capacity as a political 
leader had been substantially undermined, leaving him incapable of making firm and clear 
decisions. It was becoming "increasingly doubtful that the Shah could act on his own" 
(ibid. 372; Homayun, BBC Document, programme 20, tape no. 7). 
4.3. The Shah and His Regional Concerns 
For the Shah, it was not only the US and its presidents, with whom he was concerned. 
His relations with other states and over other crises and movements particularly in the 
Middle East and among Iran's neighbours, were of great concern to him. The region had 
been shaken by crises, upheavals, and changes of regimes which had on occasions worried 
the Shah and directly affected his regime.16 Therefore, the two main objectives of Iran's 
regional policy were namely: to minimise their negative effects; and, to establish a 
protective shell against any future crisis in the region. His regional policies would protect 
his monarchy and his international reputation, while serving the capitalist world, 
particularly the US. 
The Shah was closely looking at the monarchical states, the popular movements, and 
the revolutionary states. He had assiduous deliberation with the US administration on 
these issues, receiving advice and instructions, and informing them of the steps he should 
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take or had taken. He was trying to build an alliance of Western-minded regimes in the 
region, his regime being its main pillar. The Shah supported King Hossein of Jordan and 
King Hassan of Morocco both financially and by providing military equipment. When 
King Hossein asked for some F-5 aircraft as a free gift, the Shah replied: "Give him what 
he asks" (Alam 1991: 374). 
He was frightened by the example of Nasser's revolutionary Egypt and its concept of 
'Arab nationalism' which was generating a revolutionary myth among the Arab and non-
Arab countries of the region, including the small sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. 
Therefore, the Shah believed that his regime faced a greater menace in the south, from 
revolutionary Nasser, than in the north, from the Soviet Union (The Guardian 17 
February 1967). He also feared Qadhafi who was a prominent advocate of revolutionary 
changes in the region. When Sadat replaced Nasser, the Shah initiated strong and friendly 
relations with Egypt. At the same time, his relations with Israel were sound and strong in 
politico-economic and military-security aspects. In 1973, he helped Israel by supplying it 
with oil during the hard period of the Arab-Israeli war and the consequent oil embargo.17 
The Shah helped other North African states to confront the spread of revolution. 
Regardless of co-operation with the Algerian government in OPEC, the Shah was 
supporting Morocco - sometimes through Jordan - to suppress the Algerian backed 
Polisario. 
The Persian Gulf for him was the place that he could realise his regional ambitions, and 
it was for the country "a matter of life or death" (the Shah, The Guardian 28 September 
1971). He could not "tolerate radical regimes taking over the Arab Sheikhdoms in the 
Persian Gulf ' (in an interview by Borchgrave, International Herald Tribune 14 May 
1973). Such concerns resulted in despatching 30,000 troops to assist the Sultan of Oman 
against the Dhofari rebels. 
In 1973 the coup in Afghanistan particularly upset the Shah: the king was deposed and 
replaced by a President. The Shah helped the deposed King, exiled to Italy, to possibly 
retrieve his throne.18 When disappointed with the king's retreat, he helped the successor 
regime in Afghanistan to demonstrate that "it is we that call the tunes" (quoted in Alam 
1991: 402). He was supporting the government in Pakistan. By sending tanks and aircraft 
to Pakistan, after their conflict with India in 1965, he could overcome an internal problem 
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of arm smuggling from Pakistani Baluchestan to rebels in Iranian Baluchestan (Laing 
1977: 200-201). He was very cautious on developments in Pakistan and frequently used 
oil and economic aid to distance Prime Minister Bhutto from Arab leaders and bring 
Bhutto on his side.19 
Hence, throughout his regional policy, the Shah followed his two major goals of 
building an alliance of Western-minded regimes, and strengthening moderate regimes by 
weakening the possible popular movements in other countries. 
4.4. The Shah, the Dominant Political Actor 
When the balance of forces within society is disrupted, it is the state that determines the 
new balance of forces (Ehteshami 1995: 16). Between the two World Wars the process of 
modernisation in Iran was accompanied by a considerable degree of change in social 
stratification. New social classes and occupational groups emerged and the power of the 
old and traditional elite declined. While the Constitutional Revolution failed to build a new 
political structure and set up a new base for the elite, Reza Shah undermined the old 
balance of forces: the religious elite was eliminated from the new system by a policy of 
undermining religion; the tribal structure as the main source of military elite recruitment 
was crushed; and, the traditional nobility was undermined. The policy of attacking the 
traditional sources of power was not only pursued but also intensified during the reign of 
the Shah, an alteration from its traditional source of wealth and social status to expertise 
and technical competence. 
Within the context of the nation-state, tribal solidarity gave way to national solidarity. 
The military elite of the national armed forces replaced the old tribal army and became an 
active participant in national affairs. The bureaucratic elite, to a large extent, found a place 
for itself and became increasingly influential. The religious elite was pushed to the 
periphery of the new political structures. The economic elite, whilst prospering monetarily, 
did to a large extent lose its independence. By the 1960s, the Shah had achieved effective 
domination over the other groups within the state, the civilian politicians and the army, 
with whom on occasions, he had to share power. Such 'circulation' of elites was 
intentionally directed by the Shah, not through a competitive open process but by 
occasional use of force 2 0 
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The Iranian political process in the 1960s and 1970s constituted a system in which the 
two principal actors might be considered as the Shah and his political elite - though it is 
impossible to analyse the latter without understanding the former. The decisions of the 
Shah, the dominant political actor, directly affected the political elite.21 It was the degree 
of control, financial autonomy, and the state organisations which would determine the 
influence of the Shah in the Iranian political process. As will be shown later, autonomy of 
the state further assisted the Shah to control the balance of power in his own favour. 
4.4.1. Tin® rulimg ©Bite 
Excluding the Shah as the prime manipulator of the political process, the nobility, the 
bureaucratic and the military elites formed the main body of the ruling elite of the country. 
The religious and economic elites comprised Iran's non-ruling elite during this period as 
the ruling political elite are distinguishable from the non-ruling elite (for a general study of 
elite theory see; Pareto 1916; Mosca 1930; Michael 1949; Battomore 1964). 
The ruling elite mostly secured and maintained its political influence and power as a 
result of characteristics other than that of qualitative superiority. The predominance of 
such groups were chiefly attributed to their connection to the Shah, their foreign support -
namely the American and British embassies and later the TNCs - and partly to their 
professional skills. But whether their predominance depended upon manipulation or the 
use of force, the ultimate skill was organisational. Obviously, greater organisational skill in 
one group denoted a certain type of superiority over rival groups. 
The system was rife with officially sanctioned corruption, bribe-taking, and greed, from 
the Shah down to the court minister and then down through the officer corps and the 
ruling elite, with each maintaining a mini-court of his or her own, surrounding themselves 
with clients. This absorption of the economic surplus and its disbursement throughout the 
upper echelons of Iranian society was one material base of the Shah's power which 
secured the allegiance of his associates to the state and to his person. 
Family relations remained one of the most important factors in the Pahlavis' political 
decision-making process as it was traditionally considered a crucial element. The term 
'thousand families' shows that a number of families had been contiguously represented in 
the political elite, i.e. only 40 families represented 410 seats in the Majles and 66 seats in 
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the Senate from 1906 to 1967 2 2 These elites were linked to one another in a complex web 
of kinship ties, social intercourse, economic co-operation, and political expediency. The 
power of the political elite was considerably buttressed and expanded by intensive inter-
marriage. The branches of the family cluster had inter-married not only with each other, 
but also with an enormous number of other elite families to produce identifiable pairs of 
families.23 The dominant pattern among them was their simultaneous membership in two 
or more elite categories, what Bill (1975: 23-7) calls 'linkage figures'. The Shah, of 
course, was the prototype of the linkage figure because of his ultimate control of direct 
involvement in each of the elite categories. 
Among the ruling elite, the nobility consisted of two groups: the Pahlavi family with its 
63 princes, princesses and cousins who applied immense influence in the political process; 
and, aristocratic families who mainly set up urban ventures - either before the land reform 
or those who survived the reform.2 4 The latter were the traditional elites who had become 
modem by shifting their land and wealth to the urban industrial, agribusiness, and 
enterprise activities. Major figures among the royal family courtiers and confidants were 
Farah, Ashraf, Gholam-Reza Pahlavi, Alam, Ernest Peron, Dr. Ayadi, Ardeshir G. and 
Fardust. 
Distributive and development policies rapidly increased the role and size of the state. In 
order to maintain control over this new state, the Shah turned increasingly to the 
bureaucratic elite, whose political functions now grew. The bureaucratic elite included a 
few hundred elder politicians, senior civil servants and high ranking administrators of the 
bureaucracy, and more importantly the emerging educated technocrats without whom the 
state apparatus would have been unable to function. 
The bureaucratic elite in Iran was the most obvious reservoir of members of the 
national elite. In 1970, the civil bureaucracy was headed by an elite group whose number 
fluctuated between 450 and 500 persons. At the time, there were 22 ministers (including 
ministers without portfolio), 111 deputy ministers, and 331 director generals. A scattering 
of other individuals who were extremely powerful in the ministries bore titles such as 'high 
inspector' and 'technical advisor'. 
The salaried bureaucratic elites were totally dependent on the state, but since they were 
the carriers of change, amongst them professionals who filled the posts in various 
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ministries, economic and social services organisations, companies, universities and 
institutes, they were able to influence the political process and push the system towards a 
more Western direction. It was high calibre people in this new bureaucratic elite that could 
initiate, plan, and implement policy reforms. 
Iranian bureaucrats formed an important sector of society and were active participants in 
the political process. The all embracing nature of politics characterised the close relationship 
between the bureaucracy and the political system. They spent a considerable amount of time 
fostering good relationships with other political elites, influential people, party functionaries, 
and most important of all, the court elite. Thus, they were mostly functioning as career 
bureaucrats and as quasi-politicians. Furthermore, they increasingly played the role of 
businessmen. Such a tri-active role in the bureaucratic state brought the Iranian bureaucratic 
elite tremendous material and socio-political benefits. 
Moreover, by virtue of their position they had a more lasting impact upon the society as 
a whole. Among them were the Majles and Senate members, ministers and deputy 
ministers, key figures such as Sharif-Emami, Hoveyda, Ansari, Zahedi, Fateh, and 
Amuzegar. 
The military elite consisted of the high ranking heads of the security and military forces. 
There existed around 400 generals in the armed forces, either on active duty or retired, 
who were members of the military elite, among whom a dozen, such as Fardust, Khatami, 
Nasiri, Tufanian, were very influential.25 The armed forces and thus the military elite was 
the most independent elite vis-a-vis the other ruling elite. They were recruited mainly from 
social groups other than from the landlords and urban merchants. Consequently, any threat 
from within the political structure to the throne lacked a military base and hence was 
limited. The presence of the American military officers and advisers - 40,000 by 1977 -
would help the Shah to further extend his control over the military elite. 
The military elite, with a privileged position rendered by the Shah, had continually 
expanded its scrutiny over the opposition groups. It also controlled the activities of 
members of the ruling elite even the Pahlavi family, in favour of and under the direct 
command of, the Shah. On two mornings a week, the Shah granted audiences to his 12 
highest ranking generals, and frequent audiences to the heads of SAVAK, Special Bureau 
and Imperial Inspectorate. 
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CHART 4.1: The Ruling Elite and the Reporting Relationship with the Shah, 1965-76 
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4.4.2. The Shah-elite relations 
Most Third World post-colonial states, according to Hamza Alavi are "overdeveloped 
bureaucratic-military apparatus", a system that governs the ruling 'national elite' and 
administers it (quoted by Ehteshami 1995: 16). Thus, in Iran, the Shah at the top of the 
authoritarian-bureaucratic establishment, administered the elite in a way that: 
"to get things done, one needs power, and to hold on to power one must not ask 
any one's permission or advice" (The Shah in an interview in 1973 quoted by 
Halliday 1979: 57). 
During the 1940s, the Shah initially relied upon the support of a conservative coalition 
of traditional merchant bourgeoisie of the bazaar, the high clergy and the landlords. The 
Six-point reform programme of the Shah, labelled the 'White Revolution', the centrepiece 
of which was land reform. This marked the historic break of the regime with its powerful 
traditional allies, and indeed the elimination of an important fraction of this group, i.e. the 
absentee landlords. The 1954-63 period saw the gradual strengthening of royal authority, 
leading to the elimination of parliamentary opposition. Furthermore, the violent 
confrontation of June 1963 marked the end of political compromise with the traditional 
merchant bourgeoisie of the Bazaar and the clergy (Karshenas 1991: 90). 
As Chart 4.1 shows, the Shah successfully imposed ultimate control over the ruling 
elite. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of Pahlavi Iran is that it was the Shah 
who held full executive power in a rapidly developing capitalist state, and that he had been 
able to increase his strength as this process unfolded. However, it is a simplification to 
concentrate only on the actions and position of the Shah in analysing Iranian politics: the 
Shah did not operate in a vacuum and obviously could not run the country single-
handedly. 
The Shah served to anchor the elite and very effectively neutralised its centrifugal 
tendencies, during the 1950s and early 1960s, by policies of co-optation and intimidation. 
The elite responded to this method of rule, according to Zonis "by coping with the system, 
not by attempting to alter it in fundamental ways" (1971: 329). The process of coping 
consisted basically of learning to operate within its norms while maximising the benefits 
that could be derived from it. 
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Within the political system, the Shah had used three different means simultaneously to 
control the political elite: economic power; poUtico-administrative power; and the security 
forces. This was explicated by his treatment of the royal appointment policies, including 
the frequent surprises and personal shake ups in the administration; overlapping 
bureaucratic responsibilities; astute undermining of exceptional individuals arising among 
the elite; the forcing of communications within the bureaucracy in vertical rather than 
horizontal lines; with his own personal appointment and direction of the key cabinet 
ministers; by frequent humiliation of the upper political elite including the generals of the 
armed forces in front of one another or by one another; and most important of all by 
personal administration, nourishment, and manipulation of the armed and security forces, 
which constituted the cornerstone of his power. 
Furthermore, the Shah stimulated the rivalries and created stability for his rule within 
the state through a skilful balance of rivalries by dividing the power of the aggrandising 
elite figures and their offices- i.e. Alam versus Hoveyda; Farah and her office versus Alam 
and the ministry of court; SAVAK versus the SIB.26 Because there had been as many 
dramatic examples of downward social mobility as upward mobility, even the highest 
ranking individuals could not afford to relax. Because of the existing sense of insecurity, 
members of the political elite, in particular, expended a great deal of time and energy in 
cultivating foreign connections and ties (see Radji 1983: 37, 194). 
4 J . Control Through Economic Power 
I f the Shah's self-esteem was reinforced by his psychological relationship with the US, 
his manipulation of political decision making was consolidated by the massive wealth 
which oil exports generated. Therefore, the Shah by controlling the allocative process 
could influence directly the ruling elite or any other economically dependent social class. 
Indeed, capital had been one of the major factors which cemented the Shah's system of 
government. Other than foreign support, three things in Alam's view could keep the 
Pahlavis in power: intelligence and quality of his counsel (loyal ruling elite), control over 
the army, and wealth. In the past, the monarchy was able to bind its power base with 
money either by controlling state revenue or by amassing a large private fortune, or both. 
More often than not these alternatives were indistinguishable since there was little 
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practical division between the private wealth of the shah and state funds - which was used 
to reward loyalty to the shah. Moreover, the shah did not have to make such a distinction 
since he regarded himself as embodying the state. 
During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, the modernisation of the administration 
and windfall of oil revenues, coupled with the expansion of the economy, inevitably made 
the reward system more complex. Hence, out of necessity the distinction between state 
funds and the private wealth of the Shah, albeit on paper, became more clear. The budget 
became institutionalised so that a specific allocation was made for the 'Supreme 
Leadership of the State', which in 1976-7 amounted to $43 million (PBO 1976-7: 19). 
More importantly, the expansion of the economy and the increased revenue from oil 
resulted in a shift in the direct burden of reward away from the royal money and on to 
state funds. The budget was even used to bankroll operations which the monarchy would 
have supported out of its own pocket in the past. For instance, the budget provided 
annual cash backing for such things as Tehran's privately owned exclusive Imperial Horse 
Society, the Imperial Country Club, the Imperial Aviation Club. In the 1976-7 budget, 
$15 million was allocated for these three royal clubs (ibid.: 70-2). 
The expansion of the economy also provided the Shah with greatly diversified 
resources to grant rewards. He utilised the granting of trading and manufacturing 
monopolies and restricted licences or agencies for international companies as a means of 
making people beholden to him. In a highly protected and expanding economy like that of 
Iran such concessions were highly profitable. The Shah permitted trusted individuals as 
intermediaries in large-contract negotiations with international companies in the defence 
and civilian fields. Shapur Reporter in the British-Iranian negotiations of British Chieftain 
tanks, and Abdol Hasan Mahvi in US-Iran military negotiations are only two examples, 
among many, in this regard. 
Throughout the Pahlavi dynasty, a certain blurring and ambiguity of the distinction 
between state funds and royal funds was maintained. The NIOC is claimed to be one of 
the examples of such ambiguity in which it was a source of supplementary and secret 
funds for the regime to enrich the Shah personally and to sustain him in power (see 
Abrahamian 1982: 419-26; Graham 1980: 155-9). Graham (1980) documents that it was 
frequently transferred to a special account controlled by the Shah for either private use or 
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to pay the extra secret purchases for SAVAK and military forces. This kind of 
relationship existed between the NIOC and the royal family for quite a long time. For 
example in 1962 and in less than a month $12 million was transferred from the NIOC to 
the Swiss account of the Pahiavi Foundation (ibid. 157-8).By the oil boom of 1973/4, the 
amount transferred, in one instance, reached $2 billion, and in another occasion in 1976-7 
to $1 billion (ibid. P.156; Abrahamian 1982: 423).27 It seems that during the premiership 
of Hoveyda, in practice, the court was returned to the Qajar style, everything was in the 
hands of the Shah, and what remained was controlled by key individuals such as Alam, 
Ashraf and a few members of the ruling elites. 
The Shah by the 1970s had come to the belief that the nation consisted of nothing else 
but his loyal 'subjects'. Thus, for him "I'etat, c'est moF: everything in the country was 
either his or at his service (The Shah quoted in Radji 1983: 180; see also Alam 1991: 
228). 
4.5.1. The state's economic power and the non-ruling economic elite 
The non-ruling economic elite consisted of the old-time and the new entrepreneurs, 
some of whom were prominent members of the noble, military, and bureaucratic elites, 
and who controlled all the major commercial enterprises and private firms, and were 
involved in major economic activities - some of them in collaboration with the TNCs.28 In 
1974, only 45 families controlled 85 percent of firms with a turnover of more than 
$143,000 (Halliday 1979: 151; for a detailed list see Ehteshami 1995: 84-5). 
The economic elite mainly constituted the leading bourgeoisie of Iran in the twentieth 
century. Hence, the bourgeoisie had three main origins: landowners, the bazaar, and the 
bureaucracy.29 The oil revenue strengthened the state vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. While the 
state's policy was a capitalist one, its numerous interventionist and clientalist policies 
weakened the industrial bourgeoisie. 
The economic elite by itself could not influence power politically, largely because the 
state was neither an agent of a bourgeois class nor dependent on their wealth through 
taxation. On the contrary, as the sole recipient of oil revenues and the main economic 
player, the state became the major contributor of oil concessions and economic rewards. 
For instance, the government distributed the large amount of subsidies in the form of 
The Shah and the Autonomous State 149 
cheap inputs and credit subsidies for those who could obtain access to government 
resources (Pesaran, 1995: 95-6). Thus, the economic agents were rather keen to use the 
protection and privileges offered by the state to maximise profits and be involved in safer 
economic activities. As a result the bourgeoisie as a whole was enjoying the economic 
boom, and was in many respects dependent on the state. Because it was unable to 
translate its wealth into political influence, it had no intention, or interest, in becoming 
independent of the state. Thus, it remained loyal to the mentor of the state - the monarchy. 
This situation assisted the state: 
"to extend its influence even further and to consolidate its alliance with the 
comprador bourgeoisie as its senior partner" (Ehteshami 1995: 80). 
The economic elite could influence the power structure only indirectly through its 
affiliation with the ruling elites. 
Nevertheless, in 1975, the state began to increase its involvement in the daily life of this 
already dependent economic group. For instance, through the anti-profiteering campaign, 
in which more than 8000 businessmen and craftsmen - among them some prominent 
members of the economic elite - were arrested, the regime sought to tighten the screw 
against this emerging economically powerful bourgeoisie, which had been prospering due 
to the oil boom and strengthened by foreign economic ties. 
4.5.2. The Pahlavi Foundation: a conduit for loyalty 
While Reza Shah had been concerned with building up a personal fortune for the 
Pahlavi dynasty as a means of control and protection - for example, he seized 20% of 
Iran's cultivable land through confiscation, forceful sale, etc. and became the biggest 
landowner of his time - his son had less need to use force simply because money was 
available in more diversified forms. It was sufficient for Mohammad Reza Shah to 
exercise ultimate control over the state's economic apparatus. In spite of this, the Shah 
and his family did build a royal empire on wealth derived from the country's resources 
and state funds and favours. The royal family was involved in all ranges of major 
economic activities throughout the country either through single ownership or partnership 
(see Appendix 1). 
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The Shah, keeping over 1000 villages, sold 1106 of his villages, exceeding in value by 
1959, of almost $150 million. The value of bis hotels and his belongings in 1959 was 
estimated to be worth around $85 million (Ravasani 1990: 251) which was almost equal 
to the country's total exports. The Shah claimed in 1961 (and later in 1978) that he had 
donated his wealth to the Pahlavi Foundation and had received nothing from the 
Foundation. In a way, this means that the Shah, when he left Iran in 1978, should have 
had nothing of his own. But the Pahlavis' wealth amounted to billions of dollars inside 
and outside the country. 
The Pahlavi Foundation (hereafter PF) was the most important disguise for the wealth 
of the royal family. The Foundation became a front for the Shah's financial holdings, 
which had made him and his family among the richest in the world. PF was used in three 
key ways to assist the Shah and his family. It was a tax haven for royal investments and a 
safe and institutionalised conduit for pensions to the family and the loyal elite;30 a means 
of exerting economic control or influence by investing in specific sectors of the economy; 
and, a source of funds for royal ventures (Zonis 1971: 24). 
"After the government itself' Zonis argues: 
"it is the most powerful economic force in the country. It seems certain, 
however, that a great deal of its resources are spent maintaining and enhancing 
that economic power" (1971: 49). 
The Foundation was established in 1958, but it was not until 1961, when the topic of 
royal wealth became politically sensitive, that the Shah chose to transfer the more 
substantial Pahlavi assets to the Foundation, valued at approximately $135 million 
(Graham 1980: 157).31 Such a transfer of personal wealth to a supposed charitable 
relieved some pressure on the Shah from those who regarded Pahlavi assets as ill-gotten 
and as state fund. More importantly, PF could still be used for the very same purpose for 
which it was intended - to keep the Shah in power. However, what the Shah did was to 
institutionalise the extensive wealth of the Pahlavis under the charity organisations like 
the Farah Pahlavi Foundation, the Queen Pahlavi Foundation, the Ashraf Pahlavi 
Foundation, the Shahnaz Youth Clubs, and the most important of all, the PF. While the 
latter was receiving an annual subsidy of over $40 million from the budget, the combined 
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annual subsidy for other heretofore foundations was over $100 million (PBO, 1976-7: 
70). 
These charitable activities were used as means of royal patronage. With the oil boom, 
the business interests of the royal family prospered mostly in the private sector and more 
as a mediator in foreign trades and by being granted a monopoly. Thus, the well founded 
belief that royal patronage was the most effective guarantor of profitability and business 
security led those establishing industrial and commercial ventures to offer small stakes to 
members of the royal family or to the PF. 
According to appendix 1, PF penetrated almost every corner of the nation's economy 
and was involved in a wide range of economic activities, and covered enterprises from 
almost all sectors of society, starting with banks (15 percent of all commercial banking 
and 30 to 50 percent of all private banking); investment companies and insurance firms. It 
was also represented on a large scale in the industrial sector such as vehicles (8 percent of 
the car market), building materials, pharmaceutical products, leather, office machines, mill 
industry (15 percent of total mill capacity), several agro-industrial enterprises, printing 
and publishing and shipping enterprises, tourism and leisure industry (i.e. full monopoly 
on casinos), hotels (70 percent of total bed capacity), housing and property abroad, and 
construction and office buildings. The Pahlavi family took part in every viable project 
which appeared to be profitable, even in many cases without providing capital itself. 
The PF was mostly involved in economic activities inside Iran. But the wealth of the 
royal family was not limited to the boundaries of the country. In addition to the lists of 
banks, palaces, properties, jewellery, valuable art pieces, office buildings, factories, firms, 
etc. which were hardly possible to evaluate, the royal family transferred and invested a 
fortune abroad, in the US in particular. By the beginning of 1978, the banking system had 
accumulated a deficit of some $3 billion, of which $2.6 billion had been given in loans to 
the Iranians (mainly the royal family) and foreign capitalists who were fleeing the country 
even before the revolution was fully underway (Amirahmadi 1990: 20). During the 8 
weeks preceding the imposition of crisis exchange controls earlier in November 1978, 
$2.5 billion worth of funds was transferred abroad by 177 members of the ruling elite 
(The list was published by the striking employees at the CBI, 27 November 1978, ibid.).32 
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However, as the royal family and their Foundations rarely quoted their wealth and 
ownership of companies, it is almost impossible to have a detailed list of wealth owned by 
them outside Iran. Western estimates place the fortune accumulated by the royal family at 
anywhere between $10 and $20 billion (Washington Post, 17 January 1979). However, 
the Iranian government filed a suit in an attempt to recover about $36 billion which was 
claimed and documented to be diverted from Iran by the Shah and the royal family 
(personal account from Iran's representation at the International Tribunal at Hague).33 
The opponents of the regime and some analysts had contended that the system of 
industrial controls, licensing, tariffs, etc. was set up so that the Shah's family and close 
business associates would have an easy source of monopoly profits and political influence, 
and further that the Pahlavi family used their unrestrained political level to ensure: 1. That 
they became business partners of most major manufacturing enterprises, hotels, banks and 
insurance companies, and 2. That by resort to bribery, arm-twisting and enforced changes 
in the country's trade and banking regulations, they created an appropriate environment 
for their own purposes which often proved contrary to the objective of income. It is fair 
to say (and supported by facts) that almost all these methods of benefits and gains were 
utilised extensively by the Shah and the royal family and their associated circles; however, 
it is unlikely that most of the industrial regulations and the whole strategy itself was 
created with this purpose in mind. As will be shown later, the Shah's personal grandiose 
ambitions for industrialisation of the country was in no way less important than material 
gain by him and his ruling elite. 
4.6. The Shah and the Autonomous State 
It is useful briefly to outline the main factors that, after 1963, contributed to the 
increasing autonomy of the state from societal groups in Iran. Two main factors can be 
identified. The first was Iran's cliency relationship with the US, as will be discussed in 
chapter 6, beginning essentially in 1953 and lasting until the mid-1960s, during which, the 
US continued to provide large amounts of economic and security assistance to Iran, and 
after which the US-Iran cliency relationship began to decline (Gasiorowski 1991). This 
economic and security assistance greatly strengthened the Iranian state. The US economic 
aid programme played a key role in modernising the Iranian economy, and initiating a long 
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period of very rapid economic growth which helped co-opt social forces. After the 1953 
coup, the Shah used repressive apparatus together with the co-optive effects of Iran's 
rapid economic growth, against all sources of opposition. 
A second factor that affected state autonomy in Iran in this period was the state's 
growing revenues in the form of oil income, which first exceeded its US aid revenue in 
1958, and as will be discussed in chapter 5, became the primary engine of economic 
growth in Iran after the recession of the early 1960s (on the effect of oil revenue on state 
autonomy in Iran see Katouzian 1980: chapters 12-13; Skocpol 1982: 265-83; Moghadam 
1988: 225-38). 
As an external variable to the structure of society, and as the fountainhead of capital 
accumulation, the oil income, 
"helped to reinforce the autonomy of the state as well as the supremacy of the 
Pahlavi court-related state and comprador bourgeois faction" (Ehteshami 1995: 
78).34 
The land reforms of 1963, led to the state's autonomy from the landlords. Indeed, the 
state's autonomy from the established proprietary classes, namely the landlords and the 
merchant bourgeoisie, was a pre-condition for the state to restructure capital formation. 
The inception of such autonomy was the focal point of the industrial strategy of the state. 
As was argued, repression and co-optation made possible by the US-Iran cliency 
relationship and Iran's growing oil revenues effectively destroyed all the country's 
established opposition organisation by the mid-1960s. Moreover, the Iranian political 
system during the 1960s and 1970s lacked intermediary political organisations connecting 
the state and civil society. This increased the state's autonomy in two main ways. First, it 
enabled the Shah to consolidate his personal control over the state apparatus, destroying 
the checks and balances on state policy-making embodied in the Constitution. This 
occurred mainly because the absence of an effective opposition enabled the Shah to gain 
control over the Iranian Parliament and neutralise it as a representative body. With the 
armed and security forces in control, the Shah was able to consolidate his control over the 
remainder of the state apparatus. By the mid-1960s the state apparatus had become highly 
centralised and highly personalised, with virtually all decision making authority 
concentrated in the hands of the Shah and a few loyal advisors; no institutional 
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mechanisms existed through which societal pressure could effectively influence state 
policy-making (see US Embassy 1976). Second, in the absence of social pressures, no 
mechanism existed that could force state policy to respond to the needs of society. 
Therefore, to the extent that state policy-making was shaped by factors such as the views 
of the Shah and the ruling elite, organisations and bureaucratic process rather than by 
social pressure, the state was able to carry out policies that otherwise it could not have. 
Hence, the authoritarian establishment and the bureaucracy were two channels in which 
the Shah could impose his policies and objectives, by enjoying the autonomy of the state. 
The Shah's high degree of personal control over the state bureaucracy served essentially 
as an instrument for implementing his decisions rather than a mechanism for bringing 
expertise and public input into state policy making. As a result: 
"the state's policies were often highly irrational and divergent from society's 
needs" (Gasiorowski 1994: 449; see also Razavi and Vakil 1984: chapter 4). 
Foran notes that: 
"The Shah was so closely identified with the state that he represented the 
hegemonic part of the ruling class. Autonomous from the rest of this class, he 
was both the most powerful actor in the polity and economy and the object of 
resentment by other sectors of the elite and a potential target of social 
movements from below. The Shah and state were thus autonomous within 
Iranian society, but dangerously so, from the point of view of their own long-
term survival" (Foran 1993: 317). 
Contrary to what classical political economy from Adam Smith to Karl Marx regarded 
the state as an ultimately determinate, not a determining socio-economic category - the state 
in Iran as a sole recipient of oil revenues and manipulator of coercive and bureaucratic 
power was a determining socio-economic factor (Katouzian 1981). Hence, the autonomous 
state, through the control of the means of allocation, became the principal line of 
demarcation between different social classes, and these classes became dependent 
economically upon the state. 
Furthermore, the Iranian state's high degree of autonomy from society and its extensive 
revenues from US aid and programmes and from oil exports enabled it to dominate 
thoroughly the Iranian economy in the 1960s and 1970s. The state was autonomous, as 
the growth of bourgeoisie was dependent on and conditioned by the state. 
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The state's autonomy gave the Shah room to freely manoeuvre. Thus, policy-making in 
the Iranian autonomous state, with the absence of effective societal constraint, was shaped 
by various factors in this period, the most important among them, being the Shah's 
political and economic objectives and priorities. This, in turn, enabled the economy to 
pursue policies which increasingly distorted the economy and eventually produced a 
serious economic crisis in Iran. This is the issue to which we will return now. 
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The oil sector played a major role in the Iranian economy during the period 1940-78. 
During most of this period, oil production and exports acted as both a leading sector and as 
the determinant of the overall impact of an increase in exports. It contributed to the 
country's economic growth through linkages and spread effects and, most important of all, 
through contributions to GDP. Its share in GDP rose steadily from 13.9% in 1962 to 23.3% 
in 1972, peaking at about 50% in 1974 before falling back to 32.5% in 1977 (Table A14). 
Oil exports were by far the largest and most dynamic individual item in the country's 
export sector, and its revenues dominated the government's fiscal resources. Nonetheless, 
many links that may have existed between the oil sector and the rest of the economy are not 
as apparent as the above information indicates. 
The oil operation has both direct and indirect effects on the domestic economy. The 
indirect impact is through oil revenues; the direct impact is through forward/backward 
linkages which could be the prime force behind closer integration of the oil and non-oil 
sectors. Such an impact could be important because of the secondary and teritary industries 
that could possibly develop around the oil sector.1 
With its advanced technology and low-labour orientation, the Iranian oil industry tended to 
be relatively deficient in backward and forward linkages (Fekrat 1979 in Looney 1985). The 
backward linkage tended to be negligible, or almost non-existent because obviously the 
failure of oil to generate backward linkage was a direct result of its highly capital-intensive 
and skill-intensive technology. Its input requirements were highly divergent from domestic 
factor supplies.2 The forward linkage was negligible too. It failed to create the closer 
integration of the oil industry with the rest of the economy. 
In the apparent absence of forward/backward linkages, it was the indirect or fiscal impact 
of the oil sector which transformed the economy. Government spending was totally 
determined by oil-export receipts; income generated in the non-oil sector was wholly 
induced by oil expansion; income increases induced by increases in oil exports continued to 
expand; and the level of imports and savings eventually increased to equal the initial increase 
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in public spending. The dominance of the fiscal impact in the 1960s and 1970s meant that 
the government had to play the leading role in initiating development. This role was either 
through active state participation or through financial channels. Development depended 
primarily on the magnitude of the fiscal linkage rather than on forward'backward linkages. 
Therefore, maximising the fiscal impact was a critical problem for the government. Its 
success rested on its ability to invest productively its fiscal proceeds, in which the investment 
priorities of the country were of the utmost significance. Therefore, mismanagement in 
economic decision-making could easily prevent the transformation of the economy and the 
attainment of its objectives such as growth, price stability, and employment. 
5.1. The Impact of Oil on the Economy, 1910-50 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the magnitude of direct influence of the oil 
industry was negligible, and the oil industry remained economically divorced from the rest of 
the Iranian economy.3 
The only major connection between oil and the domestic economy was through the fiscal 
impact provided by payments of royalties, taxes and dividends to the government. Even in 
this respect, oil revenues accounted for only a small portion of the foreign exchange needed 
for imports - for both civilian and military purposes. Firstly, the Iranian government received 
only 10% of the export value on average from AIOC, secondly, the oil industry made a 
sluggish, though continuous, progress in both production and revenue (Table Al ) . As a 
result, the fiscal impact of oil revenues on the economy during this period was small, 
corresponding to its small magnitude, and it was further undermined by other factors. 
Among them were: (a) only a very small portion of oil revenues accrued to the Iranian 
government. Taxes paid by the AIOC to the British government were in some years more 
than three times the royalty payments to Iran; (b) the company's pricing policy was in favour 
of the British government i.e. the discount prices rendered to the British Navy during the 
World War I and onward; and, (c) a very low dividend policy was pursued by the AIOC. In 
1948, the British government raised its tax revenues from the AIOC, thus lowering the 
company's dividend from which Iran drew its own income. Of the AIOC's net income of 
£79 million in that year, 35.5% was paid to the British government as taxes and 12.7% was 
The State and Oil Revenues 158 
received by the Iranian government as royalties. The corresponding figures for the 1933-49 
period were on average 19.5% and 11.9% (Katouzian 1981: 182-3 table 9.1, 9.2). 
Analysis of the precise impact of oil revenues on the government budget operation for 
this period is almost impossible owing to the unavailability of reliable budget data and the 
absence of information on government reserve accounts. However, major features of fiscal 
impact of oil for this period can be distinguished since: (a) almost all receipts from oil before 
1927 were channelled for current expenditures. In the 1930s, development expenditures 
became increasingly important, absorbing a share of oil revenues. In the 1940s, oil revenues 
were again included in the general budget, accounting for both current and development 
expenditures. It seems that the major share of oil revenues prior to 1942 was earmarked for 
non-routine expenditures, i.e. defence; and (b) during the 1910-50 period, the share of 
royalty payments in government revenues never exceeded 15% - showing that the lion's 
share of government finances came from sources other than oil, such as taxes, which 
counted for two-thirds of total revenues. 
S.2. O i amd G w ® r a B m « n t Fiscal FeMcyj 1950-77 
The data suggests that, as in the period 1911-41, the direct influences or spread effects of 
the oil sector on the Iranian economy during the 1950-77 period were minimal. Looney 
(1985: 69) shows that manufacturing experienced only marginal forward/backward effects 
with the oil industry at best, indicating that the domestic economy was far from integrated 
with the oil sector. 
Thus, indirect influences through fiscal channels were by far the most important medium 
through which developments in the oil sector were transmitted to the domestic economy. As 
the sole recipient of oil revenues, the government was, therefore, the dominant influence 
from the standpoint both of domestic resources mobilisation and resource allocation. With 
the state's extensive intervention in the economy, Iran experienced a period of rapid 
capitalist development. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the state carried out extensive expenditure policies (investment 
and consumption) through the spending of oil income. This was carried out through 
subsidies, interest-free loans, privileged grants, gifts and entitlements, social security, free 
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education, high salaries and wages, etc. Throughout this period, the state was becoming 
larger in size and much more involved in social functions. 
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A: share of oil export in foreign exchange B: share of oil income in government revenues 
C: share of non-oil export in government revenues 
Source: Tables A4, A15 
As a percentage of government revenues and foreign exchange receipts oil income rose 
substantially over the 1963-78 period. Government revenues consisted of oil and non-oil 
income. According to Graph 5.1, oil revenues increasingly dominated the government 
budget, rising from 48% in the Third Plan to 78% in the Fifth Plan. By the same token, the 
share of the public sector in GFCF increased from 41% in the Second Plan to 66% in the 
Fifth Plan (Table A7). The share of tax income in government revenues dropped by half to 
18% in the Fifth Plan compared to 35% in the previous Plan. As will be shown, the rise of 
oil revenues in the 1960s had been chiefly responsible for keeping government current 
revenues ahead of current expenditures, allowing public savings to rise despite an increase in 
current public expenditure by more than three times and investment expenditures by four 
times. 
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Graph 5.1 shows that the increasing dependence of the economy on oil revenues was 
even more striking in the foreign exchange sector. During the period 1960-78, the share of 
oil revenues in all foreign exchange receipts increased from 76% in 1963 to 81% in 1973 
and later to 80% in 1978, after having fallen from its peak of 89% in 1974. 
The significance of these developments lies in the fact that for the first time the 
government actually possessed the financial capability of which it had always dreamed. Oil 
revenues thus enabled the authorities to launch a series of ambitious development projects, 
thus freeing the state from the need to raise income domestically. Oil brought new forces to 
play which allowed for the restructuring of political life. It brought spectacular growth, yet 
at the same time, engendered dependency on volatile markets, which is one of the focuses of 
the next chapter.4 But the transformation that was brought about in the rest of the economy 
by the oil sector were more far-reaching than that. It produced a new kind of economy, built 
on rent and heavily reliant on the export of a single raw material, the production of which 
required little contact with the rest of the economy (Mahdavi 1970). Most critically, since 
the state was the sole recipient of oil revenues, the major impact of oil revenues on the 
economy was through the state's fiscal/financial channels. Consequently, the autonomy of 
the state vis-a-vis Iranian societal groups and the bourgeoisie increased further (Skocpol 
1982). 
The government budget was treated as an effective fiscal tool only to a limited extent 
(Amuzegar 1977: 192). Several important trends can be noted in government budget. On the 
revenue side, in spite of a deliberate campaign to reduce gradually the country's traditionally 
heavy dependence on oil, the actual trend was in the opposite direction. 
The basic features of government revenues were as follows: (a) the relative share of oil 
income in total government revenues which, up until 1971, had stood at a fairly constant 
ratio of about 50%, reached 76.9% in the 1977 budget, after its peak of 86% in 1974 (Graph 
5.1); (b) the share of public revenues (both oil and non-oil revenues) in GNP rose from 
about 20% in 1971 to 43% in 1975; (c) the relative share of tax revenues in total 
government budget, which during the 1960s stood at around 35%, reached 17% in the 1976 
budget, after its lowest ever ratio of about 11% in 1974; (d) direct taxes, which accounted 
for about 23% of total non-oil revenues as late as 1971 increased to more than 35%, in 
1976, displacing custom revenues as the largest source of tax income, but decreasing, 
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however, as a proportion of total government revenues compared with previous years (Table 
A6). 
The heavy reliance by the government on an easy income of oil revenues for the conduct 
of its routine and development operations at the expense of traditional fiscal tools (taxation) 
was bound to produce a new element of risk. The risk was that the neglect of the necessary 
fiscal tools and taxation system threatened not only to deprive the government of additional 
revenues, but also to limit the number of policy tools available to direct economic activities. 
As long as the domestic economy was not used to raise further income through domestic 
taxation, the strengthening of the domestic economy was not reflected in the income of the 
state, and was therefore not a precondition for the existence and expansion of the state.5 
High levels of external capital inflows coincided with the initial stages of state-building, 
creating a disjuncture between the development of regulatory, extractive, and distributive 
state institutions. Through its possession of massive oil revenues, the state weakened the 
extractive and regulatory institutions: being free from taxation and domestic revenues, the 
state created instead a large number of distributive institutions and sheltered itself from the 
political and social conflict that accompanies taxation, while at the same time distancing the 
public from taking any responsibility for financing the benefits it was receiving from the 
public sector. By receiving external rent, the Iranian state inevitably ended up performing the 
role of allocating the income that it received from the rest of the world. 
Public expenditures fell into two broad categories: capital and current expenditures. 
Current expenditures had always been significantly higher than capital or development 
expenditures. Within the category of current expenditures, defence was by far the largest 
single item, accounting for about 27% of total budgeted outlays. While the defence 
expenditure increased eight times between 1972 and 1976, expenditures on housing 
(including civilian and military) and public office building went up by nearly ten times. The 
share of interest payments also rose considerably, reflecting the servicing of domestic public 
debt. Altogether, current expenditures up to 1975 tended to grow more rapidly than capital 
expenditures, reflecting (a) an increase in the government's welfare payments, (including 
food subsidies6); (b) the increasing requirements of defence and internal security; and, (c) the 
expansion of the civil service. Consequently, the share of investment in total expenditures 
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fell from 39% in 1971/2 to 32.5% in 1975/6, after its lowest ever 70s figure of 22.8% in 
1973/4 (Table A6). 
The pattern of public expenditures had the following typical properties: (a) armament and 
internal security absorbed significant amounts, and tended to increase at a relatively high 
rate, (b) public sector employment, which was the favoured method of channelling oil 
revenues into the economy, was regarded as a second form of domestic expenditure, (c) 
development plans were the means of investing oil revenues employed by the state, these 
covered capital-intensive industries, infrastructural projects and public utilities, (d) in social 
affairs, large increases were budgeted, especially for housing, education and health care, (e) 
starting in 1974 a new item foreign grants, investment and loans was added to the annual 
budget expenditures. 
Luciani (1990: 74) argues that since the state is independent of the strength of the 
domestic economy, it does not need to formulate anything deserving the appellation of 
economic policy: "all it needs is an expenditure policy". A significant structural change in the 
pattern of public sector expenditure patterns occurred in the period 1973-78. During these 
years, oil revenues were a statistically significant variable explaining variations in public 
expenditures. Moreover, most variations in public expenditures were caused by fluctuations 
in oil revenues. Thus as government expenditures were highly dependent on oil revenues, the 
relationship between government expenditures and oil revenues underwent a visible 
structural change, beginning around 1975 for investment and around 1974 for consumption, 
suggesting that previous constraints on expenditures had suddenly been removed (Tables 
A9, A14).7 
The main mediator between the oil sector and the rest of the economy turned out to be 
the state. It received revenues which were directed to the economy through public 
expenditure; since public expenditure embodied a large proportion of the national income, 
the allocation of these public funds among alternative applications had a great significance 
for future economic development. Thus, economic growth depended mostly on the state's 
expenditure policy and financial allocations in the development plans. 
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SoSo Tine Impactt ©ff Oil awnd tfia© Ftablk=Piriva4© Sector IRdaitnoBis 
Three phases can be broadly distinguished with regard to the rate and structure of capital 
formation in Iran during the post-1953 period: (1) The 1955-9 period was one of rapid 
growth of real investment following the massive injection of external funds into the economy 
(namely oil revenues and foreign capital). Government investment in this period was 
confined largely to infrastructure and light industries, while private investment was focused 
on construction, transportation and light manufacturing. This was a period of compromise 
with the merchant bourgeoisie and landlords, during which the state followed a semi-liberal 
policy. 
(2) The 1960-3 period was a period of political crisis for the regime. As was mentioned 
earlier in chapter 4, it led to the break in its alliance with the powerful traditional proprietary 
classes. The period witnessed a rapid decline in the pace of investment, in particular in the 
private sector, following the stabilisation policy of the government and the political 
uncertainties which characterised these years. The political and economic changes which 
took place in this relatively short time span created the basic elements for the new model of 
accumulation which took shape in the post-1963 period. The state's autonomy from the 
established proprietary classes, namely the landlords and the merchant bourgeoisie, was a 
pre-condition for this restructuring of capital. As a result: 
"A new capitalist class closely connected to foreign capital and with slender social 
ties was virtually grafted into the economy and formed the focal point of the 
industrial strategy of the state" (Karshenas 1990: 112). 
(3) The period of 1963-77 was the longest period of sustained accumulation in the 
recorded economic history of Iran, with a real annual rate of growth of 18.9% for GFCF. As 
will be shown, the share of GFCF in non-oil GDP rose steadily from 16.9% in 1962-3 to 
30.9% in 1971-2, reaching 50.7% in the post-1973 oil boom years (ibid.: I l l , table 5.1). 
Public sector investment in particular accelerated in this period as the government assumed 
the role of producer in basic and heavy industries such as steel, machine making, chemical 
and petrochemical. There was also a change in the structure of private investment as it 
moved into new consumer durable and intermediate products, - which created for the rapidly 
expanding domestic market - consumed by urban middle classes, rich peasantry, and sections 
of the urban working class. 
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A: consumption ratio B: investment ratio 
Source: Table A6 
According to Graph 5.2 the public sector's share of consumption and investment 
expenditure rose more or less steadily throughout the period. This rising trend was 
particularly pronounced in the case of the investment expenditures. The investment ratio 
between the private and public sectors decreased constantly. By Third Plan, government 
investment surpassed private investment, and the ratio fell below one. Under the influence of 
rising oil revenues, the government was able to steadily increase its share of fixed capital 
formation vis-a-vis the private sector's share. Thus, by the early 1970s, the government's 
real share in GFCF had reached a level of over 60%. 
The ratio of public sector expenditure (consumption plus investment) to GNP increased 
from 25.1% in 1967/8 at the end of the Third Plan to 34.2% in 1972/3 at the end of the 
Fourth Plan. From mid-1974 this trend would increase once more to 42.9% by the end of 
the Fifth Plan (Table A6). 
A distinct feature of the structural shift in the government's development expenditure in 
the post-1963 era was the increasing concentration of government investment in the 
industrial sector and its related activities, mainly heavy industry. As can be seen from Table 
A10, the share of government investment allocated to the industrial and energy sector grew 
from about 16% to 41% between the Second and Fifth Plan periods. Over the same period, 
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the share of physical infrastructure declined from 71% to 28.1%. The share of government 
investment allocated to traditional light industries fell from 77.3% during the Second Plan 
(1956-62) to 3.8% by the Fifth Plan period (1973-7), while the share allocated to heavy 
industry over the same period grew from 5.7% to 80%. Thus, real GFCF in the public sector 
grew at an average annual rate of 22% over the 1963-77 period; by 1967 it had surpassed 
the level of private investment. 
The ratio of public investment to local investment in Iran in 1970-78, as published by 
IMF, was approximately three times higher than the corresponding ratios for 'statist' 
countries like South Korea and Mexico, and approximately six times higher than the 
corresponding ratios for Brazil and India.8 
The possibilities of financing government investment through domestic resource 
mobilisation, either by taxation or other forms of government intervention, were not 
instrumental in determining the size of the government's development expenditure. Rather, it 
was the availability of external finance, namely oil revenues and foreign credits, which 
determined the magnitude of government investment. Since foreign credits were by and 
large a function of expected future oil revenues, the latter became the main determinant of 
planned investment.9 
While oil revenues had a major impact on the government's expenditure patterns, the 
private sector did not seem to have been directly affected to a great extent. During the 
period 1963-77, private sector investment was influenced indirectly and strongly through 
public sector investment, both from the demand side and the supply side. On the demand 
side, the rapid growth of government investment contributed to the rapid expansion of the 
home market. Private investors were encouraged to increase their investment with the highly 
buoyant conditions of demand and the availability of resources for investment, namely 
labour, foreign exchange and capital. On the supply side also, it is expected to have 
contributed to the profitability of private investment through direct cost reduction and other 
indirect positive externalities. Government investment in infrastructure such as transport, 
communications, energy and irrigation and its development expenditure on social overheads 
such as education and health would have obvious positive effects in this respect. Such 
complementary and dynamic interactions between public and private investment are 
expected to be particularly strong in those economies with an ample supply of surplus labour 
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and substantial possibilities for increasing the productivity of labour through the introduction 
of advanced technology. The reason for this is that such an abundance of resources, 
minimises the 'crowding out' effect of public investment.10 In the same context, Ehteshami 
(1995: 77-8) argues the importance of public sector investment: 
"As a capitalist state, it enabled private accumulation through expanding the 
market, and it facilitated capitalist reproduction through institutional control of 
labour and investment in infrastructure and those industries which, for one reason 
or another, were not attractive to the private sector". 
The public sector's investment was designed to be limited in the Second Plan. 
Nevertheless, the state became an active investor owing to either (a) the inability of the 
private sector to fulfil the obligations assigned to it by the planners (Ehteshami 1995: 78); or 
(b) the pursuit of autonomy by the state in which the private sector became dependent on the 
state and reliant on its favours (Katouzian 1981). The politico-economic uncertainty and 
lack of clear planning objectives in the Second Plan (1956-62), and growing consolidation of 
authoritarian-bureaucratic structure of the regime from the Third Plan (1963-7) onward, 
further deteriorated the economic role of the private sector vis-a-vis the public sector. Thus, 
public expenditures led to a situation whereby the private sector's investment and 
expenditure was positively correlated to the government investment and expenditure. 
By the Fourth Plan (1968-72), the public sector had surpassed private sector investment, 
rising from $68 million in the First Plan (1949-55) to $68.6 billion in the Fifth Plan (1973-
78) - a thousand-fold increase (Table A3). 
However, in spite of changes in the role of private and public sector investment, the 
former continued to dominate the consumption expenditures. This fact notwithstanding, 
Graph 5.2 shows that the consumption ratio between the private to public sectors declined 
steadily from 4.5 in 1967/8 to 1.96 in 1975/6, which indicates a growing share of public 
consumption relative to private consumption. The real ratio continued to decline too, 
showing the extent of increase in level of public consumption relative to private consumption 
(Table A9). 
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5.4. The Impact of Oil Revenues on Development Progr&imnieSs 19S©=77 
The crisis which ensued following the downfall of Reza Shah and the presence of foreign 
troops in Iran from 1941 to 1946 radically altered the balance of political forces in the 
country, and prolonged the period of political and economic uncertainty. This was 
characterised by frequent changes of government, decreasing production, food shortages, 
high unemployment, forced devaluation of the rial in order to benefit the allied forces with 
supply of cheap goods and foodstuffs, and rising prices. 
This state of economic uncertainty continued well after the end of World War I I , as 
various attempts by the government to solve the country's financial and economic crisis 
proved totally inadequate (For an analysis of the economic situation during this period see 
Mofid 1987: 34; Milspaugh 1946: 58-60; Katouzian 1981: 141-44; Pesaran 1995: 2-5). 
During the political turmoil of the post-war years, there was a change in government 
approach to oil revenues, brought on by growing nationalism and resentment of foreign 
exploitation. In 1951, the government addressed itself to the use of oil revenues to create 
productive capacity in sectors other than oil. In the coming years, national economic 
planning was the vehicle utilised by the government for this objective. Particularly from 
1956, after which oil revenues began to flow in on a large scale, the government found it 
both convenient and necessary to put oil revenues to use in the domestic economy through 
fiscal/financial allocation in planned development programmes (PBO 1968). 
Oil revenues created forces which, through the state, moved the economy toward growth 
and prosperity. Firstly, oil wealth gave the state the ability to enhance public welfare; 
secondly, massive wealth helped the state to finance increased public spending and boost 
domestic economic activities. A large part of public expenditure went on investments in 
infrastructure, social service facilities, and productive capacity expansion; thirdly, the sheer 
increase in wealth, and the seemingly unstoppable dynamism of economic growth, clearly 
paved the way for the emergence of a new middle-income class in society, with civil 
servants, entrepreneurs, skilled technicians and the like, being regarded as the main force of 
stabilisation by the regime to counter the destabilising process of economic development; 
fourthly, public ownership of oil reserves gave national economic planners a rare and 
unconstrained opportunity to shape national economic priorities. Freed from the need for 
domestic savings, national authorities had extensive and flexible options to put together a set 
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of economically rational, socially unifying, and politically acceptable policies for the use of 
oil proceeds. 
In fact throughout the Plans, and particularly after 1963, the Plans and their growth rate 
objectives were dictated by changes in the flow of oil revenues. A brief examination of the 
development Plans shows how, and to what degree and with what cost, the state succeeded 
in realising some of its main objectives. 
In the course of economic change in the period after 1963, directions were determined 
not only by the economic plans but also by the Shah's reform programme - the White 
Revolution. In effect, the Third Plan (1963-7) was put aside to make way for the land 
reform programme. The Fourth Plan (1968-72), too, was modified over its course by the 
growing list of items within the Shah's programme. Furthermore, the role chosen for the 
PBO by the Shah, furthermore, varied from time to time.11 
As Maclachlan (1991: 623) correctly argues, Iranian policies on economic and social 
development can be understood only within the context of the Shah's political requirements 
for maximisation of economic growth, as a means of vindicating the gathering of effective 
political power into his own hands and the exclusion of all others from positions of real 
authority. 
5.4.1. Tin® first two Seven-Year Flams, 1949=1955; 1956=62 
This period which covers the First and Second Plans witnessed political crisis and 
economic stagnation. The First Plan (1949-55) was to be financed by oil revenues and loans 
from the National Bank {Bank-e Melli) and the World Bank. In this plan priority was given 
to transportation and communication with 27.4% of funds being spent, followed by 
agriculture by 25% and industry by 14.3%. 
The curtailment of oil production and exports and the incoming revenues caused by the 
British government's sanctions over the nationalisation act of the Iranian industry (1951-3) 
led to the complete abandonment of the Plan. During the Plan, the country's total oil 
revenues reached £76 million and the government was unable to obtain funds from 
alternative sources of credit. Thus only one-fifth of the originally planned investment 
expenditure was available for investment. 
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The Second Plan (1956-62) was similar in many ways to the First, including its source of 
funding. The total authorised expenditure of the Plan was $1.12 billion. Transportation and 
communication, agriculture, industry, and social services accounted for 40.5%, 30%, 11.2%, 
and 18.5% of the Plan's allocation respectively. The Plan was funded by oil revenues 
(65.5%) and by loans provided mainly by international financial markets (27.1%) (Table 
A32). 
Originally, 80% of oil revenues was to be set aside for development purposes each year. 
However, by increasing current expenditure, this was reduced to an average of 50% during 
the Plan. Such easy access to foreign exchange by the government did not prevent the 
country's move to the verge of bankruptcy and a deterioration in the terms of trade and 
balance of payments by 1962. A short period of growth in the economy between 1955 and 
1960 ended with the onset of financial disorder and stabilisation policy from 1960 to 1963. 
In reality, following the 1955 oil agreement, the rate of economic expansion proved to be 
greater than the weak infrastructure could stand. Consequently, inflation affected the 
economy with growing severity. At the same time, the flow of aid funds from the US began 
to fall off and the government found itself short of finance in view of the commitments to 
economic development and defence expenditures already made - as will be shown, a similar 
situation occurred in the second half of the 1970s. The country had proved unable to adjust 
the rate of economic growth to the creation of real domestic resources, a situation that was 
to recur several times. 
During the 1950s, the gap between stated objectives and the availability of resources was 
too large to overcome. The first two plans were more financial allocation exercises than 
'plans' in the technical sense of the term (Amuzegar and Fekrat 1971). Lack of physical 
targets or explicit objectives and strategy underlying the expenditures, uncertainties about 
the availability of financial resources, and a lack of co-ordination between various 
government agencies in this period caused delay and frustrations. Thus many projects and 
programmes diverged from their original allocations. 
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5.4.2c Tli® Third and the Fourth Flams, 1963-67? 1968=72 
The Third Plan (1963-67) was essentially an investment programme for the public sector, 
together with several forecasts of private sector activities. The main objective of the Plan 
was to increase national income by 6% annually. 












First Pain 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 4th Plan 5th Plan 
A: government revenues B: oil revenues 
Source: Table A3 
The Third Plan channelled a substantial portion of the indirect (fiscal) influences of the oil 
sector into development projects. Oil revenues of nearly 145 billion rials were by far the 
most important source of development funds during the Plan period (Graph 5.3). They 
accounted for 61.1% of development funds, followed by domestic financing (18.8%) and 
foreign loans (9%) (Amuzegar and Fekrat 1971, tables 3.3-3.5). Based on the sectoral 
allocation of the Third Plan, priority was given respectively to transport and communication 
with 26% of funds allocated, agriculture with 23%, and oil and energy with 16% (Table 
A10). 
The dominance of the economy by the oil and industry sectors was evident in their annual 
growth rates of 13.6% and 12.7% respectively, leaving agriculture behind with a 4.5% 
growth rate per annum. Total investment for the Plan (based on the 1965 constant prices) 
amounted to about $5.7 billion consisting of 43% by the public sector and 57% by the 
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private sector, together raising the GNP by 8.8%. The money supply was kept under control 
and the overall level of prices remained relatively stable during the Third Plan period.12 
The actual sectoral allocation of the Third Plan deviated from the initial targets, however. 
The most important deviation was in the industrial sector, where it absorbed 8.2% of total 
public development outlays as against the 18.1% originally set by the Plan frame, mainly in 
favour of oil, energy and construction. The actual spending in the agricultural sector, 
influenced by the adaptation of the land reform and in contrast to the initial Plan's 
objectives, concentrated on the construction of large capital-intensive projects, such as six 
major new dams. 
Contrary to the situation visualised in the Plan, the government continued to influence 
extensively the investment direction of the production process. It is worth noting that during 
the Third Plan: (a) in contrast to the original intentions of the Plan, the government started to 
establish a number of highly capital-intensive industrial project such as the Arak and Tabriz 
machine building plants; (b) while 70% of industry allocations went to new industries, 56% of 
the total public sector's industrial outlays was used by the TNCs, some of them in joint-
venture agreements with the government agencies in such industries as petrochemicals and 
steel mills; (c) despite increased foreign exchange earnings of the oil sector, a balance of 
payments deficit soon appeared, growing from $58 million in 1964 to $212 million in 1967. 
Foreign loans, although substantial ($580.7 million for the Third Plan period), were not 
adequate to cover the growing deficit. 
The Fourth Plan (1968-72) began in an atmosphere of optimism in view of the success of 
the Third Plan and the promise of rising oil revenues (PBO 1968). Oil revenues rose more 
quickly than forecast, and funds available for the Plan were augmented. In terms of 
performance, the actual rate of growth during the period of the plan amounted to about 
11.6% annually (2% above target). Emphasis on the agricultural sector, which was the partial 
case in the earlier Plans, was replaced by preoccupation with industry and the construction of 
infrastructure designed to support industrial expansion, with the justification that economic 
modernisation and acceleration of growth rate and rapid economic prosperity necessitate a 
total focus on the industry sector. 
With the exception of agriculture and construction, all the sectoral value added targets 
were either attained or surpassed. Agriculture had the lowest growth at 3.9% per annum; oil 
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and services achieved the highest rate at 15.2% and 14.2% respectively, with the service 
growth almost twice the planned rate owing chiefly to the rapid expansion of government 
services. Industry grew at an average annual rate of almost 14% in real terms (almost as set 
by the target) (PBO 1973). The completion of major irrigation projects begun earlier and the 
inception of heavy industries13 generated confidence in the capability of the regime to steer 
the economy, both at home and abroad. 
The government took the leading role as investor from the private sector. Although, the 
performance of the Fourth Plan compared with the previous ones was quite impressive, it was 
losing momentum perceptibly by the early 1970s (Bharier 1971:265; Looney 1988: 107). 
New and significant projects were no longer being brought forward, while inflation (including 
prices for foodstuffs) and wages were rising in urban areas.14 The priority in the Third and 
Fourth Plans, as can be read from the final investment programme, favoured services -
especially social overhead capital - and suggested a shift away from directly productive 
activities. 
For the 1964-73 period as a whole, Looney (1988: 107) argues that while the country's 
economic goals were not always attained, they had at least remained stable. During this 
period, economic development was pursued at the expense of other programmes, apart from 
defence which continued to absorb a major share of government budget. Emphasis was laid 
on government investment in infrastructure. At the same time, full utilisation of the country's 
oil-export capacity was pursued - by the 1970s oil production was approaching capacity -
and consequently greater control over the oil industry had become a major government 
objective. 
During this period GDP grew (in constant 1974 prices) at an average annual rate of 
around 10.5%. The average annual rise of the non-oil GDP by 11.5% during this period 
shows that the rapid growth was not simply the result of increased oil revenues (table A31). 
As was the case in the Third Plan, the method of formulating the Fourth Plan was essentially 
one of trial and error. Some other problems were also the same in both Plans: lack of 
statistics, inconsistency, shortage of concrete projects, lack of optimality considerations and 
so on. By the end of the Fourth Plan the country was experiencing difficulties in maintaining 
sufficient growth in its main productive sectors - agriculture and industry - to offset rapid 
growth in services and petroleum. Relative stagnation in the agriculture sector, rising income 
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levels that produced inflationary pressures, and increased urbanisation aggravated the 
problems. Food requirements had to be met increasingly by imports, thus reducing the 
availability of foreign exchange further. 
Oil production was reaching its capacity level, foreign debt repayments and interest were 
a major drain on the country's foreign exchange holdings, and both development and 
military costs were growing rapidly. Incremental oil price adjustments between 1971 and 
1973 temporarily relieved the balance of payments pressure. However, the long-term 
problems did not significantly improve, and by the end of the Fourth Plan, the government 
was anticipating a major balance of payments crisis at some point during the Fifth Plan 
(Maclachlan 1991: 627). More importantly, the Shah, having achieved some economic gains, 
was tending to turn his attention away from the problems of the economy more to oil affairs, 
foreign policy and defence: 
"In 1973, when the most critical of decisions affecting the economy were made, the 
Shah appeared to be lacking in interest in this area [economy]" (Maclachlan 1991: 
626). 
Actually the Shah had his own views on the role of the national economy and disregarded 
the Plan altogether whenever it conflicted with his programmes. 
It would be difficult to argue the case that Iran was anything other than an oil-based 
economy in 1972, though its efforts to develop non-oil resources were designed to keep the 
country from becoming wholly dominated by exports of one commodity and dependent on it 
for development. 
In spite of its shortcomings, however, as Razavi and Vakil (1984: 35) argue, during the 
Fourth Plan period the Iranian economy reached a stage of development where it appeared 
that an increase in financial resources would open up new growth outlooks. Nevertheless, as 
will be shown below, even though these resources did finally materialise in the Fifth Plan 
period, the prospects for growth dimmed and were abruptly snuffed out. 
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5.5. The Revised Fifth Plan, 1973=7 
At the beginning of the Fifth Plan, it seemed that Iran was well placed for the 
continuation of the successful industrialisation of the preceding Plan period. Existing rates of 
growth in the economy were already high. (EIU 1973). With a target set at 15.4% average 
per year, GDP was designed to be increased to $36.4 billion by the end of the Plan. The Plan 
set the average annual growth rates for industry, agriculture, and oil sectors at 15.3%, 5.5%, 
and 11.8% respectively. 
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According to Graph 5.4, during the Fifth Plan, the average annual real rate of growth for 
these sector were 17.4%, 4.4% and 0.9% respectively. Nonetheless, oil (along with the 
service sector) stayed the dominant sector in the economy, contributing 38% to GDP, while 
industry and agriculture contributed 23.2% and 12.5% respectively. Structural changes, 
expected to come from the scheme of investment outlined above, were continuations of 
established trends. During the Fifth Plan, inflation was expected to remain at an average of 
about 4% annually. 
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T A B L E 5.1: Expenditure and Revenues Allocation to the Original and Revised Fifth Plan (1973-7) 
Expenditures: 
Original Allocations billion rials billion dollars percent1 
Development exp. 1,560 20.6 46.7 
Payments of foreign loans 221.7 2.9 6.5 
Payment of domestic loans 63.9 0.8 1.8 
Current operating exp. 1,498 19.8 45 
TOTAL 3,344 44.1 100.0 
Expenditures: 
Revised Allocations 
1. Current Expenditure 3,393.3 50.2 40.9 
Public Affairs 452.8 6.7 5.4 
Defence 1,968.7 29.1 23.7 
Social Affairs 754 11.1 9.0 
Economic Affairs 217.8 3.2 2.6 
2. Fixed Investment 2,848.1 42.2 34.3 
3. Repayment of principals of 405 6 4.9 
foreign loans 
4. Investment abroad 905 13.4 10.9 
5. Others 745.1 11 9.0 
TOTAL 8,296.5 122.1 i 100.0 
Revenues Original Allocation Revised Allocation 
billion rials billion percent billion rials billion dollar percent 
dollars 
Oil & Gas 1,577.4 20.8 47.0 6,628.5 98.2 79.9 
Taxes 2 788.6 10.4 23.5 1,215 18 14.6 
Foreign loans 433.4 5.7 12.0 150 2.2 1.8 
Domestic loans and 364.5 4.8 10.8 50 0.7 0.5 
bonds 
Others 180.1 2.4 5.4 253 3.7 3.0 
Total 3,344 44.1 3 100.0 8,296.5 122.8 100.0 
Source: PBO, Iran's Fifth Development Plan 1973-78, Revised: A Summary, 1975 
$1=67.5 Rials 1) Author's calculation, 
2) by adding the direct and indirect taxes. 3) Discrepancies due to rounding 
4) Including 135 billion rials ($2 billion) revenue from foreign investment and loans. 
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There was a concentration of development in the oil and industrial sectors by the state, in 
particular in the creation of a small number of large major capital-intensive, projects (i.e. 
Trans-Iranian Gas Pipeline, Sar-Cheshmeh Copper field) and in the expansion of existing 
ones. The aggregate effects of these major capital-intensive and energy-oriented projects in 
oil and industry were to localise the impact of state investment and to reduce the scope for 
schemes other than small-scale plants handled by the private sector. 
In the original Fifth Plan, real sources were scarce. The transport, banking and civil 
service infrastructure were unable to support the ambitious expansion of the economy 
proposed under its $20.6 billion investment programme. 
However, perceiving the main constraint of the country's development to be the 
insufficient availability of foreign exchange, the Shah and his regime envisaged development 
only on the availability of foreign exchange (Mofid 1987: 40-41). Strengthened by successes 
in the Fourth Plan, the philosophy of the Shah and a section of senior economic decision-
makers, was that the tide of opportunity for development of those areas of the economy 
other than oil had to be taken at the flood. There was a conviction that chances for sustained 
and controlled development might not appear again before oil exports had begun to fall as 
reserves became depleted (Maclachlan 1991: 628=9). As a result, the Plan should be targeted 
for a rapid industrialisation process at any costs. 
Even though the original Fifth Plan was very ambitious, it was abandoned in favour of an 
even more ambitious version as oil prices rose in the last quarter of 1973. In the light of the 
oil price hike of 1973-74, a Revised Plan was declared in August 1974. By this time the 
assumption was that with the foreign exchange constraint removed in 1973-4, the other 
constraints, especially manpower and poor infrastructure, would not be serious (Amirahmadi 
1990: 19; Pesaran 1982: 120-1). According to Table 5.1, the budget allocations in the 
Revised Plan were raised by 279% to $122.8 billion - $98 of which was from oil exports -
and the forecast rate of growth in GNP was raised to 25.9% per annum. 
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According to Graph 5.5, government allocated more investment on oil and gas than other 
sector in the Fifth Plan (reaching 24.4%). Share of government investment on transport and 
agriculture continued to fall from 39.8% and 31.2% in the Second Plan to 16.4% and 11.7% 
in the Fifth Plan respectively. Public investment in industry and mine fluctuated during the 
Plans, decreasing from 11.7% in the Second Plan to 8.4% in the Third Plan, then increasing 
to 22.3% in the Fourth one and later declining to 16.5% in the Fifth Plan. Thus the Fifth 
Plan: 
"continued promises that could not possibly be kept. In one motion, it radically 
expanded the role of the state in the economy. In every sector, oil money was to be 
spent on bigger projects and more wide-ranging social programs" (Razavi and 
Vakil 1984: 75). 
While Iran was facing a major balance of payments crisis by the end of the Fourth Plan, 
the oil price increase in 1973-4 dramatically reversed the situation and converted Iran from a 
debtor to a creditor country. The accumulated balances on current account during the years 
1973-8 reached around $18 billion (Table A-15). Investment abroad took several forms 
ranging from loans made to various foreign governments (i.e. $1.2 billion to Britain and $1 
billion to France) and international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank ($887 
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million in 1974-5), to direct investment in various private enterprises in Europe (Krupp for 
example) and the US. Furthermore, Iran gave financial aid to certain underdeveloped 
countries. On this basis, $2.38 billion was disbursed in 1974-5 on foreign loans, grants, and 
investment. Other than purchasing prestige outside the country, these investments abroad 
represented the first attempt by the Iranian government to use oil surpluses as a means of 
leverage in foreign policy; in other words to buy influence. 
On the revenue side, only oil income showed a substantial increase, during the Plan 
period, while the share of other sources of revenue such as taxes declined from 23.5% to 
14.6% and loans from 10.5% to less than 3%. Revenues from exports of crude oil and 
natural gas for the period of the Fifth Plan amounted to $84.27 billion against a revised Plan 
forecast of $98.2 billion. The growth of oil sector was even less than during the 1963-78 
period. It grew by 13.3% per annum over the 1963-72 period, but with the quadrupling of 
oil prices in 1973/4 and the subsequent weakening of the international markets, the oil sector 
lost its earlier momentum and in real terms showed only a slight increase over the 1973-8 
period (Graph 5.5). Worse than this was the fact that the value of revenues was much 
reduced by the effects of inflation and of the high prices of imported goods. Relatively 
speaking, the share of the oil sector in GDP continued its upward trend throughout the Plan 
period. It rose steadily from 14.3% in 1963 to 35% in 1973, reaching a peak of near 50% in 
1974. (Table A14). 
On the expenditure side, increases were scheduled for all sectors. From 6,241 billion rials, 
13.3% of funds was allocated for general affairs, 31.5% for defence affairs, 21% for social 
affairs, and 34.2% for economic affairs. 
So long as the construction industry was booming, those made landless by the land 
reforms could be absorbed in the urban economy, but with the collapse of the construction 
boom in 1977 the numbers of unemployed quadrupled (Mansur 1979: 28 in Omid 1994. 35). 
It was mainly those ex-landlords who successfully compensated for their land in the land 
reform of the 1960s who were involved in this line of activity. Compared with the original 
Plan, housing allocation in the Revised Plan increased by 177%.15 The government building 
and installation programme absorbed 5.1% of the share of the Plan allocation (Mofid 1987: 
108). Total fixed investment was set at $42.2 billion, of which social affairs took the largest 
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share with $19 billion, followed by industry and mines with $12.54 billion. Agriculture was 
left with an allocation of only $4.58 billion. 
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According to Graph 5.6, the share of industry in GNP increased from 13.5% in 1963 to 
18.8% in 1970, and then remained relatively constant (around 18%) until 1977 except for 
1974 which the sudden increase in oil revenue decreased the share of other sectors including 
industry in GNP. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, while the share of industry and services 
remained relatively constant, the increasing share of the oil sector, compensated the falling 
share of the agriculture sector. 
The continuous fall in the share of investment allocation and credit distribution for the 
agricultural sector, in contrast to industry and construction led to uninterrupted falls in 
agriculture's contribution to the GDP (for the share of credit allocation see Table Al 1). The 
Plan provided for a channelling of state funds into not more than 8,000 rural development 
poles at the expense of all settlements of less than 250 persons, which were to receive 
negligible investments, and other rural centres, which were to suffer much reduced financial 
allocations (Maclachlan 1991: 629) The effect of these policies was to reduce the confidence 
of private farmers and to accelerate movement off the land by the younger generation. The 
degree of urbanisation rose from 31% in 1956 to 49% in 1978. It is estimated that 50% of 
The State and Oil Revenues 180 
increased population of urban areas during the decade from 1967 to 1976 was accounted for 
by rural migrants (Pesaran 1985). 
The allocation of oil revenues was to lead to a flurry of promises by the Shah in the 
welfare area. Some of these promises such as better schooling, better social security, and 
improved health care, did materialise. But it was to create a high level of expectation among 
the population for an immediate improvement in their standard of living as well as a promise 
of achieving the 'Great Civilisation' within their own lifetimes. The fulfilment of a growing 
list of promises - which were supposed to be financed by oil revenues rather than by the 
internal industrial/agricultural production capacity - was extremely difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore the state bureaucracy was ill-prepared to execute these promises. Part of the 
failure of the Revised Fifth Plan was due not planning strategy, but to a total lack of 
economic discipline. Provisions of the Fifth Plan were abandoned almost completely. 
Expenditures were increasingly undertaken outside the framework of the Plan, since the 
Shah had apparently come to believe that he could transform Iran into a state than was the 
economical equal of countries in Western Europe, and that he was able to encourage a 
resurgence of ancient Iranian civilisation. Furthermore by allocating 24% of the Plan's 
revenue to defence expenditures, the Shah's aspiration for political hegemony in the Persian 
Gulf and an important role for Iran in the international arena were another feature of this 
grand Plan. Nevertheless, this was the time, when the country was beginning to suffer from 
major deficiencies. The country as a whole was already feeling the effect of social 
dislocation and inflation. Furthermore, the shortage of skilled labour became a major 
constraint. For instance, by the end of the Fifth Plan the number of deficiencies in the work-
force topped over 700,000, among them 560,000 skilled and semiskilled labour, and 60,000 
engineers and technicians (Table A34).16 
Given the Shah's authorised simultaneous increases in welfare budgets, the spending on 
defence and augmented expenditures on government current account, the scene was set for a 
scale of demand for goods and services which the domestic economy could not supply. 
Moreover, it could not be met from abroad thanks to Iran's limited port and transport 
faculties. 
While its original version, despite its faults and ambitious objectives, was a more rational 
approach to sustaining the pace of change and systematically strengthening the productive 
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sector, Maclachlan (1991: 627-33) argues that the Revised Fifth Plan appeared to be an 
economic failure, far from achieving its set objectives, despite the optimism that surrounded 
its inception. Indeed, in his view, on aggregate the government achieved little more after the 
oil boom than it had done under the original Fifth Plan, but at enormous inflated economic 
and social costs. 
Expansion of supply rather than restriction in demand was the key phrase. Nowhere were 
the problems more serious than in the area of transport and manpower. Even with the 
prediction of such bottlenecks, the government preferred to follow the Shah's optimistic 
dictates, namely that innovative emergency resolutions of bottlenecks were required rather 
than trimming of targets.17 
As was mentioned, during 1974, oil revenues increased to $20 billion from just $5 billion 
a year earlier. The government faced two alternatives: either to spend these revenues as they 
accrued, or pace its spending in line with the economy's ability to efficiently utilise the funds. 
Therefore, absorptive capacity18 should have been utilised by the government in 
implementing the country's development strategy. Then, the definition of absorptive capacity 
from a conceptual point of view is, as Amuzegar (1982: 121) describes: 
"the maximum level of spending of foreign exchange by the government that 
yielded positive returns, given constraints on factors pre requisite and 
complementary to such spending". 
Examining the absorptive capacity of the economy over the period of the 1960s and 
1970s shows the extent to which oil revenues relaxed or compounded the existing 
constraints in the economy. However, it is difficult to make this definition operational 
because the process of evaluating the present value of both monetary and nonmonetary 
returns from oil revenues over time in Iran, would be extremely complex if not impossible. 
Thus, an indirect macroeconomic approach to measure absorptive capacity would be looking 
at the country's incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR).1 9 It shows that the ICOR 
decreased significantly from 5.5 in 1960 to 1.3 in 1972 which means that the binding 
constraints in the economy were relaxing over the years. However, with the removal of 
financial constraint in 1973/4, while other major constraints were still binding, the ICOR 
rose to 9.22 in 1974 and later in 1976 to 11.2 (Mofid 1987: 136, table 3.24). This means 
that since these absorptive capacity constraints were expected to be binding, simply adding 
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to capital through physical investment reduced the productivity of that capital. The ICOR 
rose, showing the decline in additional aggregate output produced by the marginal change in 
capital stock. Beyond a certain point extra investment due to the high capital-output ratio 
did not lead to increased output, and thus: 
"In ordinary developing countries, the aim is to increase the size of investment in 
order to increase the size of output increments; in Iran, they should have reduced 
the size of investment in order to increase their gains, i.e. reduce their losses" 
(Mofid 1987: 134). 
To reduce the losses, a reduction in the size of investment was required (Karshenas 1990: 
17-8; Graham 1980: 87).20 
As Vakil and Razavi (1984) argue, the Fifth Plan period was a time during which the 
process of economic planning, under the pressures of the political environment (the Shah in 
particular), was virtually returned to the mere formality of disbursing the financial 
resources21 
By 1977, the way in which oil revenues were allocated by the state compounded the 
existing obstacles to achieve an export-oriented non-oil economy. Furthermore, the 
unbalanced development of the Iranian economy was reinforced by the doubling the Fifth 
Plan expenditures in 1974.22 This situation led to a series of serious economic problems with 
deep social consequences, such as. a substantial increase in the rate of rural-urban migration; 
inflation; and an increasing imbalance between the agricultural sector and the industry 
sector. Furthermore, the rapid development strategy which the Shah had in mind in late 
1960s and 1970s 
"ceased to be relevant once capital became abundant, since then spending could run 
ahead of provision of other assets and create unbridgeable imbalances between 
demand for and supply of resources. It seems that adoption of grandiose new 
schemes by the government served to delay completion of projects already in hand 
and put up the costs of both. Many of the projects did not materialise and those that 
did competed for scarce resources and helped to push up wages and inflation" 
(Maclachlan 1991: 632). 
By the end of the Fifth Plan period not one new additional petrochemical plant, steel mill 
or nuclear power station had been completed. The same was true of most industrial projects, 
that were begun or contracted for at the end of the Fourth Plan (ibid.). 
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The explosion of expenditure increased the volume of money supply in an unprecedented 
manner (by 61% for 1974; CBI 1974), which exacerbated the problems. The Fifth Plan 
(1973-77) witnessed an average annual rate of inflation of 15.7% compared with 2.6% for 
the period covering the Third and the Fourth Plans (1963-72) (Table A16). As a result of the 
increase in the aggregate demand, the manufacturers were forced to maximise their 
productive capacities, which in turn intensified inflationary pressures on the factors of 
production (Moghtader 1980: 69). At the same time, in order to alleviate internal 
inflationary pressures, the government relaxed import regulations and liberalised tariffs 
which resulted in an unprecedented influx of imports, which leading to the congestion of 
ports, roads, railroads, and transit frontiers. These not only revealed the infrastructural 
weaknesses of the economy but also caused a considerable amount of waste. Thus another 
main principle of the Revised Plan, which was to maintain rapid balanced and sustained 
economic growth with minimum price increase, had already been abandoned. 
While oil revenues were the chief factor in raising the country's per capita income from 
$250 in 1963 to $1500 in 1977, in real terms the benefit of rising income was not equally 
shared among various groups in the country. Mehner (1978: 196) points out that during the 
Fourth Plan, industrial production per capita ($367) was about three times the agricultural 
production per head ($130), while its employment relative to agriculture sector was 1 to 2 
(ISY 1995: 67) - another indication of the dualism in income distribution. The unfavourable 
trends in income and wealth distribution , among rural households, across different regions 
and between rural and urban areas, and in the country as a whole, that had prevailed in the 
early 1960s became even more pronounced in the 1970s. For instance, the consumption 
share of the top 20% of urban population rose from 52% in 1960 to 56% in 1975, while the 
share of the bottom 40% declined from 14% to 11% over the same period. This figure 
shows that there was a substantial rise in middle income groups in the urban areas - such as 
civil servants. The disparity was more severe when the urban and rural consumption 
expenditures were compared (Pesaran 1994: 9-10). The domestic market would therefore 
tend to be dominated by a highly differentiated and rapidly changing spectrum of luxury 
consumer goods - which reinforced this structure of the home market and the final demand 
facing industrial producers. 
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Other than the per capita 'distribution of income' among different sectors of the 
population, 'poverty' is another concept to quantify and discuss the income inequality. To 
this extent Azimi (1981) uses an index of biological subsistence - that is, the amount of 
material welfare necessary for survival - and identifies three levels of calorie intake, which in 
the specific conditions of Iran indicate three distinct poverty lines, namely, undernourished, 
severely undernourished, and dangerously undernourished. He shows that in 1972/3, 44% of 
the population were undernourished. Over one million (3% of the population) were 
categorised as dangerously undernourished (those with calcium intakes at 75% or less of the 
minimum requirement), while another six million people were severely undernourished 
(taking between 75 and 90 percent of the minimum calorie requirement) (Azimi 1981: Table 
3, 8 in Katouzian 1981: Appendix to chapter 13). 
Consequently, the Fifth Plan was much more than an investment programme. It brought 
great changes in the social and economic structure of the country and eventually led to a 
politico-economic explosion. As the experience of the development Plans implemented 
during the 1963-77 period shows, the size of development expenditure was frequently 
revised due to unexpected fluctuations in oil revenues. During this period when large 
unexpected increases in oil revenues alleviated the pressures of balance of payments and 
fiscal deficits, the government would respond by quickly increasing the size of its 
development expenditure and by starting various new investment projects.23 During the 
subsequent periods, however, when oil revenues grew at or below average rates, new 
investment projects had to be postponed and resort to foreign borrowing had to be made in 
order to finance the many projects in the process of completion. This state of affairs implied 
that, irrespective of the existence of medium-term planning at the formal level, actual 
government investment was closely correlated to the proceeds from the oil sector, even at 
the short-term annual level. As Karshenas (1990: 172-5) has noted, variations in oil revenues 
explains more than 98% of variations in government investment. 
Thus, all in all, 
"in what remained throughout the Shah's reign an oil-based economy, growth was 
purchased mainly through expanding oil revenues, themselves largely a function of 
increased volumes of oil exports. Not only did this result in withdrawal of the 
nation's clearly finite oil reserves at an accelerated rate, but it meant continuing 
dependence on foreign markets together with reliance on foreign technology, high 
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levels of imports and the ceding of appreciable control over domestic economic 
policies to foreign interests" (Katouzdan 1981: 324). 
The state's strategy of economic development and the degree of autonomy it enjoyed 
from the bourgeoisie affected industrial development, distribution of wealth, and the 
stratification of social classes. Major beneficiaries of economic development in the 1960s 
and 1970s were international capital and the dependent bourgeoisie who, behind the 
protective shield of the state, were able to dominate the economy and reap substantial profit. 
The state's alliance with international capital antagonised the indigenous classes and helped 
determine the content of the revolutionary movement of 1977-79 (Karshenas 1990: 234-6). 
The resultant dependent development, in which the state was involved in a triple alliance, is 
what we return to now. 
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Chapter Snss ©epmdlffiifit Bev@l©pm®mlt la Iran 
During the 1960s and 1970s, exploitation was disguised in a new and straight forward 
economic and commercial relationship. The new situation in the balance of power between 
international capital and developing countries was essentially determined by the fact that 
international capital lost its monopoly of the extraction of raw materials in the Third World. 
The most far reaching example had been in the oil sector. This does not mean, however, that 
its room for manoeuvre became increasingly smaller. International capital, as 
postimperialism (Becker and Sklar 1987) argues, found new possibilities to establish new 
forms of'partnership relationship' on a new basis with some countries which have opted for 
capitalist development. This 'new basis' of relationship was an international division of 
labour between capitalist industrial countries and developing countries. It can be argued that 
this relationship did not totally remove exploitation but only modified it and was aimed at 
converting the former suppliers of agricultural produce and raw materials into raw material 
and industrial suppliers. This transformation established a new system which we term 
'dependent capitalism'. 
The framework for the analysis of such dependent development remained the reality of 
imperialism as a world wide system of capital accumulation. More than ever, the 
international economy was dominated by capitalist relations of production and exchange. 
The political and military resources of core states were used to maintain capital invested in 
the periphery. Dependency theory has contributed to the concept of dependent development 
by providing a useful framework for analysis of the effects of imperialism on the internal 
socio-political structure of peripheries, and thus on the emergence of dependent 
development as a special case of dependence.1 
A number of attempts have been made to apply some form of dependency theory to Iran 
(Keddie 1981: 143-4; Saikal 1980: 5-6; Pesaran 1982: 504). Abrahamian (1982: 427) 
believes that a 'minor industrial revolution' took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Ahmad 
Ashraf (1971) and Katouzian (1981) challenged the idea that economic growth alone meant 
anything like an integrated form of development. Keddie (1977) and Saikal (1980) attributed 
most of Iran's problems and accomplishments to its status as a rentier state, dependent on 
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oil revenues for its growth. Capital accumulation took place in late 19th and early 20th 
century in Iran even under conditions of 'classic dependence', that is, the export of primary 
products in exchange for manufactured goods. Nonetheless, the process of accumulation in 
the 1960s and 70s was, however, of a different order. It was different because it included a 
substantial degree of industrialisation, a more complex division of labour, and increased 
productivity. This implied such a process that I employ the concept of 'dependent 
development' - used by Peter Evans (1979) for Brazilian development. 
However, my use of dependent development is a more wide-ranging one, aimed at 
discerning both the reality and limits of economic growth in Iran, concerned with the state 
and the industrialisation process, and its relation with international capital. Therefore, the 
Pahlavi state can be classified as a 'dependent capitalist' (Thiemann 1983). As a result, its 
power, was centred, partly, in the capitalist metropole. As Ehteshami (1995: 79) argues: 
"In the evolving international division of labour, Iran would serve as a stable source 
of relatively cheap oil and a consumer of Western-supplied goods and services. As 
a semi-peripheral country (Wallerstein 1979), however, it would also be active in 
the production and export of some industrial products. Within this arrangement the 
Iranian bourgeoisie was able to participate in investment as a partner either of 
foreign capital or of the state, or of both. It can be said with a degree of certainty 
that the Pahlavi state's monopoly control of the country's hydrocarbon resources 
gave it the 'edge' over the domestic capitalist class factions, even though at the 
same time it deepened its exposure to external forces and international market 
processes. The edge at home at the same time strengthened the state's position vis-
a-vis foreign capital and the supranational capitalist structures". 
The dependent structure of the Shah's regime was characterised by: firstly, the 'triple 
alliance' - as Evans (1979) calls the association moulded between the state, the TNCs and 
their Western core states, and the local capitalists; secondly, the Shah's politico-military 
patronage to the USA; and thirdly, the oil rent. In such situation of dependent development, 
as argued earlier in chapter one, the centrality and strength of the state is essential. 
Throughout the 1953-78 period, foreign capital played a major part in the development of 
local manufacturing by providing the needed finance, technology, and skilled labour. This 
was also the case in the Brazilian and South Korean industrialisation process for the 1960s 
and 1970s. In all three cases, it was unlikely that foreign capital would have sponsored 
industrialisation on its own without continual stimulation and pressure from the local elite. 
The difference was that in Iran, it was merely the state which pressured the TNCs, while in 
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the other two, the local bourgeoisie and economic elites were active in stimulating foreign 
capital to support industrialisation. In South Korea, the government forged a narrow 
developmental alliance with local conglomerate capital {chaebol) in order to pursue rapid 
economic growth, because the urgent need of the military junta was to establish its political 
legitimacy through economic prosperity. In the case of Iran and its weak bourgeoisie and 
highly autonomous state, such an alliance was in favour of the state. Here, local capital was 
dependent on the state, and the state never directly attempted or tried to strengthen the 
power base of the bourgeoisie. 
In the triple alliance, while the state was one major partner, modification of TNCs' 
strategies and behaviour partly depended on the bargaining power of local capital. 
Bargaining in turn depended on the strength of private local capital and the state. In Iranian 
development, the state played a central role in fostering capital accumulation. 
The dependence of the Shah's regime on the US changed from political dependence to a 
politico-military one, later to economico-military dependence. In the first stage of the first 
period of his rule (1941-45), the Shah was politically dependent on the US, as he was 
brought to power by the West, the US in particular. In the second stage of the first period 
(1945-53), political support continued involving co-operation at the military level. During 
the second period (1953-63), the regime depended on US economic and military assistance, 
in both forms of capital and technology. American military and security presence, along with 
administrative officers, were to build the army, SAVAK, the state's economic administrative 
machinery. During this period, Iran had embarked on capitalist development. In the third 
period (1963-79) the relations between Iran and the rest of the capitalist world moved 
toward interdependence relationship. However, the process of dependent development 
deepened, covering all areas of development. Prior to the rise in oil revenues in 1973, 
substantial American aid and credits - over one billion dollars for the period of 1950-64 from 
the US government - continued. Military help in the form of providing weaponry and 
financial credit, organisational and technical planning and support, continued apace. 
By the boom of 1973 American involvement in the Iranian industrialisation, military 
build-up and weaponry was quite prominent.2 With the expansion of oil revenues, the 
manoeuvring room of the Shah and his regime, vis-a-vis the Western world, increased. 
However, even though the relationship between Iran and the advanced capitalist countries 
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had certainly altered in many respects since the 1950s and 1960s, Iran continued to be a 
weaker partner in the international capitalist system and depended on outside support. 
As Cardoso and Faletto (1979: xxi) argue countries of the semiperiphery remain 
dependent, because their capital goods sector are not strong enough to ensure: 
"the continuous advance of the system, in financial as well as in technological and 
organisational terms". 
Although in the case of Iran, the financial constraints were removed by the sudden 
increase in oil prices in 1973, its organisational and technological dependence on the 
capitalist world remained unchanged. It is important to emphasise that the general notion of 
dependence used here, although it has some elements from the dependency theory, it is far 
different from the latter's assumptions and prescriptions, as have already been mentioned. 
The oil price hike of 1973, in short term decreased Iran's dependence on international 
financial markets and furthermore, put the state in a powerful bargaining position. However, 
oil revenues depended more on the price and level of export, which both were issues of 
negotiation between the OPEC and the West. Therefore, while oil revenue was an 
independent factor in the domestic economy, it was dependent on the capitalist world. 
Furthermore, because oil revenues played a unique and crucially important part in the state 
budget and revenues and the growth of country's GNP (80-90% of government revenue and 
35-50% of GNP for years between 1973-78), it provided the main link in Iran's economic 
dependence upon transnational capital. In more general terms, Iran's capitalist development 
had come about through the co-operation between the Iranian state and foreign interests, 
and also between the state and Iranian private capital. Iran's acquisition of skilled personnel, 
technology and training assistance from the advanced capitalist countries indicated the 
continued need for such co-operation if capitalist development was to continue. 
6.1. Centrality of the State in the Development Process 
Given the role of the state in the process of industrialisation and in the triple alliance 
mentioned above, the Iranian state played a central role in the process of dependent 
development. The increasing political decentralisation of international capital, a gradual 
process of learning within the state, and the increasing capacity of the state apparatus 
improved the bargaining position of the state vis-a-vis the West and its TNCs. Furthermore, 
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state enterprises, added to the capacity of the state and therefore its bargaining power. Over 
200 major state owned firms were involved in major economic activities, in particular the 
large capital intensive industrial units. Government revenues from these enterprises in 1977-
8 (1,116.7 billion rials) were three times the government revenues from taxes (397.6 billion 
rials) and second only to income from hydrocarbons (1,314.2 billion rials) (Ehteshami 1995: 
81). Evans argues in more depth by suggesting that: 
"Just as the existence of the TNCs changes the effects of imperialism, the creation 
of state enterprises change the institutional nature of the dependent capitalist state" 
(1979: 46). 
The weakness of domestic bourgeoisie, the backward economy, the increasing desire of 
the Shah to industrialise the country rapidly, and to control the polity by dominating major 
economic sectors through the state apparatus, made state intervention inevitable and a 
necessity. The state assumed responsibility for the construction of roads, airports, heavy 
industry, and the provision of a financial infrastructure. In spite of such profound changes in 
the relationship between the state and the private sector, the essence of private capital 
accumulation remained unchanged. 
Iran experienced rapid capitalist development characterised by the (1) separation of 
producers from the means of production (by the 1963 Land Reform), (2) freedom of the 
labour from pre-capitalist relations, (3) and the creation of a national market tied to the 
world market. Two periods marked the post-coup economic development of Iran (Moaddel 
1993: 67). From 1953 to 1963, international capital began to infiltrate different sectors of 
the Iranian economy, thus the financial infrastructure for investment was laid, and many 
large scale projects were initiated and implemented by the state. During the 1963-1979 
period, Iran experienced a remarkable economic growth which, as will be shown below, can 
be characterised as 'dependent development'. 
In this period, the state's strategy for economic development affected the distribution of 
wealth, patterned class conflict, and determined the pattern of relation in the triple alliance. 
In the alliance, it was the overall autonomy, capacity, and resources of the state that counted 
in its relation's with the TNCs and the West on one side and the local capitalists on the 
other. The process of dependent development changed the country's class structure. In 
alliance with the state, international capital gained a dominant position over the agribusiness 
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and industry sectors - both technological and managerial - and banking. A dependent 
bourgeoisie also emerged that was closely tied to, and dominated by, international capital. 
This class was the product of the state initiated economic development, consisting of the 
royal family, the owners of private banks and modern commercial centres, industrialists, and 
those involved in agribusiness - in total the so called 'one thousand families'. 
As was discussed in chapter three and four, the royal family, led by the Shah, dominated 
the polity and controlled the decision-making process. However, in Iran, the function of the 
state, as (1974) argues, did not confine itself to 
"being the ideological and political reflection of a given socio-economic basis and 
securing the general conditions for the existence and development of this basis as 
the state apparatus of power; instead the state (was) to a certain extent itself the 
impulse or stimulus behind these relations and thus at the same time (consolidating) 
its own social bourgeois-capitalist basis" (cited in Muller 1983: 72). 
The specific manifestation of the general tendency was reflected in Iran by the initiation 
and realisation of the so called 'White Revolution'. The material basis required by the 
Iranian state for the implementation of economic and social strategy grew from the 
production and sale of crude oil and natural gas. Crude oil was a source of accumulation 
which produced quite specific possibilities and characteristics in the country's economic 
structure and its growth potential. Profit from oil production played an extremely important 
role in the formation of state finance (see Table A3). 
Because of growth in revenues, the role of the state budget as the centralising instrument 
of financial resources grew more important and the power and room for manoeuvre of the 
government increased in the economic reproduction process. By actively participating in 
social reproduction, the state could determine to a decisive extent the nature and rate of 
socio-economic development in Iran. This was expressed in the strengthening and extension 
of the state sector in the national economy, which were based in particular on disbursing the 
exploitation of the oil wealth and concentrating the growing oil revenues in the hands of the 
state. The state sector became the decisive mediator and agent in the development of 
capitalist relations of production, while itself, to a major extent was dependent on the 
conditions dictated by Western capitalism, in part through the oil market. 
The enormous foreign exchange income from oil exports (over $82 billion from March 
1973 till March 1978) gave the state the financial possibilities to boost industrialisation and 
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to initiate economic restructuring on a large scale. This was reflected in the envisaged 
expenditure of the revised Fifth Plan for 1973-78 which totalled $69.59 billion (including 
$12.53 billion for industry and mining) (see Tables 5.1). 
The state share in GFCF increased from 43% in the third plan to 66% during the Fifth 
Plan (Table A7). Mainly by means of its credit policy, the Iranian government reduced the 
cost of fixed capital, thus discriminating against small and medium size enterprises, which 
generally produced in a more labour-intensive way. The dominant role of the state sector 
was not therefore a result merely of its power to dispose of considerable financial resources 
but also its control of the key industries, such as the hydrocarbons by NIOC, NIGC, NIPC, 
metal industry by NISC, SCCMC, and heavy industry by machine building complexes in 
Arak and Tabriz amongst others, and other important sectors of power generation, etc. 
Furthermore, the state had firm control of the productive infrastructure and, not least, 
owned modern enterprises in the agrarian sector. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the state stood the best chance of improving its 
position in industries involving extraction of raw materials, where technology was stable and 
fixed investment large; whereas in industries where intangible capital was more important 
and continual product innovation the rule, the TNCs had a stronger position. 
6.2. The State's Industrial Strategy 
The transfer of certain production facilities undoubtedly accelerates the pace of 
industrialisation in the developing countries and enables them to create new jobs. But this 
industrialisation is conceived as part of an internationally organised complex production 
process which defines or limits the possibilities and the extent of national shares in the 
process. The criterion applied is not the establishment of a complex industrial structure, 
especially in types of production where relatively advanced technological methods are used. 
In Iran the main emphasis in the 1960s was on the strategy of ISP to provide urban 
consumers with various goods and - in the 1970s a deepening of this path - to undertake 
production of certain basic and intermediate goods such as chemicals, steel, and machine 
tools. 
The basis for industrial development were laid during the 1953-63 period. These included 
certain measures taken by the state to encourage, facilitate and direct the country's industrial 
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development, among them the protection of foreign and domestic capital, guarantee for 
equitable compensation for losses,4 the provision of physical infrastructure, and the provision 
of financial infrastructure. 
Iran's overall industrial growth rate was an impressive 15% annually between 1965 and 
1975, registered 14.6% in 1976-77 and 9.4% in 1977-78. These rates may have been the 
highest in the Third World over this period, and were twice or more the average of the 
developing countries generally. Gross domestic fixed capital formation grew at a high 18.4% 
annual rate for 1963-77. These rates were somewhat deceptive however, in at least two 
respects: Industry's share of GNP at about 18% lagged well behind that of services (35%) 
and oil (35%) in 1977-78, and manufactured non-oil exports accounted for only 2-3% of all 
exports in 1975. 
Data on output and share of specific industries suggests that the textile industry remained 
important, increasing production between 1965 and 1975, but falling behind motor vehicles 
in terms of the total value produced. Food processing also continued as an important sector. 
Assembly-type industries such as auto and electrical appliances became increasingly 
prominent.5 
Other high-technology and capital-intensive sectors were in production of steel and 
aluminium (at great cost and with foreign help) whose output increased ten times but still 
lagged behind demand; petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals (marked by foreign technology 
and licensing); and machine tools in a plant at Arak. Important non-manufacturing sectors 
included construction, non-oil mining, transportation and banking, dominated by IMDBI -
established in 1957 with 40% foreign ownership (see Moghtader 1980). 
One of the outcomes of this policy of capital-intensive industrialisation was intense rise in 
the average investment-labour ratio. The ratio for the period 1963-72 is estimated at about 
$4,000 and for the period 1973-78 over $20,000 (Katouzian 1980: 267-68, tables 13.8 & 
13.9). This means that while the average GNP per capita during the period of 1973-78 was 
less than $2,000, the development strategy and the techniques of production chosen and 
encouraged by the state led to an average expenditure of $20,000 per head in order to 
employ one more worker. 
Despite the success indicated by the aggregate and sectoral data, Iranian industrialisation 
was plagued by a number of problems. At the core of its problems lurked structural 
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weaknesses deriving from the dependent nature of Iran's industrialisation process. The 
modern industrial sector as a whole was grossly dependent on foreign joint ventures, for 
capital, technology, management, and inputs. In this context, certain characteristic problems 
of the ISI strategy came to light. The problem of market size, limited consumption due to 
the low level of income in the country as a whole, lack of competitiveness of products on the 
world market because of high tariffs and monopoly licensing were among other problems. 
Furthermore the industrialisation process did not generate foreign exchange to finance its 
own intermediate and capital goods requirements, nor its needed consumer goods. Together 
with the high level of protection, this meant that the whole process of importing capital and 
intermediate goods and producing finished consumer goods for the domestic market could 
go on rather smoothly as long as the oil revenues kept rising. Lack of research and 
development activities and skilled labour, and the resulting overemphasis given to the degree 
of capital-intensity in industry, acted as an additional factor restricting the transfer of 
technology from the West - through the TNCs - to productive sectors of the Iranian 
economy. 
Due to these reasons, plants ran at low capacity, resulting in failure to expand export 
potential. Other difficulties included the disastrous overtaxing of infrastructure during the oil 
boom (ports and roads) which led to great wastage of imports, endemic corruption, and 
capital flight after 1975 when the state mandated profit-sharing with workers in some 
industries and initiated an anti- profiteering campaign (For detail see Looney 1988:113, 
Katouzian 1980: 279; Halliday 1979:147, 166; Graham, 1980: 88-94). Pesaran (1982) 
locates the problems of ISI in the strategy and in the pattern of artificially high profits, lack 
of forward and backward linkages in the economy, discrimination against agriculture due to 
the overvalued rial, and the brake on employment caused by capital intensity. 
The state by acquiring high-technology and capital-intensive industrial projects tried to 
achieve a rapid and short-cut process of industrialisation. The TNCs, in view of the limited 
supply of skilled labour and top professionals in Iran followed suit, undoubtedly 
accentuating the demand pressures on these already scarce human resources. For example, 
the Fifth Development Plan was short of 700,000 skilled personnel (see Table A 34). The 
military faced similar difficulties in recruiting. The air force had a shortage of 7,000 skilled 
personnel in 1976 and the navy which was a recently expanded force with little experience in 
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handling its new equipment, was in a worse condition. The trend, in view of shortage of 
skilled manpower, was towards the importation of foreign technicians, supervisors, and 
other intermediate levels of skilled personnel. 
Based on the report by the Agency for International Development (AID): 
"the scarcity of facilities for training and the consequent deficiencies of middle-
management experience and engineering, technical and service skills being 
experienced by Iran is a symptom of rapid industrial development", thus the 
industrialisation process "is necessarily heavily influenced by foreign talent 
imported to fill the gap" (AID 1972: 17). 
Furthermore, AID's report points out that the International Executive Service (IESC) 
which was active in industrial development of most LDCs, "is oversubscribed in Iran with 
requests from clients", making Iran, the second most active IESC country programme in the 
world (ibid.). US Senate (1976) anticipated that by 1980, 50 to 60 thousand American 
military personnel would have been necessary to run Iranian defence-related projects. 
Two studies by Bildner (1973) and Daftary & Borghey (Yekom Consultants : 1975) on 
the role of the TNCs in Iran reinforces such findings. Based on these two surveys on the 
TNCs in Iran, managerial positions were monopolised by foreign employees as in technical 
management (91%), marketing (65%), financing (55%), quality control (100%), and in 
position of chief accountant (100%) (Yekom 1975: 51, Table III-11; Bildner in Alizadeh 
1976: table 7). 
The state played the dominant role in industrialisation in the 1960s, allocating oil 
revenues, building infrastructure, and co-ordinating the Iranian bourgeoisie and foreign 
capital in joint ventures through the grant of loans, licenses, and contracts. In industry, the 
state's share of ownership dropped from the 1941 level of 50% to 17% in 1963 after the 
transfer of shares in state factories as compensation for the ex-proportion of landed estates. 
But as oil revenues grew the state's role in industrial investments increased apace, from 40% 
in the mid-1960s to 60% in the 1970s. By virtue of its preponderant role in the highly-
capitalised new sectors - steel, petrochemicals, and natural gas, machinery - the state 
proposed to invest $46.2 billion during the Fifth Plan (1973-78), compared with the private 
sector's $23.4 billion. Thus, local capital being weak, industrial development between 1953 
and 1978 was generally attributed to the state's dominant role. 
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&.2.L Ti@ private sectors tin© weaker partner 
The private sector certainly played a supporting part in the industrialisation process. 
Local capitalists and middle class bureaucrats in the Pahlavi periods all enjoyed some contact 
with the royal family, for to succeed one had to be favoured by the court. The main activities 
in which local capital played a role were light industries, construction, and banking. 
The active encouragement of private enterprise was an important element in the policy of 
the Iranian state. The opening up of the industrial sector to private capital in particular, 
which tried to increase the leaning of the private sector towards productive investments 
principally by making preparatory investments, granting credit, tax and duty relief and a 
series of other similar measures was an example. Attempts by the state, which were made as 
early as the Second Plan (1956-62), to promote private capital by loans did not lead to far-
reaching qualitative change in the structure or production capacities of the Iranian 
bourgeoisie. In 1960-62 private investment stood at 48 billion rials in comparison with 70.6 
billion rials state investment (Muller 1980: 77-8). During 1964-72 period, essentially new 
trends resulted from the industrialisation course of the government and the increased oil 
revenues and inflow of foreign capital. Active support from the state, which went hand in 
hand with the creation of a favourable climate for investment, led to a boom which came 
into full effect in the 1970s. 
However, in spite of this gain, the regime never allowed the private sector to set up a 
political power base, as it was the case with any other socio-political groups. In this process 
the banks and financial institutions, mostly controlled by the state (i.e. IMDBI, ICB, DIBI 
banks), had a key function within the framework of state control of the economic policies 
and was crucial in determining the direction in which the private sector had to follow. 
Apart from the quantitative aspects of the growth in volume of private investment - it 
increased from 56 billion rials in 1968/9 to 777 billion rials in 1977/8 (Muller 1980: 78) -
there was a series of qualitative changes. Over a broad front, private capital penetrated all 
branches of industry apart from oil and gas, although much slower than the state. However, 
the degree of capital concentration in the private sector - and in particular in the sector of 
industrial enterprises - increased noticeably. During the period of Fourth plan, the PBO 
made available credit to the value of 34.8 billion rials for private sector investment. In the 
revised Fifth Plan, it reached 229.5 billion rials - more than 17% of the private resources 
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which had been earmarked for investment. The private sector also received 63.3 billion rials 
in the form of profit shares from state plants and municipal administrations (see also Table 
All) . Nevertheless, the relative proportion of public investment to private investment 
increased constantly from 0.75 in the Third Plan to 1.2 in the Fourth Plan, and finally to 2 in 
the Fifth Plan - meaning that during the Fifth Plan period, the government invested twice the 
private sector. 
As already stated, within the private sector mainly by means of its credit policy, the 
government reduced the cost of fixed capital. Access to credit was generally difficult for 
small entrepreneurs because of their lack of securities, necessary know-how and contacts. 
Table 6.1: Loans Approved by IMDBI, (classified by size), million rials (mr), percent in brackets 
The 1959-77 period The 1977-78 Period 
Size (mr) Number of % Amount1 % Number % Amount1 % 
Loans (mr) of Loans (mr) 
Up to 15 150 (16) 1,471 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 13.9 (0.4) 
15-25 98 (10.4) 2,114 (1.3) 4 (3.5) 87 (0.2) 
25-45 146 (15.6) 5,132 (3.1) 9 (7.9) 287 (0.7) 
45-75 130 (13.9) 7,666 (4.7) 12 (10.5) 719 (1-9) 
75-150 166 (17.7) 17,998 (11) 28 (24.6) 3,012 (8) 
Over 150 248 (26.4) 129,226 (79) 60 (52.6) 33,684 (89.1) 
Source: Moaddel 1993, table 3.7 
1. Amounts ate rounded. 
According to Table 6.1, loans on favourable terms from government banks, which dealt 
only with a 'small number of large customers' were largely denied to small and medium-size 
industry. Furthermore, certain aspects of the tariff policy contributed to this differentiation.6 
In other words, the financial framework structured Iran's industrial development, favouring 
large-scale industrial establishments and monopolies tied to the TNCs, at the expense of 
medium and small-scale producers. 
The EVfDBFs loan policies are indicative of this trend. In general, over 95% of total loans 
approved by IMDBI were loans over one million dollars, which clearly were out of the reach 
of small-scale industries (Table 6.1). By the end of summer of 1978 it had invested $339 
million in 155 industrial and agribusiness ventures, in most of which the TNCs were 
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involved. However, even financially powerful companies found themselves excluded from 
profitable, safe and promising sphere of investment because of the government's selective 
granting of licences. Small industries had no real opportunity to receive government orders 
and also suffered because its traditional markets were expanding less rapidly (lower income 
in agriculture) and because competition against cheap mass consumer commodities grew 
more and more acute. On the other hand these deteriorating conditions of existence were 
balanced by several favourable factors, like a general increase in demand and new markets -
not least as suppliers for major industries - and to a certain extent the improvement of 
infrastructure conditions. Moreover, small and medium-size industry - regardless of the 
expanding development of large industry - still had at its disposal considerable production 
capacity and had put its own hallmark on the industrial landscape of Iran. 
Another characteristic feature of state policy consisted of the promotion of ties between 
the upper classes and foreign capital. The triple alliance of the state, domestic and foreign 
capital often came together as partners in the founding of new enterprises. The close ties 
between the Iranian state capital and private foreign capital was doubtless one of the 
characteristic features of dependent capitalist development in Iran. In connection with this 
phenomenon, a tendency of differentiation between state-owned (large, modem Iranian-
foreign enterprises) and local private companies became apparent. This tendency formed the 
basis for the continuing processes of differentiation and social regrouping within the Iranian 
bourgeoisie. 
Contrary to the South Korean and Brazilian cases, for example, in Iran private capital 
was weak and leaning on the state for support and contribution. In the former cases, the 
presence of a group of large capitalists with sizeable capital and organisational resources and 
entrepreneurial skills limited the choices of the state elite. The privatisation of state 
enterprises in Iran (more in traditional industries), although strengthening the bourgeois class 
forces, did not, however, signify a surrender of the main positions of power by the state. The 
state continued to retain its command over the decisive sectors of the national economy, 
regardless of all its principles to encourage private initiative. This policy left local capital in a 
weaker position in its triple alliance with both the state and the TNCs. The private sector 
was leaning on the state for economic credit and favours, while politically it counted on 
receiving some support from the TNCs vis-a-vis the intrusive state. 
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The provision of financial infrastructure was crucial in determining the direction of 
industrial development in Iran. Thus, banks and financial institutions functioned as the main 
channel through which foreign capital infiltrated Iran's industry (see Table A18). One of the 
most important banks in this regard was the IMDBI. IMDBI became one of the most 
important mediums through which international finance capital gained access to the 
country's banking system and hence to industrial finance. While 60% of initial equity of 
IMDBI was chartered to Iranian nationals, the actual control of IMDBFs board of directors 
and executive committee, which was the ultimate authority for loan approval, was given to 
the foreign side, for the first five years.7 This dependence on international financial capital 
had naturally enabled the latter to exert considerable control over the bank's industrial 
policies. IMDBI was mediating between the interests of local entrepreneurs and foreign 
capital in the preparation for and realisation of major industrial projects. In this way, it gave 
a decisive boost to the process of binding together Iranian and foreign capital, at the same 
time promoting the concentration and centralisation of production and capital in the hands of 
a relatively restricted stratum of major Iranian capitalists who had close links with the TNCs 
(see Table 6.1). The dominant position of international financial capital was further 
expanded through its participation in a number of other specialist and commercial banks. 
According to Table A18, 9 out of 14 (69%) of these banks were established between 
1957 and 1959, supporting the claim by Moaddel (1993) that during the second stage of the 
Shah's regime (1953-63) the financial infrastructures was laid for the subsequent 
development of dependent capitalism. Data shows that foreign participants could have 
effective control over these banks, even with minority share holdings. The foreign shares 
were predominantly concentrated and controlled by financially powerful international banks, 
while the Iranian shares were dispersed and distributed among a considerable number of 
shareholders. The rate of concentration of shares varied between 90 to 100% for the former 
compared to 20% for the Iranian shares (Moaddel 1993: 81-2). Furthermore, the credit and 
aid policies of the US in the industrialisation process of Iran, assisted her in direct control 
over the policy initiation and its direction in areas US capital was being allocated. Injection 
of more than $4 billion in the 1960s by the US government in the form of loans and credit 
was a major stimulus in the development process of the country. 
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Nonetheless by the late 1960s, while Iran was pushing for higher share of oil revenues 
(through renegotiation of agreements with the TNCs and their core states to sell more oil 
rather than bargaining over the oil price), the search for more foreign loans and investment 
continued. During the Fourth Plan, while American aid to Iran decreased substantially, Iran's 
external public debt increased to a cumulative total of $5.9 billion (while it was $500 million 
a decade earlier) of which just over 20% was in the form of supplier credits with an average 
maturity of ten years. Indeed just prior to the oil price hike of December 1973 it was 
foreseen that Iran could face serious debt servicing problems in the late 1970s unless certain 
rescheduling could be achieved. The situation, of course, changed with the surge in oil 
revenues. Some debt, the higher interest ones, were quickly paid off while others were left to 
run their course. The new situation was short lived however, as within three years Iran was 
back in the loan market. Therefore, in 1978 Iran was seeking, partly due to the revolutionary 
process though, over $3 billion in medium-term credits. 
Another partner in the triple alliance was foreign capital, whose role, during the Shah's 
rule, shaped the Iranian economy on a scale beyond the already significant one we have seen 
from 1850 to 1950. Nevertheless, after the oil price hike of 1973, TNCs were no longer a 
financier in the development of Iranian economy. The relative foreign investment in the 
economy to total investment, during the 1970s, decreased substantially in comparison to the 
1950s and 1960s (Table A20). The TNCs became more involved in providing needed 
technology, manpower and managerial positions. Ansari, the Minister of the Economy and 
Finance, estimated total foreign investment in Iran, at the beginning of 1977, at $5.2 billion, 
which was less than 4% of all capital invested in Iran (Foran 1993: 329). However, it was 
mainly concentrated in industry, and accounting for 9.4% of total investment in industry 
during the 1965-75 period (Gasiorowski 1993: 453, table 1). 
Foreign investment in Iran was mostly concentrated in some of the most important 
economic sectors: agribusiness, petrochemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, steel 
and aluminium industries. Furthermore, due to the high-tech orientation of these industries, 
the high technology inputs, skilled labour and management became important elements 
linking the TNCs with local industries. By contrast, the total foreign capital in South Korea 
for the 1960-79 period amounted around $10 billion, accounting for 30% of its GFCF. 
Foreign capital constituted 26% of South Korea's country's GNP in 1976 (Koo and Kim 
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1992: 135; Castells 1992: 39). In comparison to the Iranian state, the South Korean 
government preferred attracting new capital through contracting for foreign loans which 
accounted for 92% of total foreign capital present in the country for the 1960-79 period. 
Private loans were channelled by the government to Korean companies, according to their 
compliance with the government strategic plans. 
6.2.3,, State's industrialisation strategy and the agricultural sector 
Between 1968 and 1978, 14 huge agribusiness ventures of over 5,000 hectares each were 
established, mostly located near large dam projects. Investors included the government, 
private capitalists, international banks such as Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, and Bank of 
America, and the TNCs including Shell, Mitsui, John Deere, and Dow Chemical. 
Development and Resource Corporation (D&R), an American joint venture, played a crucial 
role in structuring Iran's agricultural development.8 By 1966, the establishment of farm 
corporations and agribusiness had became the state's official policy as the Shah began 
talking about his unique solution to Iran's agrarian malaise. This policy was directed toward 
establishing and expanding farm corporations and agribusiness. Because of this policy, a 
major share of the government budget for the agricultural sector was allocated to the 
agribusiness or related projects. 
For instance, a major share of the agricultural sector allocations during the Second and 
Third Plans went for the construction of three dams and other large-scale projects. In the 
Fourth Plan (1968-73), the main emphasis was placed on the creation of large mechanised 
farming and husbandry, thus the government decided to dispossess the peasants working on 
some 250,000 acres of land.9 In this Plan period, 18% of the agricultural expenditure was 
allocated for the establishment of 34 new agribusiness. The revised Fifth Plan allocated 
384,000 hectares of the best irrigated land for such establishments. Consequently, the 
number of peasant families possessing lands began to decline from the mid-1960s. 
The share of agriculture in the GDP fell from 50% in the 1940s to 33% in 1959, 23% in 
1969, and 9.2% in 1977-78. Iran's agricultural problems were aggravated by the poor 
performance of the new agribusiness and farm corporations. Huge agribusiness ventures 
with massive state and foreign investment in irrigation, tractors, and fertilisers did not 
contribute significantly to agricultural production. According to Table A12, 12.2% of the 
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national agricultural production surplus was contributed by modem large-scale farming. The 
share of farm corporations and agribusiness were only 2.4%. Considering that 87.8% of 
surpluses coming from the traditional farms was based on the traditional irrigation system, 
one may conclude that the state's construction of dams had had limited impact on 
agricultural production (Foran 1993: 323-5; Moaddel 1993: 75-6). 
While the state development strategy failed to replace Iran's traditional agricultural 
cultivation with a more productive modem sector, the country lost its previous self-reliance 
on agricultural products. Foran (1993: 324) concludes that: 
"the nature of the land reform and the inadequacies of the large-scale projects may 
have preserved the small size of most holdings for a time, but the maintenance and 
indeed extension of inequalities, creation and release of a huge army of landless 
agricultural workers, and spread of commercialised production and distribution all 
made the new system unmistakably capitalist in mode of production terms". 
The removal of power from the land-owning class was a major political consequence 
of the state's agrarian policies. The infiltration of international capital in this sector and 
the state's bias in favour of farm corporations and agribusiness further eroded the 
peasants' support for the state and antagonised the landowners. Landowners were 
compensated with shares in state-owned industries, worth around $93 million, a move 
which turned some of them into industrial capitalists, while others diversified into real 
estate, trade and banking (Hooglund 1982: 78-83). 
The land reform, furthermore, had a major impact on class structure of the country, in 
the rural areas in particular. The main political consequence of the land reform was the 
effective replacement of the all-powerful landlord in the villages by the obtrusive state. 
Some 45,000 large, mostly absentee landlords remained after the land reform, and as 
Table A17 indicates, 1,350 of them had substantial holdings of over 200 hectares. The 
total land held by such absentee owners was as much as 47 percent of all cultivable land, 
including the most fertile. 150,000 to 600,000 farmers owned 10-50 hectares of land 
each. This group emerged out of the former village headman, middleman, and production 
team leaders who received more land than ordinary sharecroppers. Along with the 
landlords, these middle class groups dominated the new rural political institutions, further 
consolidating their position as the most well-to-do individuals living in the countryside 
(Hooglund 1973: 233). 
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Worse off were the landless rural proletariat, around 1.4 million individuals (and more 
than seven million people including their families), constituting 40 to 50 percent of the 
population in villages, who lived by working part-time on other's land or migrating to 
nearby towns and distant cities, where they became part of the urban marginal classes 
(Table A17). Passive resistance and covert resentment on the part of the peasantry was 
apparently widespread in the 1960s and 1970s, signalling the ultimate failure of the 
political aim of the regime in creating a large class of loyal supporters in the countryside. 
The failure of the agricultural sector to cover the nutritional needs of the country led to 
an unprecedented dependence on agricultural and food imports. 
By the mid 1970s Iran became the leading importer of food and agricultural products 
in the Middle East. Three to four percent annual growth rate in agriculture, against a 
population growth of about 3 percent, meant that agricultural production was virtually 
stagnant in per capita terms despite land reform, mechanisation, the spread of capitalist 
relations, and other changes. 
However, as agriculture grew at 3-4% a year, consumption was rising by as much as 
12% annually mainly due to increasing per capita income in urban areas and an increase in 
state consumption. This meant shortfalls in production of such necessities as wheat, 
barley, rice, meat, and dairy products. According to Table A25, food imports rose from 
under $100 million in 1963 (with the agricultural balance of trade still positive as late as 
1968), to $111 million in 1970, $270 million in 1972, $1.9 billion in 1975, and $1.8 
billion in 1977 - equal to about 14% of Iran's food needs. In other words, from 1970 to 
1977 the annual average increase in food imports was 48.7%, which clearly shows the 
depth of Iran's dependence on the import of this commodity (on agricultural growth see 
also Graham 1980: 43; Halliday 1979: 128; Pesaran 1982: 281; Katouzian 1981: 305). 
Looked at another way, the value of food imports as percentage of GNP increased 
from 1% in 1970 to 4% in 1975 and fell to 2.5% in 1977 (Table A25). In other words, by 
the time oil revenues had increased, the state had massively increased imports of 
foodstuffs, both in absolute terms and as percentage of GNP. These massive imports were 
not only as a result of the agricultural failure to cover the nutritional needs of the country 
but also due to the political policy of buying off the society by making available ( in 
abundance) broader variety of food commodities through imports. 
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O A TBI® trasiSBati©raaS corporations 
Since the World War I I , international capital has attached utmost importance to the 
process of industrialisation. It is essential to note that the aims and tasks of foreign capital in 
general and of the international monopolies in particular were transformed. International 
capital was no longer an external force whose interests were represented internally by 
comprador and raw material exporters. Instead, foreign capital, operating locally, shared 
with local capital, both private and state-controlled, an interest in the further development of 
local industry. This is not to deny that there was differentiation of local and foreign capital 
within the industrial structure. It was only to say that conflicts of interest became more 
subtle. Over the issue of industrialisation in general there was no split (Evans 1979: 9-10). 
Unlike other developing countries, Iran's goal of attracting foreign capital, in the 1970s in 
particular, was not to obtain financial means to carry out planned investments, but rather to 
get access to modem technology and know-how. In fact it is, above all, in the case of Iran, 
their monopoly in the field of technology and management which gave foreign corporations 
a power to bargain with the Iranian government. Nonetheless, while the core states were 
closely concerned with the long-term development strategy of Iran, economically and socio-
politically, the TNCs, as Halliday (1979) argues, were determined to ensure that they got 
their money back as quickly as possible, thus in this criterion, it was their short-term rather 
than the longer-term interests that governed their policy. 
The 1,900 foreign corporations and banks which had established themselves in different 
Iranian industries - 1,000 of them during the 1973-77 period, Table A27 - largely gained 
control over the Iranian economy both through joint ventures and other forms not tied to 
property rights (Safari 1980 in Thiemann 1983 : 90). In joint ventures, the foreign partner 
acted as supplier in various ways, i.e. in management, sale, financing, transport and 
information services, joint research and development projects, sub-supplies, etc. 
The TNCs had major structural effects on the Iranian industry. Indeed, the production 
process relied heavily on the TNCs which supplied the needed skilled labour, managerial 
talent and international marketing expertise. 
Dependent Development 205 






Plan % Total 
% of 
Total 
Agribusiness 0 0 294 3 755 2.9 1,049 2.7 
Automobile industry & 95 3.2 583 5.8 1,835 7.2 2515 6.5 
transportation 
Building material 153 5.1 276 2.8 639 2.5 1,068 2.8 
Electrical & electronic 227 7.6 1,040 10.4 1,795 7.1 3,062 8 
Food 62 2 230 2.3 651 2.6 943 2.4 
Hotels 0 0 293 3 295 1.2 588 1.5 
Metallurgical 222 7.5 963 9.7 3,917 15.4 5,102 13.3 
Mining 509 17.1 960 9.6 625 2.4 2,094 5.4 
Petrochemicals 119 4 2,198 22 8,201 32.3 10,518 27.3 
Pharmaceutical & 684 23.1 1,210 12.1 966 3.8 2,860 7.4 
Chemical 
Rubber 754 25.4 1,224 12.3 2,617 10.3 4,595 12 
Others 146 5 698 7 3,270 12.8 4,114 10.7 
TOTALS 2,971 100 9,973 100.0 25,564 100.0 38,508 100.0 
Source: calculated based on information from CBI, Annual report and Balance Sheet, 1970, 1972, 1975, 
1978; Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments 
According to Table 6.2, the preferred sectors for investment were the dynamic, 
structurally determinant branches such as the metallurgical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries, the steel and arms industries, the automobile industry, electrical 
engineering and electronics, rubber and tyre industry and even made inroads in such 
traditionally local industries as textiles and construction. Typical of the industry established 
with foreign participation was "its pronounced assembly characters" (Thiemann 1983: 92). 
Some of them like auto and electrical industries were merely assembling imported parts, 
adding very low amounts to the total value of finished products. This high degree of 
dependence of local industry on the TNCs, undoubtedly reduced the spread effects and 
linkages from these activities to the rest of the economy (Looney 1988: 114-5). 
While countries like Iran were showing their desire for industrialisation in oil and gas 
industry, from the point of view of the strategic consideration of international capital, the 
orientation of industrialisation toward the establishment of raw material and energy-intensive 
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industries was in line with the efforts of foreign capital to extensively streamline and 
modernise their own economies in the capitalist industrial countries. Under the changing 
conditions in the oil-producing countries, the TNCs had no other choice to secure their 
energy and raw material supplies. The TNCs, therefore, were willing to help Iran expand 
into oil refining, petrochemicals, fertiliser, iron, steel and aluminium, because the West 
would get some of the finished products and would sell Iran the plants, equipment, 
technology, management, and some of the inputs, in addition to having some joint 
ownership. These included, above all, refineries ($9.3 billion investment in oil industry in the 
Fifth Plan), gas pipeline, sectors of the petrochemical industry (to build 2 new complexes 
and invest a total of $8 billion up to 1985), nitrogen fertiliser industry (to build two new 
complexes), steel and aluminium plants (increase Isfahan complex output from 700,000 to 5 
million tons per year and build seven new complexes, and a new plant in Bandar Abbas) 
(Thiemann 1983: 94). 
There were high hopes that the government would shortly gain revenues from these 
capital and energy-intensive industries. However, the value added in oil refining was very 
low and as a world surplus in refining capacity existed in petrochemicals, the market was 
facing serious competition. In addition, growing Iranian domestic market would undermine 
further the projected foreign currency earnings from massive investment in oil and 
petrochemical industries (HaUiday 1978). Waterbury argues a further point that "none of 
these industrial schemes would be viable without oil, they are in no sense then creating a 
future without oil" (1991: 24). 
The TNCs had concentrated in Iran's most important economic sectors: 14 out of 18 
agribusiness ventures; 3 out of 5 large petrochemical plants; 4 out of 5 large chemical 
concerns; 14 out of 18 pharmaceuticals;10 all of plastics; all of autos; 37 of 42 producers of 
electrical and non-electrical machinery; and involvement in the steel and aluminium 
industries. Even food processing, construction, and textiles industries were increasingly 
supplied by the TNCs. The TNCs tended to be the largest companies in Iran, capital- and 
technology-intensive, and very profitable. Behind high protective tariffs reported and 
unreported rates of returns were possible between 50 to 200% - while local capitalists were 
enjoying 30-50% profit rates (Foran 1993: 329; Halliday 1979: 148). 
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Yekom's survey shows that the main source of finance for TNCs' activities in Iran was 
the local banking sector. Their basis for choosing local partners in the country was mainly 
the contribution a local firm could make in their activity. 60 % of the 23 major TNCs studied 
in this survey had used only local finance, while none had been financed through their parent 
companies. Furthermore, other than availability of local finance, other attractions for the 
TNCs were high local demand, large market, and high import duty. Nonetheless, while the 
country provided the TNCs with most of their needed finance and a market for their 
production, the TNCs contributed only less than 30% in terms of purchasing raw materials 
from the domestic Iranian market. This would lead to an increase in the country's imports 
and hence worsening its balance of payments situation (Yekom 1976. 113-16, tables B-2, B-
3,B-5). 
TNCs' share in Iran's annual GFCF was quantitatively small compared to the share by 
local capital - the state and private. However, qualitatively they had a decisive role in Iran's 
industrialisation process and the shaping of its dependent capitalist development. Then-
monopoly role in areas of technology - in both civil and military - management, know-how, 
and skilled labour were extraordinary. The Iranian state was also dependent on the 
corporations because equipment could only be installed and operated with their help. These 
international corporations had extended their influence to new areas so that their penetration 
of the Iranian economy increased considerably in some fields. It was also reinforced by the 
licensing system, which erected barriers against the entry of new industries, thus enabling the 
TNCs to reap substantial profits. 
Typical of any industry established with foreign participation was its pronounced 
assembly character which increased considerably the dependence of the industrial sector, and 
thus the whole economy, on supplies from abroad. This trend is to be seen in the motor 
industry, the production of radio and television sets and numerous other electronic 
equipment, the pharmaceutical industry, the production of agricultural machinery, bicycles, 
port equipment, etc. The extent of dependence on imported raw materials and semi-finished 
goods was grave and exceeded 80% of overall production (Thiemann 1983: 93). The 
production of raw materials, semi-finished goods, complete components and spare parts 
imported from the capitalist countries was by 1978 between 85 to 100% in the 
pharmaceutical industry, 60 to 100% in the chemical industry, 80% in the textile industry, 
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80% in some branches of mechanical engineering and metal manufacture (car assembly, 
tractors, tyres, household appliances), more than 70% in some branches of the food industry 
(vegetable oil, margarine, meat), 57% in some branches of building material industry (bricks, 
glass, plaster, cement, metal sections, cables, paints, timber), and 41.5% in the paper 
industry (CBI1979). Such findings are confirmed by Yekom's survey (1976). 
In general, the industrial sector used imported machines to assemble imported parts with 
imported technology, sometimes in joint ventures. This was a feature of dependent 
development. 
The Shah by the early 1970s tried not to abide fully by the demands of foreign capital and 
conditions of the TNCs. This was done partly through increased imports of consumer and 
finished goods. He thought that he could obtain the same results in development process 
without abiding by the rules laid down by the TNCs. The regime's policies aggravated the 
situation of dependent development, by interrupting the course of industrialisation led by the 
Western capitalism (as was the case in Brazil and South Korea) without introducing any 
alternative route, and wasting the country's assets on imports - from the TNCs themselves 
(Tables A21, A22). The result was that the country neither achieved the level of dependent 
industrialisation that was possible, nor did it free itself from the grip of the TNCs. 
A rather relatively different case was the infiltration of international capital in South 
Korea. The nationalism of the Korean government rejected an excessive presence of foreign 
multinational corporations, fearful of their influences on society and on the political fate of 
the Korean nation. Thus, capital influx in to South Korea mainly took the form of loans. The 
effectiveness of the Korean state's development policies derived largely from the consistency 
of its policies (both political and economical, and through the years) in favour of large 
capital - local and international. This consistency in the mode of state intervention in the 
economy ensured 'business confidence' and promoted a favourable investment climate for 
both domestic and international capital. Hence, Iran, by the late 1970s, compared with 
countries at a similar level of development, such as Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, was 
less industrialised. Its financial and monopoly capital did not rely on its domestic 
industrial/agricultural capacity, but rather on depleting oil exports. However, for a brief 
period in the 1970s, Iran had seemed to be moving closer to this group in the semiperiphery. 
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O . Foreign Trad© 
The growth of the modern sector, due to its capital intensity and technological 
complexity, was tantamount to increasing Iran's dependence on imports of capital and 
intermediate goods, spare parts and machinery, and foreign specialist personnel. Moreover, 
the industrial development of the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by the country's 
increasing dependence on the export of oil. Such dependence increased Iran's vulnerability 
to shortages and breakdowns of equipment (Pakravan 1981 in Moaddel 1993: 85) as well as 
to economic fluctuations in the world market. The industrial development of the 1960s and 
1970s did not lead to a reduction in Iran's dependence on foreign trade. The country's trade 
dependence - measured by the ratio of total foreign trade to GNP - actually increased during 
the post-coup period. Iranian trade dependence was around 0.27 in the period between 
1959 and 1966, increased to 0.38 in 1973 and then jumped up to 0.62 and 0.67 in 1974 and 
1975 respectively, reflecting the effects of the increase in oil revenues on trade dependence 
(Table A8; see also Muller 1982: 84-5; Moaddel 1993: 85). 
The penetration of the Iranian economy by international capital resulted in a change in the 
structure of its domestic production. It increased its concentration in external trade and in 
the production of oil, the most profitable commodity. This led to the development of an 
'export enclave' economy characterised by uneven development - i.e. sectoral 
disarticulation. Inter-sectoral disarticulation was characterised by a lack of backward and 
forward linkages between different sectors of the economy, and intra-sectoral disarticulation 
because of a lack of such linkages within each of the main sectors of the economy -
agriculture and industry. Small-scale production, dominated by the traditional sector, did not 
have significant backward and forward linkages with the large-scale state-promoted 
monopoly sector, the so called modern sector. The modern sector was vertically integrated 
with international capital and dominated by the latter. The state's strong support for the 
modern sector was undermining the traditional sector. Because domestic production was 
concentrated in exports, both upward and downward movements in export markets 
generated dislocation in investment, employment and industrial demand. Iran's economic 
difficulties in the 1970s, which triggered political conflict, was partly the result of its 
vulnerability to the destabilising effects of the world economy. 
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A: import B: non-oil export 
Source: Table A21; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1980: table 31 
The key issues in terms of foreign trade are the balance of trade, the nature of imports 
and exports, and the terms of trade. Iran's imports exhibited an extremely high rate of 
growth over the 1963-73 period, and particularly after 1973. According to Graph 6.1, it 
increased from $96 million in 1953 to $518 million in 1963, $3,160 million in 1972 and later 
to $18,400 million in 1978; an almost 6 time increase for each of the periods between these 
years, or a staggering 190 times over 25 years. The composition of Iran's imports during the 
1960s and 1970s has shown some interesting characteristics. Up to the oil price hikes of 
1973, the composition of Iran's imports was changing such that the portion of consumer 
goods in the total was decreasing while imports of intermediate goods were increasing. Such 
a trend was in line with Iran's stage of industrialisation and development trend at this time. 
The oil price-led consumer boom of the early 1970s however completely changed the picture 
and assumed an increasing share of imports, from 15% in 1966 to 11.7% in 1971, to 17.6% 
in 1976 and then to 19% in 1977, accounting for a greater portion of total imports than at 
any time in the previous fourteen years. The public expectation for higher consumption - due 
to the oil-led development policy of the state in the early 1970s - was not halted by the 
decline in oil revenues in 1976 and after. 
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TABLE 6.3; Exports According to Production Type, in millions of dollars, percent in bracket 
Third Plan (1963-67) Fourth Plan (1968-72) Fifth Plan (1973-77) 
Export Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Traditional 756 (94.4) 1,242.9 (80.4) 2,160.7 (75.3) 
Industrial goods 45 (5.6) 303.2 (19.6) 710.8 (24.7) 
TOTAL (non-oil) 801 (100.0) 1,546.1 (100.0) 2,871.5 (100.0) 
(21.3) (17.2) (3.3) 
Oil export 2,967 (78.7) 7,458.6 (82.8) 84,270.0 (96.7) 
TOTAL Export 3,768 (100.0) 9,004.7 (100.0) 87,141.5 (100.0) 
Source: CBL Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various issues 
On exports, although revenues from oil exports soared, non-oil exports increased 
negligibly during the 1960s and 1970s. The relative non-competitive position of many local 
produced goods on the international market was and continued to be a serious long-term 
problem. As for the composition of exports, according to Table 6.3, the value of oil exports 
as a percentage of total exports increased from 78.7% in the Third Plan to 82.8% in the 
Fourth Plan and finally to 96.7% during the Fifth Plan period. The table also shows the 
dominant position of traditional and agricultural goods among non-oil export goods. The 
industrial exports goods increased from 5.6% of the total non-oil export goods in the Third 
Plan to 24.7% in the Fifth Plan. However, its share in the total export (oil and non-oil) 
decreased to less than one percent in the Fifth Plan. This means that the role of the new 
industrial export goods was reduced almost to nil. 
Iran's foreign trade was oriented largely towards the advanced industrial nations, 
especially the US, West Germany, and Japan, as Table A24 on the sources of Iran's imports 
suggests. The US took the lead from Great Britain as the undisputed hegemonic core power 
in Iran after the 19S3 coup. Multiple ties - economic, political, and strategic - were 
established between the two countries. American share in the 1954 oil deals, its direct 
investment in agribusiness, industry and banking in Iran were noted. In 1978, some 500 
American firms had $700 million invested in Iran and 12 large banks had another $2.2 billion 
in assets in Iran. To its oil interests and investments should be added trade between the two 
countries, in which the US was among Iran's leading trade partners. A trade package calling 
for $15 billion of purchases by Iran from the US including 8 nuclear plants was signed in 
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1975. Following this one, a bilateral agreement in mid-1976 projected $40 billion in US-
Iranian trade between 1976 and 1980. 
There was moreover a massive arms trade in the 1970s - about $20 billion with the US -
which did not figure in trade data and which was thoroughly dominated by the US (Table 
A27). Total American economic and military aid to Iran from 1953 to 1960 came to over $1 
billion, a sum not surpassed by any other country in the Africa or the Middle East except 
Turkey (Baldwin 1967: 200-4). Aid between 1950 and 1970 totalled $2.3 billion, over $1.3 
billion of which was military aid. In addition, the Shah's regime received $1.3 billion worth 
of new weapon systems between 1950 and 1963 (Foran 1993: 344; Ramazani 1976: 327; 
Sick 1985: 8). 
A transparent pattern of political influence followed this aid: the first $68.4 million being 
announced within three weeks of the 1953 coup, $127 million right after the 1954 oil deal, 
and other grants after Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and CENTO in 1958. Among 
the European countries, according to Table A24, however, significantly below the US 
influence in Iran, Great Britain which once was the major player, had fallen behind West 
Germany as a leading trading partner, to a position of fourth overall. Britain's largest stake 
in Iran was a 40% share in the post-1954 consortium. In the 1970s Britain was a major arms 
seller, particularly of tanks, accounting for most of the $971 million in exports to Iran in 
1977-78 (Table A 24). It was also active in the car assembly industry, as well as banking. 
Compared with other OPEC nations, Iran in the mid-1970s was the largest single customer 
of U K exports. But all of this was a far cry from Britain's traditional position as a major 
power in Iran. 
By the same token West Germany's economic recovery in the 1960s placed it in a strong 
economic position in Iran, as leading exporter from 1959 to 1970 and again in 1977. 
German investments in Iran fell in the 1970s (well behind Japan and the US), but were 
profitably placed in pharmaceuticals, steel, and agricultural machinery. The other European 
countries collectively accounted for about 20% of Iran's imports, led by France and Italy, 
with 3-5% each (ibid ). 
Japan passed Britain by 1970 and almost equalled the US by 1977 as a supplier of 
imports to Iran (excluding arms sales), especially of electrical equipment. In 1975/6, Japan 
was the largest investor in Iran, with 40% of the total investments made in that year, in 
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almost all major industries involved by the TNCs (Table A19). However, Japanese 
investment, while significant, fitted within the broad pattern of Iran's dependence on the 
advanced industrial economies, thus not really posing a challenge to American hegemony in 
Iran. 
The nature of imports further accentuated the dependent trend of Iran's development. Of 
$18 billion in total imports in 1977-78, $6.1 billion (33%) was imports of machinery and 
vehicles, $5.3 billion (29%) of steel, chemical, paper, fibres, and so forth, $4.3 billion (24%) 
was 'classified' (mainly military equipment), and $2.2 billion (12%) was of food. The share 
of oil in total exports increased from 3% in 1953 to 87% in 1963, 86% in 1972, and to 98% 
in 1978 (Table A21). One way of measuring industrial dependence on imports is, Sodagar 
(1991) argues, the calculation of import ratio in unit industrial production. According to 
Table A23-1, in 1979, this ratio for capital goods was 76% - meaning that imported goods 
constituted the main part of a unit of capital good produced in Iran. For the same year the 
ratio of imports in unit production of intermediate and consumer goods were 49.5% and 
43.5% respectively. 
While little data on the terms of trade is available, what is certain is that reliance on oil 
exports was inherently unstable, as either the West would pass the costs of its own inflation 
back to Iran or prices for oil would decline, hampering Iran's ability to import. This profile 
of foreign trade of Iran was certainly that of a dependent country (Foran 1993: 342). 
Several factors were responsible for the upsurge in Iran's imports. Among them were: 
1. The growing dependence on imported food, which in turn implied that attempts to curtail 
domestic demand would have to take into account an already perceptible discontent with 
food shortage (see Table A25). 
2. The fast growth of GFCF caused by the heavy internal investment programmes. This was 
particularly import consuming because there was a gradual increase in the 'installation of 
machinery'. 
3. Arms and military equipment, of course, comprised a big part of the total imports. During 
1974 the US alone sold $3.3 billion worth of arms to Iran (more than half the value of 
Iran's total imports in 1974). Total US arms sale to all OPEC nations was $4.4 billion 
during the same year (see Table A26). 
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4. The emergence of the newly rich middle class and the changing pattern of demand 
favoured import of consumption goods. The increased demand for passenger cars is one 
such example. During 1975 transport equipment accounted for about a quarter of British 
exports to Iran. 
The net result of Iran's swelling imports was congestion of Iranian ports and transport 
system, costing Iran over one billion dollars for port demurrage in just one year, 1975. 
Furthermore, the goods had to be stored in open air until they could be finally cleared, which 
in many cases were damaged due to Iran's harsh climate conditions. 
As was shown, the country's dependence was consolidated in two main ways. Firstly 
through foreign investment in major sectors of industry and mining, agriculture and 
commerce, secondly, through the production and export of a single commodity (oil) and 
increasing expansion of imports, including foodstuffs. This pattern of economic 
dependence was consolidated by political and military dependencies. 
6.4. The US-Iran Relationship 
From the beginning, US-Iranian relations were dominated by the Shah's concern with the 
issue of military security. Hence, as was shown in chapter 3, establishing a well-equipped 
and de-politicised Iranian military force was at top of his policy agenda throughout his rule. 
Iran's dependence included areas other than economic field. He became entirely 
dependent on foreign powers, the US in particular, when his throne was openly challenged 
by political groups from 1941 to 1953. Later during the years from 1953 to 1963, 
American's increasing involvement in the setting up of the organisations of the armed and 
security forces added the military factor to the country's dependent character. The Shah's 
realisation that "there is no economic power without military power" (the Shah, The Times, 
6 March 1976 in Laing 1977. 197) led to a situation in which the Shah, throughout his reign, 
developed military dependence on the US both on organisation and warfare, technically and 
operationally. While the basis of structure of dependence was laid down in this period, it was 
during the 1960s and 1970s that it deepened and became structural in the development 
process of the country. 
While the MAAG's assisted the Iranian government in internal security, the TAFT's 
along with the 'white-collar mercenaries' (Rick 1981: 33) provided assistance in external 
Dependent Development 215 
security. In both cases, military assistance accompanied American partial access to Iran's oil 
revenues; in the first case, the restructuring of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company into the 
NIOC with sizeable American oil interests, and in the second, the escalation of oil prices in 
order to generate sufficient oil revenue to purchase the highly sophisticated and expensive 
weaponry and logistics system of American amis and technology industries. The share of 
Iran's military imports from the US in the 1970s shows that Iran played an important role in 
anti-recessionary policies of the US government for the oil, military and manufacturing 
industries. Furthermore, Hudson argues that "taken on balance, all US foreign assistance is 
ultimately military or paramilitary in nature, even its ostensibly economic aid: it is designed 
primarily to enable foreign countries to support a military superstructure capable of saving 
the US the cost of having to provide military service with its own armed forces" (M. 
Hudson, The Political economy of foreign aid in D. Goulet & M. Hudson The Myth of Aid, 
NY, 1971: 80 quoted by Ricks 1981: 28). 
TABLE 6J \: US Military Sale to Iran, 1955-78, in millions of dollars 
Year Foreign Military agreement Foreign Military sales Deliveries 
1955-68 505.4 145.9 
1969 235.8 94.9 
1970 134.9 127.7 
1971 363.9 75.6 
1972 472.6 214.8 
1973 2,171.4 248.4 
1974 4,325.4 648.6 
1975 2,447.1 1,006.1 
1976 1,794.5 1,927.9 
1977 5,713.8 2,433.1 
1978 2,586.9 1,792.9 
Total: 1955-1978 20,751.7 8,715.8 
Source: Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, December 1978, US Department of Defence, 
Security Assistance Agency figures have been rounded. 
According to Table 6.4, total US military sales to Iran came to $20.7 billion for 1950-77, 
$20 billion of this after 1970, a sum which ate up almost 20% of Iran's total oil revenues and 
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on the American side accounted for over half of all US arms sales to foreign countries. By 
1978, there were around 40,000 American military and civilian personnel in Iran, mostly 
enjoying diplomatic immunity with military technicians drawing $9,000 a month salaries 
from the Iranian government - which amounted to about $4 billion payments in the form of 
salaries. A 1977 US Senate report admitted openly that: 
"the presence of US personnel and the presumed inability of Iranians to utilise all 
the recent arms purchases could give the US leverage over any Iranian intention 
that runs counter to US interests" (quoted in Foran 1993 : 345). 
US military mission to Iran from GENMISH (1943-76), ARMISH (1947-78), through 
the 1958 consolidation of ARMISH MAAG (1958-62), and the arrival of TAFT (1973-
78) assisted the US foreign policy makers by (1) holding the oil regions for the US, 
European and Japanese corporate interests, (2) preventing (and containing) the Soviet 
Union from access to the oil region, (3) gaining access to Iranian air space for intelligence 
gathering, to the land space for agribusiness, and to Iranian labour and markets for 
'modernisation' and (4) assisting in the conversion of that country into a military 
'satellite' as part of the US' global interests (Rick 1981). Thus, US foreign policy and the 
military missions were in one way or another, an integral part of the post-World War II 
'global reach' of the TNCs. Both worked towards strengthening the Pahlavi monarchy, 
establishing essential US programmes to provide security for the regime; and, to block 
any Soviet expansion into the capitalist controlled region and to secure US interests in the 
region. 
AID's emphasis ( 1972) which "the US investment in technical co-operation should 
match US interests" shows that presence of foreign personnel and technicians in both civil 
and military industry is one effective element in this regard which broadens the scope of 
dependence (ibid.: P.27). 
This extensive American involvement meant that Iran's socio-economic development 
and foreign policy objectives became closely tied to the interests of the capitalist world. In 
its relationship with Tehran, Washington acted as a 'Patron power' in upholding and 
securing the Shah's regime and influencing the direction and substance of its policies in 
line with Western regional and international interests (Saikal 1980: 57-8). The presence of 
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more than 40,000 military personnel, mainly involved in military related projects, was an 
important tool in this respect. (Cockroft, 1980: 144 in Stauth 1980). 
To a great extent, ever since the overthrow of Mosaddegh in 1953, the Shah had been 
dependent on the US for moral, political and military support. Having re-instated the 
Shah on his throne through a CIA-supported military coup in 1953, the US had made its 
presence felt. Cottam (1979: 323) has indicated that "from 1953 to 1963 Iran could be 
described not only as an American client state but as an American dependency. The 
regime required full protection against external aggressors as for internal survival". 
However, the reform of 1963 and the successful growth period of 1963-73 provided the 
Shah and his regime a degree of loosening dependence - a period during which the US-
Iran cliency relationship declined. In 1971, with the British pullout from the Persian Gulf, 
the Shah became the gendarme of the region, with the blessing of the Kissinger-Nixon 
strategy of global curtailment of the Soviet Union. 
For instance, the dispatching of troops to Oman, in order to help Sultan Qabus in 
1972, reflected a growing co-operation between the two states which served to enhance 
personal confidence of the Shah. By 1974 and as a consequence of the flow of billions of 
dollars of oil revenues to Iran, the dependent relationship between the two countries had 
altered significantly. While Iran increased its imports (both economic and military goods), 
its bargaining power increased. With the growing confidence of the Shah, the 'Nixon 
doctrine' with respect to Iran - which was to rely exclusively on the Shah for the 
protection of US interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region - had been thoroughly 
institutionalised in the US foreign policy. 
As a result of all the above mentioned events, on the eve of the Tehran Oil Agreements 
in 1973, the Shah was almost a new man in the international arena. Graham (1980: 15) 
points out the way in which this occasion turned to a confidence-building phenomenon 
for the Shah: 
"It was a performance to match the occasion. On 23 December 1973, while the 
Ministers representing the [Persian] Gulf members of OPEC were still in formal 
session, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, called a press conference. 
His announcement was a staggering new increase in the price of oil. The Shah 
displayed his usual polished manner but his tone had a new confidence - the 
confidence of a man who knew that his country's financial resources had 
quadrupled in just over two months". 
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However, it is important to note that in spite of a significant alteration in the degree of the 
dependence of the Shah and his regime on the US, and the increasing political and 
economical interdependence in their relationship, the basic dimensions of the Shah's 
dependency on the US did not change dramatically. The surge in oil revenues had 
provided a larger room for manoeuvre for the Shah. Thus, the basis for a degree of 
mutual dependence - between the semi-periphery state of Iran and the core country of the 
US - in which the US was the dominant player were laid. Iran was acting like a sub-
Imperialist power (Bambira 1973: 153 in Kay 1993). 
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C©mdnn§I©im 
The integration of the Iranian economy into the world market was the prime 
mover in the process of socio-economic and political change which led to the 
dissolution of the pre-capitalist system1. In particular, the state, forming an important 
mediating link in the process of integration, and having a central position in pre-
capitalist agrarian relations, played a dominant role in the outcome of the process of 
economic transformation. 
The Safavid Shahs had hegemonic positions in the state and economy, tapping 
surplus production by tribes, peasants and urban producers, and enjoying military, 
political and ideological dominance. The economy was predominantly agricultural but 
there was significant regional and minimal international trade in products such as 
textiles, porcelain and metalwork. Commercial contacts with the West (mainly with 
the Dutch and English East India Companies) , could in no sense be considered 
dependent on the West; rather it was a regional empire, influencing the politics of the 
region and competing with other empires, i.e. the Ottomans. 
During the period of the fall of the Safavid and the interval period before the rise 
of the Qajar dynasty, royal authority and control decentralised considerably. The 
Iranian state and economy were weakened just as a crucial moment in its history was 
approaching. 
The failure of the attempts to restructure the state institutions, which resulted from 
the diffuse nature of political power in the early Qajar rule - followed by the military 
defeat of the Qajar army at the hand of the Russians, 1813, 1828 and British 1857, and 
subsequent foreign intervention in domestic politics - led to a cumulative process of 
disintegration of the traditional state, concomitant with the greater commercialisation of 
the economy. 
Due to the weakness of the domestic bourgeoisie, the major phases of the 
development of the Iranian economy in the subsequent periods had their origin in 
changing external economic conditions and were largely initiated by the state. Its 
principal exports were raw cotton and silk, cereals and fruit, tobacco, opium, and 
carpets; its principal imports were cotton cloth, sugar, tea and metal goods - a peripheral 
supplier of mostly raw materials in the world economy. The political stalemate and 
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economic chaos that attended this struggle during and after World War I were among the 
most important factors in the military coup of 1921 which brought Reza Khan to the 
throne in 1925. 
The formation of the modem state with a unified and centralised administrative and 
military apparatus in the 1920s heralded a new phase in the political economy of Iran. By 
this time the political and economic preconditions for the formation of the modem 
national state were already in place: support for a centralised-state formation; end of the 
British-Russian rivalries; and the growth of government revenues through taxes and oil 
royalties. Thus, the formation of the modem bureaucratic state institutions substantially 
enhanced the power of the state within society (i.e. to intervene in the economy). The 
impact of the new state on economic development was far from the simple intention to 
create a new economic order with its efforts directed in a unilineal manner towards the 
'modernisation' of a 'traditional' economy2. 
The drive for industrialisation initiated by the state in the 1930s, Karshenas argues, 
was not the result of a pre-conceived plan by the government, but was prompted rather 
by the pressure of circumstance arising from the world depression and the problems of 
adjustment it created for the Iranian economy. Under a centralising authoritarian state, 
and fuelled by a gradually new oil-based economy, Iran embarked on what seemed to 
resemble a dependent capitalist course in the 1930s (1990: 233-4). The new state 
structure with a degree of autonomy played an important part in making the drive 
towards industrialisation possible. 
Due to the extremely low bargaining power of the government vis-a-vis the AIOC, oil 
revenues made little contribution to the financing of accumulation over this period. 
With the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Reza Shah, fundamental economic 
reforms such as the nationalisation of the oil industry and agrarian reform became central 
issues on the political agenda during the period of open politics in the immediate 
aftermath of the war (1942-53). The state and the economy entered a new phase of 
development with oil income becoming the predominant source of financing 
accumulation and expansion of state organisations. 
We briefly examine the role of oil and state in the political economy of Iran during 
the period of 1942-1979, by recalling the empirical findings of chapter three to six. 
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The State Structure 
The structural character of the regime was authoritarian-bureaucratic. Instead of 
modernising the political system, the Shah based bis power on three pillars: the state 
bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the network of court patronage. There are 
parallels with the Safavid dynasty, in which the administration, the army and the 
court were the basis of power of the state. Both states enjoyed autonomy from social 
pressures. However, the Pahlavi state enhanced its autonomy by its control over oil 
revenues and receiving US support, whereas the Safavid shahs increased the state 
autonomy by establishing a new country-wide administration and successfully 
retaining the three sources of legitimacy. 
In the absence of any major alliance with politically weighty classes and groups, the 
expansion of bureaucracy during the Shah's regime became another mechanism for the 
state's control of civil society and the maintenance of national integration. Its expansion 
was partly the result of the state's intervention in the economy. The bureaucracy became 
an instrument of power and control, a tool for achieving developmental goals; and an 
instrument for system maintenance and regime enhancement. On the other hand, the 
most important function which the repressive apparatus performed was that of guarantor 
of the regime's survival. The decision-making process and exercise of power, as was 
shown in chapter 3, was manipulated by, and depended exclusively upon, the Shah and 
his relationship with a limited circle that was the ruling elite. 
Two phases can be distinguished with regard to political developments during the 
period of 1953-79. The 1953-63 period was one of reconstruction of the state's coercive 
and administrative apparatus. During this period, the country became closely integrated 
into the western political and military system, with the Shah relying heavily on American 
financial and technical assistance to reconstruct the army and reorganise the state 
bureaucracy. During this period there was a shift in the political alliance of the regime 
which led to the strengthening of the process of bureaucratisation and centralisation of 
power in post-1963 period. Two parallel developments were involved in this process: the 
continued expansion of government bureaucracy and its growing power of control over 
the society; and the increasing shift of power within the state from the legislative to the 
executive and within that to the court and the Shah. 
After 1963, the court became the centre of power and dominated all the other state 
structures, including the government, the parliament and the party structure. Access to 
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political power became restricted to a small elite at the centre of which was the Shah and 
his family. During this period, the authoritarian-bureaucratic establishment of the regime 
was strengthened and the regime enjoyed the full support of the US, while the control 
over oil exports enhanced its autonomy from social pressures. 
The socio-political background and the character of the authoritarian-bureaucratic 
regime of the Shah during the 1953-79 period was to some extent reminiscent of that of 
Reza Shah during the inter-war period. Both relied on their over-extended bureaucratic 
and military establishments and the system of court patronage which was at the centre of 
the clientelistic relations. Both shahs rose to power thanks to foreign support and 
intervention. Despite these similarities in political forms, however, essential differences 
existed in the nature of the state's economic involvement, the capacity of state 
organisations, and its position in the world economy, between the two periods. These 
differences pertained both to the capacity of the state to intervene in the economy and 
the autonomy of the state from social pressures to pursue its socio-economic policies. 
The substantial rise in oil revenues and easy access to foreign capital in the 1953-79 
period provided a new economic condition for the state. This altered the role of the state 
in the process of accumulation. Thus the high degree of autonomy of the state from 
society, and the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite centred around the 
court and the monarch, together with the central role of the state in the distribution of a 
sizeable share of the investable funds in the economy, enhanced the power of the state's 
economic intervention. 
The ultimate aim of the Iranian political and adrninistrative structure was to protect 
the Shah and his dynasty primarily from internal threats, such as military coups and 
strong political rivals, (e.g. Mosaddegh in 1953). Hence, the country's political system 
was premised on (1) the supreme loyalty of all its primary and secondary members to the 
Shah and the monarchy; (2) overlapping responsibilities and thus conflicting interests and 
intense rivalries among these members; and (3) the virtual absence of any lateral 
communication within the administrative and military hierarchy. 
Despite the appearance of an extensive and renovated bureaucratic machinery 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, having access to massive financial resources from the 
oil sector, the bureaucracy was still severely handicapped in its goal oriented activities 
due to subordination to the court. With the plethora of overlapping agencies, salient 
political conflicts penetrated the administrative apparatus. The Shah had gradually 
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weakened its old economic allies and his regime's dependence on those allies. 
Distributive policies designed to ensure domestic peace had inadvertently created 
relatively large and complex state administrations, distributive states, unusual in that they 
emerged from the imperative to expand rather than to extract revenues. These 
bureaucracies were themselves one source of change. As the state's role grew, so too did 
its power. As the state's scope and autonomy grew, so with it grew the distance between 
the ruling elite and the population, as the popular perception of state services shifted 
from benevolence to entitlement. Therefore, the state was separated from society with no 
significant intermediate organisation connecting the two. Oil revenue enhanced the state 
autonomy and, owing to the lack of such intermediate organisations, it deepened the 
state-society gap. Indeed, the oil wealth "separated the state from society so much so 
that it would be difficult to find parallels anywhere in human history" (Katouzian 1981: 
255). 
The Iranian state was able to initiate massive petrochemical development and 
programmes of dam building and land resettlement, but there was no assurance that these 
were rooted in the needs, aspirations and skills of the Iranian people, which were hardly 
taken into consideration. Thus, although its industrial growth rate was immense, it lacked 
a foundation in social reality. 
The State and the Process of Capital Formation 
During the post World War II, period capital accumulation was mainly mediated 
through the state. Therefore, a brief analysis of the role of the state in the process of 
capital accumulation is enlightening. During this period, two phases can be broadly 
distinguished with regard to the rate and structure of capital formation in Iran during the 
post-1953 period. The first phase (1955-9) was one of rapid growth of real investment 
following the massive injection of external funds into the economy ( namely oil revenues 
and foreign loans). Government investment in this period was confined largely to 
infrastructure and light industries, and private investment concentrated in construction, 
transportation and light manufacturing. This period was followed by two years of 
political crisis for the regime (1961-2) leading to the break in its alliance with the 
powerful traditional proprietary classes. Thus a rapid decline in the pace of investment 
occurred in particular in the private sector. The political and economic changes which 
took place in this relatively short span of time created the basic elements for the new 
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model of accumulation which took shape in the post-1963 period. The state's autonomy 
from the established proprietary classes, namely the landlords and the merchant 
bourgeoisie, was a pre-condition for this restructuring of capitalism. 
The focal point of the industrial strategy of the state was formed by a new capitalist 
class closely connected to foreign capital. Secondly, the period 1963-77 was the longest 
period of sustained accumulation in the modern history of Iran, with a real annual rate of 
growth of 18.9% for GFCF. The share of GFCF in non-oil GDP rose from 16.9% in 
1962-3 to 30.9% in 1971-2, and reached 50.7% in the post-1973 oil boom years. Public 
sector investment in particular accelerated in this period as the government assumed the 
role of producer in basic and heavy industries. There was also a change in the structure 
of private investment as it moved into new consumer durable and intermediate products, 
created for the rapidly expanding domestic market. 
After the crisis of the early 1960s, there was a tightening in the hold of the state on 
society, and a growing concentration of political power in the hands of a small elite, at 
the centre of which was the Shah and his imperial court. The break with the traditional 
elite represented rather a shift towards a broadening of the state clientele, by 
incorporating the modern middle class employed in the bureaucracy and the modern 
sectors of the economy. The relationship of the regime with these classes, who were 
totally excluded from the political process, was based on the granting of material 
resources and economic privileges in exchange for passive political participation. The 
rapid growth of consumption of these classes laid the basis for the new model of 
industrial accumulation which took shape throughout 1960s and 1970s. 
With respect to the role of international capital in the process of accumulation of 
capital, it seems beyond doubt that core capitalist states and TNCs had given some 
support to the growth of the productive forces in Iran. The Shah's regime in Iran, in 
spite of some disputes and disagreements with the core capitalist countries, was tied into 
the international capitalist system and benefited from direct political and military support 
of the major capitalist nations. Actually, it has been said that the Shah's regime was to 
some degree "a creation of US imperialism in the post-war epoch" and was "a result of 
the interventions of imperialism in 1953 and in the subsequent years of consolidation" 
(Halliday 1979: 172). However, the centrality of oil points to a further aspect of the 
changes since the post World War II period, namely the growing ability of the Iranian 
state to impose its terms on economic relations with advanced capitalist countries. The 
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history of some of these concessions in favour of the Iranian state (and some other 
OPEC member states) shows that the advanced capitalist countries had not made these 
concessions willingly. 
In the case of Iran, the state, as the only recipient of oil revenues, determined how the 
revenues were channelled into the economy and which social groups were given 
privileged access to the increased consumption possibilities oil provided. 
The Iranian state was able to impose quite strict regulations on TNCs investing in 
Iran, and through OPEC it was able to multiply its oil revenues in a few years. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these advances, Iran still was subordinated to the West, in a way 
in which the unevenness of capitalist development on a world scale and the ongoing 
dependent development process in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, made Iran a weak 
constituent of the system. In this respect, its economic prosperity still rested on the 
export of a single primary product whose market it did not control. It was therefore 
vulnerable to shifts in demand and to manipulations of distribution by the oil company 
cartel and the world market. Furthermore, Iran had no independent technological 
capacity and had to import semi-finished goods to meet its industrial needs. Thirdly, Iran, 
as in its export, was vulnerable in its imports. 
Having said this, it is, nevertheless, important to emphasise that Iran was to a greater 
extent than in the past an independent actor in the international capitalist system, 
although the stronger actor in this system - the advanced capitalist states - seemed to 
encourage its development only in so far as this would accord with their own interests. 
In the long, run oil also created new international interdependencies as these states 
came to rely on foreign markets for capital, labour, and goods. The number of choices, 
the range of options that oil revenues created, the things that oil money could buy, -
these factors initially masked the growing dependency on foreign powers and markets. 
TBn<g Staift®, OBB Revenues, asad Economic Growth 
The impact of oil revenues on the process of growth and structural change can not be 
analysed in abstraction from the institutional framework of the economy, and in 
particular from the nature of socio-historical factors which shape the role of the state in 
the economy (Karshenas 1990: 237). Oil gave the regime the resources to develop new 
allies among the national population. 
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The Shah's design was to link oil revenues strongly with economic growth. Oil 
revenues were spent on a variety of projects, most notably on material and human 
expansion of the civilian and military bureaucracies. The oil price hike of the 1970s 
substantially increased the capacity of the state to intervene in the economy, both by 
increasing the magnitude of resources at the disposal of the state and by easing the 
structural constraints which had previously limited the field of effective economic 
intervention by the state. The state thus assumed a much more significant role in setting 
the pace and structure of growth in the oil era. The number of government employees 
doubled between 1972 and 1974, and its expenditure for construction and military 
hardware reached legendary proportions. Oil was used to finance both economic growth 
and bureaucratic and military build up, which were in turn used to put the state in full 
control of society and domestic polity. Furthermore, the state sustained sizeable oil 
exports and near-dominant leadership within OPEC. Oil revenues enabled the Shah to 
restructure his regime's relationship with the international capitalist system and to 
enhance its status as a semiperipheral state. As such, it consolidated its relationship with, 
and reliance on, the US. 
Without the presence of oil, the Shah would have had little success in implementing 
his policies; furthermore, Iran's relationship with the core capitalist states and with its 
Persian Gulf neighbours would have been fundamentally different. 
The Shah had justified his style of political rule by achieving economic success. 
Concentration of political power in the Shah's hands during the 1960s and 1970s was on 
the grounds that such a system permitted a rapid and successful expansion of economic 
activity (Zabih 1979: 5). 
Having considered the shortage of foreign exchange in much of the post-war period 
as the most critical single impediment to domestic economic development, the state saw 
oil revenues as the key, meeting all their needs and solving all their problems. As was 
demonstrated in chapter 5, the increasing oil revenue largely financed the high rate of 
capital accumulation. The government also adopted an expansionary monetary policy to 
stimulate private accumulation. The ease of access to external resources, i.e. oil income 
through exports and foreign borrowing, allowed the rapid acceleration of the rate of 
growth of investment and government expenditure without the need to curb the income 
and consumption of higher income groups. However, oil revenues provided a new kind 
of economy, built on rent and heavily reliant on the export of a single raw material, the 
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production of which required little contact with the rest of the economy. It brought 
spectacular growth, yet at the same time engendered dependency on volatile markets. 
The more serious problems relating to the pattern of structural change over the 1953-
77 oil period were the lopsided nature of industrial growth, which implied an excessive 
dependence on external resources, and the related problems of inadequate employment 
generation and a growing maldistribution of income. As the experience of Iran has 
shown, even the achievement of rapid economic growth may not by itself be sufficient to 
reduce economic duality over time (Amuzegar and Fekrat 1971; Karshenas 1990). 
Actually, the problems of growing economic duality and worsening distribution of 
income never received serious consideration in government policy formulation. 
The main obstacles to developing the Iranian economy and to achieving a successful 
post-oil normalisation were to be found in the Iranian state itself: the hierarchy of the 
decision-making process, the high degree of autonomy of the state, compounded with its 
repressive nature, mismanagement and politicising its economic planning and 
misspending the oil revenue3. Furthermore, the chosen ISI strategy - the neglect of the 
agricultural sector - further exacerbated the problem4. 
The Shah successfully linked oil revenues with economic prosperity and the regime's 
domestic and regional-international prestige. This policy enhanced the international 
status of the Iranian state, increased the domestic autonomy of the state, and made the 
process of rapid industrialisation possible. Yet if oil provided the opportunity for growth 
and proved to be a blessing for the state and the economy, it was also a curse, because it 
imposed limits on the economy which revenues alone could not remove. The inability of 
the state to diversify its source of revenues led to the increasing dependence of economic 
activity, and state autonomy, on oil revenues. The decline in oil revenues in 1976 
heralded an economic crisis with socio-political consequences. Thus the "crisis of 
accumulation" started to become the "crisis of legitimation" (Moghadam 1988: 230). 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the relationship 
between the oil sector and the state in the political economy of Iran during the 1942-79 
period. Firstly, the strength of the state derived partly from the institutions inherited from 
Reza Shah's regime (i.e. a centralised bureaucracy, newly established military forces, and 
executive dominance) and partly from statecraft - that is, the ways in which state rulers 
use state instruments to enhance their own power over civil society. Furthermore, 
control over the oil sector and its revenues provided the state with massive financial 
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resources which allowed the state to pursue its objectives without any financial 
constraints. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is the character of a regime rather than a state 
structure that determines whether or not the state is developmental. Having said that, 
however, having a developmental state requires the existence of necessary structures. 
The most important element that determines the character of a regime, and 
consequently the ways in which state instruments are used, seems to be the manner 
and the social context in which state rulers came to power. The Shah came to power 
through foreign intervention and consolidated his rule through a foreign-supported 
military coup. Rather than gaining political legitimacy by broadening the political 
participation in the country's decision-making process, the Shah used either coercive 
forces to repress societal groups to an extreme extent, or economic rewards, 
concessions and offers of positions within the bureaucracy to satisfy the middle class 
and the technocrats. 
Furthermore, the Shah sought to establish his regime's legitimacy on the basis of 
the ideology of kingship. However, with the surge of oil prices in the early 1970s, 
rewards rather than sound economic performance were successfully integrated in this 
process. As the sole recipient of oil revenues, the state's autonomy increased 
substantially. Thus, the state's priority to buy legitimacy gave way to further control 
of society and policy of forceful submission of the populace to support the Shah and 
his reforms, and the Pahlavi monarchy. Therefore, by 1975-6, repression had reached 
its peak. 
Thirdly, the state's choice of a development strategy and major economic policies 
were not determined by domestic and world market factors alone, but rather, and to 
a major extent in the 1970s, by political considerations. For instance, the Shah's 
decision to double the expenditure of the Fifth Plan (1973-7) was due not to 
economic but to political rationality, enforced by his personal ambitions. 
Fourthly, the dominant form of capital accumulation in Iran was shaped by the 
development alliance between the state and segments of capital. The state forged a 
narrow development alliance with the country's dependent bourgeoisie and 
international capital. In the 1970s, the state was the prime actor in this triple alliance. 
This alliance under the aegis of the state and the full co-operation of the TNCs 
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facilitated a remarkably rapid rate of economic growth, but produced enormous 
capital concentration and maldistribution of wealth. 
Finally, the behaviour pattern of a developmentalist state such as Iran must be 
understood within the context of the state-class relations. There was a systematic 
attempt by the state to exclude all the dominated classes from major political 
positions and to prevent them from participating in important economic decision-
making. The regime up to the 1970s pursued an unbalanced, highly concentrated 
pattern of capital accumulation. It pushed the political groups to the periphery of 
society and fostered the middle class - within the bureaucracy and economic elite - to 
rely heavily on the state's reward and concessions. This was possible because of the 
high degree of state autonomy and the absence of a strong politically motivated 
industrial bourgeoisie. 
The weakness of organised labour and other popular sectors and social groups - a 
result mainly of the regime's bi-polar policy of suppression and co-option - permitted 
the dependent capitalist state of Iran to adopt its policies, including rapid 
industrialisation. 
Theoretical Findings and Methodological Considerations 
This research has argued that in the case of a semiperipheral country, where the 
state is centralised and enjoys autonomy from social pressures, a partial application 
of three theories - the capitalist interpretation of the nature of the state, namely the 
Weberian-Hintzian approach; the world-system theory, and the dependency paradigm 
- is necessary to help us understand the state, its structure, its capacity, and its 
position in the capitalist world economy. 
The major theoretical contribution of this study has been to bring about a 
synthesis of perspectives derived from the above mentioned theories - dependent 
development, semiperiphery, and authoritarian-bureaucratic structure - and two 
concepts: autonomy, and interdependence. 
A systematic comparative study has been made to shed new light on why similar 
states adopt different patterns of behaviour (internally and externally), and why 
countries with similar situations end up with different degrees of development, class 
relations, etc. In this study comparisons of several kinds have been made. The 
striking similarities between the coups in Iran in 1953 and in Chile in 1973 were 
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mentioned in chapter 3, suggesting the underlying combination of internal 
contradictions and external intervention at work in both cases. Furthermore, the 
crucial difference in the general conditions that preceded the Brazilian and South 
Korean military coups of the 1960s on the one hand, and the 1953 coup in Iran, 
mainly with respect to state alliance with local and foreign capital, were noted. 
Iran's dependent development in the 1960s and 1970s was found to be 
significantly less than that of Brazil or the East Asian cases such as of South Korea. 
However, its room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the core countries (in both economic and 
political terms) and its autonomy from local bourgeoisie were substantially more than 
these countries. This was mainly owing to the importance of its oil exports, and the 
country's strategic location for the core states, thus making possible the judgement 
that Iran did rise to a semiperipheral position in the world economy. 
The second type of comparison used was of an internal type, and here a historical-
comparative methodology turned on a single case yielded much theoretical interest. 
Again, both similarities and contrastive patterns in the process of state formation 
between the Safavid, the Qajar, and the Pahlavi dynasties were noted. For example, 
certain parallels between the rise and fall of the 16-17th century Safavids and the 
20th century Pahlavis may be noted: both dynasties represented peaks of national 
economic power, dominated very much by the Shahs at the top, who established 
strong armies and bureaucracies as a successful means of control and regime 
enhancement. But the differences are equally instructive: the former was more of a 
regional empire, in no sense subordinated in its relations with the West, while the 
latter had been asymmetrically integrated in the capitalist world economy. The fall of 
the Safavids was traced to internal processes and conflicts between the state and the 
upper classes, while that of the Pahlavis involved an external dimension (dependence 
on Western capitalism, the US in particular) as well, which caused the withdrawal of 
some sections of the middle class and lower class support. 
Economically, the lopsided nature of industrial growth, which implied an 
excessive dependence on the West, and related problems of inflation, inadequate 
employment generation and extensive maldistribution of income, derived in part by 
the economic crises of 1973-8, led to the generation of economic dissent and 
grievances. It was a limited circle of ruling elite which determined the trend and the 
direction of important policies. In addition, the repressive nature of the regime led to 
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the forceful passivity of major segments of society and thus to extensive 
disillusionment of the people and the increasing antagonism of the indigenous classes. 
It may be argued that oil revenues enhanced the state autonomy and provided the 
Shah's regime with the financial means to modernise the state and the economy on 
the socio-economic level and thus expand the ranks of the modern middle class and 
the industrial working class. Nevertheless, the regime failed to modernise on the 
political level. The failure to modernise on the political level inevitably strained the 
links between the regime and the social structure, blocked the channels of 
communication between the political system and the populace, and widened the gap 
between the ruling elite and the new social forces. As a result, a legitimacy crisis 
threatened not only the regime's own existence but also the very foundations of the 
prevailing social and economic order. 
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N©te 
Ctoaptter <B>m®i TEBimreitkai IFffimdlattiktizii 
1 Generalising the rise of the modern state is a controversial issue due to the paradoxes and 
discontinuities of historical development. In addition, the feudalism=capitalism-socialism schema needs 
to be qualified. Feudalism existed extensively only in Europe, and the transitions have not sequentially 
ordered. Transition to Socialism has not always been via capitalism and through the existence of the 
working class. If we take individual states as our unit of analysis, as modernisation theorists did in the 
1960s, then we can assume that the third world countries can modernise simply by following the same 
path to modernity as of the industrialised capitalist world - transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
However, such method of analyses and subsequent assumption of transition proved not to be appropriate. 
Vincent argues that: "It is wrong to assume that the European state should act as a model for developing 
countries" " (1987: 7). Historical characteristics and the socio-political conditions of the rising modern 
state of the former are unique to itself, and no one can guarantee their similar repetition in another place 
or state. While there is no single root to modernity, the development of modern state is by no means a 
random issue. 
2 Various combinations of four historical processes and forms of politics underlie the rise of the modem 
European state: the emergence of democracy, the spread of industrialisation, the evolution of 
nationalism, and the growth of Socialism (J. Anderson 1986: 4). Among them, one can argue, 
democracy and nationalism had a common origin in European Absolutism, while Socialism and 
industrialisation were in opposition to it These four elements that grew out of the Absolutist period, 
provided the rise of the modern capitalist state. 
3 Classical liberal state in contrast with the static rigidities of the ancien regime was established to 
guarantee the rights and liberties of the individual, while the invisible hand of the market guides the 
economy. Therefore, a minimal role was perceived for the state. In this state power was shared, 
representation was wide, and national sovereignty was defined The struggle of working class and 
majority of the people modified the state's democratic feature and turned the state to a liberal 
democracy. Individuals entered into a social contract with the state - a contractual state - in 
exchange for the defence of their rights. 
4 The two terms involve very different levels of conceptualisation. The complex character of the state 
cannot be reduced to the ways in which the institutional machinery of government functions. The state 
embraces a much wider range of functions than the technical and administrative questions of how the 
machinery of government operates. 
5 The "consolidation of internal market in the periphery", which is to say the growth of import-
Substituting Industrialisation (ISI), is followed in turn by the "internationaiisation" of the domestic 
market (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 114-38). As ISI moves from consumer nondurables to consumer 
durables, intermediary goods, and some capital goods, the penetration of the TNCs might becomes more 
intense - in financing and marketing the export-led production. O'Donell (1973: 60-61) speaks of this 
situation as the transition from 'horizontal' to 'vertical' industrialisation. 
6 For example see D. Hall, World-system theory, The Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 8: 81-106, 
1982; Skocpol, Wallerstein's world capitalist system: a theoretical and historical critique, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, no. 5, PP. 1075-1090, 1977. 
7 Katzenstain (1978) concludes that the prototypical strong and weak states - subjects to the constraint 
from domestic societal groups - are those in Japan and the USA, respectively. 
8 There are two other main approaches in comparative historical method (see Skocpol and Sommers 
1980: 174-97). The 'juxtaposing case histories' is to persuade the reader that a given, explicitly 
delineated hypothesis or theory can repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness its ability convincingly to 
order the evidence - when applied to a series of relevant historical trajectories. The second approach, is 
in an opposite objective from that of already hinted above. It is to bring out the unique features of each 
particular case included to their discussions, and to show these unique features affect the working-out of 
putatrveiy general social process. Hence it suggests, that particular nations, empires and states constitute 
relatively irreducible whole, each a complex and unique socio-historical configuration in its own right. 
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Cinapter Two; TBa© Mosteirm State F©raaftii©im Sun Iimnn, 1S0©=194B. 
1 The Safavid kings were as follows: 
Ismail I (1501-24); Tahmasb I (1524-76); Ismail II (1576-77); Mohammad Khcda Bandeh (1578-87); 
Abbas I (Abbas the Great) (1587-1629); Safi I (1629-42); Abbas II (1642-66); Sulaiman I (1666-94); 
Hossaia (1694-1722); Tahmasb n (1722-32); Abbas ffl (1732-36). 
2 One of the main primary sources on the Safavid adniinistrafion is Tazlarat Al-moluk, (hereafter 
Tazkirat, for its translation, heretofore Miraorsky TM) written by an anonymous writer around 1725 
(1137 hg), following the collapse of the Safavid dynasty, to be delivered to Ashraf Afghan, the successor 
of Mahmud Afghan the abolisher of the Safavid dynasty. 
3 During the reign of Tahmasb, 114 posts of amir have been registered in books of divan-e a'la, of 
which Monshi (1616) chooses 72 of them as the most prominent and chiefs of all classes and tribes. 59 
of these 72 are Turkemans (56 qralbash) and the other 13 from all other non-Turkeman races including 
Persian. (Minorsky 1989:22). 
4 This division is more based on Tazkirat al-moluk. Others like Savory count the administration equal to 
dolat-khaneh and divides it to court and chancery. 
5 The first state council included four amirs namely the grand vizier or sadr-e a'zam, the minister of 
finance or mostowfi al-raamalek, the judiciary and religious minister or sadr, and the war minister or 
amir al-omara. 
6 Based on Nasir al-din Tusi in Akhlagh°e Naseri, P.305, the pre-Safavid society is divided into 4 
groups or classes; men of pen (ulama, scientists, those who executed great administrative and financial 
affairs), men of sword, men of affairs (such as merchants, craftsmen, artisans and tax-collectors) and 
husbandmen. 
7 During Abbas I, the transferring policy was restricted to lands. Transferring a province to khasseh, 
was suggested for the first time by the grand vizier of Safi. 
8 The policy of Abbas I to hire ordinary people in administrative positions, continued by other shahs. A 
poem describes this policy during the reign of Sulaiman. 
Rafte rafte qashu ghalamdan shod, 
Shaikh Ali Khan vazir-e Iran shod (Gradually the horse comb became a pen pox, Shaikh Ali Khan 
became Iran's grand minister (Bastani, 1969:146). 
9 Other posts were assigned as beiglar-beigi (governor general), hakem (governor), khan (chief), and 
Sultan (which was used by the Safavid shahs to downgrade the Ottoman Sultans). Their responsibility 
and power were different in scale but somewhat alike in content Vali was the governor of border states 
and often the appointment was hereditary. Hie enjoyed more independence than the others with respect to 
the state. Beiglar-beigi was the governor of provinces and hakem was the ruler of major cities. Beiglar-
beigi could have a number of hakems under his supervision. Khan generally refereed to the head of a 
tribe or a small city, while sultan retained the lowest position in the provincial governorship. 
10 In most of the first phase, this title was called amir al omara. 
11 Chardin believes their number to be 60,000 to 80,000 that were decreased by Abbas I to 30,000. In 
the time of Sulaiman, their number, as Kaempfer argues did not exceed 20,000. 
12 Their number is 30 thousand for Dela Valle, 10 thousand for Chardin, and 15-18 thousands for 
Kaempfer (1940: 89, trans.). 
13 Contrary to the general belief, this regiment was introduced into the Safavid armies before the reign 
of Abbas I, and not by Antony Sherry. Monshi(1616:427-8) points out that the tupchian regiment in the 
Balkh battle in 1603 was 10,000 soldiers with 300 artilleries. Abbas II dissimulated this regiment. 
Kaempfer says that during the Sulaiman reign these artilleries were only used as a show in front of the 
palaces. 
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14 They were 600 during the Abbas II era, as Tazkkat al-moluk points out, but were increased to 2,000, 
as Kaempfer (1940: 91, trans.) argues. 
15 Both the traditional and the new army contained cavalry (savareh nezam) and infantry (piadeh 
nezam), in permanent and temporary regiments. All these regiments were organised in groups of 10, 
100, or 1000 called un-bashi (10 people), yuz-bashi (100 people), and min-bashi (1,000 people) 
respectively. 
16 For instance, an ordinary trooper would receive annually between 5 and 12 tumans (equal to £16.5 
and £40) in the seventeenth century (Foran 1993: 24). 
17 James VI wrote in 1601 to Abbas I about Antony Sherry and means of co-operation: "For when the 
kingdom of England, furnished with a most powerful fleet, and most famous for the circumnavigation of 
the whole glob, strikes the greatest terror into the hearts of the Ottoman people, there is no doubt that ., 
we shall some day attain, both for yourselves and ours, an everlasting glory joined with the greatest 
advantage....We hope the time will shortly come when, out of the mutual desire of all the princes, the 
hostile banners of the Turkish people torn to pieces and trodden underfoot, shall be exposed to mockery 
and derision" (translation of the letter in Arberry 1942: 31-2). Karl II the king of Sweden in a letter to 
the Shah of Iran wrote: "We should sign a military agreement against the Turks" (in Kaempfer 1940: 
260). Yuhan HI, the king of Poland angry for the reluctance of the Shah, and knowing the interest of the 
Safavid shahs in astrology, wrote in 1686 to Sulaiman: "now, the situation of the stars are in such a 
way, that calls us to jointly invade the Turks" (Kaempfer 1940: 261-2). 
18 It represented a "hereditary grant of land with the title to the tax yields (or part of it), immunity from 
taxation, and prerogative rights which, in the case of large soyurghal, extended to administrative and 
judicial immunity" (Fragner, 86:510). Thus iqta was a right of tax collection to mdividual person for 
military services. In the 14th century, iqta "signified not only the ceding of beneficium but as well the 
actual land concerned" (Fragner 1986: 501). 
19 The major forms of taxes based on Tazkirat al-moluk were, olufeh, pishkar, dast-andaz, do-ashr, 
dah-yek, khedmataneh, sar-shomar, khaneh-shomar, bigar, shekar, eydi, no 'ruz, and etc. 
20 Chardin gives almost the same figure. 
21 Bastani (1969: 80) points that the crown revenue and government revenue had not been separated in 
this figure. The Shah's revenue and treasury was the main source of government budget Abbas I at 
outset of bis reign cashed most of crown golds and gems to overcome the cost of wars. 
22 Transit goods were compelled to taxation by the cities they were going through. Extra ordinance such 
as rah-dari (road maintenance) was collected. As Hinz (quoted in Fragner 1986: 539) argues, in the 
15th and 16th centuries, the price of an imported commodity in Istanbul was twice its originated price in 
eastern Iran mainly due to the local transit taxation. 
23 The initial introduction of codification was during the Qazan khan (1295-1304). 
24 He developed the road networks and paved part of them with stones. There is a myth that Abbas I had 
built 999 karvan-sara (resting place) on roads from his wealth. He ordered all regional governors, 
merchants and landlords to build roads and resting places. 
25 One reason behind this decline is related to the Timurid interest in the eastern trade (mainly in Harat 
and Samarghand), neglecting the western trade of Iran (Tabriz, Baghdad and Sultanniyeh) which was 
the adjacent point of the East-West trades. Thus when at last the country was consolidated under the 
Safavid, and the internal preconditions for commercial recuperation of Iran were restored, it was already 
too late: world trade was now running along new tracks. 
26 This, partially, was the reason which led him to receive British help to regain the control of Hurmuz. 
Britain received a concession in trade for helping Abbas I to free Hormuz from Portuguese. 
27 One reason that Abbas I banned the smoking of tobacco by 1618 in public offices (Bastani 1969: 128) 
was to increase its export 
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28 Tavarnie (1681, trans.) believed lack of knowledge and ability and promiscuity among Iranian 
merchants were main reasons for foreign domination of Iranian trades. However, the privileges of 
Europeans in custom duties and their more receptive attitude towards Armenians on one hand, and lack 
of enough capital among local merchants on the other, count more for the non-local domination in 
Iranian trade. 
29 Minorsky (1943: 23) emphasises on "the complete disappearance of the basic theocratic nucleus 
round which Shah Ismail had built up his state, without the substitution of some other dynamic 
ideology". 
30 However, Savory (1986) concludes that the Safavid fell down because they failed to concile the 
irreconcilable: Turks and Persians, tribal organisation and urbanism, the peasant-nomadic tradition and 
the sedentary life, and Sufism and dogmatic shi'ism. 
31 The Qajars, like many other Turkic tribes, migrated from Central Asia into the Middle East during 
the 14th century, but they did not appear on the political arena until the beginning of the 16th century. 
Allying with six other Turkic and Shi'i tribes known as the qizilbash (red heads), the Qajars helped 
install the Safavid family on the Iranian throne. The Safavids, although invited the leading Qajar chiefs 
into the royal court in Isfahan, they took the precaution of dispersing the Qajars, among them 
Aqqoyunlu, which Agha Mohammad Khan was from. The Aqqoyunlu Tukeman tribe claimed to be the 
descendant of Qajar Noyan, son of Sertaq a Mongul military commander (Shamim, 1372: 25). 
32 Dealing with Ottomans, Russians, Afghans, and partly the British were assigned to the governor of 
Kirmanshan, Azarbaijan, Khorasan and Fars respectively. 
33 For instance, Hossain Khan-e Sepahsalar Chief Minister of Naser al-Din Shah and for seven years 
his Minister of War, who launched a "far reaching programme including reform of army, 
administration, taxation, law and economy" failed to achieve anything apart from only the foundation of 
Cossack brigade. He did however, acquire "an unrivalled reputation for corruption" (Yapp 1987:171). 
34 There was a view within Britain that her interest would be best served by a strong Iran which would 
form a better buffer against the advance southwards towards India of Russia and which would also offer 
a better field for British economic enterprise. But in practice, the week buffer theory that Russians were 
unanimous about it prevailed. It seems clear that "the net effect of the action of the two powers in Iran 
was to impede change and this is nowhere more clear than in the matter of the railway development'' 
(Yapp 1987: 172). 
35 In the dismissal farman (order) of Agha Khan-e Nuri,1 the Shah dismissed the post of sadr-a 'zam to 
directly control the bureaucracy and the ministers: The post of sadr-e a 'zam and its administration will 
be totally dismissed from the government of Iran and will be replaced by the council of ministers'' (The 
Shah's order, dated the 20th of Moharram 1275hg, quoted in Adamiyat, 1356). 
36 He recruited only three high-ranking administrators from the previous Zand court: the state 
accountant (mostowfi), the military accountant (lashgar nevis) and the royal minister (vazir). In 
personality he did not like the palace life. He refused to have the jewelled crown, and ordered his 
secretaries to communicate in plain and simple language instead of traditional esoteric terminology 
(Abrahamian, 1982:38). 
37 The aciministration consisted of the war minister (vazir-e lashgar), the finance minister {mostowfi al-
mamlek), the head of administrative secretariat (monshi al-mamalek), the watch dog over the accounts of 
each department (saheb-e divan), and the chief minister {sadr-e a 'zam). 
38 Ministries of Owqaf (Pension and Endowments), Post, Telegraph, Science, and Mines Favayed-e 
A 'mmeh (Public Work, a non-existence Ministry, previously with the Ministry of Interior Adliyeh va 
Tejarat (Justice and Trade), Darbar (Court), Press, Jang (War), Dakheleh (Interior), Maliyeh (Finance), 
Omur-e Kharejeh (Foreign Affairs), Gomrok (Custom), khazaneh (Treasury, which was in most times a 
part of the Court Ministry), and Baqaya (In charge of government documents regarding the actual 
expenditure and income, and to collect the difference) (Sheikholeslami 1978: 225). 
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39 After his dismissal, he raises the point that "I had the intention of establishing the constitution, but 
they didn't give me any opportunity'' (Mirza Yaghub Khan, 1290hg). 
40 Even the coronation of Mozaffar al-Din took place by the loan provided by Britain through Bank-e 
Shahanshahi. 
41 Zell al-Sultan points out that Iranian governors collect two kind of taxes; asl or the tax which they 
send to the central government, and far' or tafavot-e canal, which covers the cost of present and 
contribution to the court and payment to mostowfis. Indeed, a major part of it, is collected by the 
governor himself (Sheikholeslami 1978: 236). 
42 The new army under the command of Abbas Mirza, was comprised of horse-artillery with 20 field-
pieces, 12,000 regular cavalry, and 12,000 regular infantry. They were divided in different regiments, 
each comprised of one separate tribe. 
43 Malcolm (1829, Vol. II: 358) points out that 'the different regiments were willing to be commanded 
by European officers but not by Persians of a different tribe'. 
44 It was called bunicheh or the six-month maintenance allowance. This allowance for 1886 amounted 
to about £519,214.00 (Sheikholeslami 1978: 214). 
45 In 1306hg Baluchestan sent 2 million qiran tax revenues to the capital, while the total tax collection 
was 8 million qiran. 
46 During the reign of Agha Mohammad Shah, no distinction seems to have been made between privy 
and public purses. Fathali Shah recognised a formal distinction between them. The royal treasury was 
administered under the supervision of the Shah. Khazan al-Doleh, an slave girl who married the Shah, 
and Kheyr ol-Nesa Khanum, daughter of the Shah were in charge of the treasury with the help of tens of 
financial expertise (Tarikh e Azodi 1327: 12-13 quoted in Meredith 1971: 76). 
47 The custom revenue of Tabriz increased from 12,000 tumans in the beginning of the 19th century to 
300,000 tumans in 1877 (Sani' al-Doled, VI: 348). 
48 Direct taxes consisted of land tax, flock tax, poll tax, the tax on the profit of master craftsmen. The 
mint, the mines, the post and telegraph, passport issuance, timbre publication were other sources of 
fiscal revenues. 
49 The first loan of the government was £500,000 from Imperial Bank in 1892 to compensate the 
British Tobacco concession. The aggregate loan from Russia in 1902 was £3,250,000 mainly to pay off 
the British loan. In 1911, 1913 tow further loans of £1,100,000 and £200,000 were received from the 
Russians. During the 1902-1913, the government received a total loan of £1,850,000 from the Anglo-
Indian (the British) institutions., 
50 27% of Russian investment was allocated as loans to the government, 29% in form of mortgages, 
23% investment in transportation and communication, 7% as capital share in the Bank-e Esteghrazi, 6% 
in fishing, and 12.5 percent in shipping and trade companies. The British investment included: 17.5 
percent in form of loan; 28% was invested in Anglo-Persian Oil Company; 10% in the Imperial Bank; 
and, 31% as capital share in the Persian Railway Syndicate - which only a part of this invested in Iran. 
Furthermore, Belgians invested £500,000, mainly in railway and industry, while the Germans invested 
the same amount mainly in the carpet-making firms. 
51 For example, the price of one bushel of wheat from $1.5 in 1871 dropped to 23 cents in 1894. During 
the same period, exports of Iranian wheat was 8-fold while the total value of the wheat exported 
remained virtually constant (Mc Daniel, 1971 quoted in Turner 1980). 
52 There were various privileges for foreign merchants or those Iranian merchant who would travel by 
foreign passport Among them were: 1. capitulation law almost fully protected the European 
businessmen against arbitrary action on the part of Iranian officials; 2. commercial treaties, in which, 
favoured European firms to pay a fixed custom duty of 5 % ad valorem. Russia first took these 
advantages in 1813 and 1828 treaties. Britain later in 1841, and the others in following years took the 
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same advantages. Issawi (1983:232) argues that Europeans 'levied higher duties on their own exports 
than on their imports.' Thus the government was unable to impose tariff protection to shelter local 
industries. 
53 By the Constantinpole Agreement of 19 March 1915, Great Britain had extended her sphere of 
influence into the central 'neutral' zone in return for accepting full freedom of action for Russia in the 
northern zone: formal bifurcation seemed only a matter of time (Hambly 1991: 215). 
54 Although the British, for their part, proceeded as if the ratification were a foregone conclusion, the 
agreement was never ratified and was abandoned by the end of 1920. 
55 In 1920, the Soviet Union requested a new treaty between the two countries which was signed in 
1921, days after Reza Khan's coup. The Treaty of Friendship in which it looked highly favourable to 
Iran, abrogated former Tsarist treaties, concessions (except for fisheries) and loan repayment claims. In 
April of the same year Russian troops left Iran and support was withdrawn from Kuchak Khan. 
56 The bloodless coup of 21 February 1921 was carried out militarily by Reza Khan and politically by 
Zi'a. In fact there had been no government to topple. Weeks before the coup, Premier Vosuq was 
replaced by Sepahdar-e Rashti, and the latter, expecting the coup, resigned from office. Although the 
British authorities denied their involvement, the coup was initiated and backed by them (see Hambly 
1991: 219; Keddie 1981: 87; Halliday 1979: chap. 2). In retrospect it seems that the coup was intended 
"as the alternative route to the achievement of the spirit of the 1919 Agreement - that is, a political 
stabilisation in Iran which would not pose a threat to the main local regional interests of the British 
Empire" (Halliday 1979: 44). 
57 In 1922, the Fourth Majles enacted the first law regulating civil service in Iran; age, nationality, 
education, and other qualifications for civil servants were defined. 
58 The Reformers Party was banned, the Socialist Party was dissolved, the Communist Party was 
crushed, the Revival Party that was faithful to Reza Shah was replaced by Iran-e Now Party (New 
Iranian Party) and later by Taraghi Party (Progressive Party; a model of Mussolini's fascist party and 
Ataturk's Republican Party). The Traghi Party was also dissolved on the suspicion of republicanism 
(Abrahamian 1982: 139). 
59 To control the army he held the post of the Minister of War when he was the Prime Minister. Later as 
the Shah, Reza Khan controlled the armed forces by appointing non-military officials such as Forughi as 
the Minister of War. 
60 The army consisted of the cossack brigades and the gendarmerie. He created a united force by 
amalgamating the latter into the former, and disbanding the British-controlled South Persia Rifle. The 
army was supplemented by a small air force,1 a mechanised brigade of 100 tanks, and a few gunboats in 
the Persian Gulf. 
61 They were ministries of War, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Education, Post and 
Telecommunication, Agriculture, Imperial Court, and Industry, Trade and Transport In 1934, Ministry 
of Health and Communications was added. 
62 It led by ostcmdar (governor-general), farmandar (governor), bakhshdar (mayor), and rural council 
respectively. The majority of dehestans did not have an administration. 
63 Such as Sardar As'ad, Tadayyon, Dashti, Rahnema. 
64 During the Wold War II, his son Mohammad Reza, under pressure, in an order dated 19 September 
1941 (30/6/1320), suggested the return of these lands and factories to the government and peasants. But 
this didn't happen until 1950, when a new established Bank of Omran hold responsibility to sell these 
lands in favour of the Shah's treasury. This sale excluded the large mechanised lands and took place 
during 1950-1958. 
65 Among the supplements were various laws regulating trust funds, damages, methods of testimony in 
court, trial costs of aliens, jurisdiction of shari'a courts, and inheritance. The final version of the civil 
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code was passed on 16th September 1939 in 789 articles. By 1940 more articles were added to the civil 
code, in which the right of the state vis-a-vis indrvidual person or society was increased. 
66 Thereby he solved the problem of article 37 of the supplement of the constitution law, when his son 
decided to marry non-Iranian Fuziyeh. 
67 Szyliowicz (1973: 252) argues that Reza Shah's educational ambitions were the product of a ruler 
who was at bottom distrustful of intellectual curiosity and critical inquiry. To train uncritical 
bureaucrats, docile engineers and military experts was the fundamental goal of the measures taken to 
improve and expand the system (in Matthee 1993: 334-5). 
68 The number of schools rose from 1943 units in 1924 to 4505 units in 1936 with an enrolment rose 
from 96,000 to 300,517 students in respective years. Ettela'at daily newspaper (10/7/1926) based on 
official reports reported of only 722 units of school in 1924 with 50,000 students. It seems that data 
presented by Jamalzade include all rural, urban and nomad's schools and is closer to statistics presented 
by other writers (see Menashri 1992; Faghfoory 1993). 
69 Under the Armitrage-Smith agreement of 1920, APOC paid £1 million to the Iranian government to 
settle outstanding claims. The original agreement was that APOC would pay a 16% of its 'net profit' as 
royal payment to Iran. In 1933 a new 60 years concession agreement was signed. The royalty paid by 
AIOC should be assessed on a tonnage basis (4 shilling per ton) plus various of the payments and 
guarantees. Some argue that this new deal by the government of Reza Shah with its prerogative of a new 
lengthy agreement was against the interest of the country. 
70 Though the new concession signed in 1933 did lead to some increase in the oil revenues of the 
government per unit of production, it did not bring about any significant changes in the extremely 
unequal shares. 
71 In 1900-1925, inland freight charge accounted for almost half of the market price of goods in Tehran 
(Bharier 1971:172 m. 10). 
72 Sugar, cement, cotton textile, matches were the main industries. 
73 Bharier (1971: 171) estimates the number of small workshop only in Tehran as 5000 by 1928. If this 
figure is close to reality, then the former figure shows a major decline in small workshop from 1920s to 
1940s. 
74 Based on a tighter definition of industrial workforce, by 1946, from 49,000 industrial work force, 
50% were in the state owned factories (Review of the 2nd seven year plan, P.56, in Bharier 1971:180). 
Chapter Three: The Iranian Authoritarian-Bureaucratic Regime 
1 Based on the 1907 Supplement, approval of laws concerning the revenues and expenditure of the 
country were especially reserved to the Majles. By the 1949 amendment, the Shah was empowered to 
disband either of the two house of Parliament separately or together, to have the final saying on any 
disagreement between the two house of Parliament and to preside personally over cabinet meetings. The 
amendment of 1957 empowered the Shah to return bills or laws on financial affairs to the Majles for re-
examination. The 1967 amendment designated the Queen as the regent if upon the transfer of the 
Throne the Crown Prince should not have reached 20 years of age, unless another person shall not have 
been designated by the Shah. 
2 More specifically, we can note the nationalisation of a key raw material (oil, copper), economic 
blockade by the world power, internal popularity but failure of the government to control the army and 
other elements of the state, and a coup plan designed by the CIA. (on Chilean coup see, Birns, L. , The 
End of Chilean Democracy, NY: Seabury Press, 1974) 
3 This was due to: (a) the government attitude of acting as a welfare state with rapid expansion of 
educational facilities, health and other social services; (b) growth of public administration, partly as a 
result of liberal employment; and, (c) salary rise. 
Notes 239 
4 System maintenance refers to the preservation of ongoing patterns of relationships of the system of 
monarchy and of the Pahlavi regime under the Shah. The term regime enhancement refers to the 
enhancement and promotion of the Pahlavi regime of the Shah ideologically, socio-economically, 
politically, and culturally (Farazmand 19S9:12) 
5 Councils such as the High Economic Council, the High Administrative Council, the Ramsar 
Conference. On the latter example (pine tree), as a result, the administrators in Khorasam who found 
themselves only responsible to appease Mm, contemplated grubbing up their ancient pines (Alam 1991: 
405). 
6 The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were excluded from the circle. On one occasion the Shah 
pointed out that "I have forbidden Hoveyda's brother, our representative at the UN, to report directly to 
the Prime Minister" (Alam 1991: 357-8). 
7 Under the Shah, Iran did not have an oil minister thus the finance minister usually represented Iran at 
OPEC ministerial meetings. However, when Jamshid Amuzegar, who had been Iran's Finance Minister 
and therefore de facto representative at OPEC for several years, was transferred to head the Interior 
Ministry, and even later when he became the Secretary General of the Rastakhiz party, he remained 
Iran's OPEC representative. 
8 Based on the Rastakhiz party's by-law, all applications to stand for seats in various constituencies (for 
both the Majles and the Senate), had to be reviewed and decided on by the party. For example, in 1975 
election, from around 7,000 applicants 710 were named to contest for the 268 Majles seats, and 83 
candidates were announced for the 30 elective Senate seats. 
9 The Tudeh party was organised in 1942 by a group of educated men most of whom had been 
imprisoned under Reza Shah as suspected Communists. Although at the beginning, the Tudeh party was 
proposing socialist programme and included some non-communist members in its leadership, later it 
fully turned to a Soviet-model Communism. 
10 Until 1956, up to the nineteenth session of the Majles, some 136 members were elected for terms of 
two years. By the twenty-third Majles, inaugurated in 1971, the number of deputies had increased by 
268, for a term of four years. In this session, 225 deputies were from the Iran Novin Party (the main 
stream of the later Rastakhiz Party), while the Mardom Party was represented by only 36 MPs. In the 
sixth Senate, inaugurated in 1971, the Iran Novin Party was represented by 28 of the elective seats and 
the Mardom Party by two seats. 
11 For example, on the latter case, it was used to police the anti-profiteering and price campaign in 
1975. In the name of the parry, loyal groups were used to pack rallies staged to counter religious or 
political gathering during the 1977-78 period. 
12 Although never being denied officially, there was a widespread rumour that to have a passport or an 
exit visa requires the membership of the parry - which concerned even the religious families who wanted 
to go for pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The official figures estimated the total membership at the 
end of 1976 to be over 5 million (IA 1977:119). 
13 The imposition of one-party system was in contrast with his early saying that "If I were a dictator 
rather than a constitutional monarch, than I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such 
as Hitler organised or such as you find today in Communist countries" (Mission 1961:137). 
14 The main differences of the two wings, other than personal rivalries and competition for the post of 
prime minister, was that the Progressive Liberals tended to lean towards greater social welfare, 
encourage bureaucratic decentralisation and rapid growth but not at any price. The Constructive Liberals 
emphasised on high growth no matter what the consequences. 
15 All government employees were divided into categories of established, non-established, daily hire, 
temporary, etc. Established contract was like a permanent contract which would guarantee a secure 
employment for civil servant 
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16 The actual number might be higher. Approximation and ambiguity in official figures was one of the 
shortcoming of the administration (LA 1968: 566). I f one adds civil servants who in 197S were working 
in security organisations (an estimation of around 100,000), government charities, and government 
employees working in its enterprises and factories and also in government social services, i.e. 
municipalities, etc. (500,000 based on the available data for the 1960s), military personnel (800,000 
overall consisting of423,000 regular members of the armed forces, 75,000 of para-military, and 300,000 
conscripts), and 850,000 established civil servants, the total number of public employees reaches about 
2.5 million. However, i f we consider the public employees working in organisations such as NIOC, 
PBO, CBI, and NIGC - that were not under the regulations of Employment and Administration 
Organisation - those who were working in the government ministries but umder a non-established or 
daily contract, and those who were working in government charities, the total number will be even 
higher. There was no oficial data available for most f these agencies, (see also Statistical Yearbook, 
1975,1978,1995; LA 1978,1968; military balance 1978,1979; Abrahamian 1982; Graham 1980). 
17 The number of foreign workers, who possessed work permit in the country, passed 45,000 in 1976, 
and reached 60,000 by March 1977 who almost exclusively were hired and paid by the government or its 
related agencies. (Rastakhiz, in LA 1977: 379). It seems that considering the sensitivity of the regime 
towards the military affairs in general and the foreign military presence in particular, this figure does 
not include the 40,000 foreign military personnel working in Iran by 1978. The number of foreign 
workers being paid by the government might had reached around 100,000. Thus, the government 
should have paid about $2 billion in 1975 only to those 20,000 foreign employees working in defence 
and defence- related fields ($90,000 per person per year, Graham 1980: 91). 
18 Almost all modern bureaucratic organisations show a degree of formalism. Riggs defines formalism 
as: "If you find an organisational chart which purports to describe the structure of a government 
department, with elaborate statements of the duties of each unit and post in the department, you will 
hold this chart formalistic if you see, the real people, and units in the department doing different things 
from those mentioned in the chart" (1964:15 in Farazmand 1989: 55) 
19 A third option - co-option - was pursued to a slight degree by the Shah as well, particularly at the 
elite level. However, this option was practised through successful employment of the repressive 
apparatus and oil revenues. 
20 Military officers such as General Hasan Aria, (the founder of the party, and three times Chief of 
Staff) General Akhavi ( Minister of Agriculture, Chief of Rokn-e Do), General Aryana, General * Eram 
(in Rokn-e Do) were members of the military wing of the Arya Party. This party, with information 
provided by the British and the CIA, played an important role in disclosing the military section of the 
Tudeh party within the army. 
21 Established in 1911 by the help of Swedish officers. From 1942 to 1976, it was advised by a team of 
specialist from the US. With its 2000 stations, it was the main instrument for rural control, while later 
functioned more as a counter-insurgency force. 
22 The Civil Defence Organisation was established in 1957 under the ministry of interior, and supported 
by the armed forces, to safeguard the lives and properties of people and national resources against 
damages resulting from enemy bombing, nuclear attacks, and natural disasters. The National Resistance 
Forces was established in 1953 under the ministry of war and under the command of the armed forces, 
to defend respective homes and villages by organising resistance groups. 
23 For example, Shahram (Ashraf s son) and General Khatami (the Commander of air forces and the 
Shah's son-in-law) received major bribes in return for influencing the Iranian military side to purchase 
from American designated companies including Northrop (Financial Times, 2 December 1977). In 
another case Bell paid bribes to key Iranian officials to win a $500 million helicopter contract in Iran 
(Financial Times 23 February 1975). The Shah on one occasion received $140 million over a $1.5 
billion contract with Germany. The contract later was cancelled. Shapur Reporter, a close friend of the 
Shah, received $1 million to fix Chieftain contracts for the UK companies (The Financial Times 9 
November 1977). Lockheed Scandal was a case of bribes involved in sale of C-130 transport planes to 
Iran in 1976, and in another instance bribes received for the purchase of F-14 jet fighters. (Alam 1991: 
470-71, Graham 1980; see also Ghara-Baghi 1986: 94 for cases of embezzlement in local contracts). 
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24 Even issues such as transfer of officers above the rank of second lieutenant from one branch of the 
military to another, the promotion of commissioned officers, meeting of a general by another general, 
and even a visit to holy shrines in Iraq by junior officers required his authorisation (General Jam, BBC 
Document, programme. 18, tape 6; Halliday 1979: 68). 
25 In three separate instances, the chief of staff was removed without warning. In 1966 General Hejazi, 
who had held in the position for a number of years was retired without notice. In 1969 his replacement, 
General Ariyae, was similarly retired. Two years later General Freydun Djam was suddenly removed 
and appointed ambassador to Spain, an action that was tantamount to political exile. (Zonis, 1971: 22-3; 
Bill 1972:42-4). 
26 The Bureau and later the Council was proposed by the British MJ.6 when its head Hossain Fardust 
went to take special security courses in UK (Fardust 1991: 290-2). 
27 A special network established within the Bureau headed by Brigade Safapur to infiltrate and gather 
information within the military and para-military forces. The Shah had asked Fardust to build an 
additional network within the Bureau to watch over SAVAK. Because Fardust was appointed vice-chief 
of SAVAK for over 10 years from 1961-71, to reorganise SAVAK, it was not difficult for the Bureau to 
create such network (Fardust 1991: 408-14). 
28 SAVAK's employees - including informers - were estimated somewhere between 3,000 to 3 million. 
It seems that SAVAK by enjoying co-operation of the military/bureaucratic establishment, both 
physically and informational, did not need a very crowded organisation. Nonetheless, it employed a 
large number of part-time salaried informers. 
29 That is "a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interests of 
one's country" (The Shah 1967:125-7). 
30 According to the Shah's assessment, when Reza Shah left Iran, the army deserted, the government 
collapsed, and the whole country effectively disintegrated because he had failed to institutionalise the 
monarchy and provide legitimacy for the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran (Fatemi 1982: 57). 
31 By submitting to the kingship ideology, he was the "God's special representative on earth" (Hennells 
1975: 97,106), therefore, one had no right to oppose the Shah and his leadership in establishing 'order' 
and 'peace'. 
Chapter Four: State Autonomy and the Shah-Elite Relations 
1 There is no psycho-history of the Shah, but his character and his views can be gleaned through his 
own writings, and the interviews he gave to journalists and writers, and the memoirs and auto-
biographies of his close allies and relatives, see for example the Shah 1961, 1976, 1980; for a revealing 
insight to his character see the interview with Oriana Fallaci (1977) (see also Karanjia 1977, Alam 
1991, Ashraf 1980). 
2 Mohammad Reza studied for 5 years in Switzerland, 4 years of which was in this school in Rolle. 
3 'The Shah and I' (diaries of Alam), edited by Alikhani in 1991 ranks as a historical source of the first 
magnitude. It is because Alam was much more than an official, he was a friend who escaped the Shah's 
net of suspicions. The diaries mostly fit with the events, or other diaries and books. However, the book 
suffers from some weaknesses: the original manuscript has been selected from by the Alam family and 
the editor of the book The method of selections and reasons behind it are unknown. Furthermore, the 
ambiguity on the sincerity and truthfulness of Alam himself can be seriously questioned i.e. his 
continuous extreme praise on the Shah. The diarist never put any blame on bis personal misgivings 
towards the Shah. While evidence suggests enormous personal gain by Alam and his own circle of 
relatives, courtiers and friends, there is not even a single reference to these in the book. 
The second important diaries, 'Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Monarchy' belongs to General Fardust He 
was the confidante to the Shah on security issues, the only person who was with the Shah for 52 years -
from his eighth year as his classmate in Tehran, later in Le Rosey and Officers College, serving him 
throughout his reign, and being the closest friend and advisor to the Shah in periods of his rule. His 
diaries suffers from the following weaknesses: it had been written and partly taped in prison, following 
the collapse of the Pahlavi regime (parts of the interviews were broadcasted on television); it was edited 
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by a government official and published after Fardust's death (as in the case of Alam). Furthermore, the 
role Fardust played in the weeks before and months after the revolution remains still a mystery. 
However, the diaries is one of the most detailed source for behind the scene information on the Pahlavi 
regime, in particular on personality of the Shah, the influential ruling elite and the security forces. The 
information given, as in the case of Alain's diaries, mostly matches with other documents and diaries. 
The difference between the two diaries (one very positive about the Shah and the latter partly critical of 
him) seems to lie mainly in their approach and the timing of these two writings. The former had been 
written during the grandiose years of the Shah and Ms regime, while the latter was written after the fall 
of the Shah. I have referred to these two books frequently. 
4 Psychologists conceptualise such a special relationship as 'twinship'. It is found when an individual 
merges with another, in order to generate the self-affirmation and self-strengthening which comes from 
the association with powerful other. From the strength and speciality of the Shah's relation with his 
close friends, Alam, Ashraf and Peron were the only individuals who could fit in this category of 
twinship relation with the Shah (see Zonis chapter 2). 
5 Peron, the son of a gardener at Le Rosey school and a close friend of the Shah, was apparently serving 
as a link between the court and the British intelligence services, during the Mosaddegh crisis in 
particular. Ashraf was heavily involved in promoting the Pahlavi dynasty's image of philanthropy and 
remained the titular head of the Imperial Organisation of Special Services, which had so many ex-
government heavyweights that it became known as the 'elephants' graveyard'. Alam, the Court 
Minister, the individual whom the Shah trusted more than any one else, who was deeply involved in the 
political decision-making process, in both foreign and domestic policies, by achieving the trust of the 
Shah. Furthermore were: Fardust his friend from his childhood and the head of the Special Bureau; 
Shapur G., a British agent and a close friend who had a powerful influence over the Shah and thus on 
the system; Hoveyda the Prime Minister for over 12 years; Dr. Ayadi, his personal physician; and, 
Farah, his third wife and mother of the Crown Prince. 
6 It seems that this was the first time he disagreed with his father who didn't believe such visions (on his 
father's rejection see Laing 1977; Fallaci 1973). 
7 For example, in the 1963 uprising, his power was undermined severely. It is by no means clear that the 
Shah himself would have had the mental strength to issue the order to fire on the crowds in the 1963 
uprising. He needed the external strength in the time of self-inflicted isolation and withdrawal caused by 
prevalence of bis passive character. In 1963 uprising, Alam was the source of such strength to make the 
decisions for him. It was " I myself, as Prime Minister, [who convinced the Shah and] ordered the 
dispersal of a protest against social reforms on 5 June 1963" (Alam 1991:113). 
8 The Shah loved to be praised and magnified. The ruling elite would call themselves in public 'the 
house-bom slave of His Majesty' and portray him as "a paragon of virtue whom God has bestowed on 
Iran," or as the one who is "really too great for this people" (Alam to the Shah in Alam 1991: 176, 372; 
Alam to Laing in Laing 1977: 231). Foreign dignitaries had used his occasional love for flattery to gain 
his attention. Portraying him as "De Gaulle of Iran" by the British Ambassador, "the greater man 
around" by Kissinger, and, "the Cyrus the Great of the time" by the Israelis were all examples of how to 
appease him (in Alam 1991). 
9 'Nixon doctrine' was a response to the strategic weakness of the US in the waning years of South 
Vietnam. The US designated foreign states as regional powers and supported their effort to act as 
proxies for the US. 
10 By 1951-53, the British concern was more on the effect of the victory of Mosaddegh on other external 
crisis. For her, Nasser would be emboldened to take action against the Suez Canal if Mosaddegh 
succeeded against the AIOC. Nevertheless President Truman worried more over the international oil 
industry and the stature of US oil firms. Later, with Republicans in power, the concern of D. Eisenhower 
in 1952 was that Mosaddegh was dragging Iran into chaos and the possibility of a communist take-over. 
11 The British controlled 40% with the remainder divided between the Americans, French and the 
Dutch. 
a) The American companies held 40%: Golf, Mobile, Exxon, Standard of California, and Texaco 35% in 
total (each 7%); 5 major American companies held 5%. 
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b) Dutch Bataafse Petroleum Maatschapping N.V. 14%. 
c) The Compagnie Francaise des Petrole 6% (Iran Yearbook 1977: 17). 
12 For instance, the Shah's harsh tactics and suppression of the 1963 uprising "were accepted in the US 
as an unpleasant but necessary effort to break the hold of reactionary elements standing in the way of 
social progress" (Sick 1985:11). 
13 The Nixon-Shah relationship initiated twenty years earlier in 1953 when vice-president Nixon, 
arrived in Tehran and found the Shah prepared to co-operate with the US in opposing Soviet ambitions 
in the Persian Gulf. By the early 1970s, Washington regarded the ensuing 'vacuum' (by the British 
forces from the Persian Gulf) as requiring either an American presence or the presence of a powerful 
ally. As a result of American casualties and failure in Vietnam, the US government was unwilling to 
commit itself directly to maintain the stability of the region to ensure the flow of oil to the West The 
Shah's ambition, his unquestioning reliance on and alliance with the US, and his military build up 
prepared Iran as the best possible nominee for the position of policeman in the region. 
14 The Shah had waited for years to see this moment Previously, he had dealt with successive US 
presidents but had never been given such status. President Eisenhower had dismissed his strategic 
analyses of the immediate threat of USSR to Iran; President Kennedy had pressed him for social 
reforms; and, President Johnson had only yielded to his request for modern fighter aircraft after the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1967. 
15 President Carter stood for a foreign policy with two pillars. He sought the internationalisation of the 
American concern with human rights, and sought severe limitations on the international arms race, 
especially the sale of weapons to the Third World. On the one hand, the Shah was portrayed, in the 
1970s, as the world's most vicious ruler. Martin Ennals the secretary general of Amnesty International 
announced that "no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran" {The Observer, 
May 26 1974: 1). On the other hand, Iran was "the largest single purchaser of US military equipment'' 
(US Congress 1976: iix). It seemed there was little doubt that Carter was referring to countries such as 
Iran. The US was sending contradictory signals to the Shah in 1978-9. Bakhtiyar, the last Premier of the 
Shah, points out: "Carter was a liberal.. Pentagon had another view, George Ball got mixed up in it all. 
Vance hated the king. Brzezinski had his idea of a bastion against the USSR, and wanted to play the 
army card" (Bakhtiyar, interviewed by Halliday, in MERIP no. 104,1982:13). 
16 The most annoying regional events for the Shah were; in 1952 Nasser emerged in Egypt by toppling 
the Shah's former brother-in-law, King Farouq, from the throne; King Faisal of Iraq was murdered in 
1958; Colonel Qadhafi seized power in Libya in 1969 in a bloodless coup; Sultan Qabus of Oman 
deposed his lather in 1970, also in a bloodless coup. Thus, the Shah's regime was coping in the west by 
a revolutionary Ba'ath regime in Iraq, in the east by the uncertainties of the fluid situation in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, and in the south by the Persian Gulf where the withdrawal of British power in 1971 
had left a disturbing power vacuum. 
17 One example was his order to sell in 1974 to Israel 130,000 tons of oil at the old rate of $4 a barrel 
rather than $17 (Alam 1991: 378). 
18 The Shah agreed to pay $11,000 monthly allowance and to buy him a house in Rome (Alam 1991: 
359). 
19 When Bhutto was arrested, the Shah threatened to cut off economic aid worth between 200 to 300 
million dollars a year to Pakistan if the death sentence on Mr. Bhutto was carried out (The Financial 
Times 22 May 1978). 
20 Pareto's concept of 'circulation of elites' draws attention to this problem. He means by circulation: 1. 
The replacement of individuals within the elite and 2. The replacement of one elite by another. The issue 
is whether this process of individual replacement is exclusive, or whether it is open, giving an 
opportunity to individuals from less privileged strata to join the ranks of the powerful and influential 
group. 
21 The political elite was an increasingly cohesive group of individuals in the upper class who exercised 
and possessed power "to a greater degree than other members of Iranian society" (Zonis 1971: 5-6; Bill 
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1975: 17). Dye et al defines elites as "the few who have power; the masses are the many who do aot 
Power is deciding who gets what, when, and how; it is participation in decisions that allocate values for 
a society. Elites are the few who participate in decisions that shape our lives; the masses are the many 
whose lives are shaped by institutions, events, and leaders over which they have little direct control" 
(The Irony of Democracy: An introduction to American Politics, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1987: 3). 
22 These families include Aalam, Adl, Afkhami, Akbar, Alam, Amini, Ardalan, Ashtiyani, Bakhtiyari, 
Bayat, Bushehri, DaftarL Oiba, Dolatshahi, Ebrahimi, Emami, Emami-Khoy, Eqbal, Esfamdiyari, 
Farmaafarmai'aa, Hakimi, Hedayat, Jahanbani, Khajeh-Nuri, Khalatbari, Mahdavi, Mansur, Pahlavi, 
Panahi, Pirnia, Qaragozlu, Qashqai, Qavam, Sadri, Safari, Sami'ee, VaMli, Vosuq, Zand, Zamganeh 
Zolfaghari. (Bill 1975: 34). 
23 For example, Nafisi/Khajeh-Nuri, Adl/Panahi, Aishami/Zolfaqari. 
24 People such as the Amini, Alam, Bushehri, Davallu, Farmanfarma'ian, Teymurtash, and Jahanbani. 
25 Estimated Distribution of Officers in the Iranian Armed Forces. 
Rank Generalb Colonel LC* Major Captain 1st L.* 2nd L. Total" 
Army 180 1,900 4,800 6,900 11,400 5,700 5,600 36,500 
Air Force 70 900 2,300 3,200 6,700 1,700 2,400 17300 
Rank Admiral Captain Com* LCom. LJ* Ensign Total 
Navy 140 200 500 700 1,100 1,600 500 3,600 
a. All figures are rounded, b. Some sources indicate significantly more general and admiralfficers. 
* L: Lieutenant LC: Lieutenant Colonel; LJ: Lieutenant Junior, L. Com.: Lieutenant Commander, 
Com.: Commander 
Source: US Department of Defence, Selected Manpower Statistics, 1979: 82 in W. Hickman 1982:17 
26 The basic rivalries existed between the Shah's twin sister, Ashraf, and his eldest sister, Shams and an 
antagonistic relationship between the Shah's three Queens with both sisters. On unremitting rivalry 
between members of the royal family, Sorayya (1963:65) wrote: "... a family at court who are always in a 
state of rivalry". Other lines of tension, for example, existed between the following institutions: ministry 
of interior-Tehran municipality, ministry of land reform-ministry of agriculture, SAVAK-Military 
Intelligence, Tehran chamber of commerce-Iranian chamber of mines and industries, Tehran University-
National University, the Shah's ambassadors-minister of foreign affairs. 
27 Hoveyda shows the extent of availability of such fund for the Shah when he stated: "Only 30 percent 
of development expenditure is in the hand of the government. The other 70 percent is in the hands of 
NIOC, NIGC, and the armed forces", all of which were directly controlled by the Shah (in Radji 1983: 
96-7). 
28 The former made their first fortune during the commercial boom of Wold War II and their second 
windfall during the oil boom of the 1970s, among them people such as Namazi, Sabet, Lajevardi, 
Elqanian, Vahabzadeh, and Rashidiyan. The new entrepreneurs built their business empires during the 
late 1960s mainly through their personal contacts with other ruling elites and multinationals - for 
example Khayyami, Reza'i, Yazdani. The close ties between local capital and foreign capital was 
embodied, for example in the person of Habib Sabet who apart from being vice-Chairman of IMDBL 
had seats on the boards of directors of the Irano-British Bank, etc. He founded more than 40 enterprises 
and was a member or director of the boards of companies such as Television of Iran, Iran Volkswagen, 
Firoes Corporation, General Tyre and Rubber Co., and others. 
29 Firstly were landowners who survived the land reform and received compensation either in the form 
of a share in government industries or cash. It was through the land reform that the industrial 
bourgeoisie expanded by being provided with capital. The ex-landlords became new industrialists and 
modern entrepreneurs. Secondly, the bourgeoisie was partly rooted in the bazaar. The bazaar controled 
half of the country's handicrafts production, 70 percent of its retail trade and 75 percent of its wholesale 
trade. It took advantage of the import duty exemptions provided by the state in the 1960s and later in the 
1970s from government policy of massive import. However, the bazaar had been in decline since the 
1950s as its social, economic and political position had been undermined both because of the rise in the 
power of the interventionist state and also because of state opposition to the religious group which was 
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affiliated strongly to the bazaar. The third root of bourgeoisie was in the bureaucracy, in particular the 
civil (and military) services (see chapter 3). Hence, the bureaucratic elite was becoming an important 
partner of the bourgeoisie and thus, the non-royal function of the economic elite. 
30 Based on article 7, note 7 amended to article 2 of tax law of 1969. 
31 Fardust (1991: 254) points out that the Foundation was suggested by Alam to the Shah, as a 
scapegoat The Foundation, as a non-profit-making organisation, replaced what was known as the 
Pahlavi Estate Office - created in 1951 to handle the proceeds of the sale of crown land to tenant 
farmers. The Shah from the outset of the Foundation appointed himself chief custodian, being entitled to 
2.5% of the net revenues, which this he waived. (Asasname-ye Bonyad-e Pahlavi, Pahlavi Foundation 
Statutes, Chapter 1, Article 5; see also Alam 1991). 
32 A charge was made against Ashraf, that she had appropriated $3 billion either in the form of loans or 
profits through the PF and in other activities. In another instance, relatives of Farah led by Qotbi (her 
uncle) manipulated 80% of all contracts rendered by PBO, accounted for billions of rials. They would 
sell the contracts to others - the companies who actually had to execute the projects - by receiving 25% 
of nominal value of contracts (Fardust 1991: 215). 
33 Although, members of the royal family had investments, deposit accounts, and a number of palaces 
and land in Europe, their bulk of investment and cash transfer had been to the US. When the Swiss 
government rejected to freeze the Shah's bank accounts in Swiss banks (to a request made in March 
1979) Iran focused its attention on the US for such action. In December 1980, following the death of the 
Shah, the government of IR. Iran asked for $10 billion in the form of cash guarantee - to be deposited in 
Algeria - against the estimated transfer of Iran's assets by the person of the Shah, as a part of a proposed 
plan to resolve Iran-American hostage crises. But in 1981, the government of IR. of Iran filed a suit 
against 62 alleged associates of the royal family, in the State Supreme Court of Manhattan, in an attempt 
to recover about $36 billion which was claimed and documented to be diverted from Iran by family 
appointees and associates of the Shah. 
34 The term comprador refers to that section of bourgeoisie that co-operated with international capital in 
the national economy to maximise its interests (Najmabadi 1987 in ibid.). 
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1 The demand-induced influences refer to those forces that are directly associated with the growth of 
demand in the oil sector resulting from the expansion of operations in that sector, while the supply-
induced influences embodies those influences that stem from an abundance of low-cost materials 
produced in the oil sector. 
2 For example, during the 1960s, the AIOC used internal market for only 11% of its needed 
commodities including foodstuff (Table Al). 
3 Until 1933 most of the domestic oil consumption was imported from Russia. Even after the 1933 
agreement, which gave the AIOC monopoly over the Iranian market, due to AIOC's price policy, 
consumption of wood and charcoal increased substantially. Furthermore, the AIOC was not at all 
anxious to develop ancillary industries on which it would have to depend for supply. On backward 
linkages, less than 1% of national work force of 7 million in 1949 was employed by the AIOC and all 
the company's needs, even foodstuff, were imported from abroad. 
4 The modernisation writers believed with optimism that oil would bring needed capital which would 
finally spark sustained growth, and ultimately participatory political stability. Dependency writers who 
were less optimistic pointed to the underlying similarities between oil and other commodities. Oil was a 
single export, a depletable raw material, and a commodity as dependent on unpredictable markets as any 
other. Oil would bring dependency and decline. Both predictions contained some truth. 
5 Luciani (1990) believes that this is a unique situation, almost without parallel in history, where 
economic prosperity and progress are largely independent of a domestic economic production. On the 
contrary, whenever the income of the state is based on tapping the domestic economy, the state can grow 
and perform an allocative function only to the extent that the domestic economy provides the income 
which is needed to do so. 
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6 Subsidy payments alone on such consumer items as sugar, meat, eggs, rice and wheat, and on 
materials such as cement and chemical fertilisers were equal to 40% of their cost to the government 
(Amuzegar 1977: 197). 
7 Using econometric techniques of data analysis, Looney (1985: 65) shows that a biased result is 
obtained for the pre-1975 years when oil revenues is correlated with government expenditures. This bias 
disappears when sufoijericds 1959-73 and 1974-77 are created and examined separately. 
8 The corresponding figure for South Korea in 1970-78 was 12.6%, for Brazil was 7.9% for Mexico in 
1972-78 was 16.2% and for India in 1975-78 it was 7.4% (The IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
Supplement on Output Statistics, Washington: IMF, 1984: 58-61). As these figures were according to 
The IMF, the comparison was made with the registered data by IMF on Iran in which public investment 
accounted for 46.6% of total investment (IMF, The International Monetary Fund, Supplement on 
Government Finance, Washington: IMF, 1986: 64-65). The discrepancy on data is presumably because 
different methods of measurement were used. 
9 Being the main source of foreign exchange earnings in Iran, oil was bound to play a determining role 
in the debt servicing capacity of the country in the long run, both for the foreign creditors and the 
government 
10 With the classical assumption of full employment and given technology, public investment rather 
than being complementary becomes a substitute to private investment The conventional arguments of 
'crowding out' effect of public investment strongly rely on such assumptions. Furthermore, the financing 
of government investment by external funds also ruled out the possibility of financial crowding out by 
private investment 
11 In economic terms, in the later years the Shah's programmeme combined government planning of 
ever greater scope and scale: state ownership and management of strategic industries; private Iranian 
industrial investment, frequently through state stimulation; and the encouragement of foreign 
investment, especially in more technologically advanced sectors. While for Meaner (1976: 167) "the 
history of planning in Iran is an exiting chapter in Iranian national development'', for Katouzian (1981: 
231) "the plan was never adhered to, either in letter or in spirit". 
12 While the first 2 years of the Plan were years of recession, the subsequent economic recovery, 
together with increase in development outputs (partly resulted from fuller utilisation of previously idle 
capacity), resulted in substantial increase in domestic supply of goods and services during the latter part 
of the Plan years. 
13 Including the Isfahan steel mill, a petrochemical unit, an automobile assembly plant, and an 
aluminium smelter. 
14 Price stability, as a major objective, was not fully realised over the Plan period. The GNP implicit 
price deflator rose on an average annual rate of 4.3% during this time compared with 0.6% for the Third 
Plan. During the Fourth Plan, the general price level was positively correlated with the overall shortage 
of supply, especially in the agriculture and construction sectors and movements in world price (Looney 
1988:107). 
15 One of the side effect of the spiralling cost of land was higher rent and consequential demand for 
higher wages by the urban work-force, since housing had become the major element for living cost and 
as up to 60% of pay. From 1970 to 1974, the price of industrial lands increased by almost 9 times in 
Tabriz and by 100 times in Rasht As much as 47% of the cost of housing was absorbed in land costs 
(Graham 1980:89). 
16 The initial manpower demand in the Fifth Plan estimated around 750,000. This number increased in 
the Revised Fifth Plan to 2,112,000, regardless of warning for inability of the country to supply such 
number of manpower, the skilled, technical and managerial work-force in particular. The manpower 
supply by the end of the Revised Plan covered over one million unskilled and semi-skilled labour, but it 
was inefficient to provide enough skilled labour. For instance the Revised Plan could supply less than 
Notes 247 
30% of required skilled and semi-skilled labour and about 30% engineer and medical staff demanded 
under the Revised Plan (IA 1977: 384; 1974: 445, 380; 1975: 381-5). 
17 Indeed the Planning Division of PBO suggested the major constraints to appear in those areas, with 
the emphasis placed on port capacity and skilled manpower (Vakil 1984: 84). 
18 Absorptive capacity is basically meant to characterise the limit to the rate of growth of investment set 
by all the domestic factors of production which either cannot be imported or face rapidly rising import 
supply prices. It refers to the organisational and human skill capacities for undertaking new investment 
projects. 
19 Mofid (1987: 132) argues that ICOR should provide a good measurement of its absorptive capacity, 
given the other constraints. It means that for every extra units (rials) of output produced, how much rial 
of additional capital is needed. An increasing ICOR could therefore imply a lack of absorptive capacity. 
20 The combination of falling real oil revenues and worsening price inflation, though particularly the 
former, persuaded the government to introduce measures to reduce the growth rate, fell to 3.1% in real 
terms in 1977-8 after many years of sustained high level of expansion, while the country's balance of 
payments sustained its position only by resort to expensive short-term borrowing abroad. 
21 The planning procedure and institution in Iran suffered from major shortcoming, including the lack 
of a mechanism to generate regional balance in development activities. However, the critical factor for 
the failure of economic planning in Iran was the gradual loosening of various steps of the project 
evaluation process. This loosening took place in some instance to speed up the process, but more often to 
provide an environment suitable to personal decision making. The net result of economic planning as 
Razavi and Vakil (1984, chapter 3) describe was that it turned into a futile formality with no positive 
impact on the management of the economy. 
22 Against all advice, the Shah decided to double the Plan's total expenditure allocations, previous to 
the oil price increase. 
23 For example, the original version of the Third Plan proposed a total development expenditure of 190 
billion rials over the Plan period. The balance of payments crisis of the early 1960s led the Cabinet to 
reduce the size of the Plan to 140 billion rials by a decree passed on September 1962. With the 
acceleration in the growth of oil revenues and easing off of the balance of payments problems, the size of 
the plan was once more increased to 230 billion rials halfway through its implementation. The actual 
size of development expenditure in the Third Plan was 204.6 billion. In the case of the Fourth Plan, the 
original size of planned development expenditure was 457 billion rials, which given the balance of 
payments problem of the late 1960s was too ambitious. The original Plan relied heavily on foreign 
borrowing (by 150 billion rials), which was believed to be made available by the American government 
in supporting the Iranian government in its new role of 'policing the Persian Gulf after the evacuation 
of the British troops from the region. During the two last years of the Plan, with the Tehran Oil 
Agreement, oil revenues of the government grew by an unprecedented rate of 80% which led to an 
upward revision in the size of the Plan to 554.5 billion rials. The actual development expenditure over 
the Fourth Plan was 506.8 billion rials. The original version of the Fifth Plan which was conceived 
amidst the euphoria of rapid oil revenue increases of the early 1970s, envisaged a development 
expenditures of 1560 billion rials which was three times the size of the Fourth Plan. However, with the 
immense oil revenues increase of 1973-4, the size of the Plan was almost doubled to 2848 billion rials. 
The actual development expenditure during the Fifth Plan was 2555.1 billion rials. 
Chapter Sixs Dependent Development in Iran 
1 Dependency can not be viewed as a purely external phenomenon. Cardoso and Faletto (1979: x) 
emphasises on "not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of 
structure by conflict, social movement and class struggles." The expansion of capitalism in different 
countries in the periphery thus had varying consequences, even though all countries were subject to the 
same global system. In their view, a system is dependent when "the accumulation and expansion of 
capital can not find its essential dynamics component inside the system" (ibid. P. xx). The dominant 
centre of the world capitalism posses, by definition, the technological and financial sectors essential to 
production and capital accumulation. Even the semi-industrial LDCs, however, remain dependent, as 
their capital goods sector are not strong enough to ensure the "continuous advance of the system, in 
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financial as well as in tedmological and organisational terms" (ibid. P. xxi). In oil exporting 
economies, due to the dependent nature of oil revenues in the international oil-consumption market 
(dominated by advanced capitalist countries), the country's glutted financial sector remains dependent 
on the world policies. 
2 From the early 1960s it was US pressure and support that had made possible both the 'White 
Revolution' and the development by the Shah of the military arsenal needed to dominate the Persian 
Gulf region. 
3 Import substitution strategy was designed to move economies traditionally dependent on the export of 
primary commodities and raw materials to an industrial one. New infant industries would have to be 
protected from foreign competition by high tariff walls. Thus ISL although seen as a temporary 
phenomenon, was implied and frequently meant monopolistic production and marketing at costs higher 
than similar products. It also meant lower-quality goods than those that could be imported. These 
industries were in general capital-intensive and under the best of circumstances not providers of large 
numbers of jobs. 
4 In 1955 the Law Concerning the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Capital Investment in Iran was 
enacted, in which Article 3 provided the government guarantees equitable compensation for losses. In 
addition, investment guarantee agreements were signed with the US (1957) and Germany (1961). 
Favourable laws concerning taxes and subsidies were also passed. Five year exemption to new industries 
outside the area of Tehran, 50% tax cut to those who actually were inside the area, subsidies in the form 
of import duty rebates, subsidisation of water, electricity, and energy costs, etc., were offered to the 
industries selected for growth. 
5 Dominated by the TNCs such as Siemens, AT&T, Phillips and General Motors, annual production of 
motor vehicles rose from 7,000 units in 1965 to 109,000 in 1975, television sets rose from 12,000 to 
31,000, the phones from none to 186,000, and gas oven from 87,000 to 220,000. 
6 For example, the highest interest rate was by the non-organised money market which was particularly 
widespread in rural areas. Another example is that the duty on imported investment goods was waived 
completely on condition that these imports were to the benefit of approved production investment These 
definition covered almost only all major projects (Moaddel 1993; Muller 1983). 
7 Among the foreign share holders were the Chase Manhattan Bank, the original initiator of IMDBL as 
well as other monopolies from the US, Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, 
Britain and Japan. By March 1975, during 15 years of operation, general loans given by IMDBI 
amounted 46,000 billion rials, in which half was in foreign currency (Muller 1983: 75). 
8 By 1959, D&R had won the approval of a multi-billion dollar plan for the unified development of 
natural resources of Khuzestan including 14 dams, 6,600 megawatts of power production, irrigation 
canals, and large-scale fanning. 
9 The Iran-California Corporation, the Iran-Shellcott Co., International Agricultural Corporation of 
Iran, Naraghi Agro-Industries of Iran and America, Deskar, and Dezful Farm Corporation were among 
these. 
10 Among the 18 large pharmaceutical enterprises there existed only 4 purely Iranian firms. The others 
owned or formed joint ventures by USA and German firms. Foreign investment shares were as follows:-
26% B.F. Goodrich, the USA in Abadan Petrochemical Co.; 50% Amoco, the USA in Kharg Chemical 
Co.; 40% Du Pont de Nemours, the USA in Polyacryl Iran Corp.; 50% Japanese consortium 'Iran 
Chemical Development Corp.' in Iran-Japan Petrochemical Co.; 40% British Industrial Plastics in 
Perspolis Resin Co.; IFC & Cabot Corp., the USA in Iran Carbon Co.; Zimmer, Germany in Parsylon 
(Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1978: 277). Since the end of the 1950s, numerous enterprises were set 
up in Iran, especially in the branches of industry mentioned above, enterprises which produce goods 
assembled from imported parts. 
Notes 249 
1 The Iranian experience in this respect may be contrasted with the case of Ottoman Turkey, where the 
relatively more successful attempts at reforming the central state institutions in the 19th century led to a 
totally different agrarian history in modern Turkey. 
2 The rise of the authoritarian regime of Reza Shah removed from the political agenda any talk of 
fundamental economic reforms, especially land reform. It enhanced the political power of the absentee 
landlords and strengthened the pre-capitalist relations of production in the agricultural sector which 
became a major obstacle to rapid economic expansion over the next half century. 
3 The cause of this misspending lies partly in its political character, over-expansion of authoritarian-
bureaucratic establishment namely in arms purchases, bureaucracy and services; and, in its policy of 
politicising socio-economic planning. 
4 For example, Iranian industries soon came to depend on the West for more than 65% of their inputs, 
including technology, intermediate goods and raw materials. The boom also changed the sectoral 
composition of GNP in favour of construction and service, despite huge industrial investments. In the 
industrial sector, the boom produced unprecedented concentration. In 1976, for example, the large scale 
industries (units with ten workers or more) produced 90% of industrial value added while employing 
about 18% of the industrial work force. 
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Appendix 1: Registered Assets of thePahlavi Foundation and the 
Royal Family (1978) 
A: Banks/Investment Companies 
1. Bank Omran (100%). Capital Rs5bn ($70). Total assets Rs75bn. Investment 
Rsl.4bn. Dividend Rs30 m.cmmercial bank. 
2. Omran Finance. In Greece. A major share-holder. 
3. Omran Investment. The majority share-holder. 
4. Bank Daryush. Capital Rs2bn ($29m). Major share-holder. 
5. Bank Iranshahr. Capital Rs3bn ($42m). Total assets Rs38bn. Commercial bank. 
6. Bank Etebarat (2%). Held 400 of original 20,000 shares. Capital Rsl.5bn ($21m). 
Shahram (Ashraf s Son) was the major share-holder. Commercial bank. 
7. Development and Industrial bank of Iran (1.3%). Capital Rs3bn ($42m). Share 
valued by PF at $700,000. Development bank. 
8. Irano-British Bank (1%). Held 200 of original 20,000 shares. Widely believed to 
have purchased much larger stake subsequently. Capital Rslbn ($14m). 
Commercial bank. 
9. Industrial Guarantee Fund. Capital $1 lm. Industrial finance for small companies. 
10. Omran Trinwall (39% held by Bank Omran). Capital Rsl2m ($170,000). 
Investment in Iran and overseas. 
11. Iranshahr Finance (21% held through stake in Bank Iranshahr). Capital Rs70m 
($980,000). Commodities and securities trading. 
12. First National Wisconsin Milwaukee, USA (5%). Held by Bank Omran. 
13. Hipan-Iran (11%). Capital $150,000. Spanish-Iranian service and investment 
group. 
14. Shahryar Industrial Bank. IOSS the major share-holder. Development bank. 
15. Arya Leasing. Major share holder. Loans. 
16. International Development & Construction (30%). Capital Rs70m ($lm). Ashraf 
Foundation. Investment in Iran and overseas. 
17. Kurosh Investment & Housing Society. PF and FF were among the share-holders. 
Investment in housing development 
18. Etebarat Investment & Loan. 
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B. Insurance 
1. Bimeh Melli (80%). This stake is now believed greater. Capital Rsl 50m ($2m). 
Total premiums approximately Rs800m. (Octopus, 1978, claims 100% ownership). 
2. Middle East Insurance. (100%). Ashraf Foundation. 
C . Property 
In this list, the lands owned by the royal family are not listed. Furthermore, the 
value of the royal palaces and the goods and arts inside those palaces are not 
estimated in this list, (i.e., the value of the entrance door at the palace belonging to 
Farah was worth $6 million (Ravasani 1991: 260). 
Hotels (all 100%) 
1. Tehran area: Darband; Hilton; Evin; Vanak 
2. Caspian area: Babolsar New Hotel, and Motel; Chalus Old and New Hotels; Hyatt; 
Ramsar Old and New Hotels. 
3. Other: Khorramshahr Hotel; Shiraz Hotel; Mashhad Hotel; Bu-ali Hotel in 
Hamadan; Abali Hotel; Shahi Hotel; Amol Hotel; Takhtsar New Motel and 
Hotel; Gachsar Old and New Hotel. 
4. Less than 100% share in these hotels: Aria Sheraton, Kurosh Inter-Continental, 
Bandar Abbas, Daryush, Kuy-e Saran, Takht Jamshid, Noshahr and Perspolis 
Motel. 
Tourist Complexes 
1. Namak-Abrud complex near Chalus (100%). 
2. Villas at Ramsar (1) and Babolsar (1) (100%). 
3. Casinos: Ramsar Casino and Club; Hyatt; Kish Island (100%). Two more casinos 
along the Caspian coast was owned by the Shah's sister and by his brother (Radji 
1983: 208). 
4. Kish Island Development Board (20% held through Bank Omran): 3 hotels, casino 
and 1,300 villas when complete. (Octopus, 1978, claims 100% ownership). 
5. Mehrabad Airport, Tehran: restaurant (25%). 
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Residential/Commercial 
1. Sherkat-e Shahr-e Aram (0.4%). Satellite town development project. 
2. Bungalow project near Niavaran, Tehran (219 units) (100%). 
3. Vanak Tower Block (three block multi-story residential and shopping project), 
Tehran (100%). 
4. Farahzad Development Project (30% held by Bank Omran). Construction of 
25,000 upper-income units. 
5. Levittshahr. Investment in $500m new town via Bank Omran. 
6. Arbita Construction (100%). Apartment project. 
7. Shemiran Now. Township and urban development project. 
8. Franko-Iranian. Township and urban development project. 
9. Ati-Saz (Majority share holder). Multi-story residential project near Evin, Tehran. 
10. Eskan (100% of the Iranian share). Joint venture with Reynolds Construction (the 
US). Two block multi-story residential and shopping project in Vanak, Tehran. 
11. North Shahyad Development (100%). Capital Rslb ($14.5m). Ashraf Pahlavi. 
Other smaller projects: 
12. Pahlavi Foundation; Golzar, Now-Kar, Letmal Kan. A major share-holder in all of 
them. Kordin (100%, Apartment project), teklar Development (100% of the 
Iranian share, a joint venture with two Greek and Danish construction companies). 
13. Mahmud Reza, the Shah's brother: Kolbeh, MGM, Greater Tehran Housing, 
Malek-Shahr (near Isfahan), Farah Abad. A major share-holder in all of them. 
14. Keyvan, the Shah's nephew {son of Fatemeh) :Nashiran, Lutrek. 
15. Shahram, the Shah's nephew: Iran Monir (100% with a French joint venture), 
Saman Iran, Kides Metal International (100% with a foreign firm), Iran-Nihon 
(100% with a Japanese venture), Elahiyeh. 
16. Ashraf: Mahestan (100%), Saran Co. (100% with a foreign joint venture), SJA 
(100%). Bushehri - Ashraf s husband - with a foreign joint venture), Amk Chalus 
(?%). Bushehri 
17. Pahlbod family, the Shah's son-in-law: Industrial city of Saveh Development, 
Anahha, Iran Mobile Homes, Faramin, Industrial city of Kurosh Development, 
Kurosh Bana, Mehr-Shahr, Ira (100%), Ira-sar (100%), Ira-Espi (100%, Joint 
venture with a French firm), Fiya-Tak (Joint venture with an Italian firm) 
Appendix One 254 
18. Gholam Reza, the Shah's brother: Tamishan (40%), Industrial Homes 
International (100% with Manijeh Pahlavi). 
International 
1. Pahlavi Foundation Building, 5th Avenue/52nd St., New York (100%). Book 
value 1975 $14.5m. 
2. Canal Street Project, New Orleans. Bank Omran in neighbourhood development 
scheme, believed on 50/50 basis with local interests 
B. Industrial Moldings 
Building Materials 
1. Tehran Cement (25%). Capital Rsl.lbn (SI6m); Abyek Cement (believed 
substantial); West Cement. Cement. 
2. Pars and Khuzestan Cement, believed substantial). Capital Rs7bn ($100m). 
Cement. Graham 1980 under-estimates the capital to $49m. 
3. Iranit (30%). Cement imports, asbestos, cast-iron fittings. 
4. Plast Iran, Building Material 
5. Panasuz Stake held though Fare and Khuzestan Cement (95%). Production of 
asbestos material. 
6. Other smaller factories: Par-Sweed (IOSS, building material); South Brick 
(Mahmud Reza, the Shah's brother); Tehran Plaster (100%, Shahram, the Shah's 
nephew and the Pahlavi Foundation). 
Mines 
1. Montex (35%). Capital Rsl2m ($170,000). Liquidate June 1977. Steel structures. 
2. Sangvareh Mining (40%). Provision of building material from quarries. 
3. Absang, (100%), the Farah Foundation. 
4. Mahmud Reza Pahlavi owned these mines (100%): Mashad Turquoise; Dona; 
Norgan; Iran & Romania Mining; Dona-Steg (with Pahlavi Foundation). 
5 Damavand mineral water. Bushehri with a french company. 
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Automotive Industry 
1. GM Iran (10%). Capital Rsl.5bn ($21m). Assembly of saloon cars and trucks. 
(Octopus, 1978 claims a majority share). 
2. B.F. Goodrich Iran (9.5%). Stake believed to have expanded to around 45% as a 
result of divestiture of 58% share of US parent company. Capital Rs917m 
($13m). Tyre manufacture. 
3. Bridgeston Iran (35%). Capital Rsl.85bn ($26.5m). Mahmud RezaPahlavi, joint 
venture with a Japanese company. 
4. Iran John Dears. Capital Rs700m ($10m) Abdol Reza Pahlavi, Tractor assembly 
line. 
5. Hepco (10% held by Bank Omran). the Foundation is believed to hold an 
undisclosed 45% stake. Capital Rs 700m ($10m)Joint venture with JURO for road 
construction equipment. 
6. Jeep, Capital Rs900m ($13m), car assembly production. 
7. Pishtazan (100%). Joint venture with Japanese Honda. Motorcycle and bicycle 
making. 
8. Chassis (100%). Capital Rs600m ($8.5m). Joint venture with German firm Tisen. 
Car chassis making and body work. 
Metal Industry 
1. Parshian Metal Forms. Capital Rsl08m ($1.55m). Pahlbod a major share holder, 
Metal sheets production 
2. Navard Aluminume Factories. Abdol-Reza Pahlavi 
3. Saveh Navard. Manijeh (wife of Gholamreza Pahlavi) 
4. Ahvaz Navard. IOSS and PF 
5. Dac Tiran, PF, metal pipes 
6. Alum Shars, Shams Pahlavi. Aluminume products 
Other Industries 
1. Irfo. PF. Moulding 
2. Zogaletsh. PF. Welding material 
3. Tarabgin. PF. Production of heat and sound proofs 
4. Iran Pencil (100%) Pahlavi Shrine 
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5. Ladal. PF. Chemical material 
6. Pars Mill Industry IOSS 
7. Pars Harir. IOSS, production of soft tissues 
8. Abgineh, FF in joint venture with Belgiume Gelavril. 
9. Shell Chemist Shahram Pahlavi with Netherland Shell, Anti-pest material 
Textile Industry 
1. Shah-Baf. Capital Rs4.8b ($67m), Mahmud Reza Pahlavi 
2. Iran Poplin. Capital Rs200m ($300,000), Mahmud Reza Pahlavi 
3. Azar (Isfahan) Shahram, Weaving 
4. Karaj, Gholamreza Pahlavi, Weaving 
Miscellaneous 
1. National Cash Register Iran ($38%). Office accounting machinery. 
2. Sedco (5%). Capital Rs? Drilling operations. 
3. Iran Skin and Leather Company (100%). Tanneries. 
4. Khorasan Skin and Leather Company (100%). Tanneries. 
5. Daru Pakhsh Pharmaceuticals (100%). Jointly owned by Foundation and the 
Imperial Organisation of Social Service (IOSS). Capital Rsl.2b ($ 17.2m) Largest 
Pharmaceutical producer in Iran. 
6. Union Carbide (Puerto Rico) (20%). Capital Rs? Batteries. 
Eo Printing/Publishing 
1. Bungah-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab (Book Distribution and Translation 
Company (100%). Capital Rs? Translation of foreign classics, Persian reprints. 
2. The 25th Shahrivar Printing House (100%). Stake held through involvement in the 
IOSS. Capital Rslb ($ 14.3m) Printing of all school textbooks used in Iran. 
3. Danesh-e No Printing and Publishing Company. Capital RslOOm ($1.4m). Books 
for the young. 
F . Agribusiness 
1. Ahwaz Sugar Beet Factory (16%). Sugar mill and refinery. 
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2. Kermanshah Sugar Factory (0.4%). Capital Rs607m ($8.5m). Sugar-beet 
processing. 
3. Hamadan Sugar Factory (1%). Sugar mill and refinery. 
4. Kuar Shiraz Sugar Factory (1.7%). Sugar mill and refinery. 
5. Fariman Sugar Factory. Sugar mill and refinery. 
6. Ghahestan Birjand Sugar Factory, Sugar mill and refinery. 
7. Ziaran Meat Production (20%). Capital Rs400m ($5.6m). Meat production and 
processing operational 1978. 
8. Iran Shellcott (10%). Capital Rs500m ($7m). Agribusiness in Khuzestan. In 
process of being restructured. 
9. International Agribusiness Company of Iran (%2). Capital Rs441m ($6.2m). 
Agribusiness in Khuzestan. 
10. Agricultural and Industrial Company of Khuzestan (10%). Capital Rs700m 
($9.8m). Agribusiness in Khuzestan. 
11. AIC of Jiroft (20%). PF 
12. PF: AIC Iran-America; AIC Karun; Takestan Rasin (100%); Omran Dasht, 
Alcohol and animal food, Iran Shell-Cat (10%) 
13. Mahmusd Reza Pahlavi: AIC Shahyaran; AIC FadakJKian-Shahr Agriculture; Iran 
Agriculture and Husbandry; Gol-Tapeh Agricultural Industry 
15. Gholam Reza Pahlavi: AIC Tamishan (100%), AIC Aji; AIC Pars-Shahr; Sik 
Production; Sabz-Dasht Agri-construction; 
16. Abdol-Reza Pahlavi: Dasht-e Naz (100%);Pishro Seed; 
17. Shahram Pahlavi: Iran Country Development; Silk Production (100% with a 
Japanese company); Pasteurized Milk and Husbandery Complex; 
18. AIC Galleh (100%) Ashraf Pahlavi 
19. Pak Pasteurized Dairy Product, Bushehri 
20. Ali Agricultural Organization (100%) Ali son of Alireza Pahlavi 
21. Ahmad Reza & Roza Pahlavi: Tehran Yureh . Meat and grain import; Shahparan 
(100%); 
22. Shahnaz Pahlavi & Jahanbani: Key-Dasht; Jahanmura; 
23. Scotish Agriculture & Husbandry. Shams Pahlavi & PF 
24. Varda, Nilufar daughter of Hamid Reza Pahlavi, Vinegar and food production 
25. Newla Ligation & Agriculture, Keyvan Pahlavi-Nia 
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26. Shokufe Arya Vegetable Oil, Fateme Pahlavi & PF 
Trade/Business 
1. Oraran Hygenes, PF, Import of food-stuff & cosmetics 
2. Ward-Station, Mahmud Reza Pahlavi, Import of road construction equipment. 
3. Bushehri: Solzlran,, Import and Export; Takdnsaz, Import of electric appliances 
and glass; Poliran, Import and Export; 
4. Mehr-Ararin Shahryar Pahlbod, Import and Export 
5. John Deer Distribution, Abdol-Reza Pahlavi, Distribution of Agricultural 
machinaries 
6. Shahavaran, Ahmad Reza Pahlavi, Import and Export 
7. B & F, Bahman son of Gholamreza Pahlavi, Import and Export 
Services/Leisure 
1. April Music, Bushehri, Distribution of cassetes 
2. NCR (38.9%) PF with American National, Distribution of electronic equipments 
Other Fields 
1. National Iranian Navigation Company (100%). Sold to NIOC in 1970. 
2. Iran-Sed Digging, Pf with Sed Co., Oil & gaz excavation 
3. Iran Maritime Services (100%0 
4. Iran Footbal, PF, Perspohs Club 
5. Basku Martime Services & Supplies, Mahmud Reza Pahlavi 
6. CRC, Fateme Pahlavi, Bouling Building in Tehran 
7. Japan Air services, Shahram Pahlavi 
8. Shafigh family: Air-Taxi; Air Speceial Services; Yachting Association 
9. Frankline Publication (100%) IOSS 
10. CRY (100%) PF 
11. Bushehri: Film Making Services; Iran Film Industry; Airsa Co. (100%) with 
Foreign company, Establishment Business; 
12. Nan-Shahr (100%) Shams F., bakery production 
13. Pahlbod: Damavand Navigation; Mehr Sport Club 
14. Canush Ahmad Reza Pahlavi, Bakery production 
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15. Darya-Kenar Sport Club (100%), Gholam Reza & PF 
16. Mazon (100%) Simin-Dokht Atabay (Reza Shah's nephew) 
17. Iran-Shekar, Kamran Atabay 
1-all based on 1977 (1356) value prices) 
Sources: 
1. Keyhan International, Financial Times, The Guardian, Various issues in 1963-4, 
1978, 1979, and 1985 
2. Graham 1980: Appendix A, PP. 255-8 
3. Octopus-e Sad Pa (Octopus With Hundred Tentacles) 
4. Ravasani, Dolat va Hokumat dor Iran (The Government and the State in Iran), 
Tehran: Sham'e, 1991 
5. Gerard de Villiers, 1977 
6. Interview with the Iran's representation in International Court at Heague 
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Appendix %% Tables A1-A32 
T A B L E Alo Oi l Royalties Payment to the Iranian Government 
(million dollars) 






Source: Amuzegar and Fekrat, 1971: 18-9 table 2.1 
1 author's calculation. 
The figures are rounded. 
TABLE A2: Historical Development of Iranian Oil Industry, 1913-1977 
Selected Periods Average dairy Average dairy Average daily Total oil 
production exports of oil domestic consumption revenue 
(1000 b/d) (1000 b/d) (1000 b/d) (mn,$) 
1951-54 33 9 24 — 
1955-73 2226 1,032 105 16,270 
1974-78 5635 5,062 421 91,129 
Selected Years 
1950 664 602 19 45 
1972 5,023 4,675 219 2,291 
1974 6,022 5,532 296 17,691 
1977 5,663 4,986 511 21,019 
Source: Yeganeh, M . , 1991:79 
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T A B L E A3s Share of Oi l Revenues in Government Revenues; the First to Fifth Plan 
(billion rials, percent i n brackets) 
Plans Government Revenue Oil revenue Share of Oi l 
(%) 
"¥^Pi^Ti949-55j 21 778 (37.1) 
Second Plan (1956-62) 94.5 61 (64.5) 
Third Plan (1963-7) 232 153.2 (66.0) 
Fourth Plan (1968-72) 610 385 (63.0) 
Fifth Plan (1973-7) 8,296.5 6,628.5 (80.0) 
Source: PBO, Development Plans, various issues 
TABLE A4: The Share of Oil Revenue in Govemmnet's Foreign Exchange Receipts 
(percent) 
Years 1960 1963 1966 1969 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
S h a r e 5 6 8 76 16 7 2 ™ ' " 7 5 7 6 ™ 8 1 ™ 8 9 87 8 4 8 2 "80™ 
Source: From Table 15 
1 Authors calculation. 
Appendix Two 262 
TABLE ASs Share of Oil Revenues and Taxes in Government Budget, selected Years and Plans 
(in percent) 
Year Oi l & Gas Taxes Others Total 
1962 42.7 33.5 23.6 100 
1967 49.8 38.0 12.2 100 
1972 58.9 32.9 8.1 100 
1973 66.9 28.2 4.8 100 
1974 86.4 11.3 2.3 100 
1975 78.8 17.1 4.1 100 
1976 77.4 18.6 3.9 100 
1977 73.6 21.7 4.7 100 
1978 63.4 29.0 7.6 100 
First Pain 48.1 35.2 16.7 100 
Second Plan 55.2 36.5 8.3 100 
Third Pain 77.7 18.4 3.9 100 
Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1977,1978,1979; figures for the Plans from 
Moaddel 1993:88, table 3.10 
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TAMJE A<$s GFCF and Consumption Expenditures: 1967-78 
(billion rials; percent i n brackets) 
1967/8 1972/3 1973/4 1974/5 1975/6 1977/8 
GFCF 151 287 363 564 1100 1075 
Public Sector 74 146 202 364 647 663 
Private Sector 77 141 160 200 453 412 
Ratio of Private to Public Sector (1.04) (0.97) (0.79) (0.55) (0.7) (0.62) 
Consumption Expenditure 540 898 1,227 1820 2277 2638 
Public Sector 98 253 325 581 769 799 
Private Sector 442 645 902 1239 1508 1839 
Ratio of Private to Public Sector (4.5) (2.55) (2.77) (2.1) (1.96) (2.3) 
GNP (market price) 686 1,165 1851 3,176 3,676 3,686 
Ratio of Public Expenditure to GNP (25) (34.2) (28.5) (30) (38.5) (40) 
Source: Annual Budget and Balance Sheet, 1973,1974,1977; Amuzegar 1977: 28,176 
TABLE A7 % Investment by the Private and Public Sectors in Iran; the First to Fifth Plan 
(percent) 
Public Sector (a) Private Sector (b) Ratio of (a)to(b) 
Third Plan (1963-7) 43 57 0?75 
Fourth Plan (1968-72) 54.7 45.3 1.2 
Fif th Plan (1973-8) 66.1 33.9 2 
PBO, Outline of the Third Plan 1962-67; Ehteshami 78, table 14 
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TABLE A8: Public, Private and Total Investment in Industry and Mining: the Tird to Fif th Plan 
(in billion rials, percent i n parentheses) 
T h i r d p i a n ^963.7) Fourth Plan (1968- Fifth Plan (1973-7) 
72) 
yi^c^v^maA 20 Q O . W 0 ) 1 2 5 C*T79^ 2464 Ju.3%) 
Private investment 46 (69.7%) 175 (58.3%) 310.0 (55.7%) 
TOTAL 66 (100.0%) 300 (100.0%) 556.7 (100.0%) 
Ratio of Private to Public 2.3 1.4 1.26 
Investment. 
Source: PBO, The Fif th Development Plan, 1973-1977, persian text, 1977 
TABLE A9: Real Consumption and Expenditure; 1959-77 
(billion rials, 1974 constant prices) 
Consumption Expenditure Investment Expenditure 
Year Total Private Share Gov.1 Share Total Private Share Gov.1 Share 
%* %* % % 
1959 522.5 467.8 89.5 54.7 10.5 91.1 53.8 59 37.3 41 
1961 520.3 463.6 89.1 56.7 10.9 100.6 65.5 65 35.1 35 
1963 541 478.7 88.5 62.3 11.5 109.1 64.4 59 44.7 41 
1965 584 483.8 82.8 100.2 17.2 166.3 87.6 52.7 78.7 44.3 
1967 707.7 575.9 81.4 131.8 18.6 212.3 106.8 50 105.5 50 
1969 813.9 628.4 77.2 185.5 22.8 254.8 105.4 41.4 149.4 58.6 
1971 1084 800.9 73.9 283.3 26.1 334.9 145 43.3 189.9 56.7 
1972 1210 855.6 70.6 355.3 29.4 410.6 202 49.2 208.6 50.8 
1973 1362 927.7 71.4 389.7 28.6 463.3 211.3 45.6 252 54.4 
1974 1819 1180 64.8 636 35.2 529 206.5 39 323 61 
1975 2056 1327 64.5 728.4 35.5 874.6 447.5 51.2 427.1 49.8 
1976 2409 1555 64.5 854.3 35.5 1181 522.7 44.2 658.5 55.8 
1977 2521 1684 66.8 836.9 33.2 1083 471 43.8 612.1 56.2 
Source: CBL Iran's National Account 1959-77, Tehran, 1981* 
1 government 
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TABLE AWi Sectoral Allocation of Government Development Expenditures; the Second to Fifth Plans 
(percentage) 








Social sectors1 12.5 11.7 4.6 3.8 
Total (bn rials) (75.2) (204.6) (506.8) (2555.1) 
Productive Sectors 87.5 73.4 79.2 69 
Industry 11.7 8.4 22.3 16.5 
Energy 2 4.8 15.6 18.8 24.4 
Agriculture 5 31.2 23.1 16.4 11.7 
Transport 39.8 26.3 21.7 16.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Industry 
Traditional industries3 77.3 11.7 4.6 3.8 
New industries 4 5.7 57.9 73.9 80 
Credit to private sector 7.9 25.7 6.7 15.5 
Other 9.1 4.7 14.8 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total (bn rials) (88) (17.1) (113.1) (421.1) 
Sources: CBI, Annual Reports and Balance Sheet, 1967,1972,1977; Karshenas 1990: 
1 Includes housing, education, health, urban and rural develipment and torism. 
2 Includes water. 
3 Includes textiles, food products and cement 
4 Including basic metals, chemicals and petrochemicals, paper, machinary and military industries. 
5 Includes irrigation and water. 
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TABLE A l 11 Sectoral Distribution of Credits during the First to the Fifth Plans 
(percentage) 
Sectors First Plan Second Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan 
(1949-55) (1956-62) (1963-7) (1968-72) (1973-7) 
Agriculture f l F " 21.7 21.6 17.4 9.4 
Industry and Mine 20.0 7.7 31.6 22.3 16.5 
Other Sectors 52.2 70.6 46.8 60.3 74.1 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, The Position and Problems of Agricultural Sector after the Islamic 
Revolution, 1983: 25 
TABLE A12: Contribution to National Agricultural Production Surplus by Different Farm Units 
Units million rials percent 
Traditional1 97,395 87.8 
Smal (47,182) (42.6) 
Medium (50,213) (45.2) 
Modern and Large 13,462 12.2 
Partially and Fully Integrated (10,837) (9-8) 
Corporations and Agribusiness (2,625) (2.4) 
TOTAL 100,857 100.0 
Source: Moaddel, 1993: 76, table 3.3 
1. This includes traditional rainfed, partial, and f u l l irrigation. 
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TABLE A13: Trends in GDP, The selected yeras of the Fifth Plan 
(constant prices of 1974) 
1973 1978 Average annual rate of change 
bilion rials % billion rials % % 
Agriculture 286.5 10.0 339 9.4 4.6 
Industry & Mine 387.7 13.5 684.3 19.1 15.5 
Oil 1,450.6 50.5 1,284.9 35.8 -0.7 
Services 749.6 26.0 1,281.3 35.7 15.3 
GDP 2,874.4 100.0 3,589.1 100.0 6.9 
Source: Annual Reports and Balance Sheet, CB1,1977 
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TABLE A14s Sectoral Composition of Iran's GDP (at current prices) 
(billion rials, percent i n brackets) 





1960 105.6 " ' 3 6 33.3 129.2 -3.1 301 
(35.08) (11.96) (11.06) (42.92) (-1.3) (100.00) 
1963 104.4 49.5 46.4 150.1 -5.3 345.1 
(30.25) (14.34) (13.45) (43.49) (-1.54) (100.00) 
1966 113.2 74.5 71.7 213.9 -8.7 464.6 
(24.37) (16.04) (15.43) (46.04) (-1.87) (100.00) 
1969 127.9 118.9 117.5 296.2 -17.9 642.6 
(19.9) (18.5) (18.29) (46.09) (-2.79) (100.00) 
1970 126.3 140.5 134.1 335.2 -22.6 713.5 
(17.7) (19.69) (18.79) (46.98) (-3.17) (100.00) 
1971 156.4 212.3 160.5 400.7 -27.2 902.7 
(17.33) (23.52) (17.78) (44.39) (=3.01) (100.00) 
1972 182.8 263.4 202.8 521.7 -40.5 1130.2 
(16.17) (23.31) (17.94) (46.16) (-3.58) (100.00) 
1973 219.7 586.7 282.4 645.7 -55.7 1678.8 
(13.09) (34.95) (16.82) (38.46) (-3.32) (100.00) 
1974 289.8 1433.7 385.5 1026 -108.7 3026.3 
(9.58) (47.37) (12.74) (33.9) (-3.59) (100.00) 
1975 306.2 1369.1 557.4 1352.4 -152.9 3432.2 
(8.92) (39.89) (16.24) (39.4) (-4.45) (100.00) 
1976 387.5 1671.4 848.3 1881.3 -217.9 4570.6 
(8.48) (36.57) (18.56) (41.16) (-4.77) (100.00) 
1977 459.3 1755 1005.9 2466.4 -290.5 5396.1 
(8.51) (32.52) (18.64) (45.71) (-5.38) (100.00) 
Source: Pesaran 1994: 22, table 8 
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TABLE AISs The Share of Oil revenue in Government Current Receipts and Payments; 1959-78 
(billion rials) 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
1. Current Receipts 501.6 528.1 538.7 569.8 618.8 701.4 817.3 
Oi l and Gas 335.4 358.0 391.3 437.2 470.8 555.4 607.5 
Non-oil Exports 166.2 169.2 147.4 132.6 148 146 209.8 
2. Current Payments 611.1 597.9 565.9 527.7 548.1 759.2 932.5 
3. Net Current Account(l-2) -109.5 -69.8 -27.2 42.1 70.7 -57.8 -115.2 
4. Net Capital Account 68.8 16.6 89.4 2.2 -40.1 -45.2 19.4 
5. Overall Ballance (3-4) -30 -55.4 61.4 30.3 30.6 95.4 -52.2 
6. Total Revenue (bn rials) 52.9 58.7 68.7 90.9 
Oil and Gas (23.7) (27.7) (36.4) (50.0) 
Non-oil (29.2) (31.0) (32.3) (40.9) 
7.Total Expenditure 54.9 65.8 78.9 106.1 
Current (41.5) (47.2) (52.2) (63.7) 
Capital (13.4) (18.6) (26.7) (37.1) 
8. Budget balance(6-7) -2 -7.1 -10.2 -9.9 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
1 .Current Receipts ~"940.8"'~ - - - - - - - --__„_.„.„. ._.....„.„„.„ 1690" 2734 
Oi l and Gas 715.8 875.4 958.5 1099 1268 2114 
Non-oil Exports 225 318.1 366.6 419.7 421.7 620 
2. Current Payments 1089 1387 1804 2072 2365 3015 
3. Net Current Account(l-2) -148.4 -212.3 -479.6 -553.5 -675 -281 
4. Net Capital Account 119.7 214.2 384.1 398.8 413.4 668 
5.Overall Ballance (3-4) -24.4 -3.1 -99.7 -70.9 239.3 479 
6. Total Revenue (bn rials) 96.2 110.1 129.4 150.4 173.4 258.3 
Oil and Gas (47.4) (54.0) (61.8) (76.4) (85.5) (155.3) 
Non-oil (48.8) (56.1) (67.6) (74.0) (87.9) (103.9) 
7.Total Expenditure 108.3 135.5 168.7 196.9 232.1 284.4 
Current (70.5) (82.1) (98.8) (114.4) (135.: 2) (168.4 
Capital (37.8) (53.4) (69.9) (82.8) (96.9) (116.0) 
8. Budget balance(6-7) -12.1 -25.4 -39.3 -46.5 -58.7 -32.9 
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TABLE AISs The Share of Oil revenue in Government Current Receipts and Payments; 1959-78 
(Continued...) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1. Current Receipts "3337 "'6232 20922 21971 '"24618 "25590" 22738 
Oil and Gas 2536 5073 18672 19053 20670 20904 18115 
Non-oil Exports 801 1159 2250 2918 3497 4685 4622 
2.Curreist Payments 3502 5879 12393 19025 21087 24496 21239 
3. Net Current Accounl(l-2) -165 353 8259 2946 3530 1094 1499 
4. Net Capital Account 592 925 -3254 -3939 -1155 1505 -1683 
5.0verall Ballance (3-4) 493 1151 5076 -991 2288 2014 -579 
6. Total Revenue (bn rials) 302.1 464.8 1,394.4 1,582.1 1,836.4 2,034.2 1,598.6 
Oil and Gas (178.2) (311.3) (1,205.2) (1,246.8) (1,421.5) (1,497.8) (1,013.2) 
Non-oil (123.9) (153.5) (189.2) (335.3) (414.9) (536.4) (585.4) 
7.Total Expenditure 359.1 478.0 1,076 1,456.1 1,638.9 2,146.1 1,823.9 
Current (227.3) (316.8) (727.8) (929.3) (1,047.3) (1,219.3) (1,251.7) 
Capital (131.8) (161.2) (384.7) (526.8) (591.6) (926.8) (572.2) 
8. Budget balance(6-7) -58.6 -13.2 +317.9 +126.0 +197.5 -111.9 -225.3 
Source: Pesaran 1994: 18-23, Tables 4 and 9 
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TABLE A16: Wage and Price Inflation; the First to Fifth Plan and Selected Years 
(percent) 
PLANS 1 Consumer Wholesale Wage 
& YEARS Prices Prices Prices 2 
FimPian(1949~55p"^^~ 1 9 " 4.2 
Second Plan (1956-62) 5 1.6 
Third Plan (1963-7) 1.5 0.24 3.7 
Fourth Plan (1968-72) 3.7 3.7 12 
Fifth Plan (1973-7) 15.7 13 34 
1974 15.53 17.06 31.73 
1975 9.93 5.37 50.85 
1976 16.52 13.29 35.41 
1977 25.1 14.62 33.76 
1978 10.01 9.67 14.77 
Source: Pesaran 1995: Table 3, P. 17 
1 The figures for the Plans calculated by the author. 
2 Based on the wages of unskilled construction workers. 
3. annual average rate of change for the Plans; rate of change for the selected years 
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TABLE A H ; Land Ownership after the Land Reform of 1963 
(in nectars) 




Source: Foran 1993: 318-25; Abrahamisn 1982: 429-30 
Size of 200 50-200 
holding hectars hectars 
Number 1,350 44,000 
ofowners 
10-50 5-10 2-5 
hectars hectars hectars 
150,000- 700,000 700,000 
600,000 
T A B L E A18:Major Commercial and Specialized Banks with Foreign Ownership, 1975 
(ranked according to the date of establishment) 
Commercial / Specialized Banks Date of 
Establish. 
Iranian Foreign Foreign Partner 
Russo-Iran Bank 1924 — 100 State Bank of UUR 
Bank of Tehran 1957 65 35 Paribas International, 
Paris 
Bank Etebarat Iran 1958 60 40 Credit Lyonnais, Paris 
Foreign Trade Bank of Iran 1958 60 40 Bank of America 
Irano-British Bank 1958 60 40 The Scotland & Catering 
Mercantile Bank of Iran & Holland 1959 65 35 Algemene Bank, Holland 
The Bank of Iran & the Middle East 1959 60 40 The British Bank of M.E. 
The International Bank of Iran & Japan 1959 65 35 Bank of Tokyo 
IMDBI 1959 85 15 many banks 1 
Iranian Bank 1959 65 35 Citibank, New York 
Development & Investment Bank of Iran 1973 78 22 
Bank Dariush 1974 65 35 Continental Bank of 
Chicago 
International Bank of Iran 1975 65 35 Chase Manhattan 
Irano-Arab Bank 1975 65 35 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Iran: A Survey of Business Opportunities, 1977:149 table 2 
1. seeMuller 1980: 77-8 
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T A B L E A19; Foreign Private Investment Through CAPFL the Third to Fifth Plan 
(in million rials) 
Country Secon Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan Total 
USA 455 1,609 4,962 4,997 12023 
Britain 278 230 988 662 2,124 
W. Germany 44 196 1,449 2,998 4,687 
France 127 173 512 1,493 2,305 
Japan 0 20 415 11,485 11,920 
Italy n.a 71 138 1,118 1,327 
Others 147 672 1,509 2,652 4,980 
TOTAL 1051 2,971 9,973 25,405 39400 
Source: Central Bank, Annual Reports and Balance Sheet, fot 1967,1972,1978 
TABLE A20: Local and Foreign Investment in Industrial Machinary; the Third to Fifth Plan 
(except for oil , gas, water and construction) 
(in bill ion rials, percent i n parentheses) 
Investment Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan 
(1963-7) (1968-72) (1973-7) 
Local 55.50 137.20 904.30 
Foreign 2.97 9.80 25.30 
Ratio of foreign to local investment (5) (6.7) (2.7) 
Source: CBI, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various issues from 1966 to 1978 
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T A B L E Mil Iran's Foreign Trade; 1953-1978 
(in millions of dollars1) 
Year Imports Exports Exports Balance Balance 
(without oil) (with oil) (without oil (with oil) 
1953 66.1 96.7 99.8 +30.6 +33.7 
1958 605.9 103.8 402.6 -502.1 -203.3 
1963 518.6 127.0 1,015.2 -391.6 +496.6 
1968 1,408.9 214.8 2,003.7 -1,194.1 +594.8 
1972 3,161.0 440.0 3,040.0 -2,721.0 -121.0 
1978 18,400.0 520.0 24,020.0 -17,880.0 +5,620.0 
Source: Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 104-6 table 44; Katouzian, The Political Economy of 
Modem Iran, 325 table 16.2 
1 exchange rate used: $1= 87.1 rials for 1953,76.5 rials for 1958, and 75.75 rials for 1963,1968. 
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TABLE A22s Iran's Foreign Trade as a Proportion of, GNP, 1959-1975 
(in millions of dolars, at current prices) 
GNP Foreign Trade Trade 
_ ....... 
Dependence 
Year [2]: [1] 
1959 3,703 982 0.27 
1960 4,104 1,159 0.28 
1961 4,332 1,135 0.26 
1962 4,611 1,099 0.24 
1963 4,884 1,113 0.23 
1964 5,468 1,451 0.27 
1965 6,015 1,687 0.28 
1966 6,465 1,837 0.28 
1967 7,420 2,230 0.30 
1968 8,389 2,565 0.31 
1969 9,389 2,887 0.31 
1970 10,463 3,229 0.30 
1971 13,055 4,554 0.35 
1972 16,420 5,470 0.33 
1973 24,436 9,317 0.38 
1974 41,653 25,850 0.62 
1975 46,917 31,362 0.67 
Source: Moaddel, 1993: 85 table 3.8; Central Bank of Iran; Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various issues 
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T A B L E A23s Industrial Dependence on Imports, 1979 
(in million rialspercent in parentheses) 
Industries Value of imports Value of total input Ratio of imports in unit production 
Consumer goods 125.2 287.7 (43.5) 
Intermediate goods 39.0 79.1 (49.5) 
Capital goods 39.3 29.4 (76.3) 
Others 0.42 0.57 (73.6) 
TOTAL 193.9 405.8 (47.8) 
Source: Sodagar 1991: 23, table 8.54 
1 figures are rounded 
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T A B L E A24: Leading Importers from Iran; 1959-1977 
(in million rials, percent in brackets) 
Country 1959 1963 1965 1970 1972 1974 1977 
W. Germany 124.3 109.2 180.5 347.9 327.6 1,185.0 2,747.0 
(22.8) (21.0) (21.1) (20.8) (18.0) (17.0) (19.5) 
USA 94.6 83.2 170.4 217.4 309.4 1,321.5 2.205.0 
(17.4) (16.0) (19.0) (13.0) (17.0) (20.0) (15.6) 
Japan 54.7 36.4 71.5 201.2 254.8 999.4 2,215.0 
(17.4) (16.0) (19.0) (13.0) (17-0) (20.0) (15.6) 
UK 78.2 78.0 114.7 162.7 218.4 529.5 916.5 
(14.4) (16.0) (12.8) (9.7) (12.0) (8-0) (6.5) 
France 21.2 31.2 45.1 77.5 91 242.1 634.5 
(3.9) (6.0) (5.0) (4.6) (5.0) (3.7) (4.5) 
Italy 19.5 20.8 41.4 67.9 72.8 199.4 775.5 
(3.6) (4.0) (4.6) (4.0) (4.0) (3.0) (5.5) 
Others 151.7 161.2 274.8 572.0 546 2,136.8 6,933.0 
(27.8) (30.6) (34.1 (30.0) (32.3) (49.2) 
Total 544.2 520.0 898.4 1,676.6 1,820.0 6,613.7 14,100.0 
Source: Iran Custom Administration 1964, 1973, 1978; Foran 1993:343 
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T A B L E A25: Imports of Foods; 1970-1977 
(in million dolars) 
Year Food& Beverages Vegetables & TOTAL Food Imports 
Live Animals & Tobacco Animal Oils as%ofGNP 
1970 68 1 42 111 1.04 
1971 171 3 45 219 1.68 
1972 206 4 59 269 1.64 
1973 327 5 61 393 1.61 
1974 852 13 240 1,105 2.65 
1975 1,555 26 291 1,872 3.99 
1976 1,232 77 137 1,446 2.37 
1977 1,486 130 164 1,780 2.50 
Source: Moaddel, 1990: 86 table 3.9 
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TABLE A26; Defence Budget as a Share of National Budget; 1941-1978 
(million rials, percent in bracket) 
Year National Defence Budget Share of Defence 
1942" ""11760 593 (15.7) 
1944 3,993 1,000 (25.0) 
1946 4,312 1,096 (25.4) 
1948 8,021 1,479 (18.4) 
1950 10,687 2,478 (23.1) 
1952 9,550 •— 
1954 12,456 2,544 (20.4) 
1956 23,445 5,298 (22.5) 
1958 39,660 8,378 (21.1) 
1960 52,594 16,174 (30.7) 
1962 54,667 14,448 (26.5) 
1963 55,743 14,064 (25.2) 
1965 74,725 17,163 (22.9) 
1967 134,000 33,300 (24.8) 
1969 174,100 46,800 (26.8) 
1970 204,200 58,200 (28.5) 
1971 231,000 65,000 (28.1) 
1972 302,000 92,100 (30.4) 
1973 578,100 91,000 (16.0) 
1974 785,200 135,000 (17.0) 
1975 1,903,000 373,000 (20.0) 
1976 2,310,200 476,000 (21.0) 
1977 3,153,600 567,000 (18.0) 
1978 3,530,000 561,000 (16.0) 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, various issues for 1953- 1980 
US $1 = 67 rials in 1974. 
1 Thecrease in the share od defence expenditures in the national budget is mainly because from 1973 upto 
1978, the major military cost was the purchse of military equipment which was not included in the national 
budget 
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T A B L E Alll Registered Foreign Finns by Type of Activity, 1973-77 
280 
Activity 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 TOTAL 
agriculture - - 1 - 2 3 
Mining 3 10 4 - 2 19 
Industry 3 13 19 10 19 64 
Power - - - - - -
Trade & hotels 19 44 77 60 51 251 
Construction 10 23 64 55 54 206 
Transportation & Communication 6 5 8 10 5 34 
Insurance & credit 37 61 133 71 69 371 
Social & public services 6 6 3 4 4 23 
TOTAL 972" 
Source: CAPFI Report, 1978 
T A B L E A28: Defence Expenditure 
(billion dollars). 
Year 1959 1963 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Amount 200~ 2 0 0 2 5 0 860 "l760O~ "950 " ~ ~5,50O" "^200~ "^900~ "9^ 900 
Source: The United Nation, Statistical Yearbok, Various issues for 1953-73; Graham table 8 P. 176 for 
1974-8 
Calculated based on $1= 67 rials in 1974 
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TABLE A29: Average Annual Real Rate of Growth of Major Sectors; the third to fifth Plan 
(percent at constant 1974 prices) 
Sectors Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan 
(1963-67) (1968-72) (1973-78) 
Agriculture "4 4.4 
Industry and Mine 12.7 14.8 17.4 
Construction 11.2 14.4 21.5 
Oil 11.5 15 0.9 
Services 10.3 13.5 19.2 
GDP at factor costs 9.9 13.1 8.5 
Non-oil GDP 8.5 11.2 15.3 
Source: Iran's Natioanl Accounts 1959-77, CBI1981: Table 16, Persian text 
T A B L E A30: Sources of Revenues in Development Plans; the First to Fifth Plan 
(percent) 
Source of Revenues First Plan Second Plan Third Plan 
(1949-55) (1956-62) (1963-7) 
„ _.._„ 
Loans 53.3 27.1 21.9 
Domestic (21.4) (12.9) 
External (31.9) (9) 
Others 9.6 7.9 12 
Total Revenues (billion rials) 21bnrials 94.5bn rials 232bn rials 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Sources: Amuzegar and Fekrat 1971:40-6, tables 3.3,3.4,3.5 
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TABLE A31s Sources of Revenues in Government Budget; 1973-78 
(billion rials, percent in brackets) 
Source 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Oil 178.2 311.3 1,205.3 "T,246.'8" "M09 
(30) (38) (63) (54) (47) (42) 
Taxes 236.5 153.4 290.6 485.2 414.5 698.7 
(40) (31) (15) (21) (14) (20) 
Others 166.1 263 407 578.2 1185.1 1,272.8 
(30) (31) (22) (25) (39) (38) 
TOTAL 580.8 827.7 1,902.9 2,310.2 3008.6 3,407.5 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Sources: The United Nation, Statistical Yearbook, 1978: table 201 
T A B L E A32: Manpower Supply and Demand During the Initial and Revised Fifth Pain by Major 
Occupation 
(1000) 
Personnel Fifth Plan Revised Plan Supply Deficit 
Engineer 16 36.4 20.3 16.1 
Medical staff 23 44.1 21.5 22.6 
Education staff 57 287.4 230 57.4 
Technicians 42 116.6 75 41.6 
Skilled and semi-skilled 560 810 250 560 1 
Unskilled 10 538 528 10 
Miscellaneous 13 279.5 266 13.52 
Total 750 2.112.000 **** 721.2 
Source: Iran Almanac, 1977: 384; 1974:445, 380; 1975: 381-5 
1. 290,000 manufacturing technician, 270,000 construction technician. 
2. of which 1500 should be senior administrator and personnel. 
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